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After Jihad: America and the Struggle for Islamic Democracy

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Noah Feldman's book amounts to a restatement of arguments made in the '90s by one of his apparent mentors, John Esposito, who argues thatIslamists should be allowed to win elections. The trouble is, most Muslims in the Arab Middle East disagree with them, particularly women, who stand to suffer the most under the rule of clerics. Although I disagree with Feldman's argument, my main gripe with the book is its striking lack of originality. One might as well go to the source and read books by Esposito and Akbar Ahmed.

The negative reviewers here have not read this book. In response to some of their claims: Other than Saudi Arabia, all Muslim nations allow churches/synagogues/temples for their minority faiths. Don't judge all Muslim nations by the behavior of the Saudi Wahabis. In Bangladesh, which is a Muslim democracy, Christmas is a public holiday, even though Christians make up less than 1 percent of the population. In the United Arab Emirates many malls display Christmas decorations and play Christmas carols. Christians also conquered, massacred and oppressed other peoples. Look at the treatment of natives in US, Canadian, South American and Australian history.

But now to the book. Feldman says that the West should not fear democracy in Muslim nations because even if Islamic parties come to power (they usually don't) the people will soon get tired of them because they won't deliver on basics, such as education, infrastructure and jobs. Islamic parties tend to promise Utopia if they get elected but will always fail to deliver on their promises. There is a lot of evidence to support Feldman's argument. You only have to look at Iran to see how quickly most people tired of Islamic rule. Muslims in Northern Nigeria are already starting to grumble about Islamic rule. In Pakistan, an Islamic party recently won power in one state (only because of outrage over the then impending US invasion of Iraq). Many now say that they regret their vote for this party and feel that crackdowns on freedoms and women's (already limited) rights have gone too far. In Malaysia Islamists recently lost control of one state they controlled.

Feldman also claims that Islamic Law can exist alongside democracy. Islamic Law is not actually Islamic. It did not exist in Muhammad's lifetime and was first implemented in the Ottoman Empire about 1000 years after the founding of Islam. Islamic Law only became widespread in the last 50 or so years. However, most Muslims do not know this, they falsely believe that Islamic Law is divine, and will therefore insist on some form of Islamic Law. In many Muslim nations Islamic Law exists alongside secular law. For example, family law tends to come from Islamic Law but criminal or business law is secular. I agree with Feldman that Islamic and secular law can coexist in a democratic society (it already does), and I also agree with Feldman when he says that this will make women and non-Muslims second-class citizens. But Feldman also believes, and I agree, that these societies will evolve and that women and minorities will fight for equal rights as has happened in the West. Keep in mind that in America Christianity was used to justify slavery and women's inequality. And keep in mind, that in America, women and minorities have had to struggle for the rights they have today. It's unreasonable to expect Islamic nations to become bastions of equality and justice overnight. This will be a long slow process.

Feldman is right that we in the West should not fear democracy in Islamic nations. About 40 percent of Muslims currently live in democratic countries, such as Bangladesh, Indonesia, India, France and the US, so Islam and democracy are obviously compatible. For too long the West supported and propped up dictators in Muslim nations and look what happened. America was hit on 9 11 and we and the Europeans will be fighting extremist Islamists for years to come. Giving Muslims the freedom to control their own destinies is the only answer to this problem.

Feldman propounds a solution to a crucial problem of U.S. policy toward the Middle East: the fact that almost all the Arab regimes we support have scant legitimacy in the eyes of their people. The thrust of his argument is that things are so bad now that the U.S. doesn't have much to lose in supporting Arab democracies, even those that would be anti-American. As it stands, he believes that Arab governments are able to stifle freedom of thought and speech and manipulate public opinion against Israel and the U.S., to deflect attention away from their own fragile legitimacy. Why not, he proposes, just withdraw U.S. support for these regimes and truly support open political systems. Even if Islamists take over, the necessities of rule and the realities of power would force them to moderate their rhetoric. Arabs would have a channel to vent their political frustrations, and would no longer have any reason to attack the U.S. to get at their own regimes, as was the case in 9/11. Feldman also assumes that in open political systems, Arabs would pay more attention to their own local concerns and that the Palestinian-Israeli dispute would become less important.

Feldman's internal logic is consistent and he argues well, but how realistic are his assumptions? Are Islam and democracy as compatible as he believes?

His views are important because he was among the drafters of the interim Iraqi constitution.

There is little exceptional in this book that distinguishes it from others written by similar authors. In many ways it is yet another clone of the sympathetic approach towards both nascent and moribund Islamist movements. Those who are well read in the field may find yet another standard attempt to answer the old question, "Is Islam/ism compatible with democracy?" tedious.

As a legal scholar at New York University, Noah Feldman is not by any means a mediocre scholar; however, his position does little to distinguish itself from the likes of Graham Fuller and John Esposito with the exception of a few personal features giving his position some idiosyncratic flair. One, Feldman is an orthodox Jew who is pushing forward arguments always associated with a position (wrongly) stigmatized as anti-Israel and pro-Arab. Secondly, he's incredibly politically active-having worked for Al Gore during the Florida vote recount and having been recently chosen [undoubtedly for his well-known expertise both in Islamic and American Constitutional Law] by G W Bush to help draft a new Iraqi constitution.

If you are familiar with the often-repeated argument that the US is stuck between choosing whether or not to support the definitely-evil autocracies or the not-as-evil-as-is-often-portrayed Islamists, wherein the bloody fanaticism is depicted only as a passing tendency and not essential to the movements, then you can predict the outcome of Feldman's argument. In other words, US foreign policy should be sympathetic to Islamists movements as social reformers. Feldman is quite bold in claiming that we should encourage the emergence of `Islamic' democracies, which will not be secular, while simultaneously endorsing active US interventionism in the region into seeing it happen.

One cannot help but wonder if he is try to fashion this old position in scholarship, sympathetic to many [though not all] of the Islamists' aims, as an alternative to the political ideology of the neo-conservatives. [likely intended to be brandished by the democrats?]

This book is excellent, both scholarly and accessible, handling difficult analysis with sophistication and common sense. It seems that the U.S. is now committed to fostering democracy in the Middle East in the aftermath of the war in Iraq. This is the rare book that shows some realism about the role that Islam will inevitably play in the process of democratization. Feldman's unusual message is that if we want democracy in the region -- and the U.S. at this point clearly does -- we must open our eyes to Islam's democratic potential and encourage its cooptation into the democratic process rather than have Islam coopt democracy. Many people will find the book's message difficult to accept, but there is no point to killing the messenger. Furthermore, the book is proving to be a blueprint for U.S. policy for democracy in Iraq, and it is fascinating for that reason.

Noah Feldman's book amounts to a restatement of arguments made in the '90s by one of his apparent mentors, John Esposito, who argues thatIslamists should be allowed to win elections. The trouble is, most Muslims in the Arab Middle East disagree with them, particularly women, who stand to suffer the most under the rule of clerics. Although I disagree with Feldman's argument, my main gripe with the book is its striking lack of originality. One might as well go to the source and read books by Esposito and Akbar Ahmed.

As far as I'm concerned, Noah Feldman has written one of the most important books of the post-9/11 era. This books deals with the question of Islamic democracy, and why Feldman thinks its possible.

This book can be divided into three sections. The first deals with broad discussions of the Muslim faith and of democracy. In this section, Feldman gives a plethora reasons why he thinks Islam and democracy are compatible. He doesn't say that the two fit together perfectly, or that it will be easy to merge the two, but he presents a well-reasoned, well-researched argument.

The second section of the book deals with specific case studies of Islamic countries (mostly from the Middle East). He discusses the climate in each of these countries as it relates to democracy and to Islam. Some countries appear more hopefull than others, but Feldman does a fantastic job at identifying what will have to happen in these countries for democracy to emerge.

The final section of the book deals with American policy specifically and what the U.S. should do to encourage Islamic democracy. I think a very convincing argument is presented here that the U.S. needs a new way of thinking about foreign policy if our long term interests are to be served.

This is one of my new favorite political books. I'm going to assign it for all my current world problem classes at Ohio University. It's well written, the language is clear, and I think that it presents what is ultimately the right course of action for the U.S. Feldman should be the next Secretary of State.

_After Jihad_ by Noah Feldman is focused on answering one crucial question facing American foreign policymakers today; can democracy flourish in Muslim countries?

Feldman wrote that the attacks of Al-Qaeda and others are the "last, desperate gasp" of a tendency towards violence that has lost widespread support in Islamic lands. Many Muslims stand ready to embrace democracy; it is only their governments and to some extent Western policy that stands in the way. Violent jihad has failed, with revolutionary states having only been achieved in Iran, Sudan, and Afghanistan and the only other places where such jihadists enjoy any real popular support is in areas seen as fighting wars of liberation (such as in Chechnya and Kashmir).

Washington policymakers have shied away from pressing for democratic reforms in the Muslim world for a variety of reasons, notably for a need to rely on existing Muslim allies in the war on terror, the risks of instability that democratization may pose, particularly as it might affect oil prices, and the fear that free and fair elections in several countries will bring to power violent, anti-American Islamist groups.

The author argued that this sort of thinking is flawed, that support of dictators may be of benefit in the short-term but is not beneficial in the long-term. In addition, Islam and democracy are both more flexible than is generally thought; that they are what he called "mobile ideas," ideas that can appeal to and be adapted by diverse peoples living in very different countries and societies. Any fear that Islamists may rise to power is realized when those groups are repressed, as reversing the democratic success of Islamic groups in Algeria for instance produced a civil war and similar actions could serve to alienate Islamic groups in Morocco, Pakistan, and Turkey, groups that worked within the system but repression of which runs the risk of turning them into a violent opposition.

Feldman divided the book into three parts. In part one he sought to show how Islam and democracy are much more compatible than many think. He felt it was a false dichotomy to say that the only options in the Muslim world are either a secular state or an Islamist state; a range of options are possible; a pure Islamist state relying only on classical Islamic law is only one possibility, and even if it did rely on shari'a law could still be considered democratic if shari'a law was chosen by the majority in that country and the basic rights of non-Muslims were respected. Too often to stay in power and gain the support of secular people in their own country and of the West autocrats have emphasized that they are the only alternative to Islamist rule, and again, this is a false dichotomy. Even if Islamists do come to power there is reason to show - by the example of Iran - that many people after a few cycles of Islamic government might start to look for something more secular. Also, Islamic groups are not by definition anti-American (the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan was very pro-American for instance and even Islamic groups in Turkey have been more concerned with meeting EU requirements for membership and infrastructure improvements, not exactly anti-Western activity).

Potential democratic readings already exist in the Qur'an. Both Islam and democracy share a universal belief in the principle of basic human equality, a very good starting point. The first rulers of the Islamic community adopted the title "caliph" (Arabic khalifa), which means a delegate or replacement (whether for the dead Prophet or a stand-in for God), with the Qur'an strongly implying that the caliph was to be selected by the people, that the people retain some power to displace the caliph, that he governed with the consent of the Muslim community, that he administered but did not create Islamic law (and thus was bound by that same law), and he was compelled by the Qur'an to engage in consultation (shura), though admittedly the Qur'an was rather vague on the exact nature of shura.

Feldman answered a number of objections to any synthesis of Islam and democracy. Among them, the necessity of the separate of church and state (there is no separation of church and state in the United Kingdom), the problem of a state-sanctioned imposition or support of Islamic values (Western governments endorse values by awarding medals, proclaiming holidays, and sponsoring the arts and have laws governing many aspects of family life; broadly this is the same as might exist in any Islamic democracy), the role of non-Muslims in a Muslim state (Jews and Christians held prominent positions in many places and eras, from Medina in the Prophet's lifetime to medieval Muslim Granada and beyond), and the harshness of punishments for hudud, crimes such as theft, which requires the thief loses his hand (in reality these punishments are rarely meted out and the standard of proof is often too high to reach; hudud standards for adultery requires four eyewitnesses in good standing of the act itself, difficult to produce).

In part two, he evaluated how Islam and democracy are interacting in many nations in the Muslim world, surveying the various types of regime found in Islamic lands. For those worried that civil society - vital to democracy - does not exist in the Muslim world they need only look at the web of social services and charitable institutions provided in Egypt (and increasingly in Pakistan), not by the government but by Islamic organizations. Islam he felt was unfairly blamed for the mixed success of democracy in Pakistan; it had arguably more to do with poverty, the vast disparity of wealth, low literacy rates, a too-powerful military, and other factors.

In part three Feldman argued that the United States (and the West) must change their policies towards the Muslim world, that it should encourage rather than impede democracy, that this would serve long term American interests, promote peace in the Middle East, and that it is simply the right thing to do.

Young Professor Noah Feldman is the latest high profile academic evangelist for "Islamic Democracy". I believe his apologetics regarding the application of the Shari'a (Islamic Holy Law), past, present, and potentially in the future, are delusional and corrosive.

My major concerns are the following:

(I) A completely uncritical acceptance of the most sanitized, sacralized version of "classical" Islamic history, from Muhammad's consolidation of control over Arabia, through the extensive jihad conquests of Asia, Africa, and Europe

Feldman's writings are disturbingly reminiscent of Professor John Esposito's presentations, which suffer from these inappropriate biases, as lucidly described by the scholar Bat Ye'or: 1) historical negationism, consisting of suppressing or sketching in a page or a paragraph, one thousand years of jihad which is presented as a peaceful conquest, generally "welcomed" by the vanquished populations; 2) the omission of Christian and, in particular, Muslim sources describing the actual methods of these conquests, and the rule of the conquered peoples, as sanctioned by the classical jihad ideology written by numerous Muslim jurists since the 7th century: pillage, enslavement, deportation, massacres, and the imposition of dhimmitude ; 3) the mythical historical conversion of "centuries" of "peaceful coexistence", masking the processes which transformed majorities (i.e., vast Christian populations, in particular) into minorities, constantly at risk of extinction

(II) Moral equivalences that range from the deliberately disingenuous, to the frankly absurd; just a few examples:

· The contemporary Anglican Church is deemed comparable to those Shi'ite clerics (including, one must assume Khomeini disciples) calling for the creation of an Islamic state in Iraq

· The application of Halachic law in Israel is highlighted trying (most unpersuasively) to argue that the imposition of Shari'a would be no worse- an utterly absurd comparison given the truly circumscribed application of Halachic Law in Israel, relative to the far reaching repression of basic rights for all women and all non-Muslims under Shari'a law, or Shari'a-inspired law in Muslim countries, or even Muslim-dominated provinces (eg., in Northern Nigeria) that apply the Shari'a

· Apologism for barbaric huddud punishments (stoning to death for adultery; mutilation for theft) under the Shari'a

· Non-sequitur discussion of the "limitations" of the U.S. Bill of Rights without any serious discussion of the fact that true freedom of conscience, including full protection according to Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, simply does not exist in any of the 55 countries of the Organization of Islamic States, while many are in egregious violation of its provisions

This warped historiography and unacceptable moral equivalence are melded in a clumsy, callow manner yielding roseate, if not downright reckless predictions about the presumed actions of so-called "Islamist-democrats". Indeed, the bizarre concept of "Islamist-democrats" epitomizes the profoundly flawed premises of Feldman's analyses. He specifically cites SheikhYusuf Qaradawi, spiritual leader of the influential Muslim Brotherhood as an example of such an "Islamist-democrat", calling him "complex". Again, this is eerily reminiscent of John Esposito's utterly discredited reasoning. During a January, 1998 interview - Sheikh Qaradawi stated his beliefs, using unfettered Medieval terminology, that Islamic law divided the People of the Book - Jews and Christians - into three categories: 1) non-Muslims in the lands of war; 2) non-Muslims in lands of temporary truce; 3) non-Muslims protected by Islamic law, that is to say, the dhimmis. Sheikh al-Qaradawi, made it clear that Islamic law had established different rules for each of these categories. The good Sheikh had thus summarized concisely the theory of jihad war (unfortunately ignored by Feldman, Esposito, and their ilk) which regulates the relations of Muslims with non-Muslims.

Feldman also appears to have great faith in disgruntled "former" Islamists who now profess to be "liberal Muslims"- at least in their writings. One such example is the Iranian writer Abdolkarim Soroush who previously participated in the forced Islamization of Iranian universities under Ayatollah Khomeini. But, perhaps most telling, is that Feldman provides no analysis of the human rights tragedy engendered by the failed Iranian theocracy, and its experimentation with Shari'a-inspired, "culturally authentic" Islamic democracy. We must hope that the scholarly insights of Professor Reza Afshari, an Iranian secularist,will penetrate Feldman's hubris. At any rate, this excerpt from the Preface, p. xvi, to Afshari's "Human Rights in Iran-The Abuse of Cultural Relativism", should be required reading for Feldman:

"...Ayatollah Khomeini's Iran has presented an almost perfect case. Who is more culturally and religiously authentic than the Ayatollah's? Who is more credible to say what relevance Shiite culture has or does not have for the major issues of our time? The issue is not Islam as a private faith of individuals. It is about what state officials claiming Islamic authority might have to say about the state's treatment of citizens. Islamic cultural relativism in human rights discourse addresses Islamic cultural preferences for the articulation of public policies within the contemporary state. In Iran, liberal Muslims or any other new interpreters of Islam did not come to power. When and if they do, we will have their record to examine. What we have from liberal Muslims today are only ideological claims punctuated by expressed good intentions. A sector of the traditional custodians of religion, the ulema, politicizing Islam did come to power; therefore it is logical to assume what we faced in the 1980s and 1990s was the result of Shiite Islam (at least an authentic version of it) injecting itself into the politics of a contemporary state. They created a record of what the "culturally authentic" rulers did. The Western cultural relativists deserve to know the details of that record...."

Noah Feldman in his book After Jihad, America and the Struggle for Islamic Democracy, takes a difficult subject and puts together a readable work. In After Jihad, Feldman establishes a framework for the proposition that Islam and Democracy can co-exist in the same country. While reading this sentence and the dust cover describing the book's contents will likely make most on-lookers think the book is a remedy for sleepless nights, the book is not just about the proposition. In After Jihad, Feldman provides a timely and interesting historical perspective of the Middle East, which assists the reader in understanding how a tragic event like September 11th could have come about.

In one sense a reader can come away with the idea that Feldman, a professor of law at New York University, presents an 'ivory tower' approach to how Islam and Democracy can co-exist. In another, a reader can come away with the belief that Feldman obviously has a great depth of knowledge of the subject and, at least, presents a realistic, plausible and defensible structure for this combination of ideas. Given this background, Feldman, who was recently made head of the Constitutional team with the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance ('ORHA') in Iraq, appears uniquely qualified to serve in the effort to reconstruct Iraq into a Democratic regime.

Feldman's observation that the need for Islam and Democracy to co-exist is reaching a 'new juncture in the politics of the Muslim world' makes practical sense. The autocrats are aging and are unlikely to be able to translate power to their sons, public reaction to the attack on the World Trade Center and the on-going violence in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, Feldman argues, presents a realistic view that Middle East as we know it is changing. In addition, the emergence of democracy in small countries like Bahrain, Feldman posits, makes a practical case for a 'no time like the present position' to see if there is a way to meld the concepts of Islam and Democracy in the Middle Eastern countries.

After highlighting this need, Feldman argues that the idea of Islam and Democracy can co-exist because each concept individually is universal, flexible and simple. Feldman then puts forth why this is true. Democracy is universal because everyone has the right to vote; Islam is universal because it believes God makes the same demands on all people whom he created equal. Democracy is flexible, argues Feldman, because it has shown it is adaptable to a variety of contexts; Islam is flexible because it has maintained it's core beliefs while adapting to a variety of languages and family structures around the world. Democracy is simple because it chooses leaders and makes political decisions on the basis of competition for people's votes; Islam is simple because, according to Feldman, there is no god but God, and Muhammad is his Prophet.

One of the difficult questions a reader inevitable will ask is how can a country that promotes one religion be sufficiently inclusionary as required by democracy? Feldman recognizes the difficulty by devoting a chapter outlining that very issue. Feldman concedes that women and non-Muslims would not likely be treated equally in a democratic Islamic State. Feldman, though, looks at this in a practical way, arguing between the lines, that equal recognition under the law would take time. Over time, with equal participation, perhaps, more equal recognition would emerge. Feldman points out that if total equality were the reason to stop this idea, then there would be no democracies because total equality between the sexes is not accomplished anywhere.

In all, Feldman puts a dry topic into a readable format to keep the reader awake during this interesting review of the Middle East. After Jihad is not a novelistic read, but is good 235-page review if you have an interest in learning a little more about the Middle East.

Thanks to Noah Feldman for putting this work together.