This book is an interesting concept and will be read by the intelligentsia of this country. Too many people and that means most of us are dependent upon reading newspapers, and watching television to understand the origins of the financial crisis during 2008/ 2009. Reporters simply parrot back what they are told. They possess no capacity to synthesize the vital information on which the vast majority of us will make decisions to support, or not support the programs that the Fed is putting forward.
The men in this book know what they are talking about to the extent that anyone can, when dealing with extremely complex macroeconomic interventions in uncharted territories.
Here are a few of the minds that are exploring the financial crisis and its aftermath in this book:
* George P. Shultz
Is there anyone more on top of his game than Shultz, educated at Princeton, with a PhD from MIT? He is a former Secretary of the Treasury and a former president of Bechtel Corporation. His recommendation is for all of us to think long-term because we are missing the big picture. Short term actions are having unintended long term effects that have to be anticipated.
* Allan Meltzer
Meltzer is probably America's foremost historian of the Fed. His volume II, History of the Federal Reserve was just released. In his essay in this book, he argues for a return to proven policies to attack our current situation.
* Donald Kohn
Former Vice-Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, in his essay talks about how the Fed operates from the inside, and in particular deals with the systemic risks that the Fed is trying to deal with.
* James D. Hamilton
With a doctorate from UC Berkeley he uses charts to lay out the Fed's balance sheet in detail. He shows you the precise concerns regarding inflation, and the potential loss of independence by the Fed.
* Myron Scholes
One of the authors of the Black-Scholes equations for options and derivative pricing, in this essay he argues for using market based mechanisms in an attempt to reduce systemic risk.
There are seven more experts who are writing essays. They are not all that difficult to read although it is expected that academics working at this level intentionally make themselves difficult to understand, so that they can deny ever saying anything. There are 205 pages of narrative, and it is my opinion that the most interesting part is the last chapter where the editor of the book John Ciorciari does a summary, and effectively argues for key principles and proposes recommendations. These include:
A) Dealing with Moral Hazard and the concept of Too Big to Fail
B) Transparency Improvements
C) Reforms of the Market and Regulations
D) Strengthening the Ratings Agency Concept
E) Capital Standards Enforcement
F) Derivatives Markets Improvements
G) Housing Finance Reforms
H) Bankruptcy Law Reforms
I) What to do with the Firms that FAIL
CONCLUSION:
As informed citizens of our Republic, we need to take control of these issues for ourselves, and not leave them in the hands of the academics, and the media. In order to do that we have to become better informed? Reading this book is a way to achieve that goal. I urge you if you want to understand the situation we got ourselves into, and the potential roads out of it, to read through a book like this. Thank you for reading this review.
Richard C. Stoyeck