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34 of 48 people found the following review helpful:
3.0 out of 5 stars
Two wrong do not make a right!, June 9, 2002
This review is from: 1815: The Waterloo Campaign—The German Victory (Hardcover)
Peter Hofschroer's 'slant' is that Waterloo was a German victory more than a British one and he provides some detailed research to back up his argument. We could, of course, point out that there was no actual German state (as we know it now) at the time of Waterloo but let's not become bogged down in that particular detail. The facts of Waterloo are simple. Wellington chose the ground on which to do battle and in doing so he showed the brilliance which had seen him so regularly defeat French armies since 1809. The backbone of his army was British, backed up superbly by 'German' units (most notably the awesome King's Legion) and not so superbly by dithering Belgian units and deserting Dutch ones. For over five and a half hours Wellington's splendidly deployed army repulsed Napoleon's forces and though it was a damn near run thing they held on (and even distinguished themselves as the first army to stop the legendary Imerial Guard in the process) until the heroic Blucher arrived in the nick of time to deliver the hammer blow. Peter Hofschroer provides no facts that any serious Napoleonic reader didn't already know but the premise of his book is, I sincerely believe, flawed insomuch as it was not an entirely German victory just as much as it was not an entirely British victory either. It was an allied effort that went according to plan... Wellington held Napoleon off and Blucher arrived as promised. To somehow say that the army that fought for those crucial five and a half hours was not a British one is silly. They were under the command of Wellington and were designated a British army. Over the previous decade and a half Napoleon had often used thousands upon thousands of foreign mercenaries to bolster his ranks and no-one ever says that it wasn't a French army!!! To argue, as some reviewers here have done that the Prussians would have defeated Napoleon on their own is just not on. Two days before Waterloo Blucher's army came desperately close to being completely wiped out by Napoleon at Ligny and that tells its own story. On the subject of some of the reviewers of this book on this site, I have to say that their response does not at all surprise me. The book provides a wonderful oppotunity for them to indulge in a much-favoured pastime of 'Brit-bashing' and they don't miss their chance. Peter Hofschroer presents his arguments and they are accepted only too willingly by those who read what they wanted to read. Americans and Australians having a go at the British? Whatever next, Mel Gibson making historically inaccurate films having a go at us as well...oh, er, sorry he's done that three times already hasn't he! Personally speaking, I enjoyed most of the book and would recommend it to anyone who is keen to learn more about one of history's landmark military moments. Be aware though that it has a preset bias built in to it and that's the road it heads down. History, and especially some British authors, may have failed to do justice to the contribution of the German units within Wellington's army and the crucial role played by Blucher's Prussians, however, two wrongs do not make a right and swinging the pendulum wildly in the opposite direction makes Peter Hofschroer as guilty as those errant writers before him. A good read providing you don't allow yourself to be suckered.
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7 of 10 people found the following review helpful:
4.0 out of 5 stars
Required Reading; Golden Opportunity Squandered, December 11, 2008
This review is from: 1815: The Waterloo Campaign—The German Victory (Hardcover)
My review is intended to refer to both parts of Peter Hofschroer's two-decker history of the events of June-July 1815. Indeed, it is a shame in way that they were published separately, for the events (and Hofschroer's narrative of them) are a seamless unit.
Hofschroer has performed an inestimable service by making available, in magnificent detail and fluent English, the story of the Prussian side of the events of June-July 1815. That story has for far too long been glossed over, minimised, almost ignored in English-language histories. Hofschroer has removed for ever the (always slight) excuse given by lack of a good English narrative of the Prussians' deeds. Nothing can take away his achievement in doing that, no matter how flawed his books are (IMHO) by chauvinism, misrepresentation and downright silliness.
Hofschroer reveals the new Prussian army's enormous strength of organisation and morale, which enabled it to resume a decisive offensive within 36 hours of its defeat at Ligny, and the formidable tactical grasp of its commanders in the final crisis. Rather than simply falling into line with Wellington's tattered left flank, leaving the French the possibility of withdrawal, the Prussians detached the minimum forces needed to prevent a collapse there, and maintained their drive on the French right rear round Plancenoit. That ground once gained (at terrible cost, for Napoleon knew equally how vital it was) there was no escape for the French as a formed army; their dissolution in rout was the fruit of a brilliant tactical insight ruthlessly executed. But, above all, Hofschroer gives us, for the first time in English, the human voice of the Prussian combatants. We have long been accustomed to the voices of Harris and Kincaid, Marbot and Marcel; now we hear their German contemporaries.
With all this wealth of scholarship at his command, Hofschroer had the opportunity to write the first genuinely balanced history of the Waterloo-Paris campaign, recognising the vital contributions of all the Allies. For an Allied victory (not German, not British) it certainly was. Wellington's decision to stand at Waterloo was based on his agreements with Blucher and Gneisenau for Prussian intervention, and the Prussian advance was predicated on Napoleon being pinned in front by the Anglo-Dutch forces. Neither Allied army could have won, and either or both might have been annihilated, without that basic trust and cooperation. Unfortunately, Hofschroer has sunk to the occasion. He seems to be of that mind-set which believes that balance consists of equal and opposing biases; this works fine for crankshafts, less well for history. In his efforts to redress the pro-British bias of Anglophone histories, he veers to an equal extreme of pro-Prussian bias. His industry and judgement in assembling and selecting data are magnificent; his interpretations are all too often openly, sometimes farcically, partisan. It will probably be another generation before someone achieves a genuine synthesis.
It seems to me Hofschroer's problem (my categorisation, not his) stems basically from a view, widespread in Germany, of the events of 1813-15 as the spiritual birthplace of modern (i.e. Prussian-led) Germany and the precursor of national unification. This is the German equivalent of Manifest Destiny, and Germans of even mildly nationalist tendencies bristle at any perception that it is being downplayed or marginalised - as it certainly has been in Anglophone histories. This leads him not to follow through on his genuine insight that Prussia and Britain were pursuing quite different war aims in 1815. The Prussians were seeking revenge for defeat and occupation, and the opportunity to resume Frederick the Great's programme of expansion. The British, on the other hand, wanted to restore France as an orderly member of the European family of nations, powerful enough to act as a check to Austrian, Russian - or Prussian - expansionism if necessary. A similar contrast marked the aims of Russia and the western allies regarding Germany in 1945. It also leads him to downplay the shameless behaviour of the Prussians towards their Saxon allies, 20,000 of whom were sent back from the theatre of war, almost on the eve of battle, after Prussian mistreatment drove them to mutiny. Presumably Saxons don't count as Germans in the context of 'German Victory'.
The urge to magnify Prussia's glory years also leads Hofschroer into some very silly positions. He snipes persistently at the disbursement of 'British gold' which he seems to believe unfairly attracted Germans who would otherwise have fought for Prussia. One might point out that the British had retained the old-fashioned habit of paying for goods and services received, in contrast to the Prussians who had discovered the attractions of Napoleon's methods of extortion. More to the point, however, without the 'British gold' the non-Prussian German contingents in Belgium would have been another bankrupt farce like the German Corps on the Rhine (eloquently described by Hofschroer himself). Without them the Allied line on Mont St Jean would have been 30% shorter, and Napoleon would have broken through before the Prussians arrived. The silliest assertions of all, however, are those around the alleged 'race to Paris' which Hofschroer dwells on almost obsessively in the second volume. It takes a minimum of two to have a race and there is nothing in Hofschroer's account that indicates the British were competing. I for one decline to believe that the Prussian command, so perceptive in its operational planning, was foolish enough to engage in the sort of steeple-chase Hofschroer describes. A far more plausible interpretation is that the Prussians pressed forward in the hope of taking Paris on the fly, and being brought up short before the northern defences had to wait for the British, who had all the siege guns. Probably Wellington, who (Hofschroer concedes) had far better intelligence sources in Paris, knew all along that would happen, and saw no point in wearing out men and horses to no avail.
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11 of 16 people found the following review helpful:
3.0 out of 5 stars
Sections superb but others weaker, December 8, 2001
This review is from: 1815: The Waterloo Campaign—The German Victory (Hardcover)
The author does an excellant job of describing the engagements that occured and a superb job of covering Wavre and Grouchys actions later. Again, though, his main deficiency lies in the fact that he is using a 'slant' to sell the book (of a German victory). Germany did not exist as an entity back then and what the author likes to call 'Germany' contains a large portion of nations who hated and feared Prussia. The slant goes so far as to blanket out anything that might be contradictory to his 'heroes' the famous march of the Prussians starting from the unit furthest from Wellington is brushed over as is the time delay in getting there. One wonders what the authors comment would have been if Blucher had failed to arrive in time after promising his aid - something which was quite possible. My attitude to the slant is quite simple, take away the involvement of one of the sides and would you have had the victory if yes then that side was not a key player. (i.e if America had not entered the 2nd World War would we have lost? - No Russia would have eventually ground out the victory anyway taking longer and probably most of Europe , the same cannot be said for the removal of Britain or Russia from the equation ) apply the same logic to this campaign and if the British and their contingent been removed would the campaign been won? No - the Prussians No - the Nethterlanders and Confederation troops? No - Hence an allied victory. I fully expect Hofschroer in 30 years or so to write another book claiming Waterloo the European Civil War! ;) only kidding. History is coloured by the perceptions of the present political climate but it should never be warped. Final note due to his coverage of the Prussian angle ( as long as you note the biases when they occur ) this book and its partner do belong on a Napoleonic Historians shelf it is just a pity as without the biase these could have been the greatest books written on the campaign.
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