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1812

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I was surprised that even generation after the end of Cold War books like this one are still published and claim a shelf space in history section - I felt it rather belongs to Black PR section, which nowadays is a politically correct term for propaganda. In my opinion the purpose of the book is NOT to describe and analyse the historical events objectively but to communicate a very specific picture to people with low-to-none reading background on Napoleonic wars.

Zamoysky consistently highlights the suffering of Grande armee soldiers which is described in a novel like approach, telling the story from one side, naturally making the reader to be sympathetic to Grande armee soldiers and very unsympathetic to ruthless Russians and "barbaric" Cossacks.

He dwells into the details of the suffering - highlighting the horrors of wars in a very selective approach - that is devoting numerous paragraphs to war crimes conducted by Russian partisans / peasants / Cossacks using words like "sadistic", "horrific", "barbaric" "uncivilized" while being very brief (usually one sentence) and dry when talking about the same conduct by the French.

Somehow Zamoysky "forgets" to dwell into the details of war crimes conducted by Grande armee soldiers. Zamoysky does not mention that whenever an invading army faces civil opposition - it creates a vicious cycle of violence from both sides, which is true for any nation, any army, any war, any time.

However, when the invading army does not terrorize local population usually there is no civil resistance. When Allied armies invaded France in 1814, apart from isolated cases, there was no raping, murdering and torturing of French population by Russian, German, Swedish and Austrian troops. Neither there was a material French civil resistance against the allies.

Zamoysky mentions numerous times how Russian authorities failed to care for the captured French devoting numerous paragraphs to this. For some reason he does not mention the tremendous logistical challenges faced by Russian home front and Russian army which:
- struggled badly under the economic burden of the biggest war in history
- struggled to get enough supplies for their own soldiers and sick.
- operated in twice devastated (by the invasion and the retreat) desert like area
- operated in the extreme weather conditions which was very untypical for Napoleonic wars operations as forage could not be harvested off the land and technology of that time did not allow to transport enough forage in carts. That is by the time forage is delivered the horse of the supply column would eat their own cargo.

The combined effect of the above factors diminished the Russian army from ~95,000 at Maolyaroslavetz to ~27,500 by the end of 1812 Campaign. Surprisingly, Zamoysky decided not to tie these facts together when spending a great deal of detail about the fate of the French POW. Also Zamoysky decided to ignore the fact that once escorted outside the devastated combat zone, French POW were lived reasonably well there. Certainly better than in British captivity at Lisbon and Chatham where majority of French POW died in intolerable conditions (Rothernberg).

Zamoysky bias is probably is most obvious when it comes to facts. He is very willing to takes the highest possible estimates of casually figures for Russians and always the lowest possible estimates for the French combat losses and of course the highest for non-combat losses creating an atmosphere that Russian army had nothing to do with Napoleon's defeat.
Zamoysky juggles some historical facts to make a specific impression - like he suggests that "most likely" that Russian army at Borodino was 156,000 opposed by only 120,000 which also could be "slightly exaggerated"(!) creating a sensational impression of "French were outnumbered".

Somehow the author decided not to dwell into further discussion that there is a common agreement amongst historians that Russian regular army was OUTNUMBERED by the French. The controversy is only in Russian militia units whose administration as opposed to regular army, was largely sporadic and unreliable. Either way this troops were completely useless in filed battle and no wonder Kutuzov did not used them. The performed non-combat duties only (guarding a train and carrying for wounded).

Only 80% of them were not even armed with firearms, hardly had ANY military concept of formation, lacked cohesion and it would be a pointless suicide to throw them against Europe's best army and no wonder Kutuzov did not even use them. For that reason they were not regarded as a real combat force and even those militia included in official Russian army roster was a mere trick with numbers.
Finally, if Zamosky feels that these poor fellows are comparable to French Old Guard for the purpose of numbers juggling, then he should consider thousands of French non-combatants present at Borodino who performed exactly the same duties as Russian militia and consisted of: soldiers guarding army and imperial trains, train drivers, artillery train , ammunition train, medical units, a usual big gang of adventure seekers always surrounding cantinieres and Grande armee, zgandarms (not Guard), numerous servants of officers / generals, various army / imperial commissariats with their own armed guards and officers.

These men were NOT part of the line units rosters and were never mentioned by Zamosky. On the other hand he is more than happy to include Russian militia whose big part WAS included in Russian army roster despite having not much military value and with another big part precisely unknown to this day really existed only on paper as they were spread through all rear units and duties. But Zamosky somehow decided to skip this information, which would give a completely opposite impression on his "156,000 Russians hopelessly outnumbering the French". Furthermore French none-combatants in fact unlike Russian militia WERE mostly armed with firearms.

It is interesting to see how Zamoysky deals with Borodino casualties. He states that Kutuzov "could only muster only 45,000 after the battle" - leaving the creating an impression that Russian losses were above 100,000 (156,000-45,000). He "forgets" that, apart from causalities there are other factors that affect army combat readiness to a far greater extent. The most common ones are combat chain failure and short-term combat fatigue. But yet Zamosky "forgets" to mention these factors and forgets to apply the same logic of "could muster" factor to the French army. Zamosky simply doesn't get into in-depth analysis whenever the analysis does not support his picture of "defeated Russian army".

Cavalry engagement of Mir brilliantly executed by Platov resulting in the annihilation of two Polish cavalry regiments and one day delay of three Grande Arme coprs which gave Bagration time to avoid encirclement and destruction is described by Zamoysky in a few words: "did make contact at Mir, they were given drubbing by Platov's Cossacks."
Then he goes blaming Jerome and Napoleon but "forgetting" to say a word about Bagration whose retreat was a role model. Although a few pages back Zamosky empathized the strategic goal of Grande Armee:
Page 158. ...catching Bagration became a priority".
Page 166 ....he [Bagration] was in a trap, with Jerome's three army Coprs behind him and Davout in front" Bagration's brilliant performance does not deserve even one sentence.

Battle of Ostrovno example (page 177-178): [17,000 Russians vs 26,000 French] - Zamosky starts with "12,000 Russians were left to delay the French advance". The battle is descried on about one page with comments like: "French executed a brilliant charge" "captured Russian battery" "Russians were pushed back once more" "spectacular charge led by Murat" "the Russians were defeated" - French tactical achievements are all over the page with a few mentions of Russians performance "mounted a counterattack sowing confusion in the French ranks" "determined resistance". He concluded by "Russians retreated in a good order" but forgot to mention that French in fact failed to achieve their goal of routing outnumbered 2 to 3 Russian corps and winning time to cut of Russian army and in fact Russian corps did achieve its goal and retreated in a good order while suffering the same losses.

Battle of Ostrovno is not a problem for Zamosky to refer to Battle of Saltanokvka as "Davout... although greatly outnumbered, had beaten Russians back..." [p 180]. Davout had about 14,000 troops while Bagration had about 15,000. 14 vs 15 - this is what the author calls "greatly outnumbered".

Interesting to see how Zamosky mentioned the Battle of Klyastitsy [p194] using two words: "inconclusive engagement". This "Inconclusive engagement" which effectively stopped French advance on the Russian capital and as per Zamosky himself on the same page "forced Oudinot to fall back too cover Polotzk". Also he "forgets" to mentions this time again that Russians were "greatly outnumbered" 20K vs 26K and in fact suffered 2,500 less losses while destroying 25% of the French forces. Truly "inconclusive engagement".
Sometimes Zamoyky's bias gets really ironical and absurd - for example when describing the clash of Borisov Zamoysky mentioned that "fleeing Russians left behind up to 9,000 dead, wounded and POWs" (page 459) - this claim is ignoring both common sense and uncontroversial fact that the whole Russian detachment at Borisov (advance guard) numbered only around 5,000-6,000 men even ignoring previous day losses and non-combat losses.

French achievements consistently highlighted using very fancy words ["gallant performance"] while Russian military successes are either ignored completely, or described by a few meaningless words and/or very dry language ["French fell back"].
Zamoysky goes extensively in blaming weather and logistics as an excuse to Napoleon's failure, denying any credit to Kutuzov and Russian army and failing to analyse the issue in depth and identifying the primary cause butblaming the nature and the act of God and "the Russians could claim the victory":

"The French army was demoralised...This morale failure was caused not by cold but by superiority of the Russian strategy of indirect approach. (Liddel Hart B.H. Strategy The Indirect Approach. -- N.-Y., 1954)

However, well-known outcome speaks for itself: "The French army had ceased to exist.....Should the Russian army be denied all merits for this? That was gross injustice." (Clausewitz)

Nevertheless the author prefers to deny any merit to the Russian army and to blame logistics, weather and Napoleon's own mistakes. However this is it the primary cause of the outcome?

In 1812 the biggest invasion force in history invaded Russia. Outnumbering Russian army at least two to one and, with military genius in charge they failed to achieve another Jena and Auerstedt in 1812. Instead of lighting victories of previous campaigns Napoleon failed to cut off and destroy even one Russian regiment and failed to penetrate the Russian rearguard shield at the battles of Mir, Vitebsk, Krasnoe, Saltanovka and Ostrovnoe. Can logistics and weather be blamed for this or perhaps it has something to do with as per Zamoysky "inferior in every way"(page 480) Russian army?

When the advance to the Russian capital St Petersburg is halted as a result of Battle of Klyastitsy where Russians outnumbered 2 to 3, defeat the French - Can logistics and weather be blamed for this or perhaps it has something to do with "inferior in every way" Russian army?

At Borodino Napoleon finally got the battle he wanted but instead of another Austerlitz he got the bloodiest battle in human history with indecisive result, then Napoleon falls into depression while his soldiers are astonished ("...there were no songs around bivouacs that night, no enthusiastic exchange of experience and tales fo glory.......")

"The dense Russian deployment was designed to force Napoleon to fight a battle of attrition....with Napoleon present in person and his army considerably outnumbering the Russians as regards trained troops (militia or Cossack), Russian victory was in any case unlikely.... in may ways therefore the battle of Borodino was a microcosm of the 1812 Campaign as a whole, during which the Russian high Command had forced Napoleon to fight the kind of was that suited them but not him (Lieven, Russian against Napoleon. page 195) . Can logistics and weather be blamed for this or perhaps it has something to do with as per Zamoysky "inferior in every way" Russian army?

When the French troops enter one of the most reach cities in Europe but instead of enemy surrender, Peace and a magnificent reception by city mayor - something they saw many times all over Europe in Milan, Naples, Rome, Munich, Prague, Berlin, Vienna they get a pile of burned rubble - and the subsequent looting blows up the discipline - Can logistics and weather be blamed for this or perhaps it has something to do with "inferior in every way" Russian strategy of indirect approach?

When Kutuzov performs his famous Tarutino maneuver which "by accident" proved to be of dramatic consequences to the French army and French strategic situation - Can logistics and weather be blamed for this or perhaps it has something to do with "inferior in every way" Russian army?

If French soldiers trying to forage in vicinity of Moscow as they did many time in Europe but instead they find their death at the hands of partisans, Cossacks and light detachment dispatched by Kutuzov - Can logistics and weather be blamed for this or perhaps it has something to do with "inferior in every way" Russian army?

If Napoleon decided to retreat from Moscow via south where there are plenty of supplies and food but instead his path is blocked by Kutuzov at Maolyaroslavetz and Napoleon is forced to retreat back via the devastated Smolensk route - Can logistics and weather be blamed for this or perhaps it has something to do with "inferior in every way" Russian army?

While retreating if the French cannot leave the road and go into country side to search for food because they are afraid of Cossacks do they - can logistics and weather be blamed for this or perhaps it has something to do with "inferior in every way" Russian army?

If a French soldier falls behind because he needs to defecate and he hopes to catch up with his unit in a next two-three hours as he did many times in Italy, Austria, Germany but instead he is captured by the Cossacks - Can logistics and weather be blamed for this or perhaps it has something to do with "inferior in every way" Russian army?

If a French colonel loses his regimental train because Russian advance Guard maneuvered aggressively and the regimental life-supporting system (food, clothing, supplies, ammo) is lost and the regiment progressively loses combat worthiness - Can logistics and weather be blamed for this or perhaps it has something to do with "inferior in every way" Russian army?

If a French Corps Commander and loses his cavalry , and artillery because Russian hussars of the "flying detachments" kill his foraging companies - Can logistics and weather be blamed for this or perhaps it has something to do with "inferior in every way" Russian army?
Or if Napoleon cannot halt his army for more than one night at his depots, to rest, feed, reorganize and refit his exhausted army [ which also makes people prone to diseases as immune system fails] because, firstly he finds out that his depots are already captured by "inferior in every way" Russians as a result of the Battle of Polotzk, secondly Kutuzov is making a parallel march threatening to cut him off completely, who does he blame for that?

As per the book I am left with an impression that the "weather" and "bad luck" is to be blamed for all the "setbacks". Sunday Times reviewer [in Product Description] was also left with the same faulty impression and the book made him to believe that "the vast majority of the casualties occurring during the frigid winter retreat". The review repeated the most common stereotype about 1812 Campaign while in fact the vast majority of the Grande armee was lost BEFORE they reached Smolensk at the beginning of November and before [apart from a few exceptions] sub-zero temperatures kicked in.

The author blames French bad luck, Napoleon's mistakes and weather failing to reveal the primary cause for the Grnade armee failure. Any positive comments on Russian decision making or performance are totally omitted or actually shown as failures or lucky chain of events which had nothing to do with Russian calculated decision making. Even Russian soldiers are shown as zombies and their stoicism is explained by "having nothing to live for".

Not surprisingly, the author does achieve his goal - casual readers on Napoleonic wars who do not have a lot of knowledge on the subject are easily impressed with Zamoysky linguistic talent and rich but very selective firsthand sources. It is not by accident that many reviewers who gave the book 4-5 scores had comments such: "I have not read much about the subject...." or "I have been taught in school... but now, after reading Zamoysky, I know the truth"

The only thing the book is worth reading are numerous unique first-hand accounts mostly from the Grande Armee side about the retreat.
Overall a classic example how history can be manipulated depending on agenda. Probably worth reading just for the sake of it. It might be interesting as an example of how linguistic tricks can be used to abuse the truth and create impressions, e.g. ending decryptions military performance related parts of the text on a negative or positive note depending on the author's aim:

e.g. "The French were pushed back but Russians had nothing to rejoice over" as opposed to "French executed a brilliant charge and Russians were defeated"

For objective work on 1812 Campaign and Russian role in the Napoleonic Wars I can recommend :
- Russia Against Napoleon: The Battle for Europe, 1807 to 1814by Dominic Lieven
- Napoleon's Invasion of Russia by George Nafziger

Reading the above two books would easily reveal how one-sided and biased Zamoysky's book. A Good researcher consider EVERY facts relevant to a particular topic .A good researcher does not rely on only SELECTED facts, views and sources that only confirm his side of the story. A good researcher does not engage in double standards which is not only BIASED but academically dishonest.

It is a Sunday Times bestseller, so I guess you don't really need this review to be persuaded to read the book. But if you'd like to know from me, I thought it was brilliant. It's as detailed as any serious historical work should be, but written in a thriller-like quality.
And what a thrill it is. I almost wanted to just stop reading because of the horrible events described in the book. So much unimaginable hardship, so much chances of a totally different outcome, so much stupid mistakes... and so much to learn from this hefty tome.
For instance: I always learnt at school that the Russians pulled back because they thought it a very cunning plan. As a matter of fact, they just retreated because they couldn't come up with a decent strategy and were quite afraid of the invincibility of Napoleans army.
The book is very rich in detail, but also paints a much larger picture. You can already feel the resentment growing that would ultimately lead to the Russian revolution, WW1, and consequently WW2.
All in all a hell of a historical roller-coaster ride.