6 of 6 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
More Than Just the Thirteen Weeks -- Everything is in Context, September 28, 2008
This work should be required reading for anyone with an interest in World War II and the roles played by Britain and the United States in the 20th century. The buildup to the focus on the summer of 1940 is probably the best brief synopsis of Allied/German politics from 1919 to 1940 available today, and even now author Moss surprises with relatively hidden facts and devastating analyses. Unfortunately the low number of positive ratings on the reviews clearly signifies that this is not a popular or widely read book. But it should be.
For example, how many Americans know that the US did not approve the Versailles Treaty but negotiated and signed a separate peace treaty with Germany in 1921? Or that England was essentially broke after World War I and heavily in debt to the US? Or that the US forgave the vast majority of the debt owed by European nations to it after World War I? Or that England could have signed a treaty with Hitler in 1940 that would have left England much in the same position it enjoyed in 1805 when Europe was under Napoleon? Or that Churchill rejected overtures to that treaty knowing full well that England's survival depended on it being rescued by the United States and that such a rescue would eliminate Great Britain as a world power and catapult the US into becoming the dominant world power? In a phrase, Great Britain had protected the US during its days of expansion by inforcing the Monroe Doctrine, and now the US would protect Great Britain from all threats to its security.
Moss makes clear the respective roles of Great Britain and the US during this period. Great Britain was the experienced, diplomatic leader while the US supplied resources, and production and later, manpower. In a sense, they were in the roles of parent and child, and the very great danger to England was that the US would demand (or take) the leadership role away from Great Britain by virtue of its position of power. Indeed, that was what happened, without, however, British personnel such as Brooke, Alexander and Montgomery, deriding, abusing, and belittling American leadership as long as they could. Even today, the "British Empire Syndrome" is alive and well with British authors, politicians and people indulgently consider Americans to be rather like fractious adolescents all too well aware of their wealth and power. It is to the author's credit, as someone born and raised in Britain, that he presents those attitutes and problems fairly and without taking sides.
The author points out the revulsion for US involvement in European wars that was felt in the US until Pearl Harbor. Most Americans felt their entry into World War I had been a mistake, brought about by British propaganda, Wilson's moralizing, and German strategic errors. Indeed, it probably was (see "Wilson's War" by Powell, "Echoes of Distant Thunder" by Ellis and "Savage Peace" by Hagedorn.) Now British propaganda was beating an anti-German drum again, and Roosevelt was forced to tread lightly and work behind the scenes. Conscription was introduced in September, 1940, but proposed in a bi-partisan manner without Roosevelt taking the lead. Bill 1776, the Lead-Lease bill, would follow early in 1941, opposed by mothers carrying placards saying, "Kill Bill 1776 Not Our Boys: (Life's Picture History of World War II, page 77). That the nation was going down the slippery slope was evident to all.
The majority of this book deals with summer of 1940 as advertised exploring the German successes, the international situation, British and American politics, and the British/American relationship. Somehow Moss does that in detail without boring the reader. That this was a pivotal time in world history is proven beyond all doubt by the author.
The only part I thought was overdone was that Britain was in danger of an invasion. Even if the RAF had lost the Battle of Britain, Hitler's Operation Sea Lion was half-hearted, and not really in his game plan. His eyes were on the East, always had been and always would be, and even the quick war against France was merely to protect his rear. As Moss pointed out, Hitler would probably have granted England generous terms to eliminate it as a belligerent. His terms for France were seen to be less draconian than expected, and there was no reason that England would have been excessively humbled.
Moss's conclusions were thought-provoking. What would have happened if Britain had entered into a treaty with Nazi Germany that summer? Is it possible that Germany would have changed over the years like the Soviet Union did during the Cold War? Could Germany ever have given up Fascism and become democratic without a war? Britain could have avoided becoming bankrupt and suffering heavy casualties, and possibly even retained its empire. But would it have been better off? Maybe that will be Moss's next book. If so, I will buy it.
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5 of 5 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
A wonderful new account, April 13, 2004
This review is from: 19 Weeks: America, Britain, and the Fateful Summer of 1940 (Hardcover)
The account of what England went through following Dunkirk, prior to the U.S or Russia entering the war is an extra ordinary story. In May 1940 Hitler invaded France and by June the British had evacuated Dunkirk, leaving behind 1000 guns but saving 300,000 soldiers to fight another day. England was alone, Churchill's "Fortress" which he vowed Hitler would have to `contend with'. All seemed lost, with more then 10 nations under the Nazis Yoke all of Europe was under Fascist rule. But these 19 weeks showed the resolve, not only in England, but also in America of the English Speaking brethren to defend the world from evil. Here we have the story of two men, FDR and Churchill, prepared to fight to the last to save the free world from the world of communist or fascist domination. This is wonderful telling of this story. From the skies over London to the radar stations in Dover to the America First party to the halls of Congress a wonderful tale of politics and diplomacy and public opinion is told. In the end it was these 19 weeks which saved the world, literally.
Seth J. Frantzman
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5 of 5 people found the following review helpful:
4.0 out of 5 stars
The Dramatic Summer of 1940, July 19, 2003
This review is from: 19 Weeks: America, Britain, and the Fateful Summer of 1940 (Hardcover)
Norman Moss's "19 Weeks" (England and America in the Fateful Summer of 1940) appears to be influenced by John Lukacs' "5 Days in London, May 1940." The pivotal drama in both books is the British decision to not deal with Hitler during of after the debacle at Dunkirk, but to stand and fight until North America entered the war on Britain's side. This decision was a self-sacrificial one on Bratain's part, because it cost them their empire and their status as a world super power. But as both Moss and Lukacs emphasize, the world is a much better place because they made the choice they did.
Moss expands the context of this decision to encompass the whole summer of 1940, from Hitler's invasion of France in May to the successful conclusion of the Battle of Britain in September. (Hence the title, "19 Weeks.") Moss also looks back in time to WW I and forward in time to Hitler's declaring war on the U.S. on December 11th 1941. This narrative filled in many features of the story left blank by Kukacs' much more compressed temporal boundaries. Moss includes the struggle between the interenationalists and the isolationists in the U.S., a struggle with culminated in the Republican selection of the internationalist Wendell Willkie to run against Roosevelt in the 1940 presidential election. Britain won over American public opinion by the shere power of its moral stand against fascism. But that battle was not really won until after Roosevelt was re-elected.
One fact which I learned from Moss was that Roosevelt's sale of Infantry arms to Britain immediately after Dunkirk included 500 French 75 artillery pieces as well as 500,000 Enfield rifles and 500 mortars and machine guns (along with lots of ammo). The rifles and machine guns were of little help to the British Army, as the American 30-06 round was completely incompatible with the British 303 round. The rifles were used mainly to arm the Home Guard and for training. But the artillery pieces and mortars were crucial for re-constituting the post-Dunkirk British Army, as the British lost all their artillery and other heavy equipment on the beaches at Dunkirk. Lukacs never mentioned anything beyond the sale of the rifles.
In one lapse of fact, Moss refers to the German attack on London in 1944 my means of "flying bombs" and "V-1 and V-2 rockets." That seems to betray ignorance of the fact that V-1's were flying bombs, not rockets. I can only hope that was a slip and the rest of the book is as factually sound as it seems to be.
Fred Hallberg
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