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Air Power Against Terror: America's Conduct of Operation Enduring Freedom

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Not really, but more on that later.

"Air Power Against Terror" is an incredibly detailed history of the first six or seven months after September 11th 2001, with an in-depth analysis of things that went well and things that needed improvement in the use of air power in that period. Mr. Lambeth conducted extensive research and the bibliography of this book is imposing, but emphasis was on primary sources throughout. The first two-thirds of this book are the history in chronological order, and this will be a key resource for future historians because of its detail and scrupulous referencing of sources. The last third is analysis. Mr. Lambeth's assessment is well constructed and supported and bears considerable thought from anyone involved in the Department of Defense, the military, or in any aspect of the government related to the use of military power (like the State Department).

The most contentious section of the book will be the description and assessment of Operation Anaconda, the attack against a Taliban stronghold in the Tora Bora region in Spring '02. Rather than go through the intricacies of the post-operational blamestorming, I'll sum up the understanding that Mr. Lambeth conveyed to me. From Joint Central Command to the 101st Division, noone can be absolved of responsibility. Brigade level units and below undoubedly made errors, but these are lost behind the greater errors at higher levels. The 101st deployed without its normal supporting elements (specifically an Air Force liaison element), for security duties, but subsequently, CENTCOM directed them to conduct conventional operations. In the heat of pre-battle planning, coordinatation done by the unit that had stayed behind wasn't made. Because of this, the Air Force was caught flat-footed, and failed to react quickly enough once they were informed of the plans. Many of the complaints about how the Air Force conducted operations stem from Army leaders not understanding what the Air Force can and can't do (even though the information was readily available). CENTCOM mismanaged (and over-managed) the fight, the Army didn't understand the Air Force and assumed that communication was happening, and the Air Force was slow to react once the issue was identified. This is my perception based on a reading of this book.

How does Douhet figure into all this? In 1921, Giulio Douhet, an Italian general and aviator, wrote The Command of the Air (USAF Warrior Studies) advocated what would have been an asymmetric military power structure, based on air power. Much like von Clausewitz' On War, it has been quoted, misquoted, and repeatedly cited as a definative theory of how to do air power operations. Douhet's understanding of politics and human nature was naive, but his theory would have been strong if he had incorporated a framework for media campaigns, Special Operations Forces capabilities, and had precision guided munitions and modern surveillance technologies been available. "Air Power Against Terror", especially the initial invasion of Afghanistan reads like Douhet's vision brought into the XXI Century. A country rendered incapable of defense through overwhelming air power. What is disturbing is that there are some in government who will draw the wrong lessons, not consider the conditions in Afghanistan in November 2001, and think that this was easy, and think that without qualification, Douhet exactly right. This would be bad. This would lead to travisties like Lyndon B. Johnson's incompetent management of the air campaign in Viet Nam.

If modern air power is of any relevance to your profession or even of interest, read this book. But read it, including what went wrong; don't cherry pick the parts you like.

E. M. Van Court