Customer Reviews

About Behaviorism

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Skinner in this book does what he fails to do in many of his other works, make it readable for the mass audience. B.F. Skinner has made a lasting impression on the field of psychology by his unbelievable attention to detail and the bredth of applicaiton that his work has. This book covers most areas of his analysis, that are more fully described in other places, in a user friendly manner and makes accessible for the lay person his explanations in easy to follow examples. This is an excellent primmer to Skinner.

Written late in Skinner's life, this broadly-scoped statement of Skinner's philosophy is not only an outstanding, clear, and relatively nontechnical primer to Skinner's philosophy, but it is also one of the few places where Skinner undertook to defend his positions against critics, on exactly the same points that are still widely assumed to neatly dismiss not only Skinner, but all of his ideas - and sometimes the entire notion of behavioral science - in one specious swoop.

In mid-century, Skinner became strongly associated with the word 'behaviorism' (so much so that it is now common to see famous, well-published academics confusing him with Watson, the originator of the word 'behaviorism,' whose views and approach were fundamentally different.) Skinner's views are actually called "radical behaviorism" to distinguish them from others like Watsonian S-R behaviorism, Hull's neo-behaviorism, Tolman's purposive behaviorism, and so on. Radical behaviorism, as many prior behaviorisms, held that behavior was caused in ordinary natural ways, and hence that it could be studied just as scientifically as, say, biology was, with just as little unnecessary mystery. What made it 'radical,' however, was not really that it was more behaviorist than other behaviorism, but that it embraced the existence of only-privately-observed events, like one's thoughts and feelings, in such a way that they were also considered behavior. (cf. Skinner's quote, 'The skin is not so important as a boundary.')

Skinner's philosophy had other notable and idiosyncratic properties: Skinner held that behavior was profoundly controlled by the environment (read: that what we do is done with relation to the world - compare this to Pylyshyn's absurdly contrary claim that "human behavior is stimulus free," in other words that we are so stupid that we act without regard, e.g., to what time it is, what the judge just said, or how this restaurant was awful last time.) Skinner emphasized direct application of behavioral study to political problems, was a humanist who hated coercion and punishment, and - perhaps most famously - he was excessively picky about what words were used to describe behavior (going so far as to reject, on principle, virtually any use terminology smacking of 'mentalism,' - e.g., 'thought,' even though he took pains to point out his acceptance of private life). It is the persistent emphasis of environmental influence and the persistent suspicion of anything that smelled like 'mentalism' - appeal to spirits, res cogitae, homunculi, a vis viva, or a virtus dormitiva - that are now the most noted characteristics of Skinner's philosophy.

Skinner's own words will naturally be the most reliable representation of what he thought, and this is the best place to read those words. Whether or not you have any understanding of behavioral science or of Skinner's particular take on it, this book will give you the essential and relatively authoritative philosophical views contained in radical behaviorism - unpolluted by politically motivated revisionism. With an honest reading of an accurate source, one can evaluate each idea on its own merit, without needing to take sides pro or con in order to evaluate the basic plausibility of the many and strident competing claims about radical behaviorism.

(One point is left off because Skinner's philosophy is still somewhat confusingly explained and incomplete, albeit expansive, even at its best).

A letter to the editor (published in August 1990 in the Los Angeles Times, in response to Skinner's obituary) asked the following disturbing question:

For the all effort and money spent in research in psychology, has there been any progress whatsoever?

The letter-writer asked this question not only of the Skinnerian approach in psychology but of all approaches. He seemed to be rather knowledgable in psychology. (If I remember right, he granted that the effects of intermittent reinforcement may well be something non-obvious that the research has uncovered. His point was that there is not much more.)

I was disturbed by this allegation. However, I couldn't come up with
a smoking gun rebuttal (though my thoughts were along the lines of verbal behavior and programmed instruction.)

Rereading About Behaviorism last week, I feel that Chapter 2 of this book may be pointed to as an unassailable answer to the above question -- Skinner makes some points here that are true advances being made for the first time in the history of human thought. These are Skinner's views on what self-knowledge and introspection is, the special problems posed by them, and how we have "solved" them at least partially. Skinner's views on these may well undergo considerable revision in the future -- however, without his first statement, such an improvement would not have been possible.

According to Skinner, the responses involved in introspection and self-knowledge are nothing more than verbal reports to stimulations inside the body. (In other words, these are not some mysterious non-physical stuff. The mind-body problem is solved neatly.) Skinner points out that primitive nervous systems are involved in these reports (primitive because these nervous systems have evolved not for this purpose but for other purposes). He also points out that those teaching a child to report these accurately are at a loss since they cannot directly feel these stimulations. Skinner's other points are the following:

1. The basic law of effect is what stamps in behavior

2. Unquestionably, changes in the nervous system are involved when behavior is stamped in. However, these do not produce stimulations that the learner can sense, report, and thus know (since no such nervous system has evolved).

3. Thus introspection is useless in order to know when behavior change occurs. (Skinner is not denying the private world. He readily grants even the practial usefulness of it. However, his point is that behavior altering nervous system changes cannot be directly sensed.)

Unquestionably, all these are very difficult to understand. However, one needs to only compare these with what passes in general for psychological theory to appreciate how briliant Skinnerian theory is.

I hope that I have not misunderstood Skinner too badly.

"About Behaviorism" explicates Skinner's radical behaviorism with clarity and cogency. But make no mistake - this book is no breeze, particularly to those who are unfamiliar with behaviorism and its experimental nuances. I would recommend reading this book in conjunction with Skinner's other work - "science and human behavior", as well as obtaining a modicum of knowledge concerning operant conditioning prior to tackling this work. Grasping the principal facets of Skinner's brand of behaviorism is easier said than done for the behaviorist neophyte: the fact that Skinner articulates his ethos in non-scientific 'readable' terms simplifies the language but not the ideas.

As for the work itself, Skinner embarks on a thorough and seminal examination of human behavior in "About Behaviorism." Skinner describes behavior as occurring through a causal chain of physical and putatively mental events. A physical event (contact with a hot stove) produces a mental event (the tactual sensation of `pain') which in turn produces another physical event (recoiling away from the heat). Unlike other behaviorist models, Skinner's radical behaviorism does not discount `mental' events as `unobservable' or `subjective', but merely disputes that they are `mental'. Moreover, the putative mental events which produce actions must not simply be discounted because they lack an objective framework. Such an approach nurtures the fictive mentalist depictions of the internal events antecedent to observable behavior. Radical behaviorism countenances the existence of the private events within the skin, challenges the nature of those events as `mental', and illuminates the misleading manner in which the internal observer - the individual who `feels' and `thinks' - characterizes and reports such events.

One important distinction Skinner introduces is between contingencies of survival and contingencies of reinforcement. Contingencies of survival consist of activity integral for organisms' survival (eating, breathing, sleeping, etc.). Contingencies of reinforcement refers to events that occur after behavior which by virtue of their consequences increase the probability that the behavior will occur again. Training a dog to `sit' for a treat represents a classic case of `conditioning', and the dog treat comprises the contingency that subsequently reinforces the behavior of `sitting'. The error that often occurs is to then claim that the dog will then sit because of some `instinct or `because he is hungry.' The dog's hunger is clearly collateral to the true cause of the behavior - the contingency. Skinner's behaviorist model adopts this reasoning towards the environmental contingencies which engender human behavior. Just as it is erroneous to conclude that a dog's hunger causes it to sit, so too is it inaccurate to explain that a man goes to watch a baseball game because "he feels like it," "thinks it's a good idea," or is merely "bored." All such explanations exclusively rely on internal events within the man's skin and belie the true causality that produces the behavior.

Conventional language couches what we call emotions, desires, and most importantly - choices, in vernacular that dissemble the true character of the events occurring - in Skinner's words - "within our skin." When a lovelorn individual longs for an unreciprocated romance, he might state that `lovesickness' causes his despondency. But as Skinner correctly asserts, descriptions of such feelings or emotions invoke `private stimuli.' But it is the `public stimuli' - the absence of the reinforcing contingency of the amorous behavior, that properly captures the external referent which causes both emotion and behavior. Thus when someone gets pricked by a needle, it is erroneous to report one's wincing as caused by the `pain'. `Pain' is an internal event, and a physiological phenomenon chosen by natural selection because of its worth in arranging an organisms' negative reinforcement of contingencies inimical to survival.

However, the most complex human behavior dulls Skinner's otherwise incisively analytical blade. The explanatory power of Skinnerian behaviorism is most problematic when the supposed contingencies that determine the subject's behavior come not from outside the skin, but from the subject himself. Our deepest cognition, conceptualizations, and quantitative reasoning - our most abstract ideations as to ontology, physics, and value - our most sophisticated social interactions, are not so easily elucidated by the behaviorist explanation. This does not mean the theory is false whatsoever - it simply points out that beyond the rudimentary Pavlovian level of stimulus and response - one must acknowledge that the fullest means to understand who we are come not from a facile glance at our external environmental contingencies, but from understanding the neuropsychological contingencies that we ourselves produce "within the skin." These contingencies may not be mental, but they are contingencies of behavior nonetheless. Daniel Dennett in "Consciousness Explained" has much to say on this matter. And while one cannot start the inquiry with such a Cartesian analysis in understanding our behavior, it is an intermediary in the great chain of stimulus and response that should not be skipped. Why do we daydream? Why do we philosophize? Neuropsychologists would assert that such exercises involve cerebral reproduction of information that have been mentally perceived, assimilated, and related in a Humean associationistic manner. This cerebral reproduction itself - although initially derived from an external stimulus - comprises a contingency that I'm not sure Skinner adequately analyzes.

Even if one's most personal dreams, visceral emotions, innermost thoughts, and `mental' ratiocinations are verbal reports not of internal cognitive events but external environmental contingencies, to explain this behavior by simply stating that it occurs because its personally and self reinforcing offers limited understanding. Skinner's behaviorism can easily explain why a man avoids the bad part of town when he walks to work, but this reductionist account becomes unfalsifiable philosophy when it tackles the most sophisticated, non-social, and meditative manifestations of cognition and language. Certainly, the neuropsychologist, linguist, and even philosopher offer understandings just as if not more valuable in characterizing this behavior. To illustrate, what contingency accounts for the mental imaging and defining of our most unconscious daydreams? For more on this debate, particularly within the behaviorist position on language, one should check Noam Chomsky's criticism of behaviorism as well as the subsequent behaviorist response by Nathan Stemmer.

This is not to say that Skinner's theory is wrong, but merely elicits the deeply complex `physical' causality at play. Skinner himself admits the shortcomings of the behaviorist position in explaining such behavior. This book merely questions the more untenable explanations of behavior and delves deeply into the problem of prescribing `causal' descriptions of human behavior. Thus the soundness of Skinner's approach lay in his modesty to consign explanations to a description of the contingency: NOT to recklessly postulate that the reason for the contingency's effect is a genetic prescription or environmental process without scientific substantiation of such a claim. But while spiritualisms and idealisms alike cringe at the implicit concept that humans do not possess free will, Skinner correctly recognizes the mentalist sophistry of attributing causation to everything else but our own minds. When one asks why another did not go to work today, to answer that it is because someone "makes a choice" is to give no answer at all. It is a meaningless explanation without any causal foundation and scientific worth. It therefore must be abandoned.

Ultimately, Skinner's antiseptic approach to the underlying reasons behind who humans are and why they act draws unfriendly and unfair fire from many. Indeed, the subject of human behavior has been plagued by human pride and ideological dogma. Others may doubt that this reductionist scheme can account for the more opaque and complex aspects of human behavior, and indeed, it seems strangely and simultaneously myopic and farsighted to explain abstract and cognitively internal verbal assertions through the prism of conditioning and contingencies of reinforcement. Still others have identified the tautological absurdity of human behavior deeming itself unfree and governed by environmental contingencies outside of its own control. The point is this: for any philosopher, social scientist, and psychologist who aims to assert that human language, cognition, and behavior represents something more than the offspring of natural selection and environmental contingencies - Skinner is the mountain that must be climbed, his views must be addressed, and the behaviorist position must be accounted for. Are we simply neurons firing, a highly sophisticated materialization of stimulus and response, and a more complex version of environmental conditioning?

Even if behaviorism might fall short in fully explaining human behavior, it has addressed a subject of insuperable complexity. Objectivity evaporates when human behavior examines itself. Thus if the behaviorist lens is not a scientifically valid `mirror' through which to examine the behavior humans, it is because no framework is valid and any study of human behavior falls to paradox and subjectivity. The greater point that Skinner asserts however, is that it achieves an understanding far more sound than Cartesian mentalism and associated conceptualizations of human behavior.

An exceptional book, and if one is - like me - not fully convinced that the reductionist behaviorist model can account for verbal and mental behavior, then I also recommend reading Daniel Dennett's physicalist exposition of consciousness and mind to enhance the behaviorist explanation of mental behavior.

About Behaviorism is one of B.F. Skinner's best books written to explain his views of human behavior. This book provides a nice introduction to behaviorism that fits in well with the modern world, unlike the earlier behaviorism attributed to Watson. Most of the key principles and philosophies of this brilliant man are explained There are even chapters on Thinking and The Self and Others to refute those critics who have never read enough to understand that Skinner presented a well rounded view of human behavior that was both explainable and based on scientific research. The fact that rats were the earliest subjects still leaves some lay people with the idea that behaviorism does not apply to human life. Anyone who takes the time to read this book will understand that is a total misunderstanding and one of a list of myths that Professor Skinner explodes in this book. Teachers and anyone else who wants to reach out to learn more about their students, themselves, and human behavior from a scientific view should grab a copy of About Behaviorism and be awakened to a different way to understand and change human behavior.
Don E. Williams, Ph.D.

Battle over ideas. URGH!!!!! Cultural conditioning. Science is right superstition is wrong. Behaviorism explains this. If the reviewer referenced above read and/or understood the book they could easily see how their perspective is ignorant, superstitious, and dangerous. Behaviorism is the only science of human behavior. Behaviorism explains why data driven analysis is the only true science. Science is needed so everyone stops engaging in idiotic battles and mental masturbation. Behaviorism is a science. It explains human behavior as a by product of evolution. This is the most important book ever. It is needed more than ever so we can replace judgement with understanding. It is needed to learn to help ourselves and others instead of battling over ideas. It is needed so we stop reinforcing stupid behavior that is glorified ad infinitum. It is needed so we start reinforcing true science like About Behaviorism.

...I gave this book a five for its clarity in laying out some Skinnerian basics. It's a very well-written book and clearly presents the often-misunderstood but important distinction between behavioral psychology and behaviorism (its philosophy).

There is simply not a more concise and accessible overview of the behaviorist's philosophy. So many misconceptions of the general public and beginning student of behaviorism are clarified in a relatively painless manner in this book, and it doesn't require an extensive existing understanding of behaviorism to understand - unlike some of his more technical work such as Verbal Behavior.
People often confuse (radical) behaviorism and behavior analysis with methodological behaviorism, stating that we completely ignore thoughts and behaviors typically considered to have originated in "the mind". This is an outdated characterization (as in, it comes from a time when my grandfather was in elementary school) - what IS eschewed is the concept of the mind and all of its mystique and importance.
This book belongs on the "must read" list for anyone with an interest in human behavior or philosophy of science.

This book should be the primer for all behavior analyst.Nobody does it better than Skinner.Language is simplistic enough for the layman as well as the professional.

It's not in the condition I would have wanted it to be, but the description was accurate. Seller did mention the wear to it. I am still able to read it and it was a good price.