Customer Reviews

The Air Campaign : Planning for Combat (Future Warfare Series, Vol 3)

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John Warden was the strategist of the air campaign in the 1991 Gulf War. In 1998, he updated his influential book. A must read for anyone interested in the military, its past, present and future.

Col. Warden adds new material to this important work on strategy, especially new material on what happened after the Gulf War. This book is many things. It is a history of airpower. It is a fresh look at the application of airpower. It is a guide for anyone in the military or business world who wants to compete or attack a system. Very readable. With Col Warden's reputation as the architect of the Air Campaign against Iraq, he has demonstrated that he can apply his ideas in real world situations. Outstanding read.

Colonel John A. Warden III was one of the most distinguished officers of his generation. A veteran fighter pilot, he was--is--as well a true defense intellectual--not the sort of individual often touted by the so-called "defense reform movement," but a true warrior-scholar in the classic image of, say, a J. F. C. Fuller--or a George Patton. Not one to shy away from controversy, Warden was convinced in the 1980's that the United States Air Force--had strayed away from its first principles. It had become a stove-piped, tribal organization, riven by discord and confusion between its "strategic" and "tactical" communities. Warden, in this brilliant work (written as a thesis at the National Defense University), posited an exciting new vision of the centrality of air power in national defense. This book served as an important departure point for the service's subsequent "Global Reach--Global Power" strategic planning framework issued in 1990. By that time, Warden was running Checkmate, a key office in Air Force planning. Through his own initiative and vision, he and a small team of "weapons officers" planned Instant Thunder, the first major response to Saddam Hussein's aggression in the Gulf. Warden briefed Instant Thunder to the Air Force Vice Chief of Staff (the Chief was away), and then on his suggestion to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Gen. Colin Powell. Powell sent him to CENTCOM to brief Norman Schwarzkopf. His reaction was enthusiastic, and Warden was directed to brief Instant Thunder in the Gulf, to the CENTAF air component commander, General Charles Horner. Horner, brilliant in his own right, accepted much of what Warden said. But the personal chemistry between the two men was bad, and Warden returned to the States, leaving behind a small staff of acolytes and experts, most notably Lt. Col. David A. Deptula. It was the partnership of Deptula, Gen. Buster Glosson, Gen. Horner, and (back in Checkmate) John Warden that made the Desert Storm air campaign a success. After the war, Warden became commander of the Air Command and Staff College, making notable (and badly needed) changes to its curriculum. This book is a "must read" by anyone who would consider themselves a military and/or air power professional. There are Americans alive today because of John Warden's work. Warden never made general, largely because of petty jealousies by senior people above him. He was--is--a consumate professional and true patriot: never complaining, never self-advocating, always keeping true to his core beliefs. But his truest legacy is this book and the thinking it has inspired--thinking that has lead to five notable American victories over the last decade. Buy it, read it, keep it, use it!

A fresh and renovated review on a complicated topic such as Strategy. Interesting and updated points of view with a simple and easy language. A must for any military aviator.

John Warden's book earned high praise because of its author's role in planning operation Desert Storm, but although the book is a very good synthesis of air warfare theory it is not either groundbreaking or revolutionary. In fact most of its arguments were presented for the first time by the pioneers of air power of the 1920s and 30s like Giulio Duhet and William Mitschell. Warden's contribution has more to do with the revival of those forgotten theories and the presentation of a complete picture of aerial operations instead of inventing new methods of war. Central to his thesis is the idea that air superiority is crucial, that a campaign will be lost if the enemy has it, that in many circumsatnces it alone can win a war, and that its possession is needed before other actions on the ground or in the air can be undertaken.

Warden also places emphasis on thorough training saying that if something is going to be done in war, it ought to be practiced in peace, and if it has not be practiced, losses are likely to be high and the plan is unlikely to go as expected. He analyzes the three kinds of inderdiction (distant, indermediate and close) and he gives an interesting definition of the term "close air support": "It is an air operation that theoritically could and would be done by ground forces on their own, if sufficient troops or artillery were available".

The author repeats often the great value of striking the enemy's center of gravity, that timing is everything in the commitment of air reserves and that ground and naval forces can serve as an adjunct to air forces in the battle for air superiority. His opinion that fighting defensively is the worst way to fight an air war is uneiversally accepted as is his thesis that numbers are important, so important that a primary goal of the operational commander ought to be to make sure that his forces outnumber the enemy every time they meet. Modern research using the Lancaster equations has also proved his argument that the large force almost always inflicts greater absolute casualties on the smaller force and thath it also suffers less in the process.

John Warden also explains in the Epilogue how his concept of ideas was implemented in the Desert Storm campaign of 1991. In that case the enemy was visualized as a target system of five concentric rings (leadership, key production, infrastructure, population and field forces) with the leadership ring at the center. In the case of Iraq, the US goal was "to reduce the energy level of the entire system enough to reach our peace objectives" which were to eject "Iraq out of Kuwait and an Iraq that would not be a strategically threatening regional superpower for the next decade".

On the minus side of the book are the extremely poor black and white pictures.

Even more than two decades after it was written, The Air Campaign remains a must read for all interested in military strategy. The publication of this book marked the beginning of a period of ascendancy for air power, seeing it become a weapon of choice to support government. Therefore, to understand the operations conducted in Iraq, Afghanistan and the Balkans through the 90s and at the turn of the century, one must have an understanding of John Warden's theory of air power. The Air Campaign is a great starting point for this.

The strength of this book it's development of a coherent theory during on the experience of air power gained during the preceding 80 years. Although Warden has been accused of selecting examples that support his argument and ignoring other case studies, and even of distorting the facts, the historical examples provide food for thought as they encourage the reader to view accepted fact from a new perspective.

Some may challenge the continued validity of this book in the light of the rise of counterinsurgencies as the dominant form of conflict in the modern age. Such a view would be unfortunate for it not only ignores the fact that conventional stat-on-state conflict has not ceased to be a possibility, but also that concepts in the Air Campaign have applicability beyond air power's application to conventional conflict.

The most relevant aspect of the Air Campaign is the chapter dealing with "Orchestration". Warden's use of an orchestra metaphor to reinforce his view of the need to look beyond integration as the focus of force development and application is powerful, and encourages a reevaluation of current approaches to counterinsurgency operations. Viewing it as a "land concerto" should see a few novel ideas put forward.

My only issue with this book is the quality of the printing. The photos included are grainy and low quality. This, together with some pages with faded printing, provide an unfortunate finish to a modern strategy classic.

I recommend this book to anyone interested in military history, air power strategy, or the evolution of military thought.