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Agents Under Fire, Materialism and the Rationality of Science

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Angus Menuge has written an excellent book defending the concept of "agency" against the most challenging arguments raised by contemporary materialists. Menuge shows that the Christian worldview gives an account of human agency that is not available to the most sophisticated accounts materialism. For example, Menuge engages Dan Dennett, Paul Churchland, Jerry Fodor, and other key figures in contemporary philosophy of mind. The criticisms Menuge brings to light show the breaking points in leading theories of mind. I read this book as a philosophy graduate student taking a philosophy of mind seminar, and I found that Menuge's criticisms and scholarship can run with the best of them. His carefully documented work of scholarship was a valuable tool for me as a student even in graduate school.

But Menuge's book is not just a piece of critical scholarship. He also advances some constructive theories that explain crucial features of human agents. A theistic worldview provides tools for maintaining a robust theory of personal agency that are unavailable to materialists, which Menuge brings into focus with rigorous logic and clarity.

Menuge also discusses Intelligent Design theory, including a chapter rebutting the most recent criticisms against irreducible complexity. The arguments put forward in this chapter advance the ongoing debate on intelligent design considerably.

Agents Under Fire does demand a certain background in philosophy that may place it out of reach from the unaquainted layman. Nonetheless, Menuge has written a book that is both logically rigorous and philosophically apt, which the disciplined reader will be able to understand and undoubtedly will find worthy of study. I gladly recommend this book as a fine addition to those interested in an engaging and critical study of the philosophy of mind, intentionality, and personal agency.

Philosophical naturalism is frequently advocated as the only doctrine that a scientifically informed intellectual of our time can possibly consider. Angus Menuge has shown, however, that a wide range of powerful considerations can be brought forward against this philosophy. Menuge provides a close examination of leading naturalists such as Dawkins, Dennett and Churchland, and draws upon a wide range of critics from C. S. Lewis to Michael Behe, to provide what is arguably the most comprehensive critique of naturalism yet to appear. People who are interested in the Argument from Reason should be especially interested in Menuge's disucssion. A must read for naturalists and for their opponents.

Dr. Menuge has written an extremely important underappreciated book providing a crucial link between the emerging scientific theory of intelligent design and the mind. This book exists as something of a well-kept secret. But many readers interested both in the philosophy of mind and the continuing Darwin vs. design debate will find this book to be a significant intellectual achievement.

Menuge carefully and logically explains how reductionist, materialistic accounts of rationality, concepts and intentional states are intellectually incoherent and unsatisfying. He deftly explain how intelligent agency best explains reason and rationality. Menuge thereby defends the very idea of common sense. He persuasively responds to the arguments of Dennett, Dawkins, Churchland, and others.

An impressive conceptual defense of biochemist Michael Behe's design argument of irreducible complexity is provided by Menuge. From there, Menuge ably argues that the concept of irreducible complexity is evident is manifest through rational thought processes.

Many significant insights are provided along the way in Menuge's book. His analysis of the materialist "appearance of design" argument is particularly remarkable.

The writing is methodical, but it is often quite dense. There is some complicated terminology and concepts imbedded in the text, but careful attention will allow a reader to follow and benefit from reading.

Hopefully, more attention will be paid to the mind and mind-body issues related to the Darwin vs. design debate in the years to come. Menuge has made a worthy contribution to an important topic.

Agents Under Fire defends a robust notion of intelligent agency and intentionality against eliminative and naturalistic alternatives. Angus Menuge thus demonstrates the interconnection between philosophy of mind and intelligent design.

Firstly, Menuge analyzes intelligent agents to see what they do when they produce designs. For example, Menuge observes that intelligent agents "exhibit intentionality" with "reasons for action" which are "reasons for the individual to do" that action. (pg. 27)

Menuge later tackles Behe's irreducible complexity arguments by arguing that they challenge reductionism in biology. In particular Menuge tackles head-on the objection that irreducible complexity can be produced via exaptation (i.e., co-option). Menuge finds five problems that co-optational-based accounts of the origin of irreducible complexity cannot overcome:

"For a working flagellum to be built by exaptation, the five following conditions would all have to be met:
"C1: Availability. Among the parts available for recruitment to form the flagellum, there would need to be ones capable of performing the highly specialized tasks of paddle, rotor, and motor, even though all of these items serve some other function or no function.
"C2: Synchronization. The availability of these parts would have to be synchronized so that at some point, either individually or in combination, they are all available at the same time.
"C3: Localization. The selected parts must all be made available at the same `construction site,' perhaps not simultaneously but certainly at the time they are needed.
"C4: Coordination. The parts must be coordinated in just the right way: even if all of the parts of a flagellum are available at the right time, it is clear that the majority of ways of assembling them will be non-functional or irrelevant.
"C5: Interface compatibility. The parts must be mutually compatible, that is, `well-matched' and capable of properly `interacting': even if a paddle, rotor, and motor are put together in the right order, they also need to interface correctly." (pg. 104-105)

Menuge also forays into Darwinian explanations for the origin of mind. According to Menuge, the Darwinian psychology produced by Dawkins, Dennett, and Pinker is unable to explain the integration, unity, direction, and reliability of rational thought. For example, "if it is assumed that the human brain evolved gradually from an ape's brain, then the vastly superior psychological ability of the former would require a long and gradual series of changes resulting in a much more complex brain." (pg. 135) But since "at the anatomical level, human brains are very much like ape brains" Menuge argues that "`relatively small alterations of brain structure must have produced very large behavioral discontinuities in the transition from the ancestral apes to us.'" (pg. 135, quoting Fodor) Menuge further concludes that "[i]f that is the case, cognitive capacities are not Darwinian adaptations that developed gradually" but are either "remarkable flukes of nature, by-products of changes that were selected for other reasons" or, as Menuge believes, they "require some nonnatural explanation." (pg. 135)

Drawing on his experience as both a philosopher and computer scientist, Menuge shows the reader that the materialist's attempts to rid science of all commitment to teleology can only result in incoherence. Instead Menuge presents his own unique argument for the legitimacy of intelligent design.

I can see why Michael Ruse, in his forward to the book, did himself a great service by 1. reading it himself and 2. being wise enough to not venture a pre-emptive rebuttal attempt. In fact, I accept his invitation to read this astonishing and influential book. I found it to be direct, and well written, Angus Menuge deftly illustrating concepts well through his unique flair and subtle wit.


First, a devastating blow to those who don't think anything is designed at all (Strong Agent Reductionism)...One particular gem of fact that leapt out at me was on page 15 of the preface...


"If nothing is actually designed, then design is an illegitimate concept."..."It then becomes a serious problem how the intentional stance which attributes goals and designs to an agent, can be so successful in interpreting and explaining the scientist's own behavior in constructing theories and in (as we all say) designing theories".

and another...same page...


"....the very notion of explanation employed by the scientific materialist assumes the existence of agent, that is, beings capable of directing their behavior on the basis of representations of states of affairs, such as hypotheses, predictions, plans and designs"

"Understanding therefore, requires intentionality"


Comments mine here. >> And you guessed it! Intentionality implies..purpose..and purpose implies ....design.


Here's another gem, sure to agitate the most committed materialist...from page 17 of the preface...


"..design and intentionality are legitimate, but nonnatural categories. Given the fact that these categories are explanatory in the human case, it is dogmatic to declare a priori that they must fail in alleged cases of alient, superhuman, or divine design or intentionality. Following the recent work of Del Ratzsch, I argue that common arguments against invoking the nonnatural or supernatural in science are mistaken and rest, in many cases, on unexamined prejudices that derive their plausibility from an uconscious identification of empirical science with materialistic science."


"If humans really do have goals, as the rationality of science presupposes, then it is surely possible that other agents have goals and that we may sometimes discover empirical evidence of their activity."


Moving along now, to Chapter Three, pg.82, we find a logical argument to support the above stated, that



" P1.If something has a purpose, then it is designed
P2.Intentionality has the purpose of guiding behavior.
P3.So intentionality is designed via P1 & P2
P4.Clearly, our intentionality is not designed by us, although it does
enable us to convey our own designs.
P5.Thus, our intentionality is the result of prior design via P3 & P4
P6.If (as Fodor reminds us) something is designed, then it is the
product of intentionality
P7.So, our intentionality is the product of prior intentionality via P5
& P6.



Moving along to Chapter Four, pg.103, begins a point by point (5 points) logical rape of the co-optation argument that seeks to tear down the mountain of evidence for design in the bacterial flagellum. This alone is worth getting the book.


and further, in Chapter Seven, pg.174 "But if human agents result in undeniably designed effects, it is dogmatic to exclude the possibility that other kinds of agencies are capable of doing the same thing"

The above statement is so elegantly put...Beautiful...



Moving on to a more well known contemporary topic in Chapter Eight, beginning on page 196, Menuge then does a take no prisoners attack and waste'm all demolition of some of the popular evolution myths, though mostly based on well know material also brought out in Well's "Icons of Evolution"..

A gem here, page 196

"Scientists should not be tied to a dogmatic starting point, such as Dobzhansky's maxim that "nothing in biology makes sense except in the light of evolution". Rather they should assert that, "nothing in biology makes sense except in the light of evidence."



Menuge then goes for the kill, taking apart some of the well known evolution myths and hoaxes meant to spread disinformation to the public, while keeping in line with scientist's presuppositional materialist perspectives (also known as methodological naturalism, scientism, et etc)
1. The 1953 Miller-Urey experiment, that was made under assumptions that the early earth had no oxygen, but since then, new evidence has shown that early earth did indeed have oxygen..thus, the Miller Urey experiment was "designed" or "manipulated" (though ignorantly) in a way that made the experiment appear to work, but only if the early earth did not have oxygen. Since the experiment worked..therefore (it was assumed), the early earth did not have oxygen! I never thought of these ambitious scientists as religious before, but I must say that it appears they were taking a great step of faith to expect anyone to believe their conclusions 50 years later.



Then "Darwin's Tree of Life" is shown to be rootless, merely a vibrantly growing bush with no evidence to support it from the fossil record. In fact, the fossil record indicates a much different story... geologically and morphologically sudden appearances, not gradualism.
Then, the "homologuous limbs" idea is put in it's grave (again), not to forget the Haeckel draws of embryonic development, long ago found to be faked. From pg.198


"Scientists of that time were not eager to check out Haeckel's work, so the bio-genetic law was "deduced from evolutionary theory rather than inferred from the evidence". Even today, biology textbooks continue to teach it.


Next debunking was done on the Archaeopteryx, and then the Archaeoraptor (found to have "a dinosaur tail glued to the body of a primitive bird"). That bird must have flown like a lead balloon. :)


Next debunking was on the bacteria and insect resistance adaptation evolution issue... already long known to produce adaptations without producing a new species. Even with the insects in question, fruit flys, an additional pair of wings resulted, but there were no muscles for the wings, which means it would have been a survival deficiency(like most mutations).


I wish Menuge would have expounded more on debunking the evolutionist/materialist perspective of human evolution. From page 199


"Even more dogmatic, and an apt example of Bacon's idols of the theater, are the accounts of human evolution offer by paleoanthropologists. Here it becomes obvious that certain stories are appealing for ideological reasons and that, because fossils are not self-interpreting, they must be artistically placed into preexisting narrative structures"


and a final quote..pg.199


"One can hear Winston Churchill as a biologist: "Never in the field of science have so many based so much on so little"


(comment mine>> The above, undoubtably referring to those dogmatic evolutionists with their religiously fervent adherence to philosophical materialism)


Well I have only mentioned small morsels of the raw and effective dismantling of materialism/scientism/philosophical materialism that Menuge presents in his unique and to-the-point manner. I highly reccomend this book.. and like Michael Ruse, I reccomend it be read by those who are critics of design.

"Agents Under Fire" is a scholarly work defending the intentional nature of consciousness against reductive materialism. The author has a Dennis Miller-like gift for descriptive allusions. Occasionally that cleverness sometimes comes at the price of clarity. I often found myself unpacking metaphor instead of following his compelling arguments. Readers who are not familiar with the issues of philosophy of mind will not find this an easy read.

Nevertheless, careful reading reveals a systematically built case for the irreducibility of intentionality. First he refutes the claims of the physicalist position then works towards exposing the inconsistencies of more moderate forms of eliminative materialism. In short, he effectively demonstrates that reductions of human agency to natural processes, as advocated by Dennett and Churchland (in particular), are incoherent. A brilliant Leibniz-like ontological proof of God is presented as part of Menuge's carefully articulated defense of agency. This ontological proof takes the basic form that since there are entities that have contingent agency (human beings), some higher entity that has agency as a necessary property of its being must exist to confer it.

Throughout the text, Intelligent Design (ID) as a legitimate scientific approach to certain problems emerges as a secondary, though closely related issue to that of agency. Here the author does not present any new arguments in favor of ID, but rather re-presents those of Dembski and Behe. Using historical examples and tightly constructed arguments, Menuge contributes to the debate by demonstrating that an a priori commitment to methodological naturalism is profoundly unscientific. The final chapter deals with the relationship between science and theology even more directly, theology is not required to forever yield and adapt itself scientific pronouncements, especially when those pronouncements ignore or attempt to explain away the very qualities that make us human.

I'll admit that Dr. Menuge's book is not a light, bedtime read, but he deftly explains and then examines the problem of "agents." An "agent" is the philosophical referent for what we commonly call our self. He contends they're under fire because certain systems of thought (e.g., naturalism) define agents out of existence. Dr. Menuge examines the arguments, evidence, and implications building a solid case for the existence of real agents: We do have a "self." This might cause torturous difficulties for naturalism, but that should not cause us to shy from the conclusions. Recently Dr. Anthony Flew has re-thought his position; even Dr. Danial Dennett has expressed waffling in recent interviews. This book is well worth the read.

Menuge mounts a sophisticated philosophical argument against the philosophical underpinnings of Darwinism, scientific materialism. Menuge believes that Darwinism is living on the borrowed time of Enlightenment thinking which sees material as all that is and matters.

To do this he advances that scientific materialism cannot sustain itself coherently by seeing design as merely illusionary, not fully embracing either agency or intentionality, both necessary to understand the basic scientific method of hypothesis and challenging theories by planned experimentation and rationalization.

Drawing and engaging with the popular Darwinisist reductionist philosophies, Menuge takes on Strong and Weak Agent Reductionism, finding both of them incapable of logical defenses for both scientific investigation and mental processes that we humans assume to be real so that science can advance.

This is sophisticated philosophy, so those as this reader that do not regularly engage in its vocab find the sledding rugged finding such terms as "agency, synchronic, diachronic, epipheneomenalism, etc." However, the interested reader will find Menuge's ability to define and clarify these as he goes along with useful, common illustrative examples to aid.

A weak, inappropriate response is that this damages science, allowing religion to enter. This is the false move that Menuge identifies, showing an illogical move from scientific materialism to scientific attitude. He states: "scientific materialism is neither an implication nor presupposition of doing science." Both forms of reductionism he finds unable to maintain the rationality of science, having a unsupported bias against the nonmaterial.

He champions well a view of Intelligent Design that is coherent and upholds the scientific attitude and method without the false, illogical attachment to scientific materialism. We all have been highly suspect not of science, but of the philosophical basis of scientific materialism.

A book that must be dealt with by the Darwinists, so this reviewer will wait to see that response and Menuge and others reply.

finally.. a complete challenge to evolutionary naturalism and one i *think* it'll find extremely hard to refute (as michael ruse almost admits in the introduction).. it goes hand in hand with victor reppert's excellent 'c.s. lewis's dangerous idea' and william hasker's 'emergent self' as cast iron theistic challenges to the materialist reduction of agency.. i'd also recommend c.s. lewis' 'abolition of man' simply as a frighteningly prophetic outlook of man's future once morals and values, much like consciousness/mind/soul here, are reduced to the material/natural.. after that its all brave new world, 1984 etc. and why not?

ok.. im off to listen to zao's new album the funeral of God..