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After Tet: The Bloodiest Year in Vietnam

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Yes Tet of 1968 was hell for those of us that were over there at the time. And then came May and August of 68, which were also two of the bloodiest months of the war. I was with the 1/27 25th Infantry Division at Cu Chi, which was a major area of tunnels for which the VC and NVA stored weapons and supplies. As a "tunnel rat" I experienced some herrendous experiences there. Ron Spector has made some very good conclusions regarding the war and points out some of the many problems that we 19 year olds had to incur. Great book for those of us that were there as well as the rest of you who just want to gain some understanding as to why we lost the war, and some 56,000 young men as well.

This exceptionally comprehensive and readable book is a "page turner." I couldn't put it down! Highlighter in hand, I penned marginal note after note, comparing my own memories and observations as a Navy doctor ashore in I Corps in 1968 and '69 with those of the author. In the introduction Spector asks: "How did we lose the war? Why were we there?" Then he adds: "In a sense we have no real history... instead we have controversy, myth and popular memory." He then proceeds to skillfully weave historical background, Vietnamese and American, with vivid descriptions of battles, skirmishes, debates, intrigues and campaigns... providing vignettes of personal experiences balanced from many viewpoints: the young American draftee, the college OCS-trained officer, the Viet Cong soldier... generals and politicians, presidents and negotiators... Vietnamese and American. "After Tet: The Bloodiest Year in Vietnam" will be placed, along with Frances Fitzgerald's "Fire in the Lake," Neil Sheehan's "Bright Shining Lie," Tim O'Brien's "The Things They Carried" and Bernard Fall's "Street Without Joy," as an irreplaceable, imminently re-readable reference on the Vietnam War.

I guess I really didn't know that my period of time in Nam was the bloodiest until I read this book and all of the statistics, etc. However, I can tell you from an artilleryman's perspective in I Corps that 68 was a year that still makes me wake with the sweats every few nights. I was near My Lai in June (at LZ Dottie about 3 mos after the massacre) and the area was still bad news. My unit was also near the DMZ near Phu Bai a couple of months later - same story -at Fat City - same story and the same story for the remainder of the year. Please note that I didn't come into country until June which was about 4 1/2 months after Tet when so many of the VC were killed. I believe that the Tet Offensive was a political not a military victory because of need for the press to get stories. Yes, the VC proved that no part of Nam really was safe. But, who really felt safe in a combat area? Because of this need for press coverage I believe that the NVA and the remainder of the VC were embolden in 68 until they were nearly militarily destroyed. And at the same time how many young American men had to die or become maimed because of the press' need for blood. Don't forget the roles that McNamara and Jane Fonda (both war criminals in my perspective) had in the creation of Tet offensive. My time in 69 was not so night sweat inducing, since most of the VC and many of the NVA realized that they too were "cannon fodder" because so many of their numbers were killed or seriously wounded in 68. If you want to read a good book regarding this time period, this is one good book. It can be considered a little dry with its statistics, but what true history book doesn't give statistics. This book belongs on every Viet Nam vet's bookcase.

An excellent book on the Vietnamese War of 1968. Spector not only tells us why we (Americans) failed at the war but also what the weaknesses were on the other side (Viet Cong and NVA). The book summarizes some of the problems associated with the war such as race relations, lack of a professional soldiers and officers, and weapons. Spector describes that 1968 was the critical year of the war. America and the Saigon regime won the military battles but lost the political war. He equates the war at that point to the stalemate of the Western Front during the First World War.

Having served in Viet Nam immediately "After Tet" this book filled in what was going on elsewhere in-country as well as the political climate.

A couple of questionable references (like LAW = Light Automatic Weapon) were easily overlooked. The book was otherwise well written and easy to read.

In the first paragraph of the introduction to this vivid study of one year in the Vietnam War, historian Ronald Spector asks: "How did the United States lose the war in Vietnam?" In 1968, according to Spector, the U.S. faced a dilemma: "Even while American forces were experiencing success on the battlefield and in the contest for the countryside, American GIs were beginning to show signs of coming apart under the continued strains of fighting a costly stalemated war for objectives that were never clear or compelling." Spector persuasively argues that this was the critical year in the conflict.

Although Spector is correct that the Tet Offensive in January of that year was not the complete surprise that some contemporary observers reported, the extent and ferocity of the attacks were a public relations disaster for the American military command, which had been issuing generally optimistic reports about the war. Spector reports these grim statistics: "More than 40,000 civilians had been killed or wounded in the fighting, and 1 million new refugees had been created." As Spector puts it succinctly, "the Tet Offensive had shown that no place in Vietnam was truly safe." In late March 1968, President Johnson met with an informal group of elder statesmen and advisers referred to as the "Wise Men," and former Secretary of State Dean Acheson warned: "We cannot do the job we set out to do in the time we have left, and we must begin to take steps to disengage." The President bitterly complained that "the establishment bastards have bailed out," but the Wise Men were merely articulating the consensus public sentiment: The United States could not win the war, so it had to get out! Both the political and military leadership of the American war effort changed in March 1968. President Johnson first announced that General William Westmoreland, the top commander in Vietnam, would be promoted to Chief of Staff of the Army, a move widely viewed, according to Spector, "as a clear sign that Washington had lost confidence in Westmoreland's leadership." A few days later, Johnson announced that he would not seek reelection. But little changed on the ground. According to Spector: "Over the eight weeks following the March 31 speech, 3,700 Americans would be killed in Vietnam." According to Spector, American combat forces "faced a formidable enemy." He quotes a Navy corpsman attached to the Marines: "You'll never hear Marines say the North Vietnamese aren't tough. They're probably the toughest fighters in the world as far as I'm concerned." They also were determined. Spector reports: "A study commissioned by the Defense Department in 1967 had concluded that `the enemy's morale was well-nigh indestructible and therefore not likely to be significantly lowered by pressures on soldiers in battle." Spector explains that "the continued presence of 550,000 American soldiers in South Vietnam continued to provide the Communist soldier with his strongest incentive to keep fighting." Endemic South Vietnamese corruption undermined the American effort. According to Spector: "Although South Vietnam received lavish U.S. aid after [Ngo Dinh] Diem consolidated his power in 1955, much of the aid money found its way into the pockets of Army officers, provincial officials, and members of the Ngo family." Spector provides these details: "Beside the sale of jobs and misappropriation of funds and materials, South Vietnamese generals engaged in a wide array of other rackets, including the use of their military forces to protect or promote criminal activities...Drug trafficking was widespread, and many of Saigon's top officials and generals were rumored to be heavily involved in smuggling and protection of the opium trade...Another source of profit was trade with the Viet Cong. Large quantities of food, gasoline, medicines, and equipment, much of it supplied by the United States were sold to the Communists by South Vietnamese soldiers, usually through middlemen. " In the summer of 1968, a major riot occurred at the largest military prison in Vietnam, the U.S. Army stockade near Long Binh. According to Spector, "the rioters [were] almost all blacks...Virtually everyone in Vietnam, from newspaper reporters to stockade guards, joined in labeling the...uprising primarily a race riot." Spector explains: "The most common source of dissatisfaction was the feeling that African- Americans were discriminated against in promotions and job opportunities. A universal complaint was that blacks were overrepresented in combat units. It was also widely believed that in line units African-Americans were always assigned the most dangerous jobs....Another source of friction was the alleged discrimination on the part of the military police, most of whom were white." According to Spector: "With the murder of Dr. Martin Luther King in April 1968, signs of racial polarization and tension became clear and unmistakable." In addition to racial troubles, Spector writes that, "by the end of the year an even more serious problem, growing drug abuse, had also made its appearance." According to Spector, although "[m]arijuana was as readily available in Vietnam as whisky or cigarettes," its "[u]se of marijuana was a crime subject to fairly harsh punishment, including possible imprisonment under the Uniform Code of Military Justice." He adds: "By the end of 1968 more and more GIs were turning to drugs to help them escape the heat, tedium, fear, and loneliness of Vietnam and to hold on to thoughts and memories of life `back in the world.' The younger the GI and the lower his rank, the more likely he was to be a drug user."

According to Spector, 1968 "ended as it had begun, with bloody yet inconclusive struggles on the battlefield and continued diplomatic deadlock." In Spector's view: "The battles of 1968 were decisive... because they were so indecisive...[T]he Vietnam War remained what it had been and would remain until 1973: a stalemate." Spector concludes: "After 1968 both sides recognized that they could never completely destroy or drive out the opponents from the mountains, jungles, rice paddies, and villages of South Vietnam." To paraphrase Spector's opening question: How did the United States ever think it could win this war?

Of the many, many books addressing the subject of the war in Vietnam, this is certainly one of the better ones. Mr. Spector is not only a good historian, but, just as importantly, a good writer and story teller. I doubt that a person could read this work with out becoming, at the very least, just a bit emotional.
The author, I think, has been very even handed with his assessment of the situation we found ourselves in at that time. He does not appear to have an axe to grind, one way or the other. Having served myself, I found the terminology used and the attitudes written about, to be pretty correct. You certainly will want to add this one to your collection and I recommend it's reading very much.

This book is well worth reading for the student on Vietnam.

For those contemplating engagement in the affairs of State, the mistakes should be lessons learned.

I would like to add that while many of the lessons learned in Vietnam were initially disregarded many of those same lessons have been revived and are still taught today in the jungles of Central America, and at the Jungle Operations Training Center (JOTC) located in Panama.

If you like this book, you should read the "New Legions" by Donald Duncan

This book covers the year time period after the Tet offensive during the Vietnam War. Given the title of the book I was prepared for a page after page description of savage combat. What I found was that the book was not just a description of one firefight after another, but a comprehensive account of the Vietnam War effort during this one-year period of time. The author does a great job of describing the experience of American soldiers in the Vietnam War during the year after Tet.

The author provides the reader with a brief, but complete and readable historical background for the war up to 1968. He also gives us very clear and vivid descriptions of the battles and everyday life of the foot solders. We also get a good run down of the South Vietnamese corruption that worked against the American effort to save their country. This was the part that really surprised me the most, it seamed like the South Vietnamese wanted and needed the war to continue to keep the profitable drug trafficking, smuggling and protection rackets going. What made me furious were the details of the United States supplied food, gasoline, and equipment that the South Vietnamese were selling to the North Vietnamese.

The author also spends some time talking about the drug use by the soldiers and the difficult race relations. This section of the book was not as surprising given that was the same environment in the states at that time. Overall, this book is a well-written and informative, but not a rundown of overly descriptive bloody fights. He does a wonderful job in describing the environment, how hot it was the difficulties in moving through the country, the differences in the front line and the support areas. This is a good book and a great way to introduce yourself to the Vietnam War.

"After Tet" is a well written and informative account of the turning point of American involvement in the Vietnam War. Spector lacks the storytelling touch of a Stephen Ambrose, but he still presents a full account of what was actually the bloodiest year of the war. Many historical accounts of the War show a strong bias toward the period up until Tet and neglect what came after. This book is part of the attempt to correct that deficiency in our historical record.