Customer Reviews

1815: The Waterloo Campaign—The German Victory

5 star:		(11)
4 star:		(3)
3 star:		(4)
2 star:		(2)
1 star:		(2)

 

 

Peter Hofschroer's 'slant' is that Waterloo was a German victory more than a British one and he provides some detailed research to back up his argument. We could, of course, point out that there was no actual German state (as we know it now) at the time of Waterloo but let's not become bogged down in that particular detail.

The facts of Waterloo are simple. Wellington chose the ground on which to do battle and in doing so he showed the brilliance which had seen him so regularly defeat French armies since 1809. The backbone of his army was British, backed up superbly by 'German' units (most notably the awesome King's Legion) and not so superbly by dithering Belgian units and deserting Dutch ones.

For over five and a half hours Wellington's splendidly deployed army repulsed Napoleon's forces and though it was a damn near run thing they held on (and even distinguished themselves as the first army to stop the legendary Imerial Guard in the process) until the heroic Blucher arrived in the nick of time to deliver the hammer blow.

Peter Hofschroer provides no facts that any serious Napoleonic reader didn't already know but the premise of his book is, I sincerely believe, flawed insomuch as it was not an entirely German victory just as much as it was not an entirely British victory either. It was an allied effort that went according to plan... Wellington held Napoleon off and Blucher arrived as promised.

To somehow say that the army that fought for those crucial five and a half hours was not a British one is silly. They were under the command of Wellington and were designated a British army. Over the previous decade and a half Napoleon had often used thousands upon thousands of foreign mercenaries to bolster his ranks and no-one ever says that it wasn't a French army!!!

To argue, as some reviewers here have done that the Prussians would have defeated Napoleon on their own is just not on. Two days before Waterloo Blucher's army came desperately close to being completely wiped out by Napoleon at Ligny and that tells its own story.

On the subject of some of the reviewers of this book on this site, I have to say that their response does not at all surprise me. The book provides a wonderful oppotunity for them to indulge in a much-favoured pastime of 'Brit-bashing' and they don't miss their chance. Peter Hofschroer presents his arguments and they are accepted only too willingly by those who read what they wanted to read.

Americans and Australians having a go at the British? Whatever next, Mel Gibson making historically inaccurate films having a go at us as well...oh, er, sorry he's done that three times already hasn't he!

Personally speaking, I enjoyed most of the book and would recommend it to anyone who is keen to learn more about one of history's landmark military moments. Be aware though that it has a preset bias built in to it and that's the road it heads down.

History, and especially some British authors, may have failed to do justice to the contribution of the German units within Wellington's army and the crucial role played by Blucher's Prussians, however, two wrongs do not make a right and swinging the pendulum wildly in the opposite direction makes Peter Hofschroer as guilty as those errant writers before him.

A good read providing you don't allow yourself to be suckered.

My review is intended to refer to both parts of Peter Hofschroer's two-decker history of the events of June-July 1815. Indeed, it is a shame in way that they were published separately, for the events (and Hofschroer's narrative of them) are a seamless unit.

Hofschroer has performed an inestimable service by making available, in magnificent detail and fluent English, the story of the Prussian side of the events of June-July 1815. That story has for far too long been glossed over, minimised, almost ignored in English-language histories. Hofschroer has removed for ever the (always slight) excuse given by lack of a good English narrative of the Prussians' deeds. Nothing can take away his achievement in doing that, no matter how flawed his books are (IMHO) by chauvinism, misrepresentation and downright silliness.

Hofschroer reveals the new Prussian army's enormous strength of organisation and morale, which enabled it to resume a decisive offensive within 36 hours of its defeat at Ligny, and the formidable tactical grasp of its commanders in the final crisis. Rather than simply falling into line with Wellington's tattered left flank, leaving the French the possibility of withdrawal, the Prussians detached the minimum forces needed to prevent a collapse there, and maintained their drive on the French right rear round Plancenoit. That ground once gained (at terrible cost, for Napoleon knew equally how vital it was) there was no escape for the French as a formed army; their dissolution in rout was the fruit of a brilliant tactical insight ruthlessly executed. But, above all, Hofschroer gives us, for the first time in English, the human voice of the Prussian combatants. We have long been accustomed to the voices of Harris and Kincaid, Marbot and Marcel; now we hear their German contemporaries.

With all this wealth of scholarship at his command, Hofschroer had the opportunity to write the first genuinely balanced history of the Waterloo-Paris campaign, recognising the vital contributions of all the Allies. For an Allied victory (not German, not British) it certainly was. Wellington's decision to stand at Waterloo was based on his agreements with Blucher and Gneisenau for Prussian intervention, and the Prussian advance was predicated on Napoleon being pinned in front by the Anglo-Dutch forces. Neither Allied army could have won, and either or both might have been annihilated, without that basic trust and cooperation. Unfortunately, Hofschroer has sunk to the occasion. He seems to be of that mind-set which believes that balance consists of equal and opposing biases; this works fine for crankshafts, less well for history. In his efforts to redress the pro-British bias of Anglophone histories, he veers to an equal extreme of pro-Prussian bias. His industry and judgement in assembling and selecting data are magnificent; his interpretations are all too often openly, sometimes farcically, partisan. It will probably be another generation before someone achieves a genuine synthesis.

It seems to me Hofschroer's problem (my categorisation, not his) stems basically from a view, widespread in Germany, of the events of 1813-15 as the spiritual birthplace of modern (i.e. Prussian-led) Germany and the precursor of national unification. This is the German equivalent of Manifest Destiny, and Germans of even mildly nationalist tendencies bristle at any perception that it is being downplayed or marginalised - as it certainly has been in Anglophone histories. This leads him not to follow through on his genuine insight that Prussia and Britain were pursuing quite different war aims in 1815. The Prussians were seeking revenge for defeat and occupation, and the opportunity to resume Frederick the Great's programme of expansion. The British, on the other hand, wanted to restore France as an orderly member of the European family of nations, powerful enough to act as a check to Austrian, Russian - or Prussian - expansionism if necessary. A similar contrast marked the aims of Russia and the western allies regarding Germany in 1945. It also leads him to downplay the shameless behaviour of the Prussians towards their Saxon allies, 20,000 of whom were sent back from the theatre of war, almost on the eve of battle, after Prussian mistreatment drove them to mutiny. Presumably Saxons don't count as Germans in the context of 'German Victory'.

The urge to magnify Prussia's glory years also leads Hofschroer into some very silly positions. He snipes persistently at the disbursement of 'British gold' which he seems to believe unfairly attracted Germans who would otherwise have fought for Prussia. One might point out that the British had retained the old-fashioned habit of paying for goods and services received, in contrast to the Prussians who had discovered the attractions of Napoleon's methods of extortion. More to the point, however, without the 'British gold' the non-Prussian German contingents in Belgium would have been another bankrupt farce like the German Corps on the Rhine (eloquently described by Hofschroer himself). Without them the Allied line on Mont St Jean would have been 30% shorter, and Napoleon would have broken through before the Prussians arrived. The silliest assertions of all, however, are those around the alleged 'race to Paris' which Hofschroer dwells on almost obsessively in the second volume. It takes a minimum of two to have a race and there is nothing in Hofschroer's account that indicates the British were competing. I for one decline to believe that the Prussian command, so perceptive in its operational planning, was foolish enough to engage in the sort of steeple-chase Hofschroer describes. A far more plausible interpretation is that the Prussians pressed forward in the hope of taking Paris on the fly, and being brought up short before the northern defences had to wait for the British, who had all the siege guns. Probably Wellington, who (Hofschroer concedes) had far better intelligence sources in Paris, knew all along that would happen, and saw no point in wearing out men and horses to no avail.

The author does an excellant job of describing the engagements that occured and a superb job of covering Wavre and Grouchys actions later. Again, though, his main deficiency lies in the fact that he is using a 'slant' to sell the book (of a German victory). Germany did not exist as an entity back then and what the author likes to call 'Germany' contains a large portion of nations who hated and feared Prussia. The slant goes so far as to blanket out anything that might be contradictory to his 'heroes' the famous march of the Prussians starting from the unit furthest from Wellington is brushed over as is the time delay in getting there. One wonders what the authors comment would have been if Blucher had failed to arrive in time after promising his aid - something which was quite possible.

My attitude to the slant is quite simple, take away the involvement of one of the sides and would you have had the victory if yes then that side was not a key player. (i.e if America had not entered the 2nd World War would we have lost? - No Russia would have eventually ground out the victory anyway taking longer and probably most of Europe , the same cannot be said for the removal of Britain or Russia from the equation ) apply the same logic to this campaign and if the British and their contingent been removed would the campaign been won? No - the Prussians No - the Nethterlanders and Confederation troops? No - Hence an allied victory.

I fully expect Hofschroer in 30 years or so to write another book claiming Waterloo the European Civil War! ;) only kidding. History is coloured by the perceptions of the present political climate but it should never be warped.

Final note due to his coverage of the Prussian angle ( as long as you note the biases when they occur ) this book and its partner do belong on a Napoleonic Historians shelf it is just a pity as without the biase these could have been the greatest books written on the campaign.

This book is a major contribution to the history of the Napoleonic war in 1815. It reveals a wealth of important information about the German soldiers in 1815 that I had not previously known. This is profoundly researched study, very readable, and an example of how military history should be researched and written. It firmly cement Hofschroer's reputation as a very talented writer and a fine historian. The scholarship appears thorough and careful. This study is written in an accessible style.

I consider this work one of the most eye opening books of military history. Hofschroer does not claim that the Prussians won at Waterloo, or won alone the War of 1815, but that 3/4 of the victors were German speaking folks. Thus the German and Prussian contribution to the victory was DECISIVE.

Although I love to read Siborne and Chesney, I was a little bit tired from the national fanfaronade from some other British historians. And the lack of humility and objectivity in their works is shameful. They like to criticize Napoleon and ridicule Blucher, but their own Wellington is treated like a SACRED COW. I feel the strong , national, FEEL GOOD, spirit of their books. Also they are too often too keen to blame foreigners for all their own sins.

According to my count of the sales ranks on Internet Hofschoerer's "Waterloo: the German Victory" is the No 1 bestseller (of Napoleonics). It surpased even other fine works like: Elting's "Swords around a throne"(No 2)

Bowden's "Napoleon and Austerlitz"(No3) Nafziger's "Ivasion of Russia" (No4) and Duffy's "Eagles over the Alps" (No 5)

This book covers also the sieges of French fortresses by the Prussians, and THEIR capture of Paris. The maps are fine. This book is worth bying!

Peter Hofschroer's sequel to 1815: The Waterloo Campaign - Wellington and His German Allies ... is now out there titled: 1815: The Waterloo Campaign - The German Victory The subtitle sums up Hofschroer's thesis, that the Germans, in particular the Prussians did most of the fighting, suffered the most casualties, as well as inflicting the most telling damage to the French.

Mr. Hofschroer covers all the traditional points of Waterloo, ie. Hugomont, LaHaye Sainte. He is not revisionist in the sense rewriting those engagements. Rather he presents in more detail than any other work in English that I have read (Siborne, Ropes, Fortescue, Naylor,and Chandler)about what the Prussians were up to that day. You get the whole battle with Hofschroer, but with different emphases.

Mr. Hofschroer goes into quite a bit of detail with regards to the fighting between Thielemann and Grouchy at Wavre over the period June 18-19. He also goes into quite a bit of detail of the Prussian pursuit of the defeated French back to Paris and is quite explicit in stating that it was a Prussian pursuit not an Allied pursuit. Wellington seems to have functioned in an ancillary role on the western flank, somewhat to the rear of Blucher's spearheads.

With regards to Siborne, Mr. Hofschroer gives him credit for researching and correcting the time of Wellington's receipt of the news on June 15 regarding the advance of French. In his first edition Siborne reports that the Duke received the news (from Zieten) sometime between three and four in the afternoon. Siborne later corrected this in a 3rd edition to 9 a.m. Mr. Hofschroer simply states that most British Waterloo historians ignored the correction. Wellington's disregard of the 9 a.m. message was an error in judgement on his part which he sought to mask by stating that the Prussians were tardy in getting it to him. (For what it is worth the Greenhill edition of Siborne published in 1990 is the 3rd edition.)

When you consider how much has been written about the Napoleonic Wars and particularly the Waterloo Campaign, it is admirable that somebody can come up with so much new material so long after the event. This book is well-written, well-presented, well-illustrated (particularly the maps) and has surely got to become the standard text on the campaign for many years to come.

Hofschroer has the annoying habit of bringing hard facts to light. How many British accounts point out that 75% of the Allied troops in the campaign were German? He also shows how much of the fighting and marching they did - more than Wellington's much-praised British troops. I suppose we are going to hear the sadly by now usual Oxford-accented howls of protest from certain people in the British military establishment. A shame they cannot make any meaningful or factually correct criticism.

Then comes a very interesting chapter on how Wellington went about protecting his reputation - with deliberate falsehoods and suppression of revealing material by Clausewitz. Those that see Wellington as some sort of saint are going to see what sort of politician he really was. I suppose we are going to get the sadly by now usual hysterics from certain other quarters. A shame these people cannot deal with this issue on a factual basis.

Judging by the criticisms of the first part of this work, it is probable that certain parts of the British historical establishment will come out with the same sort of unfounded and factually incorrect criticism made about volume one. It is understandable that a group of people who have made their reputations from peddling incorrect information get upset. A shame they cannot base their criticisms on the real facts of the situation.

This is a lot of book for not a lot of money. It is the best book on Waterloo written since Siborne - and he wrote nearly 200 years ago. There will probably not be a better book on the subject for another 200 years!

Too much had been said and written about Waterloo, although I never could recall any one of them ever provided a balanced perspective of both Allied and Prussian contributions to the effort. Unfortunately, most publications on this side of the Atlantic tended to focus on the British point of view, and Wellington's supposed tactical ingenuity.

Lauded as one of the most 'decisive' battles in history, a program on A&E called Waterloo a 'clandestine clash between two Titans' (obviously leaving Blucher out of the picture), while other similar presentations had nothing but Wellington. I seldom hear Prussians being mentioned in these televised programs, and if I did, usually in the last few minutes, I was lucky.

But, lo' n' behold, '1815: The Waterloo Campaign-The German Victory', a book that finally steers away from generally accepted views.

I have to admit, I find myself in agreement with a large portion of the author's argument.

Personally, I hold reservations in regards to Wellington's capabilities as a general and Waterloo's significance.

To me, Waterloo was just the final battle of a desperate old man, by then crippled with numerous physical discomfort expected of his age. It was the last battle of the Napoleonic Wars, just as Berlin was the last battle in the European theater of WWII.

Napoleon's army wasn't in tip-top shape either. After losing most of it in Russia, followed by Leipzig, his army by the time of Waterloo consisted mostly of raw recruits. Hardly the once feared Grand Armee. Really, I don't think its a miracle that Waterloo was won, but rather, it'd be a miracle if Napoleon wasn't beaten!

Nevertheless, Waterloo or not, Napoleon's days were numbered. If the British weren't involved, the Prussians, combined with Austrian and Russian armies would have overwhelmed him (again) elsewhere, and a fate worse than exile would have awaited the former French Emperor.

But, Waterloo was made possible because both Wellington and Blucher wanted to shed French blood as soon as they could.

As for Wellington, I believe the man had merits, but I doubt he was as great as many of his biographies claimed him to be. Yes, he held the line against Napoleon and the relentless assault of his army while waiting for the Prussians to arrive. Granted, Wellington pulled it off very well, but that was all he did, against a sick old-man and his beaten army (nonetheless one that would have certainly beaten Wellington had the Prussians failed to show). If Prussian support was not available, and Wellington chose to fight on, then Napoleon could have slowly grind Wellington's coalition armies into pieces without having to race against time.

Yet, Wellington was not the first man to defeat French armies on the field of battle. Others, such as Austria's Archduke Charles, had beaten Napoleon's feared Grand Armee at the height of French expansion, while General Kutuzov of Russia utilized scorched-Earth policy and bleed Napoleon dry during his ill-fated invasion of Russia. But neither of them got as much credit as Wellington. Indeed, history is biased.

Personally, I consider Nelson to be far more brilliant as a commander than Wellington, and Trafalgar to be more significant than Waterloo. Why? Consider this, if Nelson failed to stop the French navy, nothing would have prevented the Grand Armee from launching a full-scale invasion against England. If that had happened, well? Forget Waterloo, hell, forget Wellington.

Regardless of my personal views on Waterloo though, it does not mean I believe in a German victory, either.

Waterloo was simply a choice made by two (very motivated) parties with similar interests. Nothing more, and nothing less. Blucher and Wellington decided to finish Napoleon then and there, and they did just that. Neither Blucher nor Wellington could have achieved victory by themselves. They needed each other.

Wellington, judging by his biographies, craved fame and glory while Blucher essentially operated almost on personal vendetta. I would not be surprised if the only thing that went through old Blucher's mind was "death to Napoleon, death to Napoleon, kill, kill, kill...*repeat*".

Still, I purchased this book for balance's sake. One of the main reasons being my belief that the German (Prussian) voice had been silenced in most of the historical studies that had something to do with Waterloo, and this is one of the few books I know, where their voices could be heard, in lengthy, carefully studied details. Kudos to Peter Hofschrser in his attempt to challenge, and essentially help balance conventional views.

After all, Napoleon did say the following:

"Ah ! Wellington ought to light a fine candle to old Blucher.
Without him, I don't know where His Grace, as they call him,
would be; but as for me, I certainly wouldn't be here."

PS. As for previous reviewers who were concerned with Germany not being a 'state' during the Napoleonic Wars: Yes, it is true. Germany did not exist as a nation-state then, but I doubt that was what the author was referring to. While the nation-state did not exist, the historical 'Germany' did. Germany and Germans would have been a reference to the historical geographical location of 'Germany' and its people.

This is revisionist history. It is not the first book to state that the Brits did not win Waterloo, nor will it be the last. The coverage of Waterloo is fixated only on the issue of Wellington's culpability in covering his tracks. The other irritating theme is that the Germans won Waterloo by sheer numbers of Germanic people represented in the campaign. For a full understanding of the roles played by the French, the Brits, the Dutch-Belgians, you'll have to look elsewhere. So how can this book be the definitive book on Waterloo?

This was exceptionally well researched, and has tons of new information for me, an English-language reader. The facts are presented in an interesting and professional manner. The author successfully challenges the typical English point of view on 1815. Truly an eye opening book for thousands of readers.

After reading this book I better understand the role the Prussians played in this campaign, and I admire their achievements. It puts the role Wellington's troops played into proper perspective.

Surprising for me is Wellington's nasty personality. This was the dark character of this war.

Paddy

The author's only objective is putting forward the idea that it was the Germans who were responsible for the victory at Waterloo and the ultimate demise of the French.

Ok. Based on this kind of thinking it was the French who won the War of American Independence as without their timely involvement the Americans would have been forced to call it day; and it was the Americans who won World War 1 as without their participation the Allies would not have had enough men for a final push.

More respect should be given to those nations represented and the men who fought and died. Waterloo was won by the Allies, as plain and simple as that!