Customer Reviews

After Philosophy: End or Transformation?

5 star:		(0)
4 star:		(1)
3 star:		(0)
2 star:		(0)
1 star:		(0)

 

 

The pages in this book are enclosed in cover, but it has no beginning and no ending. It is a sign, a mirror, a reflection, of an unending dialog that has trickled its way through Western culture for thousands of years. This dialog has been at times contentious, rich in symbolisms and thought experiments, and executing always a random walk through conceptual space. This book is one of thousands throughout history that have attempted to find rest, to find a fixed point in a dynamical system of words and thoughts that the West has called "philosophy". There has been no paucity of ideas and energy in this unrelenting search for this elusive equilibrium called Truth. The search algorithms have employed the ultimate in human imagination and logic, and have been executed without yet any indication of completion. Unable to find a resting point that is deemed comfortable to all, a few of the bricklayers of thought we called "philosophers" have abandoned the search for it. This book gives the reader a sample of them. When picked up and opened, one learns of:

The pragmatic post-philosophical culture of Richard Rorty, wherein man and woman are alone and finite, and have "no links to beyond"; where science is an inquiry just as is literature. In this culture, opponents in thought cannot find resolution according to criteria agreed to by both sides.

The "principle of legitimacy" and "narrativity" of the French Nietzschean Jean-Francois Lyotard, with its bricklaying tool the pragmatics of language courtesy of Wittgenstein. Dialog for Lyotard is a kind of war, albeit a "playful" one. All speech is thus in the domain of "agonistics". But the language games via computerization, he asserts, can be a dream instrument for controlling and regulating the market system. But the computerization can supply groups with the information needed to make knowledgeable decisions. Language games are then non-zero-sum games of perfect information, where minimax equilibria are not to be found. After all, the reserve of knowledge and utterances are inexhaustible. Lyotard has stumbled upon a possible dialog of 21st century ethics: a playful argumentation with the machine.

The "counterphilosophy" of another French Nietzschean, Michel Foucault. Foucault is a bricklayer though who uses power tools. But power is essentially positive, and not to be masked by the human sciences or individual self-knowledge. These create a facade of universality and objectivity. For Foucault, (true?) intellectuals participate in a "local" struggle, namely to detach the power of truth from its modern forms of hegemony.

The deconstruction of the (self-professing bricoleur) Jacques Derrida. Derrida's bricks are never laid. Instead, he removes the gout between the ones that are already set in the buildings of Western metaphysics.

The semantic transformation of metaphysics of Donald Davidson. Davidson's bricks are tainted with common sense: he believes that communication dictates that most of our beliefs must be true. Too much error implies massive unintelligibility.

The "prima philosophia" of Michael Dummett, which underlies all the rest. Dummett's foundational/Fregean bricks give a theory of meaning, which is identical in his view to a theory of understanding. The house of philosophy is to be built first by analyzing thought, which is to be distinguished from the process of thinking, and it is to be analyzed by analyzing language.

The referential semantics of Hilary Putnam. Reason is a regulating principle for Putnam. Our philosophical buildings, our truths, are constructed from our conception of rationality. But these buildings have no foundation, even though they are built with the tool of reason.

The "philosophy of ultimate origins" and "transcendental pragmatics" of Karl-Otto Apel, which attempts to join the houses of analytic and Continental philosophy. The house built by Apel has a high roof. In his ethics in particular, a justified norm must have the agreement of all participants in the discourse.

Philosophy as the "guardian of reason" and "placemarker" and "placeholder" in the house of Jurgen Habermas. For Habermas, philosophy works in harmony with the human sciences, and finds itself inserted into the contexts of empirical research. But Habermas advocates a philosophy of reconciliation across the "whole spectrum" of ideas, not just science.

The philosophical hermeneutics of Hans-Georg Gadamer. For Gadamer, understanding becomes an event in which interpreter and text mutually determine one another, and prejudices and prejudgements become prerequisites for real understanding. Knowledge independent of perspectives is an illusion for Gadamer.

The "ontology of human finitude" of Paul Ricoeur, wherein reflection always becomes interpretation. Existence is interpreted from signs "scattered in the world." Truth and method cannot be separated in the the hermeneutic house of Ricoeur.

The historical narratives of Alasdair Macintyre, wherein "philosophical history" is needed for adequate understanding of a given worldview, as well as its rational justification. The "history of an argument" plays a decisive role for the resolution of issues, says Macintyre.

The "legitimized" rhetoric of Hans Blumenberg, which, contrary to the Platonist dogma, reaches equal status with philosophy. In the house of Blumenberg, rhetorical justifications can be better than science, and these are not merely decorations in this house, but essential for its functioning.

The philosophical anthropology of Charles Taylor. The "self-interpreting" residents of his house of philosophy are human agents, who are "subjects of significance" . These agents are to be distinguished from other animals and from computers, in that they are beings for whom things matter. Moral concerns, love and hate cannot be described in terms of the calculations of reason. Taylor unwittingly takes on the ethics of the 21st century: rational deliberation from both man and machine. Both of these entities have concerns that matter to them.