Customer Reviews

1805: Austerlitz: Napoleon and the Destruction of the Third Coalition

5 star:		(2)
4 star:		(7)
3 star:		(3)
2 star:		(3)
1 star:		(0)

 

 

Robert Goetz, an international sales consultant and Napoleonic aficionado, delivers a meticulously researched account of Napoleon's stunning defeat of the Third Coalition in 1805: Austerlitz. Goetz has spent years researching the Russian army of this period and his narrative is the first that covers their perspective in detail, although the author is fair in his treatment of the French and Austrians. Compared to earlier works by Duffy and Bowden, this book by Goetz provides a higher level of detail - in fact, too much detail for any but the most die-hard Napoleonic enthusiasts. The author's main focus is to provide a very detailed analysis of the order of battle, unit strengths and casualties, but the actual battle narrative sometimes drowns under this veritable tsunami of data. 1805: Austerlitz offers an excellent reference book on the campaign and it clearly enlarges the information available on this battle, but it will appeal to a fairly limited audience.

1805: Austerlitz consists of eight chapters, three of which discuss the formation of the Third Coalition, the Ulm Campaign and the movement to Austerlitz. Goetz' chapter on the background to war is unusually good because he goes beyond the typical examination of the three main armies to discuss the forces and plans of all the coalition partners, including Sweden and Naples. Most books virtually ignore events in this war beyond Bavaria and Austria. Goetz is to be applauded for putting Austerlitz in proper strategic context. The description of the Ulm phase is good, although not much different from other accounts. Four chapters discuss the battle itself in great detail, covering the four main phases (Allied attack, French counterattack, French exploitation, Allied retreat). The author provides four very detailed appendices on Allied strength estimates, capsule biographies and order of battle.

The author joins with other historians in criticizing the Allied plan of attack for Austerlitz and later concludes that, "defeat was likely from the outset." However, I think that bashing the Allied plan is a straw man argument at best, since it does not appear that the Allies had a real battle plan. As Goetz notes, Weyrother's instructions for battle were based on guesswork and providing no specific guidance for actions on contact or how to utilize the Allied artillery superiority. Instead, the Allied columns marched off into the fog, hoping for the best. That is not a plan. Goetz does cover the battle in minute-by-minute fashion and the 20 excellent maps make it easy for the reader to follow individual actions. Goetz also provides a table on Allied artillery losses - there is a wealth of data in these pages.

The author is also to be applauded for his balance in the book; although his main interest lies with the Russian forces, Goetz acknowledges the "near flawless" French tactical performance. Goetz attributes the French victory to better leadership, better training, more combat experience - all of which added up to "superior tactical execution." On the other hand, he blames the poor Allied performance on a premature attack before all forces were available and a plan based on faulty assumptions (although the text makes clear that poor command and control was a decisive weakness). However, Goetz believes that the Russian soldiers fought as well as the French at the small unit level and that the French enjoyed no doctrinal advantages. In his assessment of the battle, Goetz seems to want to find a silver lining for the Allies by claiming that the French pursuit failed and the Allied armies were able to escape. Perhaps, but the fact that the Allies agreed to an armistice almost immediately and meekly agreed to all of Napoleon's terms indicates that their armies were unwilling or unable to carry on the war. The author's attempts to "dispel many of the myths" surrounding Austerlitz does not contain any fresh revelations. Goetz asserts that the `myth' that the Allied defeat was due to the use of outdated tactics is untrue, but it is unclear who he is refuting. He also notes that the `myth' that thousands of Russian troops drowned in the Satchan Pond is untrue, but Chandler noted as much forty years ago. This "myth busting" effort seems to be wrestling with phantoms in not disputing any specific counter-claims and sounds like a publisher's effort to attract more attention to a book for commercial purposes.

While 1805: Austerlitz is an illuminating work that delivers a wealth of data, the author's portrayal of the actual human beings involved and the drama of close combat is fairly flat. Although Goetz criticizes Tsar Alexander as `inexperienced' and General Buxhowden as `incompetent' this still does not explain the dysfunctional nature of Russian command and control on December 2, 1805. After reading Goetz' account, it should be clear to the reader that the Allied defeat rested heavily on Buxhowden's leadership failures, which crippled the Allied main effort. Buxhowden's failure to commit his plentiful reserves to either the fighting on the Goldbach or the Pratzen Heights was so incomprehensible that it cannot be chalked up to mere incompetence. Kutusov is portrayed as being in thrall to his sovereign's faulty decision-making but Bagration is shown acting aggressively without orders - clearly personalities mattered. The French commanders, with a few exceptions, are depicted as little more than ciphers. Ultimately, 1805: Austerlitz is an excellent study of this classic battle, but the author's efforts to present every last fact that he has extracted from Russian reports sometimes obscures the human drama.

The battle of Austerlitz was one of the battles that changed the course of European history for several generations. It was the climax of a brief campaign between Napoleon - the recently crowned Emperor of France - and the Third Coalition - Which was mainly Russia and Austria with some financial support from Great Britain. While the book spends the bulk of its pages on the battle itself, it does set up the battle within the context of the overall war and campaign that preceded it as well as the results of the battle.

The first few pages are dedicated to setting the stage. It discusses Napoleon's moves and the desperate maneuvering that brought about the Third Coalition. This section is very short and appears to be thrown in almost as an afterthought. Unless you already are aware of some of the players and the history, it will provide very little enlightment as some of the action are given a sentence or two with no rationale provided. So, you have to grasp the significance of any of these events on your own. As a newcomer, you will likely be scratching your head over what caused this war to even start.

The second part of the book describes the initial campaign from the declaration of war to the surrender of the Austrian army at Ulm and the movements that brought the French and Coalition armies together on 1 December 1805. This is another section that is very much a buildup to the main event. It makes for very dry reading as it seems to be page after page of recitations of the movements of one military unit after the other as they pass through various small towns in the countryside. Even with the help of the included maps, it makes for very hard slogging. It does not help that there are no anecodtes or anything to brighten up the very dull recitation of place names and dates. There is one exception to this general rule and it is the exception that proves how much better this book could have been. The specific anecdote of how the French managed to capture a key bridge intact even though it was already ringed with explosives and guarded by Austrian soldiers is both incredibly funny and poignant!

The bulk of the book is devoted to a blow by blow and almost minute by minute account of the batlle itself from the early maneuvering at 7:00 AM until the fall of darkness at about 4:00 PM. Each unit and its roles and activities is described from both sides at the Battalion level. Since there were almost 200 battalions involved, you can understand why this book is over 300 pages in length! To ease understanding of the big picture, the author divided the action into chapters that are arranged by timelines and by portion of the battlefield. So, the story starts from the early morning activities on the south end of the battlefield where the Coalition forces started their attack and moves to the center at the same time, and then the North. This is followed by a similar recitation when the action shifted to the center and then the north.

The descriptions of each facet of the battle are laid out in extreme detail with movements of generals as well as units explained with maps interspersed frequently through the text and many footnotes that explain some minute detail or provide a reference to the author's sources. In general though, I found the footnotes to be less than useful to me.

The final two chapters are very short and attempt to explain the causes of the Coalition defeat and route as well as to wrap up the story of the war which essentially concluded after this battle. The causes of the great French victory are ascribed to a much better trained army and to Napoleon's flexible planning as counter to the suspicion, distrust, and rigidity of the Coalition generals. This is probably true althought Napoleon's actions throughout the day are only glimpsed and he appears to be a disinterested observer on the day of the battle itself. The final chapter is again a very dry recitation of what took place after the battle and the various diplomatic treaties that ended the war and the shifting of the national boundaries that followed those treaties.

In summary then, I find this book to be very complete as far as recreating individual unit actions during the battle at the Battalion level and higher. However, its very dry nature and almost complete lack of any focus on the personalities and the people involved made it a very difficult read. I suppose if you need a reference for a wargame that attempts to replicate the battle then this book should grace your library shelves, but if you are interested in anything beyond the bare bones movements of units then this book is not what you need.

Well written by a first time amateur (in the best sense of the
word) historian. Lucid description of the strategic and
tactical context of the battle. Napoleon neither hustles
to glory a la Connelly, nor envisions the perfect plan a la
his buletins. Rather he's prepared to retreat, plans to turn
the Allied right, then takes advantage of the Allie's empty
center. Goetz is very concerned with precisely describing
what actually happened. It becomes clear in the text or
footnotes at many points in the narrative that Goetz has
discovered a commonly repeated misconception.

This was particularly apparent in the dramatic story of the
clash between the Russian Cavalier Guard and the French
Imperial Guard Grenadiers a Cheval. I cross referenced the
3 most accessible English texts. All 3 portray the Russian
Guard as advancing on the center trying to restore the
disasterous situation - Goetz points out the Tsar's brother
was trying desparately to leave the field by remain in
contact with the army HQ. All 3 have the Russian foot guard
racing 300 yards up hill to attack, then cavalry clashes deciding
the action - Goetz has the column's
cavalry discovering and routing isolated French battalions,
then battling the French guard cavalry to allow the foot
to escape, an ultimately successful rearguard action.
Night and day, and thoroughly convincing.

A must buy for anyone interested in the battle.

With nearly 400 pages and 20 maps this is definitely a book written specifically for afficianados of Napoleonic Wars and at times I found the level of detail slowing me down. But this book, (in 8 chapters) covers predominantly what has become known as teh battle of 3 emperors - Austerlitz where Napoleon, outnumbered, crushed the European opposition setting himself as teh supreme force in Europe.

This is almost universally regarded as the most impressive of Napoleon's many victories and so is well worth studying in detail. It also shows his impressive tactics, (which were later scornfully brushed off by Wellington, yet proved so effective against forces many times the size of his own). of the It is difficult to emphasise now just what the French victory against a larger army meant, but Goetz does do a fine job of identifying the reasons it happened

Goetz analyzes breaks the battle down hour by hour - and also includes, the planning, the vicious fight for Sokolnitz as well as those around the Pratzen Heights, Lannes and Bagration

There are 8 chapters - four are about Austerlitz. There are two which describe the build up and planning and the final two cover the rest of the campaign. There is a vital overview(for me anyway being a novice on Napoleon's battles outside the Peninsular) in the start with a description of armies, etc. I found it handy to have a secondary source beside me as a reference for some of the details.

Given that I am not an expert to any degree on Napoleonic conflict outside the Peninsular I cannot review this book for its strengths as a reference as I have little to compare it with. I did find it a good, if at times taxing read. It is detailed but I think had I a stronger interest in Austerlitz it might have flowed better.

I did feel my knowledge of teh campaign was strongly enhanced and I found this book a good read overall.

Robert Goetz has produced a new history of the War of the Third Coalition, focusing in particular on the battle of Austerlitz. Though balanced in its approach, Goetz promises to give us the Russian and Austrian side of the story. He defends his choice to give the "Allied version" of the campaign by pointing out the prior emphasis in books on Austerlitz on the "French version." This is a decision that readers who are well-versed in the campaign would probably welcome.

Goetz has given us a military history of the campaign so there are no in-depth discussions of the political and diplomatic aspects of the Third Coalition, except as is necessary to give a coherent picture of events. And as well focusing, as the title states, on Austerlitz, Goetz does not ignore events elsewhere-in Italy, in Naples, in north Germany, in Hanover, in the Tyrol. This serves to place the events of Austerlitz in their wider perspective. What Goetz gives us is a step-by-step account of one of Napoleon's greatest campaigns. Where Owen Connelly sees "blundering to glory," Goetz sees Napoleon's strategy as "characteristically dynamic and flexible."

Since 2005 is the bicentennial of both Austerlitz and Trafalgar it is natural to see these decisive battles commemorated in books. A search of WorldCat, a comprehensive bibliographic resource, shows 1805: Austerlitz is one of only four books on Austerlitz published so far in 2005, while close to fifty books have appeared on Trafalgar. Compared to the output of new and reprinted works on Waterloo, the Peninsula campaign or the 1812 campaign against Russia, any new work on the War of the Third Coalition is more than welcome. The lack of interest in events outside of these three well-trod topics is perhaps understandable, but the Austerlitz campaign has more than its share of dramatic events-the capture of Mack's army virtually entirely by maneuvering, the ruse by Murat and Lannes to take the Tabor bridge over the Danube, Napoleon's torchlight procession on the night before the battle, and the sun of Austerlitz breaking through the fog on the day of battle.

The main body of the book is divided one-third on the planning for the campaign and the events leading up to the battle of Austerlitz, and two-thirds on a detailed, hour-by-hour description of the battle itself. A brief description of the breakdown of the Peace of Amiens, with as even-handed an account as one is likely to find in such a short space (blame for the renewal of hostilities is apportioned on both sides), sets the political background. Though Goetz lays out the grievances on both sides, it was ultimately France's predominance in Europe that brought about war (of the annexation of the Ligurian Republic the Allies opined that "...the past conduct of Genoa, or any of the other States, [do not] give them any claim, either of justice or liberality" from the Allies).

Goetz also presents a succinct overview of the opposing forces. According to Goetz, while the Austrians and Russians were, on paper, seemingly formidable, they were, respectively, "disorganized and demoralized" and "overconfident and lacking in training or relevant experience." The French on the other hand had ended the wars of the Revolution with an army with an inconsistent track record, somewhat neglected by the Directory and under-strength. Napoleon, on taking power, reorganized the army, building upon an officer pool brimming with talent, and put it through intensive training in the camp at Boulogne. The French army was, Goetz states, "perhaps even the finest infantry fielded throughout the wars of 1792-1815" and "constituted a well-led and well-trained force." These were the instruments the two sides had to work with.

Napoleon crossed the Rhine in September and the Danube in October 1805. The French march into Germany, the linking up with the Bavarian army, the surrounding of the "unfortunate Mack" at Ulm and his surrender of ninety-six battalions of infantry and twenty-six squadrons of cavalry (many without firing a shot) are all dealt with expeditiously. Gen. Mack had argued, erroneously as it turned out, that it would take the Russians 64 days to affect a junction with the Austrians while it would take the French 69 days to arrive at the war zone. The Austrian command assured the emperor that "everything has been calculated so that Napoleon... cannot appear before we have been joined by our allies..." But Napoleon operated with a different clock than the Allies. Following Mack's defeat, Napoleon pursued the retreating Allies, hoping to bring them to a decisive battle. As they fell back, the Allies were able to unite their scattered forces. Prussia, though still stalling and indecisive, was now part of the anti-French coalition. The Allies were now, they believed, in a position to turn the tables on Napoleon and destroy him. But pride goeth before the fall.

When it comes to the battle of Austerlitz itself the balance between the French side and the Allied side of the story comes back onto an even scale as Goetz lets participants from both sides get their say and the Allies are largely reacting to the moves of the French. The Allies, like Cavafy's Trojans, turn out to be prone to disaster again and again despite all their misguided hopes. The Allied plan was predicated on the dubious proposition that Napoleon would either do nothing in response to the Allied advance or flee in terror. Instead the found Napoleon at the top of his game. By noon the "Battle of the Three Emperors" was all but lost by the Allies. By three o'clock the Allies were fleeing the battlefield, the Allies' "high hopes of the morning had been entirely replaced by demoralization." The winter's early sunset and the fatigue of the French troops was all that saved many of the survivors of the battle.

The book presents a level of detail that may overwhelm the casual reader but will be welcomed by Napoleonic hobbyists. Written in a straight-forward, documentary fashion, the volume lacks the blood and guts- the smell of gunpowder and horse-sweat -that a writer using a more 'novelistic' approach would have given the subject. This too might make the book a difficult read for those not intimately interested in the period. This extremely detailed account of the battle takes advantage of not only the older accounts and documents-French, German and Russian, but also the work of more recent writers. Goetz does an excellent job of coordinating, melding, comparing and contrasting the diverse and sometimes contradictory reports of the battle.

The appendices include orders of battle (OOBs), army strengths and capsule biographies of the main participants. The book includes forty illustrations, including portraits of many of the leading personalities mentioned in the text, as well as photographs of the battlefield as it appears today. Finally the volume includes twenty excellent maps produced by Max Sewell. The index is not analytical and lists chiefly references in the text to the main participants of the campaign.

The title of this review refers to the poem "Trojans" by C.P. Cavafy

I found Mr. Goetz's text to be a rather laborious read, which I can live with if the information is engaging. However, I was disappointed that Mr Goetz, a self-professed student of the Russian army for 7 years, understands so little about Napoleon's Grande Armee. He should have done a lot more studying and understanding of the French prior to publication, OR, should have either asked for help or had available for him at the publisher an editor that knew something about the subject matter. As a result, Goetz makes numerous mistakes. What really jumps out is how Mr Goetz tries to equate the organization of the Allied armies to that of the French corps d'armee system; that is a claim that no properly-trained Napoleonic author would ever try and make. As a result, Goetz goes on to make numerous mistakes in detailing the organization of the French forces along the coast, and how they were organized, and how they were supposed to function. This absence of expertise with the French culminates towards the end of the book when Goetz contradicts himself. In trying to explain Napoleon's victory, Goetz, at the beginning of one paragraph makes a claim as to what was the most important aspect of French arms, then changes his mind and states the opposite at the end of the same paragraph. All this results in an embarrassing sequence of misinformation about Napoleon's forces that might have been corrected had an editor with knowledge about the subject matter been on this project (but then, this is not the only book from this publisher that recently suffers from the absenxce of an editor).

In conclusion, Mr Goetz's grasp of the French Grande Armee is not very strong, which is regrettable, given what army so impressively won at Austerlitz.

This is a very thorough and detailed account of perhaps Napoleon's greatest victory (and certainly the one he was most proud of). The author briefly writes of how the battle came about by the failure of the treaty of Aimens and the formation of the third coalition against France. The author covers the the pre battle tactical and polictical maneuvering and the major personalities involved, with both sides attempting to put their forces into position to ultimately acheive decisive victory. However, it was Napoleon that was able read his Russian & Austrian opponents rashness and enticed them to draw off the bulk of their forces to attack his right flank and leaving the dominant Pratzen heights vulnerable to attack by the French.

The battle itself is well covered off with the author detailing the movement of forces and blow by blow account of the battle. In fact the detail is such that it sometimes hard to take all in, but thankfully the author had the foresight to use maps to show the movement of forces at various places & times of battle so the reader can better visualise his narrative. Goetz also makes use of some first hand accounts that give weight to his own explaination of battle.

The author suggests that was perhaps the French tactical prowess in the field (after months of training at Camp Bologne in anticipation of the invasion of Britain)that gave the French the edge. 'This was demonstrated repeatly by the effectiveness of their musketry, their cool maneuvering under fire, effective coordination of combined arms operations and larger larger scale maneuvers, and a superb discipline produced by high morale and complete confidence in their commanders'. The French command & control system also had flexibilty enabling commanders to adapt & maneuver their forces to changing situations to acheive ultimate mission objectives (that is very similar to the German Army in the WWII in its Blitzkreig). The Russian and Austrian forces typically seemed to be locked and awaiting orders from above losing valuable time & few officers used their initiative. Having said that the Russian & Austrian forces fought hard and bravely and at times were able to throw the French back. In the end it was Napoleon's careful planning, use of detailed information about the enemy and the ability to acheive numerical superiority at a given point that led to his decisive victory.

As a number of other reviewers have stated, this is a very complete and thorough examination of the Austerlitz campaign and battle, giving more focus to the the Russian Army than some previous studies, but this is definitely warranted. However, my primary complaint is the exceedingly dry and tedious writing style of the author. I will not present myself as an expert on the Napoleonic Wars, but I have read well over 100 books on the subject, and this book is a struggle to complete each page. There is very little sense of the tremendously varied interesting, compelling, and dynamic leaders of this age. These were some real characters, men of flesh and blood, and more than a few wrinkles, but compelling figures then, and now, but one fails to comprehend that in this book. Good history is not a mere recitation of facts; it should make at least some attempt to transport you back in time. I believe this book fails on that level.

This is a book about how the Allies lost at Austerlitz, not about how Napoleon and the French won. Mr. Goetz does state in his intro that this will be construed as the "Allied version" of events and he wasn't kidding. We get blunder after blunder and the incompetency of command of the Allies in great detail, and the Allied details are great if you're into that sort of thing, but the French accounts are sparse. I wanted to learn how a great battle was won, not lost. I will be buying a different book on Austerlitz to get the taste of defeat which comes with this one out of my mouth.

I found Robert Goetz's 1805: Austerlitz to be a well written and well balanced account of Napoleon's finest victory. This book is definitely about the battle as the campaign only takes up the first 120 pages of the 354 pages. Rest of the book is made up of battle narrative, order of battle and appendixes.

I found the detail of the battle to be well presented and clearly written. Thus it poses no problem for me reading it although I do admit that I am well versed in Napoleonic history. The maps proves to be very useful and author gives out the causes and effects of the battle movements very nicely. The Allied forces put up a far greater struggled then previously noted in other books and not all of Napoleon's plans fell into place. The presentation of the campaign and the main battle seem to be well balanced. Allied's perception as well as the French were well written. One of author's premises was to point out that only a few years ago, the Austrian and Russian military forces were on par with the French. But at Austerlitz, superior French training, battle skills and command structure far surpassed their enemies who seem to be standing still in the world of military progress.

If there was a weakness in this book and I believed it have been mentioned already by a previous reviewer, there seem to be a lack of human characteristics involved in this book. We really don't know the commanders who fought this battle and how they truely affected its outcome.

Otherwise, this book come highly recommended for anyone interested in this Napleonic battle which highlights one of the finest hours of Napoleon and his Grande Armee.