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1812: Napoleon Invasion Russia-Softbound

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1812 is a compilation of Austin's three earlier books on Napoleon's invasion of Russia. Austin's work is deservedly a classic, but due to its complexity is not for novices to Napoleonic history. Nor should this work be read by the faint-hearted, given some of the rather gory and explicit details of a rather savage chapter in the history of warfare. This book is not a comprehensive history of the campaign, since the main focus is on those units that marched to and then retreated from Moscow. Austin uses 100+ eyewitness accounts as the basic material to stitch together a portrait of the campaign as seen by the participants. Readers who seek discussions of grand strategy, the causes of the war or detailed orders of battle will be disappointed by this approach (they should instead turn to Chandler's and Riehn's excellent accounts), but those who want to gain a birds-eye view of the campaign will be very pleased.

Although the account starts with the invasion in June 1812 and covers the battles of Smolensk and Borodino, the most gripping part of Austin's work is the last 400 pages on the retreat from Moscow. The reader will find this account both agonizing and spellbinding, due to the appalling suffering and courage in adversity. This book is about real soldiering, when the chips are down, you are starving and the temperature is sub-zero. Although destroyed by the retreat, the bravery and ability of the soldiers of the Grande Armée shine in these pages. On the other hand, the battle accounts, such as Borodino, are good but a bit confusing and not particularly unique. Better maps with annotations where the major characters were located on the battlefield would have been very helpful.

Unfortunately, this very well researched and written book tends to fall apart a bit in the last few chapters (perhaps due to writer fatigue, after 1100 pages). Austin's account of the campaign ends once Marshal Ney leads the French rearguard across the Niemen River on 12 December. However, the retreat lasted two more weeks across a Prussia that was about to declare war on France. Austin provides no accounts of the final tally of survivors at Konigsberg. After following many of these characters for 1100 pages, Austin only informs the reader of the final fate of a few eye-witnesses, and then only in footnotes. A solid epilogue with notes on each character is missing.

These eyewitness accounts are the heart and soul of Austin's monumental work. However, certain facts should be made clear. First, they are not representative accounts; staff officers and inner-circle types make up 50% of the accounts, with only a handful of enlisted soldiers, NCOs or junior officers included. This is for the obvious reason that very few of the later made it back to publish accounts, but the staff officers had a better chance for survival. The second fact relates to the subjectivity of some accounts. There are cases of exaggeration, distortion and lies in the accounts, which Austin does his best to correct. One eyewitness for example, claims that the Grande Armée lost all its artillery in Russia which Austin corrects in a footnote (the French brought back at least 50 artillery pieces). Thus it is critical for readers to glance frequently at the footnotes to see where accounts are misleading. Nevertheless, Austin cannot eliminate the subjective factor in these accounts. One glaring case I found that goes without notice by Austin involves one of the principle accounts, by Colonel Lubin Griois, commanding the light artillery in the 3rd Cavalry Corps. Griois constantly complains about General Armand Lahoussaye, who took over the corps after the Battle of Borodino in September 1812. According to Griois, Lahoussaye is new to the corps and is an "imbecile". Austin repeats this every time he refers to Lahoussaye. Unfortunately, this does not mesh well with the facts. According to the authoritative dictionary on French generals by Georges Six, Lahoussaye had been a division commander in the corps for nine months so he was not a newcomer as Griois claims. Furthermore, Griois fails to mention that Lahoussaye had 20 years of combat experience in the cavalry, including the 1805-1807 campaigns in central Europe and 1808-1811 in Spain. Nor does Griois mention that Lahoussaye was seriously wounded at Borodino, which probably interfered with his command ability. Austin fails to mention that Lahoussaye was a baron in the Legion of Honor and that his name is inscribed on the Arc d'Triomphe. Napoleon did not allow "imbeciles" to command for 20 years and thus, Griois' account is probably a case of axe grinding against a former superior. Austin should have provided the background on Lahoussaye to provide balance.

Finally, a critical factor is how Austin uses the accounts, which are often missing crucial pieces. Based upon the pieces of the accounts he offers for example, it seems that almost nobody made it back from Russia. Colonel Chlapowski, commander of the Polish Lancers in the Guard, figures prominently in Austin's account, as do the Lancers themselves. Austin infers that almost all of the Lancers died escorting Napoleon out of Russia. Actually, in Chlapowski's full account, he states that the Lancer's went into Russia with 915 men and came out with 422. Austin uses partial accounts to suggest that the Old Guard came out with only a handful of men. While the Old Guard suffered very heavy losses, it went in with 5,286 infantrymen and came out with 1,430.

Nevertheless, 1812 is an excellent account of the Russian campaign. Reading it will certainly give one an excellent "feel" for the events, if not for all the facts. Therefore, this book should be used in conjunction with other standard campaign histories for balance.

The book is a combination of Austin's 3 previous works: The March on Moscow (out of print), Napoleon is Moscow, and The Great Retreat. Previous reviewers have correctly described these books as providing an atmospheric mood of the unfolding catastrophic events. The descriptions are mainly from army officers observing the campaign and Napoleon. The book is better at providing insights into human nature and reactions to chaos than as an detailed analysis of battlefield strategy.

This should not be the first book one reads on Napoleon. The style assumes a knowledge of generals and familiarity with military vocabulary that I lacked when I started it. A reading of Elting's introduction to his Military Atlas of Napoleon would be helpful to neophytes before starting Austin's book to prevent bewilderment over terms such as voltigeur, hussar, cuiassier, etc.

Nonetheless, the images of these first hand accounts are haunting.

The author did a wonderful job of stringing together a diverse canvas of first person accounts into a coherent narrative. A must read if you are interested in what "actually" happened in 1812. You'll not find strategic analysis or detailed orders of battle info here. But if you want a unique and first rate narrative on the subject, this is it.

This is a superb collection of eyewitness accounts of Napoleon's infamous campaign of 1812. All life - and death - is here. It is a testament to the hardships that human beings can endure and to the courage and tenacity of the human spirit. And is is an excellent piece of scholarship by the author - it must have taken ages to piece this impressive mosaic of views and opinions together.

I have read the trilogy twice and have started for the third time - there is always something new to discover with every reading. This book is so compelling it reads like a novel. You can feel those bleak, scouring winds and hear the crisp frozen snow crack beneath your feet.

You will discover old favourites like Coignet and Bourgogne as well as a host of characters larger than life who did, nonetheless live and experience the traumas described in this book. As Napoleon waited fatally in Moscow, hoping that the Tsar would sue for peace, the Russian Army surrounding him grew ever stronger. The English General Wilson (who would later be sent to jail in France by Louis XVIII for defending ex-soldiers of the Emperor) describes how the Guard ploughed through the massive Russian Army like a battleship through a fishing fleet at Krasny. But this trilogy, you will not be disappointed!

John Tarttelin MA, FINS