39 of 40 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
The most current history of the German-Russian War, January 25, 2009
This review is from: Absolute War: Soviet Russia in the Second World War (Vintage) (Paperback)
I have read at least 50 books on the German Russian War---the major component of World War Two in Europe. My first novel, An Honorable German, a World War Two saga told from the point of view of a German UBoat commander, will be published in May. In order to write a novel told in a convincing way from the German POV, I spent 25 years reading German history. I say this to demonstrate my competence to write this review.
First and foremost: if you are looking for a superb general history of the Ost Krieg as seen by the Russians, then buy and read this book. There was a brief window in the the years after the collapse of the Soviet Union when scholars such as the author( whom I do not know) had access to previously top secret information about Russia in World War Two. Putin shut this window and much of this information was reclassified. Professor Bellamy scrambled through this window of opportunity and did an amazing amount of original research from the original battle reports, NKVD reports sent to Stalin, records of discussions of the Stavka, etc. Because he was able to examine unredacted material, indeed the actual reports which Stalin had held in his own hands, Dr. Bellamy was able to shatter certain myths of this period---the most hallowed being the tale of Stalin panicking and retreating to his dacha and staying incummnicado for a week till the Politburo begged him to come back and lead the nation. Piece by piece Professor Bellamy takes apart this myth based on the actual communications in their original between Stalin and the key members of the Politburo. I use this as an example to show how carefully he did his homework and in doing so swept away a number of myths people have accepted for decades. Second, Professor Bellamy pauses on a regular basis and specifically cites the verified casualties on each side, how those numbers affected the belligerants within the specific context of that time of the war and then shows the Allied figures for the same period. Anyone who has read deeply into the literature of WW II in Europe knows that in my phrase, "the Americans did the supplying and the Russians did the dying." While many scholars point this out they do it in an unconvincing way because they cannot bear to let go of the cherished myth that the Allied landing on D-Day was the turning point of the war, which is patently absurb. The Normandy landings were a side show compared to what was happening in the East. Two weeks after Normandy the Russians literally destroyed most of Army Group Center in four days---27 German divisions and various corps HQs simply vanished. Over 300,000 men gone--not accounted for to this day.
Dr. Bellamy is very, very clear on this point: World War Two in Europe was won in the East. By showing the verified statistics and expalining them in detail and comparing them to the other powers, he demonstrates beyond a shadow of a doubt that the Ost Front was the decisive theatre of the war in Europe. He further points out that as terrible and ruthless and bloodthirsty Stalin and his men were, they did win the war and for political reasons we in the West have never wanted to acknowledge the sacrifice the Soviets made.
Another especially interesting part of this history is the personal interplay between the major figures on the Russian side. Because of his research, he is able to really show how these personalities functioned together and often made horrendous mistakes due to juvenile vanity.
A far more nuanced portrait of Stalin also emerges. Stalin was as evil a human being who ever walked the planet. It is almost as if the devil himself had spawned Stalin. But he was a human being with his own emotions---which is the most frigntening thing since Stalin demonstrates the evil humans are capable of. But the author reaches through this record of evil and extracts the actual decisions Stalin himself made at critical times and how critical those decisions were to both Soviet victory and soviet losses. Being able to see Stalin up close working with his cabinet so to speak one sees a man who, reluctantly, begins to listen more and more to what he is being told and act on verified information and not fantasy. Using Stalin's personal office diary which notes who saw him and when, the author is able to correct a number of scholars and participants about who met with Stalin and when and what was decided.
Perhaps the most original contribution in this book to the history of the time is what a critical role the NKVD played in the war and how this was all thought out before hand. To win the war, Stalin had to stay in power and the population had to be both cowed and controlled. The author shows through numerous original documents exactly how the NKVD did this, how accurate their reports were, and how well organized and motivated they were. Without the tens of thousands of NKVD fighting units and undercover agents, Stalin simply could not have been able to harness the energy of the entire population to repell the germans.
This highly orignal examination of the NKVD and how it fit into the larger scheme is fascinating and no one else save Professor Bellamy has done it.
I will end by saying no histroy is perfect and there are certainly points I would contest with Professor Bellamy. However, given the originality of his work and given what Dr. Bellamy ferreted out and disclosed for the first time, I would rank him above all other historains of the war in the east and I would go so far as to say he is only one rung below Col. David Glantz who is the greatest historian of the Soviet struggle in World War Two.
Help other customers find the most helpful reviews
Was this review helpful to you? Yes
No
29 of 32 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
A Superb New History, December 25, 2007
This book, even at almost 700 pages of text, is a page turner. It is a superb, balanced history using recently opened sources from the former Soviet Union. Having read the memoirs of many of the German generals who fought during World War II, this book greatly helped to round out my understanding of the fighting on the Eastern Front. Not only is this book an outstanding military history, but it also deftly addresses key social, economic, and diplomatic issues. It is superb at explaining why the Soviets defeated the Nazis -- as opposed to books that focus on Hitler's mistakes. Having served as both an armor (tanks) officer and history professor while in the U.S. Army, I found this book to be invaluable.
Help other customers find the most helpful reviews
Was this review helpful to you? Yes
No
51 of 63 people found the following review helpful:
3.0 out of 5 stars
A book full of missed opportunities, November 1, 2007
This book aims to present the Second World War from the Soviet perspective by using documents from formerly closed Soviet archives and memoirs only recently published in their full length (ie those written by Zhukov and Rokossovsky, respectively).
While the non-Russian reader can only welcome such an attempt, Prof. Bellamy's book suffers from some major shortcomings, one of which is the apparent inability of its author to read German language sources. Some errors (German ambassador von der Schulenburg is misspelled as "Schulenberg" throughout the book) could have been avoided.
But the major shortcomings are in the material presented for the Soviet side. Bellamy avoids discussing the Soviet pre-war military strategy and doctrine in a separate chapter, even though he rightly writes about the entirely offensive deployment and strategy vis-à-vis Germany. When military strategy is discussed, however, he erroneously attributes the Soviet's doctrine on the eve of the war to Svechin ("Strategy") instead of to Vladimir Triandafillov ("The nature of operations of modern armies") and Isserson.
Another major topic that is missing in this book is the Soviet Order of battle on June 22, 1941. Strangely enough, the well known German Order of Battle is given in the book, but no details about the Soviet deployment along the German, Hungarian and Romanian border. This is a very disappointing fact, especially because one would have wanted to compare the striking similarities in the deployment of the opposing forces. For very detailed information about the Soviet Order of Battle I can only refer the reader to the detailed works of Charles Sharp and Craig Crofoot for the ground forces and to Christer Bergström's about the Soviet Air Forces.
Overall, this book is not bad, but full of missed opportunities.
Help other customers find the most helpful reviews
Was this review helpful to you? Yes
No
![[Start the discussion]](http://g-ecx.images-amazon.com/images/G/01/x-locale/communities/discussion_boards/start-new-discussion-sec._V192250339_.gif){kind=small}
