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Most Helpful Customer Reviews
1 of 1 people found the following review helpful:
4.0 out of 5 stars
A good study of the impact of air power in Vietnam,
By
This review is from: Air Power and the Ground War in Vietnam (Paperback)
Dr. Donald Mrozek undertook a study of the impact of air power on the ground war during the Vietnam Conflict. He admits he focuses on aspects of the air war less emphasized in other sources, purposefully avoiding some of the grander scheme aerial campaigns. He approaches his task by outlining prevalent theories of air power used by the United States as it entered Vietnam in chapter one. The second chapter covers the disjointed and inefficient command and control of the joint forces, to include a conflict of the services' doctrine of how to employ air power. Politics and civilian officials drove much of the war, which did not help form an effective joint air component, and Mrozek discusses this in the third chapter. The next three chapters deal more with the actual conflict in Southeast Asia, and how air power was put to use there. The fourth chapter highlights how air power allowed supply to units typically considered beyond the line of supply, as well as assault on targets previously unassailable. This expands in the fifth chapter to discuss joint efforts and interservice cooperation. The sixth chapter follows innovative use of weapons during the air war, and the manner of impact this use had on the ground campaign. Mrozek concludes with thoughts on how air power changed the manner of conducting war in light of lessons learned by Vietnam.
Air Power and the Ground War sheds little new light on the aerial campaigns. In the introduction, Mrozek admits a heavy reliance on published accounts and a lack of using all available documentary material. Instead, he states, he seeks to offer distinct arguments in each chapter, which, when taken as a whole, offers a more enlightening view of the support and efforts provided by the air war in Vietnam. What this does mean, however, is the book can be read with little other knowledge of Vietnam. While Mrozek does not give detailed information regarding specific battles or military actions, he lays each out in the book with just enough detail to get the reader to understand the concept as presented. More often than not, he presents several examples to prove a point, although none in great detail. Even while the book has appeal to the Vietnam history novice, it also holds appeal to those who have taken special interest and study into the war. Mrozek's focus on command and control, conflict of doctrine and joint efforts brings together the ideas from an Air Force perspective. Mrozek reviews the history of air power doctrine, dating back to the First World War. A point he makes and returns to throughout the book is how air power theory often ignores historical experience, instead relying on technology and innovation. This leads to projecting how the weapons can be employed against future threats instead of the current threats. This became a downfall during Vietnam because the Air Force had relied on Strategic Air Command to fight future wars, predicted to be nuclear in nature. The Air Force had not prepared itself for unconventional and regional conflicts, and was not ready to support the ground war at the onset. This reliance leads to what Mrozek calls "a peculiar attachment to weapons and systems projected for the future," and can be seen in the modern era with the F/A-22, which was initially procured to fight the same enemy the B-52 was designed against nearly fifty years ago. While the only conflicts the world has seen since Vietnam have been regional and non-nuclear, until 2001, air weapons were designed to fight against the nuclear enemy. The insight into this ill-suited preparation and the effect on Air Force operations in Vietnam remains valid, especially with the on-going unconventional war against terrorism. During Vietnam, the utility of air power was initially seen as limited and unable to have direct impact on the enemy. This came partly from the ill-preparation by the Air Force for unconventional warfare. It was furthered by the diverse doctrine of each service with regards to air power. Lack of coordinated command and control of air assets throughout the theater enhanced the limitations, as well as micro-management of the war by civilian authorities in Washington, far removed from the combat engagements. While Mrozek does not discuss how this thinking carried into the future after Vietnam, a study of Desert Storm indicates a surprise at the utility of air power. Mrozek sets the stage for how a misunderstanding of air power propagated and remained entrenched in the military until the 1990s. Views of General William Westmoreland, who was Commander US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, indicate a top-level Army perspective of what air power could and could not do to assist the war effort. Additionally, a simplified study of the combat at Khe Sanh reviews much of how air power was adapted from the strategic defensive doctrine embraced by the Air Force to useful battlefield tactics and support critical to defend the forward firebase. The chapter on innovation of air power during Vietnam is extremely enlightening. Certainly not all-inclusive, the chapter covers innovative techniques and technologies, and perhaps more importantly, the limitations of each. Often when reading about air power in Vietnam, the breakthroughs are touted as critical for the development of future air power systems. The drawbacks of each, either technically or tactically, are often overlooked. Mrozek does great service in giving a whole picture understanding of some of the advancements. A portion of the innovation, indeed much of what is focused on in the book, is how air power was used to support a conventional war. One such technology - or blending of technologies - adopted during Vietnam was the fixed-wing, side-firing gunship. By placing artillery and machine guns in cargo aircraft, the Air Force had a mobile firepower to put in orbit over a ground position on call. Remote outposts could have a great amount of support if they were attacked, even at night, because of the gunships. Three models of gunships were created, one of which, the AC-130, remains in the Air Force inventory today, with great utility for use in the war on terror. The gunships had limitations too, which Mrozek highlights; they were slow, vulnerable to enemy aircraft, anti-aircraft artillery and surface to air missiles. Still, they were an innovation designed specifically to support the ground war through air power, and were remarkably well-suited for their tasks. The chapter on innovation can be read and applied to all areas of military use, especially in a global environment where weapons are employed in manners other than their initial intended application. The flexibility to adapt the weapons is crucial and can be extremely beneficial, but as Mrozek states, "any solution attempted could in turn generate new problems." This book is a mix of history, insight and analysis. It summarizes events during the Vietnam War to support the benefits and limitations of air power in support of a conventional ground conflict. Many of the points Mrozek makes continued to plague the Air Force following the conflict, including several which remain valid in modern military actions. In his final chapter, Mrozek concludes fundamentally the conflict in Vietnam failed "in conception and vision on the strategic level." This included in no small part the use of air power. Doctrine, including the differences among the services as well as the focus only on strategic defense by the Air Force, failed to prepare for effective use of air power, and was not tempered through study and analysis of history. The doctrine forged a mindset in the American military as well as civilian leadership about how air power could be employed. Still, despite these shortfalls, air power was successful in the support of ground counterinsurgency operations. Mrozek clarifies in his final chapter air power is not the solution to all problems, comes with its own issues, but is a vital asset to waging joint warfare. He concludes the book by saying, "the potential of air power for impact on ground combat can neither be fully known nor fully realized without also knowing the impact of American mentality about the uses of air power."
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