Customer Reviews

Afghanistan: The Bear Trap: The Defeat of a Superpower

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3 star:		(1)
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The most interesting aspect of this work is the real nuts and bolts of the war in Afghanistan, and the Pakistani contribution to the war effort. The logistical nightmare of providing arms to the Mujahideen are only one facet of this massive supply operation, and I would strongly recommend this book to anyone who is interested in learning about this aspect of the war from a real insider.

I do find flaws in this work, however, and they basically arise from the real difference of opinion about the US role in that conflict. Yes, the United States was interested in supplying the rebels for the sake of Great Power Politics. A defeat of the USSR in Afghanistan surely would be a great victory for the West, and that is why the arms were supplied. Lets get real here. The author seems to take exception with the fact that after the Soviets pulled out, the US did not seem very interested in defeating the puppet government. Why would they care? The weapons were not supplied out of any desire to assist in the Jihad, nor were they provided out of a hope for a better future Afghanistan. Afghan politics was (and is) made up of rivalries, warlords and open conflict. The US had little interest in getting involved before the Soviet occupation, so why would they after? Any interperetation to the contrary is to miss the point. Standard realist politics, pure and simple.

The author also believes that the US removed support from the Mujahideen so that they could not defeat the communist government and create a fundamentalist regeime. The recent events in Afghanistan showed exactly why this was of such great concern to the US. Hindsight is certainly 20-20, and this book was written and published well before the 9/11 attacks on the US. But I feel that the author's concern about the lack of US support for the defeat of the puppet government has been conclusivly shown to be the correct policy choice. The fundamentalist Taliban government allowed Al Qaida to flourish, and we all know how that turned out. I don't beleive too many people who will read this book will feel sorry for the failure (at that time) of a fundamentalist take-over of Afghanistan. Too bad they eventually did so. Maybe the US should have done even more to prevent it.

Also, the author seems to find reason to blame the US for pretty much everything that went wrong with the war. Even when he had no proof, he did not hesitate to show how the US could have done the bad deed. I found very little thanks to a country that sent millions and millions of dollars to help fight the war, even if it was for reasons of self-interest. (Realist politics again.) I continually found it difficult to read where the US was selfish for only wanting to help defeat the USSR, and that the CIA should somehow have been interested in Jihad or helping the historically conflict-ridden political parties within Afghanistan. Even during this war with the USSR, the warlords (according to the author) would sell arms they were given, fight with each other, and pretty much do what they wanted. It was only by using the carrot of more arms and heavier weapons could any control be established over these groups. Why would the US want to get invloved in that???

The subject of the Stinger missiles is covered in great detail, and the introduction of these weapons really changed the whole nature of the conflict. It is claimed (correctly) that the CIA did not want to give this weapon to the Mujahideen for fear it would find it's way to terrorists and unfriendly countries. It was pointed out many times in the book how "if we had the stinger" and this defeat was because they didn't have it, the author himself admits that several weapons DID find their way into Iran. So the US was right all along to be concerned. All air travelers should be concerned that these weapons are still floating around somewhere. Pretty scarey, and the CIA was right to be worried. But that did not seem to be of interest to the author.

So all in all, it is a very good work for the inside scoop on the war from the Pakistani point of view, and it should be read as such. But, the attitude against the US was pretty hard to fathom, and it got to be an annoying part of this book. I'm hardly a flag waver, but give credit where credit is due. The major reason the Soviets left Afghanistan was because of the massive US aid effort. Perhaps that should have been pointed out more in this book.

This is a very interesting book. It provides a good amount of detail about the US - Pakistan process for arming the Afghanistan fighters. It is also an eye opener about the world of international arms sales - what surprised me the most was that many Arab nations were willing to send complete junk for weapons to fellow Muslims. I also enjoyed the story of the first shoot down of a Soviet helicopter and the videotape that made its way to Reagan.

I would argue with the statements about the abandonment of the US - we did leave but we were never in this war to nation build. All of the countries helping out the Afghanistan's were doing so to fight the USSR, not to nation build Afghanistan. We completed a bargain, however unseemly, which was to supply weapons not to make Afghanistan the 51st state. The one thing I would have liked was a bit more size. Overall, a good book and I would recommend it.

Afghan/Soviet War books can be broken up into a finite set of subjects. Personal/First Person Journalist account, War tactics or High level political/war analysis.

This book is squarely in the last category. A view of the war as described by the Pakistani ISI Brigadier General who ran it.

Regardless of the fact that the book is one sided, I found the book invaluable as a reference on how the Pakistani's ran the war. From Supply chain, US politics, right to on-the-ground tactics; the General goes over everything. At some points admitting Government secrets (That had probably be unclassified by print time).

An excellent book, well written, and interesting. The book even reviews at a tactical level, many battles you can read in "The Other Side of the Mountain".

This book won't cover the entire war, but is a great high level view of the Pakistani operational framework.

THIS IS A FACTUAL, READABLE AND DETAILED, INSIDER'S ACCOUNT OF THE AFGHAN WAR AGAINST THE SOVIETS. THAT SAID, IT MOVES WELL ENOUGH TO MAINTAIN THE READER'S INTEREST.

THE AUTHOR LITERALLY COULDN'T BE MORE QUALIFIED TO SPEAK. AS HEAD OF THE PAKISTANI INTELLIGENCE SERVICE'S AFGHAN BUREA FOR FOUR CRUCIAL YEARS FROM 1983-1987, HE WAS THE STRATEGIC AND SOMETIMES TACTICAL BRAINS BEHIND THE MUJAHIDEEN EFFORT AGAINST THE SOVIETS, PROVIDING LEADERSHIP FOR MUJAHIDIN COMMANDERS IN THE FIELD AS WELL AS THE OVERALL CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS. HE IS ARTICULATE AND COGENT IN HIS PRESENTATION (THE BOOK IS QUITE WELL WRITTEN) AS WELL AS SURPRISINGLY VULNERABLE IN WHAT HE SHARES.

WHAT RESULTS IS AN AUTHORITATIVE AND PERSONAL ACCOUNT OF THE SOVIET AFGHAN WAR, TOLD BY THE PAKISTANI GENERAL WHO SERVED AS ITS ARCHITECT. THE AUTHOR LAYS OUT HIS THINKING AND INVITES THE READER INTO THE DECISION MAKING PROCESS (AN AMAZING OPPORTUNITY) AS HE SEEKS TO DISCERN HOW BEST TO EMPLOY HIS LIMITED AND DISPARATE FORCES AND RESOURCES TO OPPOSE (AND EVENTUALLY DEFEAT) THE VASTLY SUPERIOR FIREPOWER AND TECHNOLOGY OF THE SOVIET ARMY. HE LAYS OUT THE IMMENSE LOGISTICAL, POLITICAL AND CULTURAL PROBLEMS WHICH FACED HIM AT THE OUTSET.


IN THIS BOOK THE READER BASICALLY GETS TO SIT DOWN WITH PAKISTANI BRIGADIER GENERAL MOHAMMAD YOUSEF AND LISTEN TO HIM TELL HIS STORY. IT'S QUITE AN AMAZING OPPORTUNITY IF THOUGHT OF IN THOSE TERMS... I HIGHLY RECOMMEND IT TO THOSE WITH AN INTEREST IN THE HISTORICAL EVENTS WHICH HE DESCRIBES, OR THOSE WITH A GENERAL INTEREST IN EITHER PAKISTAN, AFGHANISTAN OR THE MILITARY DECISION MAKING PROCESS. IVE READ SEVERAL BOOKS OF SIMILAR SUBJECT MATTER - THIS ONE IS REALLY A GEM.

This is one hell of a book. It goes into a lot
more detail than most people want regarding
covert operations against the Soviets during
the Afghanistan war. The descriptions of the
CIA's efforts to obtain deniable armaments is
tragedy mixed with comedy. Checkbook war-fighting
doesn't work very well.

The most interesting thing I found in the book was
the description of the failures of the SAM-7 and
blowpipe missiles to bring down Soviet helicopters,
followed by the success of the Stingers. In the
book, Stingers are described as having IFF, which
makes them incapable of shooting down American
military aircraft. Perhaps this is true. If it's
not true, why would a book published 10 years ago
make an offhand claim like that?

The story of how the war ended is disturbingly
familiar to those who watched the end of the Gulf War.
Because we preferred anarchy over a fundamentalist
government, the US betrayed the mujahadeen as soon
as the Soviets left the country. After five more
years of civil war, the fundamentalists took over, anyway.

There are lots of other tidbits, and the overall
effect is to bring things into focus. It's not a
pretty picture. You can see why the various governments
involved didn't really want this book published.

After September 11, it is more relevant than ever.

This is a Pakistani account of operations supporting the Mujahideen during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. First published in 1992 it predates the Taliban and 9/11 giving an `unvarnished' view of events.

The main theme is how the US helped the Mujahideen to the threshold of victory, only to yank the rug out from under them at the last minute. That contrasts sharply with the American narrative in which we helped the Afghan freedom fighters overcome the Soviet goliath (and then the credits rolled). Those aren't the only narratives at play, but the book gives an important slice of what was going on in Afghanistan during the 80's and how it contributed to what followed.

It seems that most authors writing on the conflict between the Mujahideen and the Soviets choose their favorite guerilla leader and pay tribute to him alone. Too often this leaves a substantial gap in the grander scheme of the Afghan war. Mohammad Yousaf is no exception.

Being the head of the Afghan bureau of the ISI, Yousaf seems to have been in close contact with Gal Badin Hekmatyar and places the chieftan in high regards. However, Hekmatyar has been equally labeled a guerilla mastermind and a cowardly schemer. Yousaf fails to acknowledge the more unflattering aspects of Hekmatyar's reputation or spends much time discussing other commanders like Abdul Haq and Ahmed Shah Massod.

However, Yousaf does provide a very enlightening discussion of Soviet and Afghan tactics. With numerous maps illustrating a number of Mujahideen operations, the reader is granted a better understanding of how the war was fought on the ground.

Furthermore, Yousaf's high ranking position does provide useful insight into how the United States funded the Mujahideen with weapons and supplies through Pakistan's intelligence service. Still, I would have liked to see Yousaf lend greater depth to the role Saudi Arabia played in funding the more fundamental guerilla factions.

All in all, Yousaf's work is an interesting contribution to the work written on the Afghan war. However, it is limited in scope and is tinged with biases. In order to truly understand the war in Afghanistan, a different text would be more appropriate.

I think it is an excellent book.Many people in the world would not like this book to be read but the lessons are very real.One of reviews mentioned that U.S was there only for realpolitik and had no concern about Afghanistan and Pakistan. As the history shows U.S ditched Pakistan and Afghanistan shortly after Soviet defeat but then at what COST? By not getting involved in rebuilding Afghanistan it only handed Afghanistan to Osama in a silver platter in the end getting 911 attacks? .Similarly, by placing unlimited sanctions on its trusted ally Pakistan and allowing India to take unmatched edge in conventional strength only forced Pakistan to sell the only thing it had i.e. Nuclear Technology thus making the world far more dangerous place.Was that a wise U.S policy??

The book was written nearly 10 years back , and the present events clearly demonstrate a clear failure in the U.S grand strategy in the post Soviet era.

As this book shows and as the 911 commission openly stated that U.S must be ready for making the hard choice of undertaking a long term relationship towards Pakistan in particular and the regian in general.

The CIA:

1: was (probably) responsible for Zia'a death

2: didn't know the first thing about how to wage a guerilla war

3: either allowed or participated in widespread corruption and theft

4: was foolishly reluctant to install an Islamic fundamentalist government in Kabul, and

5: at the end, intentionally pulled the rug out from under the Mujahadeen.

Pakistan's ISI, on the other hand, was wise, incorruptible and only cared about winning the war.

Other than maybe 10 pages describing a handful of battles, I've just told you everything there is in this book.