Customer Reviews

Air Power: The Men, Machines, and Ideas That Revolutionized War, from Kitty Hawk to Gulf War II

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I'm always a little wary of long history books written by journalists, who sometimes present history as a tedious interview of various "sources." Stephen Budiansky, a correspondent for the Atlantic Monthly, is a happy exception to the rule. His prose is clear and crisp, and he tells an engaging story in a way that kept drawing me back to his rather hefty "Air Power."

Budiansky begins his book by explaining why the accomplishments of the Wright Brothers were so remarkable. He then renders a detailed history of the military uses, both real and imagined, of aircraft. The result is a story of a rapidly emerging technology told against the background of the military theories of the 20th and early 21st century.

Throughout his book, Budiansky takes issue with the views of theorists and generals who claimed that air power could be a "war-winning" weapon, either because it could be used to terrorize civilian populations into surrender or because it could cause rapid economic collapse by striking at the chokepoints in an enemy's supply system. The author argues that, with very few exceptions (such as the interdiction of German oil supplies in the last year of World War II), air power has not performed very well as a strategic tool and has always been far more effective when used as a tactical weapon in support of forces on the ground. In this sense, the Second Gulf War in Iraq can be viewed as the apotheosis of the effective use of air power: with the advent of readily available precision weapons, even "strategic" aircraft such as the B-1, B-2 and B-52 bombers have been used to great advantage in the role of close support of ground troops.

In the aftermath of the opening phases of the Second Gulf War, air power is for the moment ascendant on the battle field. But if there is anything to be learned from Budiansky's meticulous history, it is that military innovation is a very Darwinian business. Plenty of bright people are studying the successful American and British invasion of Iraq, trying to make sure that the air power strategy used in that conflict will work just as well in the next war--or, for those worried about being on the receiving end, trying to prevent that strategy from working at all.

As someone with four decades of professional experience with air power both as a military planner and aerospace engineer, I was initially a little skeptical about a survey to be written by a professional writer with no direct background. In fact, however, Stephen Budiansky's book, is an extremely impressive accomplishment -- it is hard to imagine that anyone could do it better. It is very thoroughly researched and sets a high standard for accuracy and thoroughness, but never gets bogged down in the details. Budiansky fashions his immense collection of data into a coherent and fascinating story, alive with real people and vivid action. There is always a sense of purpose and direction to his narrative and the reader never feels lost.

The high quality of the research and writing is matched by the quality of the book's production. Its nearly 100 photos are well selected and very finely reproduced on high-grade glossy stock. Budiansky's concise, clear, and accurate explanations of battles and technologies are illustrated with well-drawn maps and diagrams. As specific aircraft are discussed, they are represented in the margins in clear drawings and basic data. Rather than clutter the text with footnotes, the extensive references are collected at the end, in a format which makes it easy to locate the source of every quotation and important piece of information. A bibliography of more than 500 items testifies to the author's thoroughness as well as providing easy routes to finding additional information. In every way, this is a great deal of book for the money, particularly at Amazon's price.

Books about air power seem as common as clouds, and most have about as much substance. This one is a great exception, a volume packed with solid information, presented in a consistently clear and interesting manner.

Will O'Neil

PS. As a matter of full disclosure I should note that I am mentioned among Budiansky's acknowledgements. In reality, I played a very modest role in it, restricted to providing some research information and advice. It is in no sense my book, and I would not hesitate to criticize it if criticism were warranted. It is not.

Before the Wright Brothers ever flew, authors like HG Wells were predicting that vast destruction would be wrought from the air in any future conflict. This is the story of how aviation technology slowly, fitfully came to deliver on that promise.

From the first short hops at Kitty Hawk, Budiansky takes the reader from the anticlimactic debut of heavier than air craft in the Italo-Turkish war to the awesome power of the USAF during the two Gulf Wars. Without neglecting the obvious great battles and aircraft, he emphasises crucial peacetime developments, in both aircraft design and the equally important realm of tactics and strategy, that did so much to shape how wars were fought.

The book has some minor flaws. British and American development of such technologies as the jet engine, radar, and swept wings are given exhaustive treatment, at the end of which we are informed that, by the way, the Germans had also made these inventions years before. It is also unfortunate to end any piece of writing with the statement "Rumsfeld was right". While the second Gulf war was a technological and military triumph, we are given no hint of the morass Iraq was to become or how ineffective all weather medium level precision bombing is against an urban insurgency.

But these jarring notes are insufficient to spoil a masterpiece. Budiansky leaves us with the irony that air power has achieved its greatest success in the battlefield role that ambitious officers have been trying to escape since the beginning.

Bottom line up front Amazon.com buyers: This book is worth its money just for the number of insightful tales. Example, the writer gives the full aerodynamic reasons why the Fokker VII was the best fighter of the Great War, World War One. The little Fokker D VII only had 160 HP, little better than a modern Cessna 172. Allied aircraft of WWI had up to 400 HP engines and had less performance than the German Fokker. The Germans had a spents more time on the science of aerodynamics.

The book is full of wonderful stories. Here is an example. Did you know in the closing months of WWII a group of British FM-2 Wildcats (Martlet IIs) flying from carriers mixed it up with German pilots flying BF-109s out of Norway and shot several of the 109s down? Yes! Who would have "thunk" the portly Wildcat could best the BF-109? The aircraft that helped win the 1942 Battle of Midway could best the BF-109 if its flown by the right pilots. Speed is life to a fighter but something can be said for turning radius, rate of climb, and pilot experence.

There is a saying among historians that it takes 50 years for the truth to be written about subject. This book is very anti-strategic bombing but gives specific reasons why strategic bombing is pointless. Why? Well, if you want to miss the target, waste aircrews, wreck aircraft, kill civilians, and enrage the populace of a nation then use strategic bombers. The writer goes on to give sterling examples of how much better the fighter bombers (or Jabo, pronounced "ya-boh", a contraction of the German word Jagbombenflugzeug) was for bombing targets and tactical support. Example, it was the fighters, not the bombers, that beat Germany in the Western front in France during WWII. Nearly every tank, truck, train, and bridge were knocked out by fighter bombers, not bombers.

And those lessons were ignored.

Korea was a mini-repeat of WWII. While B-29 bombers would impotently flail against the North, it was the fighter bombers that stopped communist forces in the South.

And those lessons were ignored.

Vietnam was a wretched air war from every point of view. The aircraft were wretched, such as the F-105 that few without self sealing fuel tanks (what was the USAF thinking!?!). The targets were wretched, like the "Ho-Chi Minn" trail that was nothing more than a series of bicycle trails spread over a 75 mile wide area. The political control from Washington was wretched, Johnson bragged the military could not bomb an outhouse without his permission. Vietnam was a nearly worthless war from an air power point of view.

Desert Storm is the first war, post WWII, that air power was used right. However, the author gives some stories that didn't quite make it to the major media. First point, the only aircraft that could fly to Bagdad was the F-117. One massive raid by regular aircraft on Bagdad was done and it took losses. Yes, the Iraqi anti-aircraft artillery was that good. Second point, the aircraft that did the "tank plinking" in Desert Storm was NOT the A-10. It was the F-111. Why? The two seat F-111 had a dedicated WSO (weapons system officer) and better sensors than the Warthog. The WSO would designate the tank and the pilot would kill it with a string of iron bombs. Using an F-111 to kill tanks is like using a semi-truck to pull your lawn mower. It works but...

The death of the strategic bomber cult happens during the Gulf War. Some strategic bomber clown flies down to Saudi Arabia and tries to show USAF General Chuck Horner a proposed strategic bomber version of "shock and awe". Horner isn't buying it and it's amazing to read. One thing comes to your mind: used car salesmen are in every profession.

What does the future hold? Who knows? Stealth will play a huge part. So will robotic aircraft. Desert Storm will be seen as the high water mark of air power. Missiles, super artillery, robots, particle weapons, and stealth will be the future of support on the battlefield.

This is a most excellent book

Stephen Budiansky's _Air Power_ is an excellent overview of the rise, development, and transformation of military aviation during the course of the twentieth century. Throughout, the author does a fine job of balancing his clear understanding of the physics behind the technology of flight with lively and interesting anecdotes regarding the technicians, pilots, and engineers who helped transform the airplane from the plaything of rich sportsmen into the world's most powerful weapon of destruction. Although, as another reviewer has already noted, Budiansky's incessant criticisms of those who favored strategic bombing from c. 1920 through the Viet Nam War does grow a bit tiresome, this remains a terrific introduction to a very important subject.

When there is a paradigm shift in a technology, there is a tendency to evaluate everything in terms of that shift, and often harshly judge those who behaved differently in the past. In the case of AIR POWER, the paradigm shift is the explosive advance in precision munitions, and the great evil of the past that Budiansky wants dead is any concept of the strategic use of bombing, prior to the use of precise guided munitions.

So right from the beginning Budiansky has an agenda and that is to deprecate and smear any use of bombers in a strategic way. And he does. It's horrifying when fighters almost disappear from the US arsenal in the 1950s. LeMay and Spaatz are such bona fide idiots that you can't believe that anyone would have trusted them with Match Box cars, much less the defense of the United States. And all of what he says makes sense in the context of a reality where precision munitions are plentiful and the use of dumb bombs senseless.

What he never gets at is why the US government paid for such an expensive force of bombers. Although Budiansky is constantly making fun of how poorly educated bomber pilots are, he can't escape the fact that smart men evaluated the relative merits of the alternatives and chose to purchase bombers instead.

Why?

Well, that's a question Budiansky fails to answer. My answer to that is simple: from the late 40s through most of the 1950s the strategic bomber force was given the funds because they were to deliver nuclear weapons, and when a single aircraft with a single bomb can deliver more destructive power than a thousand conventional fighter bombers, and in an era when it was thinkable to use the nuclear weapons of the time, values are different.

Prior to the 1950s, he delivers a lively history, despite his prejudices and after about 1972, the sheer dearth of any good analysis makes this book quite valuable. It is quite true that much of the advances in aviation are paralled with the revolutionary increase in accuracy in weapons, and he makes a number of interesting comments about how just about any aerial weapons platform this day is a close support weapon.

But that's just it. There is a lot more to the use of airpower than close air support. And what you're going to get here is the history of Air Power judged entirely by the ability of a private to kill Asians at the press of a button.

David.

This book has just the right mix of fascinating anecdote, illuminating technical detail, and historical exposition to make it both an entertaining read and deeply informative. As a pilot with a background in physics I especially liked the fact that Budiansky's technical explanations were generally clear concise and accurate. Probably the most important thing to take out of this book is how a military doctrine can become so ingrained that it survives for decades despite voluminous empircal evidence to the contrary.

Good overview on the technical aspects of flight & the integration into the military structure. Provides a good review of the the difficulties encountered during the inter-war period of the 1920s & 1930s. The book undervalued the importance of logistics during the WWII Pacific Campaign because it was "boring". Good book for readers who are looking for an overview without too much detail.

I read this book, here in Brazil, when a friend of me, send it.I read this book in some days days and, as combined, I return the book to the owner.
This book has come parts that are good, and many parts bad.
About the beggining of air power, it claims that Wrights Brothers begin it.In fact, the first ever plane, ver to fly was the 14-bis, bye a brazilian, who flew publically and openly, in 1906, in France.In 1907, the brazilian Alberto S. Dumont, also made the first pratical airplane in the world.Were the experiences of Alberto Santos Dumont, in 1906-1907, who really shows the world the possibilities and realities of aircraft, and air power.The Dumont's experience were all public and we could repeat then.
Before 1908, the Wright brothers never, even claimed that the were inventors of nothing.They and in fact anybody else, never made no (public)fly in any made by then before 1908.In fact, any Wright flying machine replica had ever flown, in any part of the world.In december, 2003, the president G. W. Bush, send to fly a fake.Even with so many frauds, the machine, never went in the air.If you go to Kitty Hawk, you can see museums, monument to the eugenist Wright brothers, etc.There's one thing you can't see.A real replica of any fly experience of Wright brothers between 1903 and 1907.Lyke the UFOs, the ghosts, Virgim Mary,etc., the Wright results between 1903 and 1907 are unpossible to be repeated.The russian, germanies claims they also invented aircraft before the brazilian A. S. Dumont.And all of then have experience to show.The same is unpossible to Wright brothers's experiences before 1908.The Wright brothers were also ridiculous wrong that any aircraft could in any future, to cross the Atlantic ocean.The Wright brother also claims that weels in aircraft "are ridiculous".In fact, 100% of aircraft ever produced with commercial and military use, had weels.100% of aircrafts made by Alberto S. Dumont had weels.The Wright brothers only in 1910, finnaly made an aircraft with weels.Even the USA's govern knew nothing about the Wright's sucess before 1908.The book "Man flies" tells you about this subject.It was wrien by an american.
This book tells the limitations about strategic air power in World War II.In fact it don't tell facts such as the fact more then the half of German's 88 mm cannon were in Germany, fighting against american and english air bombers.In fact, even not destructing the German's industrial base,the fact of simple existence of that bombers put hundreds of thounsands of personal and cannons in German soil, not fighting USSR.
The B-24 Liberators could exterminated the nazi subamrines in 1942, if Winston Churchill and Frankln D. Roosevelt had gave this order.They didn'd this because of orders, not lack of tecnology or manpower.Only after march, 1943, the B-24 Liberators and Sutherland begined the destruction of german submarines.In may, 1943, about 30% of german submarines were sent to destruction by air power.Aircraft and bomber's atacks also had propaganda efects in german's minds.
About first Gulf War, in 1991, this book claims that F-117 made many diference.In fact Saddam Hussein never defeat even the weak Iran's air force in eight years, between 1980 and 1988. Saddam Hussein fail completely to destruct the Iran's air force.With or without the F-117, the result of that war will be the same.This book shows that F-111 was better then the A-10 Thunderbolt.I didn't know this thing.
The AAA is very a limited weapon, against any kind of aircraft.More then about two miles height of fly or distance, every AAA will had very limited sucess, and more probably no results at all.In 2001, the taliban's AAA made any damage to any american aircraft.The weak Saddan's AAA in 2003, was nothing more the paper's tiger against the USAF.In fact USAF lost more aircraft by accidents and friend's fire, in second war against Saddan, then all the SAM and AAA of Saddam Hussein.