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Against Deconstruction

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Because I've read the work of John M. Ellis very closely for several years (including *Against Deconstruction*), I'd like to offer a corrective or two to the review below. Just how carefully the reader read the text in question is unclear, but the review betrays some very fundamental confusions. For instance, the review states:

"Twentieth century analytic philosophy has, with its emphasis on necessary connections between words and things, reduced the subtle beauty and infinite complexity of language to a stereo manual. Derrida is the greatest living philosopher of our current age, along with perhaps Noam Chomsky."

Now, Derrida and Chomsky may or may not be great philosophers; what *is* certain is that their views of language are very much at odds. Derrida speaks of "infinite signification" in the absence of a "transcendent signifier"...a fancy way of saying that since words don't map directly or "neutrally" onto referents, then signification (meaning) is "infinite".

On the other hand, Chomsky's UG (Univeral Grammar) argues for a "principles and perimeters" view of the brain and human intelligence: in plainer English, he means that the brain has discrete "modules" or sections that are responsible for equally discrete "modules" or sections of intelligence...so, for instance, one part of the brain handles syntax (grammar), while another handles spatio-visual data. This idea, take it or leave it, is very much like the "stereo" idea that the review below mocks...and the same review, of course, praises Chomsky. AND it categorizes Chomsky and Derrida as two great philosophers...well, given that the two are so much at odds, they can't *both* be on the money about language and signification. If Chomsky is right about language, then deconstruction is very much wrong, and visa versa. Yet the review lumps them together and shows no knowledge of the wide gulf between the two approaches.

So, take the review below with a grain of salt, to say the least. Read *Against Deconstruction* yourself and make up your own mind. Whether you finally agree or disagree with Ellis's view of post-structuralism, you'll almost certainly learn an awful lot about language and linguistics; Ellis's rescue of Ferdinand de Saussure from the misunderstandings of poststructuralism alone is worth the price of the book.

John Ellis' book remains a good beginning for individuals caught up in the deconstruction phase of their lives. Deconstruction is simply untenable, and Ellis simply elucidates this. His arguments are clear, concise, and often redundant, but then this is the obverse of deconstruction, so it may need repeating. There are other challenges to deconstruction that Ellis does not make, challenges more in line with the philosophy of language and mind (e.g., Kripke, Searle, Ryle, et alia) that are more decisive, but also more complex. This simple tome, however, has enough to get one started, and if the deconstruction bug is still not eradicated, there are other compelling arguments elsewhere to bolster some of the gaps.

In this slim, clear-headed volume, John M. Ellis gives a strong and well-informed account of the many outstanding logical, philosophical, and critical-theoretic objections to Jacques Derrida's theory of deconstruction. Juxtaposing his own lucid common-sense forms of discourse and analysis with those of the deconstructive mode, Ellis seeks to demonstrate here that deconstruction's goals are not only unreachable, but also pointless to pursue: the rear cover excerpt speaks of the essential critical act of "finding the new, rather than debunking the old". And at that, the author excels.

"Against Deconstruction" is written in an exceedingly clear and precise scholarly style, one that tastes of cool, classical Greek rhetoric. Each sentence is an enjoyable lesson in how to write clearly and think sharply, as is Ellis' clean large-scale organization; for this reason alone I would recommend it as an instructive rhetorical model for students and writers.

Ellis' mental camera zooms in on the contemporary critical scene, first documenting the strange patterns of denial and argument that have appeared since deconstruction's rise to popularity in world academe. Next he examines Derrida's brainchild itself, untangling the Gordian knot of deconstructive theory and practice. Moving from logic and reason to linguistics and interpretation, Ellis subjects deconstruction to a rigorous logical and historical analysis, finally diagnosing it as a reactionary product of the French educational system, a product that has little value anywhere outside that environment.

In his judgment of deconstruction's proper place in the critical landscape, Ellis articulates an elegant set of criteria for such judgments, and there lies the book's best feature. His formulation asks, "How do we appraise a critical method? By what criteria do we judge the value of statements of critical theory, and individual works of criticism?" Ellis' answers to those questions are excellent and well-presented.

John Ellis has spent a long and distinguished career debunking what he saw as trendy, illogical, and just plain faulty theories of literary criticism. For him, if any theory purports to explain the relation that a text has with its readers, that theory should be able to withstand a rigorous dissection by those who are more interested in truth and logic than in following the crowd. In AGAINST DECONSTRUCTION, Ellis takes to task the theory called deconstruction, as initially promulgated by Jacques Derrida in 1966. Even before deconstruction took firm hold in academia, Ellis, in his earlier THE THEORY OF LITERARY CRITICISM (1974), sounded a warning that theories which claim a special exemption from analysis and wrap themselves in mystic splendor are likely to be far less sophisticated than at first glance. Ellis shows disdain for any theoretician who stridently asserts that "logic, reason, and analysis are insufficient to discuss Derrida" (9). He further takes offense at the prevalent mode of deconstructionist thought that implies it need do no more than dismantle previously existing worn-out theories without offering a viable and presumably more useful alternative. A recurrent theme, Ellis sees in Derrida, is the latter's refusal to investigate alternatives to his own animus toward logocentrism. Ellis also exposes Derrida as one who shamelessly claims to be a firm originator of a dramatic and even heroic basis for judging texts in terms of their inherent contradictions as indicated by their binary opposites. Such binaries, Ellis notes, are neither original with Derrida nor a particularly fruitful way to limit academic discourse to polar opposites while totally ignoring a vast range of shades of meaning that are interspersed between them. Finally, Ellis lists many rhetorical tricks, flourishes, and deceptive practices, all of which add up to a theory that has succeeded in entrenching itself in literary discourse despite its many flaws. Clearly, as long as Derrida's followers can repeat the mantra that "all interpretation is misinterpretation," then the validity of deconstruction as a useful tool in literary analysis will endure only for as long as it takes enough people to see that the literary emperor truly has no clothes.

Back in the 1970's and the 1980's the early writings of the French philosopher Jacques Derrida exerted considerable influence on literary studies at some of America's better universities. Professor John M. Ellis does not think this was a good thing and, in this little book, he tells us why.

Almost everything of interest in this text is contained in the lengthy chapter entitled "Deconstruction and the Nature of Language". It's here that Ellis states and defends three theses:
1) Derrida's claims that "there is no linguistic sign before writing" and "the concept of writing exceeds and comprehends that of language" are pretty much untenable no matter how charitably they are construed; 2) the speech/writing opposition deconstruction makes so much of has nothing to do with the main thrust of Derrida's thought, which is his advocacy of an anti-essentialist view of language (which is tenable, but neither original nor radical); 3) Derrida's description of language as "a system of signifiers" and his claim that "signifieds" can be in the position of "signifiers" betrays either a gross misunderstanding of Ferdinand de Saussure's theory of linguistics or a willful, and unsubstantiated, mutation of the same.

In his remaining 100 pages Professor Ellis abandons close reading and careful discussion of Derrida's texts in favor of a more general examination of the rhetorical strategies often employed in deconstructionist literary criticism as practiced by Derrida's disciples (for example, Ellis shows that a sexy categorical slogan such as "all interpretation is misinterpretation" is either obviously false or, at best, trivially true). While interesting, a little bit of this goes a long way--I found myself skimming the last couple of chapters.

...

Though the tide of deconstruction, the powerful Gallic efflux it was in the seventies and eighties, has ebbed somewhat, having given way to its close kin, New Historicism, it continues to have some currency in literary criticism: one would certainly be remiss if in her critical writing she did not drop the late M. Derrida's name now and then.

And yet, after having read recently Professor Ellis's *Against Deconstruction,* an absolutely withering critique of the titular adversary by any sensible measure, I wonder how deconstruction managed to survive, in whole or in part, nearly a decade into the early twenty-first century.

Let me say that I am not unsympathetic to the posture and attitude that characterize deconstruction's practitioners, but I have to admit that, as Ellis closely and rigorously argues, the revelation -- a revelation which makes one blush, believing he should have known this all along -- that deconstruction is old wine (admittedly, it is French wine, but old nonetheless) in new skins has forced me to cast a rueful eye upon my six years' apprenticeship in this discourse.

Yes, "old" because all criticism, as Ellis points out, is contestive, skeptical, resistant; thus to lard one's critical writing with nearly inscrutable, neologistic French loanwords is at best self-indulgent, if not captiously insistent on solipsism. And "new" because deconstructionists parade rhetorical dipsy-doodles as truly learned, truly sophisticated subversion -- a subversion that, according to Professor Ellis, remains deliberately incomplete, because to do otherwise would force deconstructionists to commit to a definite position. Which leads one to the conclusion, as it does Ellis, that deconstruction is far more establishmentarian, far more conservative (an accusation I believe Jürgen Habermas also leveled at French theorists in general) than the hoary old, and supposedly monolithic (though this too is a bogus assumption, as it turns out), New Critical (?) interpretations of literature deconstructionist criticism purposes to supplant.

There are surprises aplenty awaiting the curious reader of *Against Deconstruction,* the most surprising of which is the analysis of Derrida's (ab)use of Saussurean linguistics, perhaps the most damning thing to emerge from Ellis's forensics. And the reader will be left, then, to confront anew certain common-sense assumptions abandoned when she entered the thicket of literary studies: that it is often the most prettily wrapped packages which contain the most ho-hum gifts, and that the most indigestible critical fare is often the most meager.

Ellis's lengthiest chapter, concerning language, stokes my suspicions about Derrida. In that chapter, Ellis accuses Derrida of a fallacy, viz. the false dilemma, by implying that meaning in language can have but two possible explanations. Words either take their meaning from non-verbal essences or, lacking those grounds, are held in place syntactically, by relation to other words. Since the former has been discredited, only the latter in the form of word-play remains. And voila! - post-modernism comes into view. This is the dilemma fallacy in its purist form since excluded from the equation are all those intermediate positions, including Saussure's, that make use of concepts or categoreal distinctions. True, some varieties of this third approach have been discredited. But as Ellis's useful example of ambient temperatures shows, a variety of alternative concepts does not imply that categoreal distinctions are not based on non-verbal grounds. Derrida appears to have passed over such alternatives in uncaring fashion. If Derrida's many followers have a stronger position to state in support of deconstruction, I have not seen it.

I would have preferred more material on Paul de Man, who for some reason is scarcely mentioned in the book. Nevertheless, Ellis has effectively challenged the current fashion among the avant garde.

I am not a specilaist ion the field and I purchased this book to undertand deconstruction and its problems better. I was not disappointed in Ellis' exposure of the fallacies of deconstruction; however, I think he focused excessively on Derrida, while there are others such as Lacan, kristeva to mention a few that also deserve some 'attention'. I found the chapter on Language to be the clearest and most useful; however, I stress that I'm not a specialist and admit that reading this volume was somewhat difficult due to its emphsasis on logical reasoning and arguments. Nonetheless, I do think that its criticisms of deconstruction - and especially its misguided applications in the US - were very clear and convincing. Indeed, I find that Ellis' is strongest when he describes the intellectual climate out of which deconstruction was born, that is the stale monolithic character of french literary criticism of the 50's and the nned to supplant it with radical aideas that ultimately turn out to be just as stale. My only criticism is the the writing style that may put off the non-specialist. accordingly for thsoe like me I recommend the beautifully written The Reckless Mind by Lilla, which also exposes the fallcies of Derrida and other deconstructionists.

There are many books, pro and con, about current literary theory. Most of them are written by literary academics. This one is by a philosopher. The significance of this difference is in the tools which the author brings to bear on the problems or on his intolerance of slipshod thinking and sleights of hand. This book is also rare in that respect. The usual attitude of professional philosophers to Derrida is to let his arguments "fall of their own weight." However, fervently held beliefs do not fall of their own weight or even by the weight of argument. Ellis is to be complimented, therefore, for the extreme patience he shows in plodding through every detail of the claims of Deconstructionism and painstakingly refuting each one. This book will, of course, have no effect on the true believers. Nothing will. But for the undecided and the not-yet-converted this book may be a lifesaver. In the end, Ellis concludes that genuine theory "ought to employ analysis rather than rhetorical drama." (p. 158). Instead, in Deconstructionism, "theory" becomes in large measure a new vehicle through which older, unthinking attitudes are clung to and genuine change resisted." (p. 154) Ellis' book is analytical rather than constructive. For constructive answers to the problems that led to Deconstructionism and the other newer attempts at theory, see A Book Worth Reading.

First of all this text is remarkably lucid. Furthermore, it is quite fair in its critical analysis of the subject at hand. This text is also, though now around two decades old, very important to the ongoing debates concerning "deconstructive events".

Strengths: Ellis raises powerful objections to the privilege with which "deconstruction" is treated by its adherents. Specifically, through this text the author makes it quite clear, even early on, that "deconstruction" may be read as self-undermining, both in presentation and execution. Even more particularly, Ellis's observation that there are better and worse interpretations of deconstruction, evinced by both Derrida and his commentators, directly flies in the face of the central "deconstructive" tenet that authorial intent can not be a controlling factor.

Ellis also admirably calls to question some of Derrida's rhetorical movements, especially those key movements on which major points turn. For example, Ellis points out the habit of switching out terms for other terms, in supposed demonstration of validity, while no such successful demonstration may actually be taking place. I am thinking specifically of Ellis's discussion of the "language:speech/writing" translation, by Derrida, to "writing:phonic/graphic". This observation is quite prudent.

The chapter on the utility of "deconstruction" as criticism is among the best in the book. I recommend this chapter be read along with the writings of Gasché (against the possibility of "deconstructive" criticism) as well as the writings of someone like de Man or Norris (for the possibility).

Weaknesses: There are several, but of most notable interest to me was the early discussion of what Ellis takes to be a confused understanding of Saussure by Derrida. I do want to emphasize that on much of this material concerning a historical and conceptual analysis of Saussure, Ellis is quite spot-on; for example, his discussion of the "garbling" of 'sign', 'signifier', and 'signified' on the part of Derrida and his commentators is remarkably keen and one of the most poignant contributions he brings to the discussion. I hope that many readers, especially those committed to Derrida's "project", pay close attention to these passages. Elsewhere, however, I take it that Ellis is misconstruing things. For example, Ellis offers evidence that he takes to directly call into question the idea of ethnocentric logocentrism, in particular that Saussure offered a groundbreaking response to the Western tradition of preference for the written (strictly-speaking, not the written in any expansive Derridean sense of the term) in an ostensibly total lack of awareness of Plato's opinion on the matter --- and this is very much an area to which Derrida, following Nietzsche before him, looks to respond. Here Ellis takes Derrida to commit the offense which he condemns in Saussure -- privileging the written over the oral, but this is decidedly off-base.

The text also looks to be too selective for a deep critique. For example, some of the passages withdrawn from Spivak's translation of Grammatology are encapsulated within a lack of original context, and in some cases the questionable points of argumentation hold much more weight when taken within the entire essay or chapter within which they are found. This, alas, can be a struggle in the composition of any critical response to a text. I also have small concerns about the extent to which Ellis really went through the original French versions on his own -- being no issue had he not explicitly noted in a footnote on p. 18 that he had done so. I think that, at points, some passages fall victim to poor translation into English. Of course, this burden may not be exclusively placed upon Ellis, but if he is able to read the French, I see it as a less excusable error than it would be with the lack of French ability.

In a word: This is an extremely valuable text but like any other it cannot offer any final word on the matter of the "deconstructive" possibility. I would recommend this book more to dogmatic followers of Derrida than I would to those who have already dismissed his project, although this text should be read by philosophers and lit critics alike, not to mention anyone else working within the humanities or social sciences.