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5000 B.C> and Other Philosophical Fantasies
1
Why Are You Truthful?
1
Why Are You Truthful?
MORALIST: I have gathered you good people together on this occasion because I know that you are among the most truthful people on earth, and so I propose that we hold a symposium on truthfulness. I wish to learn from each of you your reasons for being truthful. Adrian, what is your reason for being truthful?
ADRIAN: My reason is quite simple. It says in the Bible that one should be truthful, and I take the Bible seriously. Since my greatest duty on earth is obedience to the will of God and God commands me to be truthful, my reason for being truthful is obvious.
MORALIST: Very good! And you, Bernard, why are you truthful?
BERNARD: I also take the Bible very seriously. The one thing in the Bible that impresses me most is the Golden Rule: Do unto others as you would have others do unto you. Since I wish others to be truthful with me, I am accordingly truthful with them.
MORALIST: Excellent! And you, Carey, what are your reasons for being truthful?
CAREY: My reasons have nothing to do with religion. I am truthful on purely ethical grounds. I desire to be virtuous, and since truthfulnessis one of the virtues and lying is one of the vices, then to be virtuous it is necessary for me to be truthful.
EPISTEMOLOGIST (who is, strangely enough, in this group though he wasn't invited): I find this reason peculiar! Carey evidently doesn't value truthfulness in its own right but only because it belongs to the more general category of virtue, and it is this more general category that he values. Indeed, his very way of putting it: "To be virtuous it is necessary for me to be truthful," his very use of the word necessary suggests that he is reluctant to be truthful but is nevertheless truthful only as a means to another end, that end being virtue itself. This is what I find so strange! Furthermore, I think--
MORALIST: Sorry to interrupt you, old man, but it was not my intention that we criticize the speakers as they go along. I prefer on this occasion to let the speakers simply state their views; we can reserve critical analysis for another time. And so, Daniel, why are you truthful?
DANIEL: My reasons are also nonreligious--or at least nontheistic. I am a great admirer of the ethics of Immanuel Kant. I realize that his ethical attitudes were, at least psychologically, tied up with his religious ones, but many people who reject Kant's theistic views nevertheless accept his moral ones. I am one such person. I am truthful out of obedience to Kant's categorical imperative, which states that one should never perform any act unless one wills that act to be universal law. Since it is obvious that if everybody lied there would be utter chaos, I clearly cannot will it to be universal law that everybody lies. The categorical imperative hence implies that I, too, should not lie.
MORALIST: Very good! And you, Edward, what are your reasons for being truthful?
EDWARD: My reasons are purely humanistic and utilitarian. It is obvious that truthfulness is beneficial to society, and since my main interest in life is to benefit society, then accordingly I am truthful.
MORALIST: Splendid! And you, Frank, why are you truthful?
FRANK: In order to live up to my name. Since my name is Frank, then it behooves me to be frank with people.
MORALIST: Stop being facetious! This is a serious symposium! What about you, George, why are you truthful?
GEORGE: Because I am a selfish bastard!
MORALIST: What!
GEORGE: Exactly! The few times I have lied, I have ended up getting it in the neck! It's not other people I care about; I care about myself. I don't want any trouble! I have simply learned from hard and bitter experience that honesty is the best policy.
MORALIST: What about you, Harry?
HARRY: My ethical orientation is rather similar to that of George. But instead of using the rather harsh phrase selfish bastard, I would prefer to classify myself as a hedonist; I perform only those acts calculated to maximize my pleasure in life. I am not as fanatical as George; I place some value on other people's happiness but not as much as on my own. And I have much rational evidence that in the long run I will be happiest if I am always truthful.
MORALIST: So you are a hedonist! In other words, you are truthful because it gives you pleasure to be truthful, and you avoid lying because you find lying painful. Is that it?
HARRY: Not quite. I do not necessarily derive immediate pleasure from being truthful. Indeed, sometimes it is immediately painful. But I am a thoughtful and rational person; I am always willing to sacrifice my immediate pleasures for the sake of my ultimate good. I always plan ahead. Therefore, I am truthful since as I told you I have rational evidence that my being truthful is best for me in the long run.
MORALIST: What is this evidence?
HARRY: That is too long a story for us to go into now. I think we should instead hear the views of the other speakers.
MORALIST: Very good. What about you, Irving?
IRVING: I am also a hedonist.
MORALIST: That so far makes three of you! George, Harry, and you.
IRVING: Yes, but I am not like the others.
MORALIST: How SO?
IRVING: You mean how not! By temperament, I feel very different from George, and unlike Harry I am not the rational type of hedonist. Rather, I am a mystical hedonist.
MORALIST: A mystical hedonist? That's a strange combination! I have never heard that one before. What on earth do you mean by a mystical hedonist?
IRVING (sadly): I don't know!
MORALIST: You don't know? How come you don't know?
IRVING: Well, you see, since I am a mystical hedonist, I am also a hedonist. I feel that if I knew what I meant by a mystical hedonist, I would be less happy than I am not knowing what I mean. Therefore, on hedonistic grounds it is better that I do not know what I mean by a mystical hedonist.
MORALIST: But if you don't even know what you mean by a mystical hedonist, how can you possibly know that you are one?
IRVING: Good question! As you say, since I am unable to define a mystical hedonist, I couldn't possibly have rational grounds for knowing that I am one. Yet, in fact, I do know that I am one. This is precisely where my mysticism comes in
MORALIST: Oh, my God! This is too complicated for me!
IRVING: Me, too.
MORALIST: At any rate, what is your reason for being truthful? The same as Harry's?
IRVING: The reason is the same, but my justification of the reason is totally different.
MORALIST: I don't understand. Can you explain this?
IRVING: Why, yes. Like Harry, I believe that my telling the truth is best for me in the long run. But unlike Harry, I have no rationalevidence for this. Indeed, all the rational evidence I have is quite to the contrary. Therefore, the rational thing for me to do is to lie. But I have a strange intuition that I had best tell the truth. And being a mystic, I trust my intuition more than my reason. Hence, I tell the truth.
MORALIST: Most extraordinary! And what about you, Jacob?
JACOB: My truthfulness is a matter of contingency, not choice.
MORALIST: I don't understand you!
JACOB: I have simply never had the opportunity to lie.
MORALIST: I understand you even less!
JACOB: My attitude is as follows: Obviously, no one in his right mind would ever think of lying to his friends; it only makes sense to lie to one's enemies. If any enemy ever threatened to harm me, I would not for a moment hesitate to lie to divert his attack. But since I have no enemies and never have had any enemies, the opportunity for me to lie has never presented itself.
MORALIST: How singular! And what about you, Kurt; what are your reasons for being truthful?
KURT: I have only one reason. I am truthful simply because I feel like being truthful; I have no other reason than that.
MORALIST: But that is no reason!
KURT: Of course it is a reason! As I just told you, it's my only reason.
MORALIST: But your reason is no good!
KURT: Whoever said that I had a good reason? I said that it's my reason; I didn't say it was a good one.
MORALIST: Oh, but just because you feel like being truthful, it does not follow that you should be truthful. Of course, I believe that you should be truthful but not merely because you feel like it. There are many things I feel like doing, but I don't do them because I know that I shouldn't do them. Not everything that one feels like doing is necessarily right! So why is your feeling like being truthful an adequate justification of your being truthful?
EPISTEMOLOGIST: I thought we weren't supposed to argue with the speakers.
MORALIST: I shall ignore that remark. I repeat my question: Just because you feel like being truthful, why does it follow that you should be truthful?
KURT: Should be truthful? Who the hell ever said that I should be truthful?
MORALIST: Don't tell me now that you believe that you shouldn't be truthful!
KURT: Of course not! I don't give a damn what I should or shouldn't do!
MORALIST: Oh, come now; surely you want to do what you believe you ought to do!
KURT: What I ought to do! I couldn't care less! Look, man, I don't give one hoot for all your ethics, morality, religion, rights and wrongs, oughts and shoulds! As I told you, I feel like being truthful and that is my only reason.
MORALIST: But I am trying to explain to you that that reason is inadequate!
--This text refers to an out of print or unavailable edition of this title.
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Most Helpful Customer Reviews
8 of 8 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
excellent,
By A Customer
This review is from: Five Thousand B.C. and Other Philosophical Fantasies (Hardcover)
This isn't one of Smullyan's books of logic puzzles (those are great too!), but rather contains highly entertaining (and mind-stretching) flights of philosophical fantasy and paradox. If you like Godel, Escher, Bach by Douglas Hofstadter, you'll like this.
6 of 6 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
Witty!,
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This review is from: 5000 B.C. and Other Philosophical Fantasies (Paperback)
This book is a collection of anecdotes, discussions and little philosophical dramas. It is an esy read, but some of the ideas are very deep, some are just funny. Anyone with the slightest interest in philosophy whatsoever can and should read this little book. The book adresses epistemology, religion, ethics and logic. Some things are weird and not really related to philosophy but still fascinating. In his dramas, Smullyan plays with many philosophical schools and positions. On the way he creates some new philosophical schools of thought, which is a lot of fun. Everyone who wants to know what experimental epistemology or materialistic mysticism is should read this book.
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