Customer Reviews

Action Before Westport 1864, Revised Edition

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Howard Monnett's "Action Before Westport 1864" is the only complete and detailed study of the pivotal battle of the 1864 Confederate invasion of Missouri. The original work was published in 1964 and is somewhat dated in style. Monett's son slightly revised the original work in 1995 and re-released the title (this, the revised edition being reviewed.)

The Battle of Westport, Missouri in 1864 was the culmination of the Sterling Price's ambitious Confederate invasion/raid of his home state of Missouri. The aim was to gather recruits and provisions, while relieving some pressure on the eastern Confederacy by forcing the Union onto the defensive in the trans-Mississippi. Unfortunately, the increasingly rotund and infirm Price was a poor choice for conducting a rapidly moving raid. Price, a more charismatic politician than able general, moved too slowly, and failed to gather the large number of hoped for recruits. A number of successes were achieved in the capture of Federal garrisons, and great plunder and livestock were gathered. The resulting large wagon train only encumbered the cavalry raiders, and allowed the scattered Union forces to converge on Westport (Kansas City).

As Price attempted to press his raid toward Kansas, he was pursued by the cavalry of Alfred Pleasonton. A.J. Smith's Federal infantry from Missouri were also sent after Price. Kansas hastily assembled its entire militia, and the victor of Pea Ridge, Maj. Gen. Sam Curtis, recalled his Indian fighters and gathered the Kansans to make a stand. With proper coordination it should have been possible to halt the raid and trap Price's army of three divisions under the Marmaduke, Fagan, and the incomparable Shelby.

Communication between Curtis and Pleasonton was spotty because of the intervening CSA army. Elements of Curtis' forces slowed the advancing Confederates at Independence, but failed to stop them at the Big Blue River line and forced Curtis to withdraw to the border. On Oct. 23, Curtis had collected his force for the decisive attack just south of Westport, while Pleasonton's force had finally come up and was to simultaneously to attack and push through the rearguard of the raiders. Mistakes by Pleasonton and delays or timidity by subordinates slowed the cavalry general's attack and prevented a blocking force from sealing the southern exit for Price's wagon train and army. Heavy combat by the two pincers and a surprise flanking action by Curtis did defeat Price's force and sent it into retreat.

The retreat would turn into disaster two days later at Mine Creek, Kansas. There a smaller force of pursuing Federal cavalry crushed Fagan and Marmaduke's rear guard divisions. A complete rout of the entire force was halted only by Shelby's division rushing to blunt the Federal pursuit..

Price claimed great success in the raid. After all, he did cover an enormous number of miles, capture and parole thousands of Union troops, and destroy or capture vast stores of property. However, only a small shattered remnant of his command remained at the end of the march in December. The warfare in Missouri had effectively ended.

Monnett reveals a noteworthy aspect of the action before Westport: the considerable Federal use of diminutive mountain howitzers to confront the rebel army. At least 13 of these pieces provided invaluable service. While of short range and small, mountain howitzers fired the same 12 lb shell as the Napoleon, and were superior to rifled cannon in firing canister.

Monnett's point of view is primarily Union since most of the available accounts came from that quarter, but CSA accounts are also included where available. The tone itself is balanced, praising and castigating both sides based on individual performance and success or failure. Discussion of the bitter partisan warfare is muted, probably too much so. He does not stress some of the more notorious guerrilla acts/reputations of participants on each side.

The book is surprisingly short for such a major battle (actually a series of battles), but in this case it is somewhat understandable. There was a dearth of documentation of the battle, partially because of the extended running pursuit and long series of smaller engagements. With two of the three CSA division commanders captured, the heavy reliance on Kansas and Missouri militia, and the disjointed Federal command, a full accounting was never really compiled for either side. Still, this seems a battle and campaign that could benefit greatly from a modern in depth treatment.

Monnett's style is typical for the time the book was written, with occasional heroic flourish and sometimes overly decorative prose. However, overall it is not overbearing and in other instances appropriate. In contrast, the author is surprisingly businesslike in many sections and seems to have done a fine job of sorting the many confusing movements and counterthrusts. One area that benefits from detail is his careful description of artillery types of each battery as it engages.

The battle maps of each action are of serviceable and of varying detail--typically of regimental level, with key topographic features shown, but lacking scale. What the study needs most is a set of day-by-day overview maps of the various converging forces. Such maps would greatly augment the text in sorting the many elements of the Union pursuit. An order of battle with commanders at regimental and battery level is included.

This is an enjoyable book to read and at present there is nothing to supplant it. The work is a must have for those studying the war in Missouri. Hopefully, one day an even more detailed study of this battle will be made.