Customer Reviews

Agents of Innovation: The General Board and the Design of the Fleet that Defeated the Japanese Navy (Blue Jacket Bks)

5 star:		(2)
4 star:		(1)
3 star:		(0)
2 star:		(0)
1 star:		(0)

 

 

This original book is focused on the role that the U.S. Navy General Board had in designing and, to the extent possible, building a U.S. Navy capable of meeting and defeating the Imperial Japanese Navy in WWII. The General Board was created in 1900 to advise the Secretary of the Navy on technical matters related to naval ship design, construction, and armament. In practice the Board functioned as a component of what was in all but name the Navy General Staff. The Board was dissolved in 1950 when changing command structures made it redundant.

By Kuehn's account the most important service of General Board came during that period of uneasy peace between the end of WWI and the start of WWII. His argument, which he supports quite well, is that in spite of imposed treaty limitations and chronic shortages of funds, the Board cooperated with the Naval War College, the Chief of Naval Operations(CNO), and the Navy Bureaus (e.g. Bureau of Aeronautics) to build a powerful modern navy entirely capable of meeting the challenges of WWII. Perhaps one of the most surprising points he makes is that the Board did not seek consensus, but cooperation and mutually developed solutions to problems involving a wide spectrum of naval issues.

During the inter-war period, the General Board was a powerful advocate for a strong navy and was composed at times of the CNO, the President of the Naval war College , the Chief of Naval Intelligence, and the Commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps. Remarkably although most senior U.S. Naval Officers at the time were 'battleship men', the Board consistently demonstrated a clear understanding of vital role that naval aviation would play in future fleet encounters. Probably the most difficult problem that these intelligent and prescient officers had to solve was how to provide the Pacific Fleet with adequate forward support bases in the Western Pacific. Under the Washington Naval Treaty the U.S. was forbidden to build effective, fortified full service naval bases in the Western Pacific or to improve the few existing bases already built there. This forced them to reconsider their strategic (Orange) plans for war with Japan and to develop various innovations to extend the range and effectiveness of the Pacific Fleet. The most far reaching and original of these innovations was the 'Mobile Base Project' (MBP) which incorporated floating dry docks and a carefully crafted logistic support system that proved itself in WWII. All in all not a bad record for the Board or the U.S. Navy.

This book provides a very useful consideration of how the US Navy responded to the profound changes resulting from the Washington Naval Treaty of 1922. In some ways it offers an often difficult to find link spanning the interwar years. Many of the topics discussed may be a bit dry or too detailed for the general reader, but for those in search of a thoughtful discussion of how the USN got from WWI to WWII, this book will be rewarding.

Perhaps the most interesting point is the author's contention that the 1922 Treaty's limitation on expanding or enhancing the USN's bases in the Western Pacific forced a number of innovations that might otherwise have been unnecessary. Among them were the need for ships with the ability to be at sea for extended periods of time, an early appreciation for the importance of naval aviation, and seagoing dry-docks and support facilities. The author explains that this restriction of the USN's "fortification" of bases that would have been useful in an "Orange War" against Japan was the quid pro quo for securing Japan's acquiescence to a ratio of capital ship tonnage only 60 percent of that allowed the USN and the RN. I thought the author made a compelling case for his argument, but eventually I found his belaboring of this concept became somewhat tedious.

Although they were not central to the author's thesis, I would have enjoyed more coverage of the negotiations that led to the 1922 Treaty and the politics surrounding the appropriations for the Navy during these two decades. Both topics include a colorful cast of characters and constitute important pieces of a jig-saw puzzle that, when fully assembled, explains how the USN was ready to fight and win the war in the Pacific.

Agents of Innovation explained how the General Board of the US Navy, in the wake of the Washington Naval Treaty's ban on American fortification of it Western Pacific bases began thinking of innovative ways of addressing the limitation. Because of the lack of forward bases, the Navy began planning for a long-range, blue water fleet with extraordinary ability to replenish underway. It also began planning for the "step-by-step" strategy of island hopping and establishment of forward operation bases (the secret Mobile Base Project) to include SeeBee construction battalions and dozens of floating dry-docks some of which could accommodate the largest ships in the American inventory.

All of these preparations (made in the 20's and 30's) laid the groundwork for the American victory over Japan. This book was absolutely fascinating, anyone with any interest in WWII naval strategy needs to read this book.