Customer Reviews

1815 The Waterloo Campaign: Wellington, His German Allies and the Battles of Ligny and Quatre Bras

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My review is intended to refer to both parts of Peter Hofschroer's two-decker history of the events of June-July 1815. Indeed, it is a shame in way that they were published separately, for the events (and Hofschroer's narrative of them) are a seamless unit.

Hofschroer has performed an inestimable service by making available, in magnificent detail and fluent English, the story of the Prussian side of the events of June-July 1815. That story has for far too long been glossed over, minimised, almost ignored in English-language histories. Hofschroer has removed for ever the (always slight) excuse given by lack of a good English narrative of the Prussians' deeds. Nothing can take away his achievement in doing that, no matter how flawed his books are (IMHO) by chauvinism, misrepresentation and downright silliness.

Hofschroer reveals the new Prussian army's enormous strength of organisation and morale, which enabled it to resume a decisive offensive within 36 hours of its defeat at Ligny, and the formidable tactical grasp of its commanders in the final crisis. Rather than simply falling into line with Wellington's tattered left flank, leaving the French the possibility of withdrawal, the Prussians detached the minimum forces needed to prevent a collapse there, and maintained their drive on the French right rear round Plancenoit. That ground once gained (at terrible cost, for Napoleon knew equally how vital it was) there was no escape for the French as a formed army; their dissolution in rout was the fruit of a brilliant tactical insight ruthlessly executed. But, above all, Hofschroer gives us, for the first time in English, the human voice of the Prussian combatants. We have long been accustomed to the voices of Harris and Kincaid, Marbot and Marcel; now we hear their German contemporaries.

With all this wealth of scholarship at his command, Hofschroer had the opportunity to write the first genuinely balanced history of the Waterloo-Paris campaign, recognising the vital contributions of all the Allies. For an Allied victory (not German, not British) it certainly was. Wellington's decision to stand at Waterloo was based on his agreements with Blucher and Gneisenau for Prussian intervention, and the Prussian advance was predicated on Napoleon being pinned in front by the Anglo-Dutch forces. Neither Allied army could have won, and either or both might have been annihilated, without that basic trust and cooperation. Unfortunately, Hofschroer has sunk to the occasion. He seems to be of that mind-set which believes that balance consists of equal and opposing biases; this works fine for crankshafts, less well for history. In his efforts to redress the pro-British bias of Anglophone histories, he veers to an equal extreme of pro-Prussian bias. His industry and judgement in assembling and selecting data are magnificent; his interpretations are all too often openly, sometimes farcically, partisan. It will probably be another generation before someone achieves a genuine synthesis.

It seems to me Hofschroer's problem (my categorisation, not his) stems basically from a view, widespread in Germany, of the events of 1813-15 as the spiritual birthplace of modern (i.e. Prussian-led) Germany and the precursor of national unification. This is the German equivalent of Manifest Destiny, and Germans of even mildly nationalist tendencies bristle at any perception that it is being downplayed or marginalised - as it certainly has been in Anglophone histories. This leads him not to follow through on his genuine insight that Prussia and Britain were pursuing quite different war aims in 1815. The Prussians were seeking revenge for defeat and occupation, and the opportunity to resume Frederick the Great's programme of expansion. The British, on the other hand, wanted to restore France as an orderly member of the European family of nations, powerful enough to act as a check to Austrian, Russian - or Prussian - expansionism if necessary. A similar contrast marked the aims of Russia and the western allies regarding Germany in 1945. It also leads him to downplay the shameless behaviour of the Prussians towards their Saxon allies, 20,000 of whom were sent back from the theatre of war, almost on the eve of battle, after Prussian mistreatment drove them to mutiny. Presumably Saxons don't count as Germans in the context of 'German Victory'.

The urge to magnify Prussia's glory years also leads Hofschroer into some very silly positions. He snipes persistently at the disbursement of 'British gold' which he seems to believe unfairly attracted Germans who would otherwise have fought for Prussia. One might point out that the British had retained the old-fashioned habit of paying for goods and services received, in contrast to the Prussians who had discovered the attractions of Napoleon's methods of extortion. More to the point, however, without the 'British gold' the non-Prussian German contingents in Belgium would have been another bankrupt farce like the German Corps on the Rhine (eloquently described by Hofschroer himself). Without them the Allied line on Mont St Jean would have been 30% shorter, and Napoleon would have broken through before the Prussians arrived. The silliest assertions of all, however, are those around the alleged 'race to Paris' which Hofschroer dwells on almost obsessively in the second volume. It takes a minimum of two to have a race and there is nothing in Hofschroer's account that indicates the British were competing. I for one decline to believe that the Prussian command, so perceptive in its operational planning, was foolish enough to engage in the sort of steeple-chase Hofschroer describes. A far more plausible interpretation is that the Prussians pressed forward in the hope of taking Paris on the fly, and being brought up short before the northern defences had to wait for the British, who had all the siege guns. Probably Wellington, who (Hofschroer concedes) had far better intelligence sources in Paris, knew all along that would happen, and saw no point in wearing out men and horses to no avail.

I suppose any new book on the Waterloo campaign needs an angle. For Hamilton-Williams, of course, it was the (now discredited) accusation against the Sibornes of a "crime against history". For Hofschroer it is the perceived slighting of the German (Prussian, really) contribution in the campaign by English-speaking authors, and of course various charges against the Duke of Wellington, primarily that that he intentionally misled the Prussians regarding his ability to support them at Ligny; that this contributed to their defeat there; and that he and his admirers subsequently tried to cover this deceit by doctoring the official record. I am all for correcting misconceptions, and I hardly see the Duke as "an infallible, totally virtuous near-deity", but I just didn't find these claims that compelling.

Hofschroer's strategy is basically to interpret every ambiguous piece of evidence in such a way that it supports his case against the Duke. Thus the book reads like a courtroom transcript with the case for the defense deleted. To take one example, consider Hofschroer's treatment of the allied wrangling over how the various minor German contingents would be divided between Wellington and Bluecher. The Prussians try to claim all of these troops for themselves (except the Hanoverians, who have long been part of the British army and are never at issue), but in the end they are outmaneuvered by the wily Wellington with the result that the minor Germans are split roughly 50-50. Hofschroer inflates this to a 2-1 edge for the Brits by including the Hanoverians in the final calculation, and then portrays Wellington's motive in fighting for these German troops at all as merely an effort to gain some future (postwar) advantage. Of course, any decent defense lawyer would note the disingenuousness of the arithmetic, and point out that while postwar advantage may indeed have been a secondary consideration, Wellington's primary concern was most likely simply to field a viable army. Indeed, before this was resolved he was so short of troops that he actually considered importing Portuguese. Hofschroer mentions this, and later notes in passing that Wellington's army would have been painfully small without the Germans, but he doesn't state the obvious conclusion: that the Duke actually needed these troops. Instead, this is just the first in a series of tricks and swindles perpetrated by Wellington on the simple, trusting Prussians. Perfidious Albion!

Overall the one-sidedness of the discussion and the author's wounded tone did a lot to spoil this book for me. It's a shame, too, because it does contains a lot of very useful information on the various German armies and contingents, much of which was not previously available in English. I can recommend this book as a very valuable resource on these grounds.

This book is a detailed investigation into the events leading up to the great confrontation at Waterloo; specifically the lesser known battles of Quatre Bras and Ligny. In this aspect, the book excels and gives a remarkably clear history of how it all came together.

The other aspect of this book, which dominates the last few chapters, is Mr. Hofschroer's assertation that the Duke of Wellington deceived Prince Blucher and the Prussian Command about his intentions to assist the Prussians in the defense of Ligny. Mr. Hofschroer has received much flak for this attack on the beloved Duke, a hero in British history.

As a new amateur scholar to this historical period, I think that my mind is a little less inclined to lean one way or another and this too despite my British heritage. Mr. Hofschroer lays out his evidence in convincing and painstaking detail using much German archival material that was not available or was ignored by Anglo-historians.

While he makes convincing arguments towards the Duke's deceptions, one can't help feel that the author has an axe to grind with the Anglo supporters. This is reasonable to a degree as it certainly balances the point of view from the Prussian side. At times however, I grew a little weary of his attacks. It is human nature to take sides and Hofschroer is as guilty as anyone.

However, all that aside, the evidence he presents in his book is convincing enough to raise questions, if not of the Duke's guilt than certainly of his integrity. Though I am not convinced that the Duke of Wellington deliberately left his allies hanging in the wind, there is something rotten in the state of Belgium. Even to my amateur eyes it is plain that the Duke could not make good on his promises with the actions that he took. No one really knows what his motives were, but it is plain to see, when the evidence is examined through this book, that the Duke of Wellington was not playing with all his cards on the table.

I enjoyed the book thoroughly. The evidence was laid out carefully and even the most jaded of readers has to ask themselves questions of the Duke of Wellington and his machinations.

I wished the author had provided a bit more detail and insight from the French perspective as well as from others of the Allied cause. This book is not the bible of Quatre Bras/Ligny but in expounding the point of view of the Prussian Army it excels and at the very least raises many intriguing questions as to the Duke of Wellington's motives and intentions. Did he deliberately leave the Prussians to their fate, or did he cover up his strategic mistakes and follies? Read the book, it's a remarkable story.

This book along with the second volume " The German Victory" seems to have touched a nerve ending among many readers.

The book covers the overall situation in Europe before Waterloo, the fragile coalition between the Allies, the fighting around Carleroi, Franses and of course the dual batlles of Ligny and Quatre Bras. Peter Hofschroer writes almost entirely from a Prussian perspective which is refreshing but at times a little frustrating (as I would have liked a bit more French input). He tries to convince the reader that the Waterloo Campaign was more of a German/Prussian victory than a British one based on the make up and numbers of the Allied forces that actually fought in the campaign. He also pulls no punches on the Duke of Wellington's performance in the opening rounds of the campaign and concludes from the evidence of his research that the Duke deceived his Prussian Allies into fighting at Ligny when he knew he could not offer any support.

I enjoyed reading this book which I found to be thoroughly researched and thought provoking and also made good use of maps. Peter Hofschroer has certainly come up with an interesting alternative view point which may polarize the way many people view how the Waterloo Campaign was won.

Peter Hofschroer is by no means alone in his effort to set the historical record straight about Waterloo. Alessandro Barbero, professor at Piedmont University, makes it very clear in his book "The Battle, a New History of Waterloo," that Wellington was at the brink of being trounced by Napoleon when Bluecher came to his rescue and defeated the French. The British version of this historical battle misrepresents these facts. It celebrates Wellington as the great field marshal who saved Europe, when in fact it was Bluecher's forces that put an end to Napoleon's ambitions of a French dominated continent.

My point was that the situation regarding the Hanoverians was qualitatively different than that of the other German states. Hanover had been for 100 years under British rule, and Hanoverians had served with the British army since 1803. Their fate was not at issue during the dispute over who would get the minor German contingents. In Hofschroer's own words: "Prussia clearly wished to bring the armies of the small north German states under her control, excluding Hanover of course,..." (p. 43).

I should also have mentioned that in addition to including the Hanoverians in evaluating who "won the battle" for German manpower, he *excludes* from the Prussian side of the ledger some 12,000 Hessians who were in the process of being absorbed by them (p. 55ff). By slipping in a few extras for the Brits and leaving out some for the Prussians, he creates the impression that the outcome was much "worse" for the Prussians than it actually was. You may disagree, but I call this disingenuous.

I mentioned this example to illustrate the general style of analysis in the book. Even leaving aside outright distortions (as above), events which are subject to uncertainty are invariably interpreted by Hofschroer so as to show Wellington in the worst possible light. Thus does he build his case.

And what about Ligny, anyway? The bottom line is that Wellington did give significant support to Bluecher on the 16th. The Anglo-Allies tied down over 40,000 French troops and prevented Napoleon's planned enveloping attack on the Prussian right, an attack which likely would have resulted in the destruction of the Prussian army and the loss of the entire campaign. Sure Wellington was lucky, but so what? The end result was that the Prussians outnumbered the French by at least 16,000 men at Ligny -- a fact you will have to strain to learn from this book. There, despite this strength advantage and fighting on the defensive, they lost.

Now, one might assume that Prussians would have as much inclination as anybody to want to find scapegoats and/or fine tune the official record to cover their own failures. According to Hofschroer, however, it is only the British who were ignoble enough to play this sort of game.

Well, I guess it's one solution to the problem of biased historical writing: just write biased, one-sided accounts from all sides. This book is a nice contribution toward achieving this lame sort of "balance."

This book is controversial and the people who blindly follow that Wellington is a hero who saved Europe from the Corsican ogre will be upset, offended, and write scathing reviews, like some of those above.

First, let me say that Mr. Hofschroer has done the research that some accuse him of not doing. As a personal friend of Mr. Hofschroer's and a contributor (finding him materials) towards his efforts in writing this work I have seen copies and comments of those researches for the five years prior to the publication of this book. I cannot say if previous authors looked at those materials, but they surely did not publish what was found in them. In addition, the work is not written from the English perspective, but from the very neglected Prussian perspective of the battle of Ligny. The English army is almost never mentioned and though it was engaged at Quatre-Bras at the time of this battle, that battle is NOT the focus of this book, like every other book on this campaign ever written in English.

Hofschroer begins his book with the story of the political struggle between England and the rest of its European allies for the domination of the Dutch-Belgian coast (control of the mouth of the Rhine). He explores the Saxon mutiny, another obscure, yet important event prior to Waterloo.

The bulk of the work is a detailed account of the battle of Ligny, which frequenlty describes actions on the company level. It is supported with a complete listing of sources, footnotes, maps, and some illustrations/photographs.

Unlike other works published in the last five or so years, it is a legitimate piece of research unfettered by an overindulgence in conspiracy theory, though it does demonstrate that Wellington was less than a gentleman when dealing with the Prussians. Oh, this is not an original theory produced by Mr. Hofschroer, but one that arose about 100 years ago. Hofschroer has, however, dug into mounds of British documents and records to support the contention that Wellington allowed the Prussians to take the first blow so as to soften the next French blow, which fell on the British at Waterloo.

George F. Nafziger

Let me state up front that I know Peter, via correspondance, and admire his work. This book will offend many who see the questioning of Wellington's integrity as near-heretical. However, a reader with an open mind will find a lot of new information here to spark his interest. There is much evidence to suggest Peter's work is at least partially correct in its premise, if not wholly so. The controversy and unreasoned attacks on this book (and the author) should be put aside and the thesis that the author presents should be studied on its own merits.

Much of the information presented is new to the English-speaking reader. The role of the Prussians in the "100 Days" has often been portrayed in popular histories as being an incidental (at times nearly comical) sideshow to the Wellington-Napoleon clash. This book will show that reality was very much a different matter . The political background, the dispositions of the various armies and the movement of the Anglo-Allied, Prussian and French forces up to and including 16 June 1815 are examined in detail.

Unfortunately the main feature of the book has been overshadowed by the controversy surrounding Wellington's motives

The controversy, in reality a minor part of the work, surrounds Wellington's motives in dealing with his Prussian allies. Wellington's famous disparaging remarks about the Prussian deployment at Ligny are shown to be erroneous at best (shown by a careful study of the terrain at Ligny and the dispositions noted by other members of his staff) and the reason behind his remarks are carefully examined. This alone casts doubt on Wellington's veracity, leading one to find the rest of the author's theory compelling.

Definitely a must-have for anyone interested in the "100 Days" and the serious student of the Napoleonic Wars. Be warned- you must have an open mind. Those who see Wellington as an infallible, totally virtuous near-deity will be offended.

I find some of the comments here laughable. How many books on the Waterloo Campaign have there been in which previously unpublished archive material from Britain, France and the Netherlands has been used? How many have compared the private papers of Wellington with those of Gneisenau and Constant Rebeque? How can anybody who has not done this original research talk about 'misinterpretation of the facts'? It is most unlikely that they know where these archives even are, let alone what is in them.

Incidentally, Wellington's private papers have only recently come into the public domain. Until then, the family has ensured that only family friends and relatives have had access so that what is published is favourable to the image of the first Duke that the family want to present. Lady Longford is a relative of the current duke. Any surprise that her biography presents a favourable view?

There are those, of course, who think that Wellington was a saint and an honest politician. They should try reading some of his unpublished papers to see how he manipulated the record of Waterloo in his favour.

About the funniest comment was that on the one-sided nature of the book. A book written from the German perspective concentrates on the German accounts. It would have been a bit surprising if it didn't. Does the dust jacket claim otherwise?

This book has been lauded in some circles for its use of archival material. The author has made numerous public comments extolling the virtues of using material located in archives and in Official Militay Histories of the era.

In his introduction the author states that he has made great use of the work of the historian Pflukg-Harttung and that "there are no serious grounds for accusing Harttung of national bias" as his work was written prior to World War One.

This of course couldn't be further from the truth and would, if presented at any modern confrences on the nature of "German" historiography get the author laughed out of the hall.

There is no doubt that the author has consulted arhival material and this reader has little doubt that the author has reported acuratly what he found in those archives.

Alas, that is precisely the problem with this unintentionaly funny book.

As numerous historians have pointed out in scholarly works, the Prussian and later German official histories, (as well as those of England, France, Austria and America)all suffered from being used as agit-prop in the service of nationalistic polices and a "blood and iron" glorification of the past.

In Prussia and Germany there are numerous cases of historical works on the so-called "wars of liberation" being less than truthful and in some cases being fabricated. In the case of the noted histroian Droysen, his intention to write a work critical of Scharnhorst was censored and blocked by the Prussian miltary establishment.

Secrecy laws promulgated by Moltke (the younger)served to weed out anyone and everyone who was not "correct" or who didn't advocate the "proper" views on the prussian army, the German Empire and its history.

Pflukg-Harttung wrote for many of the publications used by the German government to advocate its propogandistic and nationalistic views.

As one historian recently described official Prussian/German histories that:"amounted to a romantic-heroic history centered on an intuited understanding and vicarious experience of the past." In other words, German official historians flat-out invented what they didn't know and called it "intution" and "precise method" based on the alleged superiority of their race, nation and systems of study.

While usualy excellent when listing topography or orders of battle the official Military Histories and the people who made them are abosultely the last place anyone interested in something aproximating the truth should go.

In a nation (Germany)in which the army was a "state within a state" in which strict censorship laws were enforced, in which only those who expressed the "correct" political views were given voice and advancement, both in the military and without, unbiased history was impossible, and Pflukg-Harttung is no exception. The German General Staff, wrote, as another historian said," History not as it might have been, but as it should have been..."

Did Wellington lie to the Prussians? It is a possibility. But, no one reading a book making use of material produced in the nutcracker of nationalism and censorship that was 19th and early 20th centruy Germany will get at the truth behind the accusation.

A book that trumpets its sources without checking to see if the sources are completely valid or to what, IF ANY, extent those sources were corrupted by the context in which the were produced, is better used as a doorstop than taking up space on a bookshelf.

Self-professed businessmen should stop confusing close proximity to CEOs as an analogous means of understanding the so-called "man management skills" of generals.

As they say in the law, "evidence" from the "fruit of the poisoned tree" is invalid. Pflukg-Harttung may or may not have known what he was talking about, but an author who uses Harttung without checking to see why he was allowed to publish his work while others, like Droysen (and still countless others) were censored can't be taken seriously.

Sincerely,

Charles Talkoff

PS

Sources:Gordan Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army 1640-1945

The persistence of the Old Regime, Arno Mayer

And, esp. for details on the less than honest methods of Official Histories, Antulio J. Echevarria's heroic History and Vicarious war: nineteenth-century German Military History writin