Customer Reviews

Against Method

5 star:		(16)
4 star:		(3)
3 star:		(2)
2 star:		(0)
1 star:		(0)

 

 

Feyerabend was probably the first philosopher of science who really stated that science as it is practised by scientists themselves is NOT an enterprise which can be strictly constructed or even fully described in any conventional methodical way such as the philosophies of positivism and even rationality or idealism for that matter propose. As is true for any human enterprise, no matter how strongly this is denied by the popular science press, it is, as Feyerabend puts it, an anarchaic enterprise, this does not mean random chaos or a process with no order rather he refers to the fact that scientists just as authors of great literature or poets, pursue their subject via many paths rather than the strict methodologies which are supposed to define science, in fact these methodologies fail to be `...capable of accounting for such a maze of interactions'. Einstein is noted as saying that `The external conditions which are set for the scientist by the facts of experience do not permit him to let himself be too much restricted, in the construction of his conceptual world, by the adherence to an epistemological system'. Feyerabend goes on to say that `The attempt...to discover the secrets of nature and of man, entails, therefore, the rejection of all universal standards and of all rigid traditions.' So starts his book "Against Method" and through detailed analysis of the scientists and the phenomenon in question Feyerabend proceeds to demolish any assertions which compress science into a box which stands alone outside of all other influences such as religion, history, culture or philosophy.

The idea that irrational means are used by scientists to form theories and understand phenomena is stressed. Similarly the fact that an observation is made does not necessarily imply the theory which follows eg the moon seen through Galeleos eyes. Also, reason is sometimes discarded in favour of new, seemingly unreasonable, ideas which explain the phenomenon and finally science itself becomes a kind of tradition in its own way. The blindness of the usual ways of thinking about science as expressed in the popular press is made clear and it is shown science is not and never has been or will be the only true way of understanding the universe.

Feyerabend's book is very entertaining given the radical and playfull nature of the man himself (see `Killing Time', his autobiography), nonetheless it is very well researched and his argument is solid. He does not shirk his academic responsibilities but rather writes as he thinks is best in order to explain his ideas without necessarily having to write in a cold or overly rational way.

Feyerabend also includes excerpts from his experience of famous scientists during his life such as the radical Felix Ehrenhaft, the young Popper full of vitality or Wittgenstein. He further explores his own misgivings when teaching people of cultures other than his own eg native Americans, Mexicans and so on and his own understanding that he had no real right to say his own phiosophical view or rather the one pushed by his society was any better than theirs or that intellectual procedures which approach a problem through concepts are the right way to go. Feyerabend stresses that the phrase "anything goes" is far more relavent to the progress of human knowledge and science.

An excellent book written with style

A friend of mine who worked in a restaurant once told me that if I knew what was going on in the kitchen, I would never go to eat there. After having read Feyerabend I wondered: if the general public knew the inside world of science, would anything with "scientific" basis still be trusted, would we admire their celebrities like Einstein, Feynman, etc.?

Against Method calls into question the position that science enjoys in modern society (politics, education, etc.). The separation of state and science the same way it was done in the case of state and religion during the Enlightenment is suggested. The main reason is that science is hardly distinguishable from the myths often encountered in religion, it can be equally as dogmatic (if not more), aspects of religion often criticized by scientists (such as giving more weight to ideas coming from prestigious sources) are very much present in science as well, and the concept of scientific method that is supposed to distinguish science from myth, according to Feyerabend, does not exist. Scientists on their way to useful discovery use a variety of tools, which includes rational argument and experimental checks, but it can also include rhetoric, propaganda, opportunism, etc. Furthermore it is not only that the scientific method does not exist, but it would hinder progress (in particular of science itself) if it existed, since proposing new ideas would be prevented from coming to light by the strict and binding criteria of any method, and in fact spontaneity would be sacrificed. It is also mentioned that the situation in science is steadily worsening since science has become a business in which producing bulk, (not mentioned are politicking at conferences, kissing up to powerful maffiosos of the field), etc. are more essential in building a scientific career than in depth investigations or great ideas.

Essentially the above is the analysis of science according to Feyerabend. His criticism of modern science (or perhaps more its institutes which intertwine with politics and business) is rather apposite. His solution is a sort of democracy or anarchy of ideas where science, religion, voodoo are more or less given "equal opportunity" to contribute, and everyone takes from them what s/he needs at any given time.

It seems to me that one of the conclusions of the book is not to give automatic trust to what is called science. Scientific achievements are not to be under-appreciated, but there is no reason to follow the advice of scientists (or so-called experts), necessarily, on issues such as their critique of religion (or other competing ideas of the world at large), what should be taught in schools, where tax money should be spent, or even scientific issues such as whether genetically modified organisms necessarily benefit everyone. The invention of the transistor certainly has made life easier, but science can do as much harm as good: some of the most talented and intellectually persistent individuals are drawn into an institution where they are likely to spend their energy on publishing papers in obscure journals (of which millions of pages are published weekly), and their talent geared at solving questions important only to a tiny part of the community (mainly other academics). (To some extent they become like medieval monks, only that medieval monks did not hold their annual conferences at the most expensive vacation resorts of the Mediterranean.) Thus science, even in ideal circumstances (that is neglecting the possibility of corruption, nepotism, etc.), can be a major obstacle to the spontaneous flow of human creativity.

All in all the issues raised in the book are likely to become more important in the future, since the position of science as the key to humanity's salvation or progress is less and less taken for granted unlike for much of the twentieth century (at least in the West).

A shortened sequel to this book is "Science in a free society", where much of the details are not elaborated but the ideas are stressed.

Anyone who expects an academic, theory building and hence myopic interpretation of history, especially in the context of scientific discovery and the nature of scientific fact and laws, would be well-advised to look elsewhere.

This book is a humorous, multi-sided and relentless attack on accepted notions and interpretations of consistency and progress, achieved through a single method (such as rationality or logic), in the area of human knowledge. Feyerabend denies method supremacy over contextual and meaning rich subjective thinking, and marshals the facts of history to establish the lack of any single method or well-defined body (such as science) in the growth of human knowledge.

What Howard Zinn did to conventional history with "A People's History of the United States", Feyerabend here accomplishes with regards to the history of science and rationalism. In doing so, he opens the door not for sloppy thinking, but for colorful and context rich thought and expression.

Philosophy of science can be fun at times. This book proves it. Feyerabend wanted to shock the scientific community when he wrote it, and was very good at it.

What are the main theses of the book? First, "the" scientific method does not exist. Scientists have to invent new methodologies on their way to discovery. Second, sometimes progress requires theories that contradict facts as scientists perceive them. Third, sometimes it requires irrational arguments in order to get your point across in science. Fourth, science does not deserve a special status in a social debate.

To many scientists, these ideas would sound provocative even expressed in the politest of manners. But that was not Feyerabend's style. On the contrary, Feyerabend overdid many of his statements ("The only principle that does not inhibit progress is: anything goes"), and he made rude remarks. Some of his statements are not very well supported by arguments. That, of course, is hardly surprising for someone who defends some irrationality in science. But it will not convince a hard-boiled rationalist. Also, Feyerabend's exaggerations made it easier for his critics to criticize him.

And still, Feyerabend knew what he was talking about. Scientists are indeed sloppier and more irrational than they pretend to be. Galilei's statement that the earth rotates around its axis did contradict the "fact" that nobody ever noticed any influence of this rotation. And it was not science that first pointed out the dangers of environmental pollution.

Conclusion: Against Method is a classic, and it deserves it. It's a very interesting book for those who know how to read it.

Paul Feyerabend, in writing this book during the anti-authoritarian, hippie infested, mid 60's was, like Kuhn, just asking for heavy misinterpretation. This should make us want to read the book all the more. Feyerabend, as you will discover, is NOT anti-science, Feyerabend is NOT anti-reason and for god's sake, FEYERABEND IS NOT A SUBJECTIVIST! What he is advocating is scientific anarchism, meaning: science does not proceed by any set of rules, criterion or methods. So, as may suprise you, Feyerabend is not even that contraversial.

Feyerabend supports himself like this. Science operates from theories which inextricably use observation, preconcieved theories (like "the earth is moving right now"), language and subject-dependent vantage point. Since none of these are completely, or ever could be, accurate, no theory can ever be proved, and so many theories would be refuted because of changing paradigms, preconceptiois and world-views affecting all of the above, science would never make any progress. Thus, if there are any rules, they are pragmatic hence science is purely instrumental meaning it can only be judged in retrospect and rules only exist situationally. All may be broken.

So how is Feyerabend not contraversial? Between Popper (all theories are inextricable from preconceptions that sometimes are shown erroneous), Dewey (science is pragmatic and instrumental) and Kuhn (paradigm shifts mark heavy changes in science and because of their scope, make scientific change excruciating and unreliable), all of these Feyerabendian critiques have been made before. The other detriment is that while he makes strategic points against method, it would've helped his credibility if he guided us to a new starting point. If we can only judge science in retrospect, but still can't even be sure that are preconceptions won't get in the way, than how could we even do THAT. An attempt at an answer (even in guess form) would have been nice.

To his credit, the book is written well (certainly not difficult to read), is thought provoking (this coming from a Popperian) and does make some good adjustments to what came before. Popper's insistence that theories, when replacing others, need to be at least as explanative as the old ones. Feyerabend smartly answers with a quick retort - 'Why? Why couldn't a new theory solve most of the problems so well, that we use it assuming the rest will be figured out in due course?' There is also a brilliant post-script where Feyerabend advocates 'seperation of science and state' and makes a beautiful case for science education that teaches many 'hows' instead of many 'whats'. Also his "postscript on relativism" and three prefaces (original, third edition and chinese edition) give a much deserved slap in the face to those that still look at Feyerabend as a relativist and non-believer in science. They need to read this book like they should've the first time. You should read it too.

This book is a must read for those interested in the history and philosophy of science, epistemology, and philosophy. Feyerabend presents a refreshing perspective in philosphy of science, even in the context of contemporary thought. The arguments presented in the book are bold, original, persuasive, and often humourous. Feyerabend's main thesis is that the ideas of 'scientific rationality,' 'truth,' and 'progress' are myths. He supports an 'anarchistic' (or 'Dadaist') conception of scientific methodology.

This is a beautifully written and beautifully argued critique of modern philosophers' naive accounts of scientific rationality. I shall merely summarise some of the historical examples used---to indicate repertoire, as it were---for I am unable to convey the virtuosity of the performance itself.

Galileo used "propaganda" and "trickery." He presents his account in terms of relative motion of the path of a rock dropped from a tower not as a consistency proof of his point of view (which it is) but rather as an inconsistency proof of the opposing view (which it is not). (pp. 68-69). His account of circular inertia follows the exact same pattern (pp. 74-76).

Galileo's contemporaries did not trust the telescope, with good reason. The observations contained many inconsistencies: the planets were magnified but not the stars (p. 92); some stars were seen double (pp. 88, 90); the moon appeared to have enormous mountains and craters but its boundary was still perfectly smooth (p. 91); the first telescope Kepler received from Galileo "showed the stars as squares and intensely coloured" (p. 90). Galileo could not explain the inconsistencies or even the optical basis of the device; his knowledge of optics was very poor (p. 82). It is furthermore well known that our vision can easily be misled in the absence of visual cues such as background, overlap, etc. (p. 87), and "that the senses are aquatinted with our everyday surroundings, but are liable to give misleading reports about objects outside this domain ... [This] is proved at once by the appearance of the moon [which] gives us an entirely false idea of its distance and its size." (p. 86)

"Friction" was to Galileo a purely ad hoc hypothesis "defined by the obvious discrepancy between fact and theory rather than as physical events explained by theory of friction for which new and independent evidence might some day become available (such a theory arose only much later, in the 18th century)." (pp. 104-105)

Newton was similarly forced to assume that mirrors had a special power. "Considering that the surface of mirrors is much rougher than the lateral extension of the rays, the ray theory is found to be inconsistent with the existence of mirror images (as is admitted by Newton himself): ... a mirror should behave like a rough surface, i.e. it should look to us like a wall. Newton retained his theory, eliminating this difficulty with an ad hoc hypothesis: 'the reflection of a ray is effected not by a single point of the reflecting body, but by some power of the body which is evenly diffused all over its surface.'" (p. 44)

Newton thought God interfered in the solar system. "According to Newton the 'mutual actions of comets and planets upon one another' give rise to 'some inconsiderable irregularities ... which will be apt to increase, till the system wants a reformation' ... [i.e.] gravitation disturbs the planets in a way that is likely to blow the planetary system apart. ... Newton concluded that it was being periodically 'reformed' by divine interventions." (p. 40)

Relativity theory was refuted in 1906. "Kaufmann stated his conclusion quite unambiguously, and in italics: 'The results of the measurements are not compatible with the fundamental assumption of Lorentz and Einstein.' Lorentz's reaction: '... it seems very likely that we shall have to relinquish the idea altogether.'" Ehrenfest and Poincare were also convinced. (pp. 40-41)

"Some scientists propose theories and calculate cases which have little or no connection with reality" (p. 240). Many of the greatest scientists of the 18th and 19th centuries worked enthusiastically of hydrodynamics despite the fact that the results of this theory "virtually do not agree at all with the practical phenomena" (p. 240).

In Against Method Paul Feyerabend argues for an "open" approach to epistemology. His idea that scientific truth is only one kind of truth is certainly not original, but few have argued it with the force and style that he is able to bring to this book. With regard to his style, he makes philosophy entertaining, although his irreverence toward many icons of modern thought may shock some readers. One doesn't have to agree with everything he says to see the basic humanism that animates his arguments. Perhaps the most important statement in this book is his protest against the way that scientists and political leaders use science to justify cultural genocide. (We, the experts--scientists, and the politicians who rely on us as "their" experts--know better than yourselves--"primitive" people--what is good for you. We want to replace your "superstitions" with our "truth" for your own good.) Feyerabend recognizes that there are truths that exist independent of Western science, including artistic ideas, mystical ideas, other sciences that Western science sees as unscientific (like Chinese medicine, or Native American ecology), and that much of the hegemony that Western science has in the world today comes from the fact that it serves the interests of the politically powerful (and gives them the best weapons). Feyerabend makes his case for an all-inclusive methodology in science, his famous "anything goes," with humor, passion and a brilliance drawn from his own multi-disciplinary background.

The reader below is right when equating Howard Zinn to Paul Feyerabend.... both are among my favorite authors, both perform similar functions, and both are, to say the least, controversial in many ways.... not just because of their eloquence and ease to read....

First, if you are a scientist and not philosophically inclined, skip this book because this is not going to be something that is in any way akin to your spirit. This book is a wholesale attack on how science is traditionally viewed: Science is not, Feyerabend argues, one long march toward some ideal of knowledge, but something different entirely....

Feyerabend is both enlightening, erudite, and fun to read: I'm not going to spoil him because he explains himself much better than I could ever. I recommend this book to anyone into the history of science, to anyone who has read and liked Thomas Kuhn, and to anyone with an open and inquisitive mind in general.... as well as to anyone who is just looking for an interesting author to discuss over martinis....

Paul Feyerabend is one of the most pioneering of the contemporary pragmatist philosophers of science. This is the 1988 edition of his first book originally published in 1975. Most of his philosophical ideas are set forth in this book, and its "Analytical Index", which functions as a table of contents at the opening of the book, is wonderfully convenient for entering his thought.

His thesis of "scientific anarchy" or "anything goes" is probably the most controversial of his ideas about the empirical sciences. It is fully intended to be more radical than Kuhn's phrase "scientific revolution." Feyerabend ridicules any positive valuation of scientific institutions or rational processes involving criteria for scientific criticism in basic science. He is thus explicitly and emphatically opposed to Popper's philosophy of scientific criticism, and he caricatures it as "ratiomania" and "law-and-order science."

His "incommensurability" thesis of the semantics of successive scientific theories is his best-known idea, and it resembles Kuhn's use of the same term. Unlike Kuhn who qualified his earlier statements, Feyerabend makes no concession to the radical nature of his thesis. In this book he elaborates his "incommensurability" thesis in terms of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis of linguistic relativity. Like Kuhn, he unfortunately never developed a theory of meaning description.

His rejection of the positivist observation language makes his philosophy characteristically post-positivist, and his thesis of "counterinduction" is one of his most interesting ideas. His exemplification of counterinduction in Galileo's defense of the Copernican theory is one of the most insightful philosophical analyses I have ever read. Had Feyerabend not taken Bohr's ideas as definitive of quantum theory, he might also have exemplified counterinduction in Heisenberg's reinterpretation of the electron's track in the Wilson cloud chamber, which Heisenberg describes in his book, Physics and Beyond.

I believe that retrospection will reveal that Feyerabend is one of the truly great philosophers of the twentieth century. For more about his philosophy Google my book titled History of Twentieth-Century Philosophy of Science at my web site philsci with free downloads. See especially Book VI.

Thomas J. Hickey