1967: Israel, the War, and the Year that Transformed the Middle East [Hardcover]

Tom Segev (Author), Jessica Cohen (Translator)

Book Description

Release date: May 29, 2007 | ISBN-10: 0805070575 | ISBN-13: 978-0805070576 | Edition: 1st

From Israel's leading historian, a sweeping history of 1967--the war, what led up to it, what came after, and how it changed everything

 

Tom Segev's acclaimed works One Palestine, Complete and The Seventh Million overturned accepted views of the history of Israel. Now, in 1967--a number-one bestseller in Hebrew--he brings his masterful skills to the watershed year when six days of war reshaped the country and the entire region.

Going far beyond a military account, Segev re-creates the crisis in Israel before 1967, showing how economic recession, a full grasp of the Holocaust's horrors, and the dire threats made by neighbor states combined to produce a climate of apocalypse. He depicts the country's bravado after its victory, the mood revealed in a popular joke in which one soldier says to his friend, "Let's take over Cairo"; the friend replies, "Then what shall we do in the afternoon?"

Drawing on unpublished letters and diaries, as well as government memos and military records, Segev reconstructs an era of new possibilities and tragic missteps. He introduces the legendary figures--Moshe Dayan, Golda Meir, Gamal Abdul Nasser, and Lyndon Johnson--and an epic cast of soldiers, lobbyists, refugees, and settlers. He reveals as never before Israel's intimacy with the White House as well as the political rivalries that sabotaged any chance of peace. Above all, he challenges the view that the war was inevitable, showing that a series of disastrous miscalculations lie behind the bloodshed.

A vibrant and original history, 1967 is sure to stand as the definitive account of that pivotal year.

 

Editorial Reviews

From Booklist

It is now 40 years since the Six Days' War, in which Israel routed the armies of Egypt, Syria, and Jordan and transformed the geography and political landscape of the Middle East. Segev is a columnist for Ha'aretz, Israel's leading left-of-center daily newspaper, and he clearly views the events leading to the war as well as the aftermath of the conflict with a predictable bias. Still, many of his revelations are both startling and credible. A substantial portion of the book is devoted to an analysis of Israeli society on the eve of the war. Segev portrays a nation plagued by disillusionment, communal tensions, and anxiety about national survival. The idealism that inspired the early Zionist pioneers had waned, and the Ashkenazi and Sephardic communities seemed increasingly resentful of each other. An increased awareness of the Holocaust by the younger generation combined with the extreme rhetoric of Arab leaders contributed to a sense of impending doom. Segev asserts that the outbreak of war was hardly inevitable and was precipitated by gross miscalculations by both sides. Freeman, Jay
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Review

"Today we know that Israel's triumph in 1967 was a Pyrrhic victory. Tom Segev's 1967 makes that more clear than anything written on the subject . . . Segev documents this historic tragedy brilliantly, authoritatively, as no one has before."--Amos Elon, Ha'aretz

 

"Tom Segev's 1967 offers a brilliant description of the Six Day War in its widest context: the international scene, the Middle Eastern confrontations, the political and social situation of Israel, as well as fascinating snippets of everyday life. The crucial role of individual actors is deftly woven into the general picture, the description of the military events is enthralling. This is probably the best book on those most fateful days in the history of Israel and the Middle East."--Saul Friedlander, author of The Years Of Extermination: Nazi Germany And The Jews, 1939-1945

 

"The year 1967 divides the history of Israel in two: what came before and what came after. Tom Segev's book makes this abundantly clear, and demonstrates the difference between a military victory and a political one."--Daniel Barenboim

See all Editorial Reviews

Product Details

• Hardcover: 688 pages
• Publisher: Metropolitan Books; 1st edition (May 29, 2007)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0805070575
• ISBN-13: 978-0805070576
• Product Dimensions: 9.3 x 6.5 x 1.9 inches
• Shipping Weight: 2.4 pounds
• Average Customer Review: 3.1 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (14 customer reviews)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #1,083,907 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

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Most Helpful Customer Reviews

21 of 24 people found the following review helpful

4.0 out of 5 stars Quite Good But One Sided July 30, 2007

By R. Albin TOP 500 REVIEWER

Format:Hardcover

This good book is a combined political and social history of Israel before, during, and after the Six Day War. Segev presents a detailed portrait of Israeli society and politics as being in the throes of a major transition. In 1966, Israel was in something of a funk. A major recession caused considerable distress, immigration had slowed, Israeli society was having difficulty assimilating Middle Eastern immigrants, and the Ashkenazi political elite was aging.

Against this background, Segev describes the crisis with the Arab states primarily in terms of internal Israeli politics and the difficut decision to take preemptive action. Segev does well in describing the complex political dynamics of politics leading up to the war and the decision to go to war. Segev sees internal Israeli politics as the major driver of the decision to go to war. He asserts that the war was avoidable and clearly sees the Israelis as the major decision makers. These views, however, are only assertions. Segev presents no real discussion of this contentious issue. A major problem with his assertion is that there is no discussion of the war from the Arab point of view or any documentation about Arab decision making. The issue of whether or not the war was avoidable, however, is not really the focus of the book.

Segev's recurrent theme, which runs throughout the whole book and emerges most strongly in the final sections, is the internal contradictions of the Zionist ideal. The Zionists exhibited a quasi-mystical desire to possess Palestine but also wished to establish a European style democratic state. This second goal, however, conflicted with the reality that fulfillment of the Zionist project meant the involuntary displacement of Palestinian Arabs....

The best parts of the book are the later parts dealing with aftermath of the war and the initial occupation. Segev rebuts the myth that the Israeli government offered to restore the conquests in exchange for peace. His description of the beginnings of the occupation is useful for explaining the genesis of the present disastrous situation.

As a social history and description of Israeli politics, this book is very good. In terms of the genesis of the war, Segev is unconvincing because he doesn't present any real data. I recommend reading this book in conjunction with Michael Oren's Six Days of War. Oren's book is a more conventional diplomatic and political history of the war. Unlike Segev, Oren did make an effort to examine Arab sources and his conclusion is that the state of Israel faced an 'existential' threat. Read more ›

4 of 4 people found the following review helpful

5.0 out of 5 stars Excellent! Excellent! Excellent! November 10, 2010

By E. Kelley

Format:Hardcover|Amazon Verified Purchase

I am a picky reader, so please do not take this review lightly. I have read a great deal about the Israeli-Palestine conflict, but Thomas Segev far exceeds anyone else I have read for his objective and balanced treatment of this complicated subject. His detailed descriptions of everyday Israeli life interspersed with historic/political details create an absolutely intriguing and fascinating book. Segev's careful reliance upon historical documents and newspapers as well as personal and professional correspondence gives this account of the 1967 conflict an irresistible quality.

I cannot say enough except that I cannot wait to receive my next book by Tom Segev!

4 of 4 people found the following review helpful

5.0 out of 5 stars One of the Best Books of 2007 February 19, 2008

By Sam Yahm

Format:Hardcover

Rated by the Economist Magazine as one of the best books of 2007, 1967: Israel, the War, and the Year that Transformed the Middle East provides exactly what it tries to provide, an insight into how the "Six Day War" affected Israel. I recommend this book to anyone who wants to gain a greater understanding of Israel and their view of the Middle East. This book also provides an inside look into Israeli politics now and then.

2 of 2 people found the following review helpful

4.0 out of 5 stars Leaves the reader with more questions than answers but still important July 22, 2008

By Matthew Smith

Format:Hardcover

Mr. Segev has given readers another look into Israeli society and history. What I really liked about this book is how the author tackles the topic from all facets of Israeli society. He doesn't simply chronicle the decision making process among the leaders of Israeli society, but instead attempts to chronicle the story as seen by all Israelis. In doing so the author has written a psychological history as much as anything else.

By going through letters, diaries, newspaper headlines and combing through government archives Mr. Segev attempts to give the reader an inside look at what was happening with Israeli society before, during and immediately after the Six Day War. He uses soldiers diaries to give the reader a sense of what they were fighting for and what they thought. He uses correspondence between relatives in Israel and abroad to show the mood of the Israeli people. He writes of the elitism of
Ashkenazi and the impoverishment of the Mizrahi Jews. The feeling of gloom and failure of the Zionist dream seems almost palpable. The Zionist dream seems to have stalled after hitting the harsh realities. Israel's great leaders had gone into semi-retirement (although never really far from center stage). The recession on top of all the other real problems created a depressing mood on the eve of Israel's most resounding triumph. Mr. Segev does a great job detailing all of this, and he goes deep into the elites feelings and decision making process in the lead up to the war.

But I had some serious problems with some of the history presented here. During the lead up to war Segev paints a picture of indecision and fear among the ministers. He writes about all night ministerial cessions discussing the dangers of war.... The reader gets a picture of a government besieged by their own generals demanding immediate action and enemies that surround them ready to crush Israel in a single blow. The military leaders pushing for action and insisting that every delay brings Israel that much closer to total annihilation. At the same time Israel's enemies are pushing for war. The problem I have is this is contrary to everything I have ever read on the situation, and in the book Mr. Segev gives readers hints to the false picture. He writes about a CIA man living in Israel who advises his Israeli neighbor on how to properly dig a trench in preparation for the oncoming war, but then tells the man there is no need in digging the trench since Israel will have won the war in a week anyways. He also writes about a U.S. assessment that basically gives the same time line. At one point he writes that Eshkol knew that the generals were exaggerating about the dangers they faced. Not only that but every account from Egyptian point of view I have read speaks of the fact that Nasser felt himself pushed into a war he couldn't win by the Syrians. Nasser knew he couldn't win which is why he made conciliatory offers such as allowing Israeli shipping to pass but without flying the Israeli flag.

What I don't understand is why did the U.S., Egypt and Jordan governments have intelligence assessments that had pretty good assessments of the situation but yet the Israeli government didn't. This is one problem with Segev's account. He portrays the government as indecisive and overly worried, but the military leaders are chomping at the bit to attack Egypt. I can see the near hysteria that might grip the average Israeli citizen, but why is Eshkol so worried at one moment but at the next he knows the generals are exaggerating the dangers. It makes no sense.

All in all this book is very deserving of the four stars I gave it despite some of the very real problems I had with the book. His description of the days after the Israeli victory and the euphoric feelings that swept through the Israeli nation is very good, and of the leaders almost criminal refusal to tackle the very real problems with the newly occupied territories and the people therein that has condemned future generations to constant strife is excellent . There decision to simply put off the question of how to handle these problems was negligent in the extreme.

I concur with a previous reviewer that this work has to be read in conjunction with other more comprehensive works, but this book has some strong merits of its own, and it is essential in getting a full picture of the Israeli perspective in this war. One more caveat, this was not a comprehensive work. It is written from the Israeli perspective only. This isn't a problem, but readers should be aware of this before getting into this book. Read more ›

2 of 2 people found the following review helpful

3.0 out of 5 stars a noble effort January 7, 2008

By Eric Maroney

Format:Hardcover

Segev is a journalist who writes history through the lens of journalism. So 1967 is an attempt to capture this spirit of journalistic history, as Segev quotes newspaper accounts, letters to the editors of various Israeli newspapers and periodicals, during the prelude, action and aftermath of the Six Day War. Segev uses a technique he perfected in One Palestine, Complete: taking certain set-historical characters, ordinary people and introducing them throughout the book at various stages. He also, as in his previous books, takes aim against Israeli leaders with characteristic venom: Eskol and Dayan, for instance, do not come out smelling like roses in 1967. As with nearly ever work about the Israeli-Arab-Palestinian conflict, not everyone will be satisfied with Segev's conclusion (that the taking of the West Bank, Gaza and the Golan Heights did not add to Israeli's security, but detracted from it), and here, as in other places in the book, Segev may falter a bit in his historical logic.