Customer Reviews

Afghanistan's Endless War: State Failure, Regional Politics, and the Rise of the Taliban

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"For weak states... [t]he end of the Cold War has revealed an international system that is flawed and troubled." "It was always assumed in the West that with the end of the Cold War would come the fundamental alteration -- even the end -- of the East European states. It was less well understood that the end of the Cold War could also sound the death knell for many weak Third World states." Larry Goodson writes about Afghanistan in a solid if unspectacular style. A survey of pre-Soviet Afghan history is followed by a detailed recounting of 20 years of war. He provides some basic facts about the country: there are no railroads and only one major highway, which now is more like a jeep track than a highway. Literacy is well under 10%, and life expectancy under 50. Irrigation has been destroyed. Potable water is available to 12% of the population, and almost 50% has been displaced. Two decades of war, supported by military aid, consumption-oriented economic aid, and refugee relief, have left an economy with no functional industry and only drugs, smuggling, and small-scale agriculture to sustain it.

The Cold War played out in the Third World (much the way that colonialism did during the Concert of Europe and its aftermath from 1815 to 1914) as Great Powers vying with each other through proxies in preference to direct conflict. Commercial interests played a secondary role. With the demise of the USSR, commercial interests have not moved to the fore. Rather, second and third-tier Powers have been freed to reenact proxy warfare in the weakest of states, like Afghanistan (and Zaire, Indonesia, etc.). The involvement of several interested outside parties, which he quickly surveys, makes de-escalation nightmarishly difficult, especially as the proxies fear wholesale exile or extermination (a fear with some basis).

"The Taliban lack talented political leadership, competent military performance, and ideological creativity," and were unlikely to form a stable state even if they had been completely victorious. "The Taliban have virtually no program with regard to more traditional areas of social policy, such as public health, infrastructure reconstruction, and education. In these areas the Taliban rely almost completely on outside organizations for assistance, both in keeping with Afghanistan's traditional governmental preference for a rentier economy and the Taliban's focus on warfare to the exclusion of all else... Herat and large areas of Kabul, for example, have had no regular supply of electricity for several years, and water throughout the entire country is unsafe to drink."

The Soviet policy of depopulating the countryside created massive numbers of refugees, most of whom fled to Pakistan. The Soviet unwillingness to invade Pakistan permitted refugee camps to serve as bases for insurrection. Refugee camps have 1,000 to 10,000 familles per camp. A typical village had only 100. Half the camp population are children. These are only a few of the facts to the author uses to convey the "vast cultural changes in the Afghan social framework."

Pakistan's willingness to host a refugee-based insurgency, with assistance from the US, Saudis, and others, has been the most important of factors enabling war to continue long after a locals-only war would have burned out. But Pakistan has paid a price, in the strengthen Islamist voice at home and in "the leaky weapons pipeline and burgeoning drug culture [that] had created a Pakistan rife with violence, crime, and corruption." "Corruption of the pipeline happened at all levels, and weapons destined for use against the Soviets ended up in the hands of Pakistani soldiers or drug traffickers, were sold in the arms bazaars of [Pakistan], or were stockpiled for later use. Estimates of how much aid actually leaked ranged from 20 to 80 percent but mujahideen combat commanders were vocal in their frustration at the lack of assistance."

Even before the war, Afghanistan was a weak state, with limited powers over and integration of its territory and people. In the early parts of the war, the existing ruling classes of tribal and elders and religious leaders were killed or exiled. "Group identity usually extends no farther than the qawm [communal group], which never extends beyond the tribal or ethnic group level and can be much narrower, depending on circumstances." Goodson's chief insight is that Afghanistan's breakdown is part of a worldwide pattern FAR beyond the West and Islam. Only US involvement can alter that pattern -- a prospect whose imminence seemed unlikely to him before 9/11/01. Even after it, that prospect is far from assured.

This book should be read by every U. S. Citizen if you want to understand the who, what, when, where and how of the world politic in Afghanistan. Reading this book will give you a complete understanding of the meaning of the word "Blowback".

It is easy to read and understand. He sets forth all the historical facts including the facts that we do not want to hear. No matter what you may think before reading Mr. Goodson's book, after you read his book you certainly will have more to think about.

Many people who thought they had the answer as to what to do about Afghanistan, have found themselves asking. . . "What should we do about Afghanistan and the Middle East"? If you read closely he gives us a few hints!

Rather than give all the answers, Goodson documents a bewildering chain of events and players in this chaotic region of the world. His reasoning appears sound and his research impeccable.

After reading the book (one interesting passage, by the way, was his comment (I paraphrase) "it would be difficult to imagine a scenario that would remove the Taliban from power in the near future" I was left pondering the amazing twist and turns reality takes -- and saw this whole region in an entirely different light. Particularly the role of Pakistan.

(Some might see) the book as rather sterile. I did not. I found it much more engaging than "Tournament of Shadows", for example -- but then again, I am fascinated by the kind of analysis this author engages in. Showing how behavior (of individuals, societies, cultures) is multi-determined, and avoiding the pitfalls of simplistic answers to complex questions.

I just read Goodson's book and am very pleased. He gives a thorough analysis of the background to the current situation in Afghanistan and explains the existing dangers confronting the country and the region. Finished just before 9/11 the book does not lose any of its relevance.

The most cogent ideas I came away with where the horrifc devastation caused by the Soviet Union in its attempt to take over the country in the 1980s. The problem it has created for Pakistan being a host to the Afghan refugees and backing the Afghans in their war efforts against first the Russians and then the Northern Alliance. Lastly the number of bordering countries and their involvement in Paksitan.

This is an excellent analysis and makes one feel very sorry for the plight of this poor country caught in the middle of the cross hairs of major powers

This is a very impressive book, perhaps one of the best all-around books on Afghanistan, yet when I finished it I had the strongest feeling that it had been a rather antisceptic review. Eurudite, one of the best outlines I have ever seen for examining a truly chaotic situation, everything falling into place from chapter to chapter--yet at the end of it I simply did not have the guts of the matter in my hands.

I found the answer in other materials, including a special project to map all of the existing tribes, sub-tribes, and individual leaders where they could be identified. The project required monitoring of local radio stations in various languages, some of which did not have print media. At the end of it all what came across was massive--massive--chaos in a medieval environment where everyone, without exception, regards every foreign power--and especially the superpowers--as an intruder, and every other Afghan as someone to be killed, exploited, or followed, depending on the situation.

This is a very fine book, but when one examines the list of organizations (14) and key individuals (16), what comes across is antisceptic simplicity. This is not a criticism of the author, the research (virtually every English-language reference of note), or the conclusions--all fit well within a very thoughtful approach to describing this failed state called Afghanistan. What jumps out at me is the fact that we do not have the access to the same story as told in Russian, Chinese, Dari, Farsi, Pashto, Urdu, Hindi, and we have done nothing to actually get below the state level--what I call "two levels down"--to the sub-tribe level.

As the world gets more complex, as "wild cards" such as Omar bin Laden cause massive dislocations within major developed countries, not just in isolated failed states, it seems to me that we do not have the sources and tools in hand to get a truly comprehensive coherent view of any particular situation. I would go so far as to say that each book such as this can only be considered a calling card--an audition--and that a real understanding of the Afghan situation could only emerge from a multi-national effort that brings together such talented authors, across cultural and national lines, and gives them the kind of collection, processing, modeling, and operational intelligence support that are normally reserved for just a few great nations. In brief, what we understand about Afghanistan is now too important to be left to a single author or a single perspective--and certainly too important to be left to a single failed intelligence community that thinks only in English.

Larry Goodson's Afghanistan's Endless War is a gem that shines with solid research and clear prose. This survey of Afghanistan's past will assist anyone who wishes to grasp how this central Asian country became the center of US foreign policy recently. Goodson briefly examines Afghanistan's early history when the country hosted part of the famous silk trade route that connected the occident with the orient. Another section details England and the Soviet Union's reasons for establishing hegemony in Central Asia. Goodson provides solid reasons why each nation's conquest failed in Afghanistan. Lastly, the author presents an overview of Afghanistan just prior to September Eleventh and offers, albeit somewhat dated, future scenarios.

Goodson's purpose is to show how various events within Afghanistan's borders along with foreign intervention have shaped this nation. He contends that "Afghanistan has a singular importance to the region it touches" and does influence its neighbors as well as other foreign nations. The text is filled with facts that support this thesis. In the chapter analyzing the Post-Cold War era, Goodson describes how Pakistan, United States, Russia, Iran, China and others are devoting resources in the quest to determine Afghanistan's future. However, steering Afghanistan's social and economic environment is extremely difficult due to long standing traditions and local laws of indigenous tribes such as the Pushtins, Hazaras, Farsiwans, and among others that are often incompatible with different tribes. According to Goodson, Afghanis are seldom steamrolled or permanently purchased into allying with foreign nations.

Most readers will want information about the inception of the Taliban movement. Goodson argues that the Taliban started when Pushtin Islamic religious students attempted to bring stability to post-communist Afghanistan. Originally funded by the Pakistan government, the Talibans piled up military successes and ended some of the lawlessness and chaos that pervaded Afghanistan. Foes of the Taliban lost military size and strength because of perpetual fighting and later formed a loose coalition of tribes called the Northern Alliance. Although the Taliban never truly gained official recognition as the legitimate government of the Afghanistan, private donations increased to further Taliban control. Additional aid came from "Saudi Arabia and other Persian Gulf countries," regional mafia, "heroin smugglers, Osama bin laden," and Unocal (Union Oil). The giant US oil company, Unocal, hoped to build a natural gas pipeline from Turkmenistan through Afghanistan to Pakistan. Unocal gambled on the Taliban establishing stability to the region by defeating the Northern Alliance and oppressing the local population.

Goodson defends his thesis well throughout the text by showing how Afghanistan, a medieval country in the twenty-first century, is inextricably linked to the central Asian region and the rest of the globe. Equally convincing is Goodson's argument that Afghanistan suffers from weak state syndrome in a post-Cold War era. No longer are the two superpowers paying consistent attention to Afghanistan and smaller national powers intermittently commit resources that often perpetuate the imbroglio. Because Afghanistan must rely on outside and sporadic help, the nation fails to develop a strong central government that can "penetrate" local "society, regulate social relationships, extract resources, and ...use resources in determined ways."

One shortcoming of this book maybe, ironically, its attraction: the book is brief. Goodson glosses over some important topics. One example is when the CIA began training Afghanistan soldiers prior to the Soviet invasion. This event needed further explanation. Nevertheless, Goodson's Afghanistan's Endless War is a fitting place to begin comprehending the complexities of Afghanistan. This book is highly recommended

This book does an excellent job of detailing Afghanistan's history of war as well as describing the rise of the Taliban. Its well written and points out the sheer volatility of this nation that has been at war, either against outside invaders, or amongst its own people, for more than two decades.

Wow, what a scholarly survey of the Afghan civil war to include the Soviet occupation, the pursuit of power by the competing mujahadeen factions, and the rise of the Taliban. Goodson's tome provides the layman and the scholar a comprehensive account of the recent fighting in Afghanistan that offers a look into the unique nature of Afghanistan with regard to the deep ethno-linguistic cleavages.
The only negative I could see was that it was published about 10 months too early. The big question mark of the Taliban's future has been addressed to a large degree. I can't wait for an updated edition. I would recommend this book strongly to anyone that is curious about how things came to be in Afghanistan. A great companion book would be "Taliban" by Ahmed Rashid or "Fundametalism Reborn?" edited by Maley.

You can tell this book is the author's adapted PhD thesis. That's not a criticism. Larry Goodson has been studying and traveling to Afghanistan for decades, and this is an extremely thoughtful, well-organized recent history of the place, along with Goodson's explanations of why it's such a mess. It's hard to argue with his conclusions. Because it is so well-organized, it is an easy book to skim to gather facts on specific topics.

I thought this book a somewhat dry but meticulous survey of Afghanistan. My conclusion is that every nation that tried to directly influence events there has suffered extreme consequences. A lot of Pakistan's problems have roots in its attempts to create a security buffer in that country. The Soviet Union, the U.S. and all others have found this one region to defy all attempts to create their respective ideals of a stable Afghan government.

Goodson understands why outside powers fail in Afghanistan in the long run, expending resources with nothing tangible to show in the end. It is a unique, diverse and ungoverned country, with a long history of conflict and shifting loyalties. This is a place where things don't work the same way as anywhere else. Even now, it would be beneficial if more Americans read this book and force more thoughtful coverage in the media.