Award-winning reporter Jason Burke shows how the threat from Islamic terrorism comes not from a single criminal mastermind, or even from one group. In this revealing account, he characterizes it is a broad movement with profound roots in the politics, societies and history of the Islamic world. Using hundreds of interviews and thousands of documents, Burke shows how "Al-Qaeda" is a convenient label applied misleadingly to a diverse, disorganized global movement dedicated to fighting a "cosmic battle" with the West. This is the definitive account of the mysterious organization, retelling its story from scratch and challenging many myths that threaten the very foundations of the "War on Terror."
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Book Description
Editorial Reviews
From Publishers Weekly
Not many reporters have firsthand experience of terrorist camps, but Burke, chief reporter for London's Observer, achieved it during the 2001 war in Afghanistan. His nuanced investigation into Islamic extremist groups benefits as a result; his depth of knowledge is clear as he paints a complex portrait of al-Qaida and related groups. The outfit often called al-Qaida is, he says, actually a loose amalgam of groups that share a similar worldview: a belief in Islamic fundamentalism and antagonism toward the West. This is not new, but Burke writes clearly, and his descriptions of terror camps and religious schools-even a brief description of a bombing campaign in Afghanistan-make his work more lively and powerful than most of the recent books on the subject. Similarly, he shows that Osama bin Laden is less central to the enterprise than Western leaders think; the Islamist movement is longstanding and widespread: "This movement is growing. Osama bin Laden did not create it nor will his death or incarceration end it." As a result, he argues, the U.S. focus on bin Laden and al-Qaida is misguided and ultimately a waste of time-in fact, he says, it will only create more bin Ladens. Only a battle to "win the hearts and minds" of the Islamic world will effectively counteract the terrorist phenomenon. Unfortunately, Burke fails to address how this might be done, but he's made a strong argument that it is the road to take. Maps not seen by PW.
Copyright 2003 Reed Business Information, Inc.
Copyright 2003 Reed Business Information, Inc.
Review
"An accurate analysis...an informative book."-- Albert Smith, The Irish Independent
"A must-read...Burke's sophisticated view of Al-Qaeda is convincing. Burke's book is the one that will last. It's a triumph."--Giles Foden, The Guardian
"This book is an eye-opener... authoritative and detailed"--Hazhir Teimourian, The Literary Review
"This young, impassioned journalist has made an important contribution to the growing literature on al Qaeda."-Jeff Stein, Washington Post Book World
"He has given us an indispensable guide to the multidimensional reality of Al-Qaeda"-- John Gray, New Statesman
"...more lively and powerful than most of the recent books on the subject."--Publishers Weekly
"...Burke has taken the time to sort it out...compulsory reading for Rumsfeld and his clique."--Sam Kiley, The Evening Standard (UK)
"Fascinating...packed full with totally new material."--Gilles Kepel, author of Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam
"...a book which vastly increases our understanding of the Al-Qaeda phenomenon. Burke writes with admirable lucidity and the benefit of his frontline reporting and deep research."--Peter Bergen, author of Holy War, Inc.
"A must-read...Burke's sophisticated view of Al-Qaeda is convincing. Burke's book is the one that will last. It's a triumph."--Giles Foden, The Guardian
"This book is an eye-opener... authoritative and detailed"--Hazhir Teimourian, The Literary Review
"This young, impassioned journalist has made an important contribution to the growing literature on al Qaeda."-Jeff Stein, Washington Post Book World
"He has given us an indispensable guide to the multidimensional reality of Al-Qaeda"-- John Gray, New Statesman
"...more lively and powerful than most of the recent books on the subject."--Publishers Weekly
"...Burke has taken the time to sort it out...compulsory reading for Rumsfeld and his clique."--Sam Kiley, The Evening Standard (UK)
"Fascinating...packed full with totally new material."--Gilles Kepel, author of Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam
"...a book which vastly increases our understanding of the Al-Qaeda phenomenon. Burke writes with admirable lucidity and the benefit of his frontline reporting and deep research."--Peter Bergen, author of Holy War, Inc.
"...more lively and powerful than most of the recent books on the subject."
(Publishers Weekly 20030707)" This book is an eye-opener... authoritative and detailed"
(Hazhir Teimourian The Literary Review )"This young, impassioned journalist has made an important contribution to the growing literature on al Qaeda."
(Jeff Stein Washington Post Book World )"He has given us an indispensable guide to the multidimensional reality of Al-Qaeda"
(John Gray New Statesman )"...Burke has taken the time to sort it out...compulsory reading for Rumsfeld and his clique."
(Sam Kiley The Evening Standard (UK) )"Fascinating...packed full with totally new material."
(Gilles Kepel Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam )"...a book which vastly increases our understanding of the Al-Qaeda phenomenon. Burke writes with admirable lucidity and the benefit of his frontline reporting and deep research."
(Peter Bergen Holy War, Inc. )"Jason Burke... has made an entirely persuasive case. ...This young, impassioned journalist has made an important contribution to the growing literature on al Qaeda."
(Jeff Stein Washington Post Book World 20030914)
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Most Helpful Customer Reviews
21 of 22 people found the following review helpful
Format:Hardcover|Amazon Verified Purchase
_Al-Qaeda_ by Jason Burke is an excellent and well-researched book on the structure, history, philosophy, goals, and future of not only of al-Qaeda itself but of other militant movements within the Islamic world.
Most fascinating to me was that the book was as much as about what al-Qaeda wasn't as about what it was (and is). Al-Qaeda is one of the most misused, overused, and misunderstood words in the media today, one that has artificially been imposed upon a rather large and diverse group of Islamist groups beginning in the early 1990s.
In Arabic, al-Qaeda is basically an abstract noun, one meaning "base," as in a camp or a home, or "foundation," as is what is under a house. It can also mean "pedestal," such that what supports a column, and also can mean "rule," "formula," "method," and "pattern." It has been in use since at least the mid-1980s among the Islamic radicals fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan, though Burke wrote that this should not be surprising, as it is a common Arabic word. Generally the term since then has not been used to describe an extant organization, but actually a purpose and a function. One of the first times the term was encountered was from the name of a terrorist manual, entitled _Al-Qaeda_, obtained from Ahmed Ajaj, detained months before the 1993 World Trade Center attack and later convicted for his role in that assault. The title was translated at the time as meaning "the basic rules" and Burke felt that was the correct translation; that it is not the name of a group being used but rather it is being used in its sense of a "maxim" or the "fundamentals."
Many in the media, in positions of leadership, and even professional analysts often make the mistake of thinking of al-Qaeda as some sort of united organization, run by one man, maybe envisioning a James Bond type villain presiding over a vast international organization from some secret lair in the desert. The closest thing according to Burke that ever really could have been called "al-Qaeda" was a rather small and short-lived organization, one active between 1996 and 2001 and largely based in Afghanistan, destroyed and dispersed as such by the fighting at Tora Bora.
If anything, he wrote, there were three al-Qaedas. One is what he called "the al-Qaeda hardcore," based in Afghanistan, comprised of men such as bin Laden, Mohammed Atef, Abu Zubaydah, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and others, a small group of militants, generally Afghan war veterans. Then there "the associate members of al-Qaeda," long-term associates of bin Laden and the hardcore, not usually based in Afghanistan, who accepted missions from them, acted as intermediaries and recruiters for not only the hardcore but for others, and also undertook projects of their own. The third group is vast, amorphous, and hard to define, basically the movement of modern radical Islam itself, with its myriad cells, domestic groups, and individuals. This Burke called the "network of networks;" other groups, originally often with only very local concerns (Burke detailed at length militant movements in Kurdish Iraq, Pakistan, Algeria, Uzbekistan, and elsewhere), that would from time to time come to be to varying degrees under bin Laden's umbrella, sometimes for specific missions (approaching bin Laden or his associate members for money, weapons, fatwas, or training), other times for more long term associations. An important aspect of the network of networks is that many groups were often very independent in action and only worked with bin Laden as they saw fit; there was no compelling these groups and individuals to act.
In reality, there is a rather broad movement of Islamic militancy active in the world today, of which al-Qaeda is only a part of. Burke viewed Osama bin Laden as actually a rather peripheral figure, mainly existing in a charismatic, inspirational function or as a facilitator for the activities of other militant organizations and individuals. Burke provided several models to view al-Qaeda. One is to see al-Qaeda as some sort of wealthy university distributing research grants and providing classes to allow the ambitions of its pupils to be fulfilled, a sort of Holy War Foundation. Another analogy is viewing it as a model of venture capitalism; individuals or small group approached the chief executive and the board (bin Laden, etc.) with ideas that they believed were worthy of support. This board would evaluate hundreds of proposals and decided which to back, which missions would turn a profit so to speak.
The last section of the book detailed the results to date of the war on terror. Though there have been successes - many members of the al-Qaeda hardcore have been killed or captured, Afghanistan has a real chance at democracy, and there has been extensive physical damage to the hardcore with the loss of its training camps and its refuge in Afghanistan - Burke felt that the group is winning. Those hardcore members that were not killed or captured have dispersed and continued to aid and fund operations worldwide. Many of these militants, after dispersal from Afghanistan following the American attack, caused radicalization wherever they ended up, notably in Pakistan, Kashmir, Algeria, Yemen, Chechnya, Indonesia, and Uzbekistan. Though bin Laden's ability to personally influence events has greatly decreased since he went into hiding after Tora Bora, the network of networks is hardly touched, as most groups are firmly rooted in "local contingencies and causes," having little if anything to do directly with al-Qaeda, and didn't necessarily need al-Qaeda to begin with. From Burke's perspective bin Laden is doing very well, as he achieved his goals of radicalizing movements in many countries, leading them to plan their own terrorist activities, using people often with no previous experience with terrorism and unknown to security services (the October 12, 2002 Bali bombing had nothing to do with al-Qaeda) and to unite and work with other groups outside their own narrow local goals, with militants from diverse places cooperating like never before.
Most fascinating to me was that the book was as much as about what al-Qaeda wasn't as about what it was (and is). Al-Qaeda is one of the most misused, overused, and misunderstood words in the media today, one that has artificially been imposed upon a rather large and diverse group of Islamist groups beginning in the early 1990s.
In Arabic, al-Qaeda is basically an abstract noun, one meaning "base," as in a camp or a home, or "foundation," as is what is under a house. It can also mean "pedestal," such that what supports a column, and also can mean "rule," "formula," "method," and "pattern." It has been in use since at least the mid-1980s among the Islamic radicals fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan, though Burke wrote that this should not be surprising, as it is a common Arabic word. Generally the term since then has not been used to describe an extant organization, but actually a purpose and a function. One of the first times the term was encountered was from the name of a terrorist manual, entitled _Al-Qaeda_, obtained from Ahmed Ajaj, detained months before the 1993 World Trade Center attack and later convicted for his role in that assault. The title was translated at the time as meaning "the basic rules" and Burke felt that was the correct translation; that it is not the name of a group being used but rather it is being used in its sense of a "maxim" or the "fundamentals."
Many in the media, in positions of leadership, and even professional analysts often make the mistake of thinking of al-Qaeda as some sort of united organization, run by one man, maybe envisioning a James Bond type villain presiding over a vast international organization from some secret lair in the desert. The closest thing according to Burke that ever really could have been called "al-Qaeda" was a rather small and short-lived organization, one active between 1996 and 2001 and largely based in Afghanistan, destroyed and dispersed as such by the fighting at Tora Bora.
If anything, he wrote, there were three al-Qaedas. One is what he called "the al-Qaeda hardcore," based in Afghanistan, comprised of men such as bin Laden, Mohammed Atef, Abu Zubaydah, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and others, a small group of militants, generally Afghan war veterans. Then there "the associate members of al-Qaeda," long-term associates of bin Laden and the hardcore, not usually based in Afghanistan, who accepted missions from them, acted as intermediaries and recruiters for not only the hardcore but for others, and also undertook projects of their own. The third group is vast, amorphous, and hard to define, basically the movement of modern radical Islam itself, with its myriad cells, domestic groups, and individuals. This Burke called the "network of networks;" other groups, originally often with only very local concerns (Burke detailed at length militant movements in Kurdish Iraq, Pakistan, Algeria, Uzbekistan, and elsewhere), that would from time to time come to be to varying degrees under bin Laden's umbrella, sometimes for specific missions (approaching bin Laden or his associate members for money, weapons, fatwas, or training), other times for more long term associations. An important aspect of the network of networks is that many groups were often very independent in action and only worked with bin Laden as they saw fit; there was no compelling these groups and individuals to act.
In reality, there is a rather broad movement of Islamic militancy active in the world today, of which al-Qaeda is only a part of. Burke viewed Osama bin Laden as actually a rather peripheral figure, mainly existing in a charismatic, inspirational function or as a facilitator for the activities of other militant organizations and individuals. Burke provided several models to view al-Qaeda. One is to see al-Qaeda as some sort of wealthy university distributing research grants and providing classes to allow the ambitions of its pupils to be fulfilled, a sort of Holy War Foundation. Another analogy is viewing it as a model of venture capitalism; individuals or small group approached the chief executive and the board (bin Laden, etc.) with ideas that they believed were worthy of support. This board would evaluate hundreds of proposals and decided which to back, which missions would turn a profit so to speak.
The last section of the book detailed the results to date of the war on terror. Though there have been successes - many members of the al-Qaeda hardcore have been killed or captured, Afghanistan has a real chance at democracy, and there has been extensive physical damage to the hardcore with the loss of its training camps and its refuge in Afghanistan - Burke felt that the group is winning. Those hardcore members that were not killed or captured have dispersed and continued to aid and fund operations worldwide. Many of these militants, after dispersal from Afghanistan following the American attack, caused radicalization wherever they ended up, notably in Pakistan, Kashmir, Algeria, Yemen, Chechnya, Indonesia, and Uzbekistan. Though bin Laden's ability to personally influence events has greatly decreased since he went into hiding after Tora Bora, the network of networks is hardly touched, as most groups are firmly rooted in "local contingencies and causes," having little if anything to do directly with al-Qaeda, and didn't necessarily need al-Qaeda to begin with. From Burke's perspective bin Laden is doing very well, as he achieved his goals of radicalizing movements in many countries, leading them to plan their own terrorist activities, using people often with no previous experience with terrorism and unknown to security services (the October 12, 2002 Bali bombing had nothing to do with al-Qaeda) and to unite and work with other groups outside their own narrow local goals, with militants from diverse places cooperating like never before.
29 of 36 people found the following review helpful
By A Customer
Format:Hardcover
Ever since 1998 (the year of the embassy bombings), I've actively searched for good books about al-Qaeda. This book is probably the best that I've read. Only Peter Bergen's "Holy War Inc" approaches it in quality. In a comparison of Burke and Bergen's books, I would say the former is more up-to-date and with more analysis; the latter is slightly more readable. In total, I would give Burke's book the edge simply by reason of it being newer:
The Very Good:
1. The chapters explaining the al-Qaeda viewpoint are excellent.
2. The details about the Cole plot and the Millenium conspiracy are very good.
3. The analogy of the hard-core al-Qaeda being a "venture capital firm" of terrorism (or a library or newspaper) is quite apt and very interesting.
The Not So Good:
1. The book rambles in a couple of spots.
2. The author does not provide any concrete road map for combating the al-Qaeda "ideology."
**************************
Another thing I would like to comment on is the fact that both Clarke and Bergen's books pass a number of tests for me about whether they are worth reading (I suggest readers apply them when considering buying future books on this topic):
1. They don't blame the US or the West for the problem. This is a very annoying characteristic of a lot of writing about Bin Laden. Some people out there just refuse to accept that sometimes people do very bad things for no good reasons at all.
2. They don't say that our problems with Bin Laden will disappear if we are more even-handed in dealing with the Israeli-Palestinian dispute.
3. They don't propose or even waste time by considering idiotic conspiracy theories such as the idea that Bin Laden was behind Oklahoma City, TWA 800, and other unconnected tragedies and terrorist events.
So read this book and learn something!
10 of 11 people found the following review helpful
By Munawar Ali
Format:Paperback
This book is a compilation of really good research (all footnoted), personal interviews, and eyewitness accounts of events that have occurred from 1990 forward. Mr. Burke's analysis is top notch, and accurate for the most part.
That's all jim-dandy, but what sets this book apart from the rest, is Mr.Burke's understanding of the religion of Islam, Muslims, and the extremist mindset. Generally, most authors lack knowledge of Islam, and thus draw incorrect conclusions.
The book is objectively written, with minimal personal opinions or diatribes. (That's a positive). I recommend this book as the definitive guide on Terrorism in the 21st century.
Having said that, the Conclusion chapter is bad, and seems to be written by a PR person. Conclusions that do not line up with what Mr.Burke said in the book...But aside from this, a good read.
That's all jim-dandy, but what sets this book apart from the rest, is Mr.Burke's understanding of the religion of Islam, Muslims, and the extremist mindset. Generally, most authors lack knowledge of Islam, and thus draw incorrect conclusions.
The book is objectively written, with minimal personal opinions or diatribes. (That's a positive). I recommend this book as the definitive guide on Terrorism in the 21st century.
Having said that, the Conclusion chapter is bad, and seems to be written by a PR person. Conclusions that do not line up with what Mr.Burke said in the book...But aside from this, a good read.
Most Recent Customer Reviews
2.0 out of 5 stars
Biased....
The book starts with describing how the brave Mujahedeen fought the russians with primitive weapons and how the americans explicitly helped them. Read more
Published 6 months ago by Khalid al-Albaanii
4.0 out of 5 stars
The best book on this subject.
I'll start with the one problem I have. There are still many questions regarding the terrorist attacks. Hani Hanjour's ability as a pilot is one of them. Read more
Published 8 months ago by Colin
5.0 out of 5 stars
Fantastic book!
Fantastic book! What an extraordinary piece of investigative journalism. It's scary to think that there is little anyone can do today about "al-Qaeda. Read more
Published on September 21, 2008 by Savo Heleta
5.0 out of 5 stars
Excellent insight into global jihad philosophy
This book helped me make the philosophical transition from wanting to help my country by fighting in a Global War on Terrorism to accepting the reality that non-military actions... Read more
Published on April 23, 2007 by Malcolm Brown
4.0 out of 5 stars
Know Your Enemy
Jason Burke's book is extremely well researched. His knowledge of various elements within Radical Islam is quite frankly scary. Read more
Published on August 25, 2006 by Matthew Patty
4.0 out of 5 stars
required reading
I just got dug in and after 25 pages already feel like I know
more about the terrorist network commonly known as Al Qaeda
than George Bush, Rumsfeld and Rice. Read more
more about the terrorist network commonly known as Al Qaeda
than George Bush, Rumsfeld and Rice. Read more
Published on August 27, 2005 by W. Vana
5.0 out of 5 stars
Excellent insight, one of the best books about Al Qaeda
Jason Burke has done a great service to us all by writing this book in such a clear and measured tone. Read more
Published on August 19, 2005 by Eyes Have Miles
5.0 out of 5 stars
The True Story of Radical Islam
For those who wish to understand the madness that has invaded a cultured Islamic religion and how disaffected young men are drawn into acts of terror, this is a "must read"... Read more
Published on August 12, 2005 by Frederick J. Jane
5.0 out of 5 stars
Thorough, thoughtful and well argued
London Observer Chief Reporter Jason Burke was featured in the recent BBC2 documentary "The Power of Nightmares" which compared the rise of Islamic militancy with the corresponding... Read more
Published on November 27, 2004 by O. Buxton
5.0 out of 5 stars
An excellent read
Burke undertakes a much better analysis of the links between al-Qa'ida and other Islamic militant groups. Read more
Published on September 26, 2004 by A. Wilson
Front Cover | Front Flap | Table of Contents | First Pages | Index | Back Flap | Back Cover | Surprise Me!
Citations (learn more)
This book cites 26
books:
See all 26 books this book cites
13
books
cite this book:
See all 13 books citing this book
- Saudi Arabia (Creation of the Modern Middle East) by Heather Lehr Wagner on 10 pages
- Global Jihad by Bin Laden: Zawahiri: Zarqawi on 5 pages
- The Failure of Political Islam by Olivier Roy on 5 pages
- Middle East (A Silver Burdett international library selection) by Maureen S. Abdallah on 5 pages
- Islam in the World by Malise Ruthven in Back Matter (1), Back Matter (2), and Back Matter (3)
See all 26 books this book cites
- Al-Qaeda's Armies: Middle East Affiliate Groups & The Next Generation of Terror by Jonathan Schanzer on page 90, page 122, and Back Matter
- Cultures Merging: A Historical and Economic Critique of Culture (Princeton Economic History of the Western World) by Eric L. Jones on page 209, and Back Matter
- Satanic Purses: Money, Myth, And Misinformation in the War on Terror by R. T. Naylor in Back Matter
- Crime in an Insecure World by Richard V. Ericson in Back Matter
- Crime in an Insecure World by Richard V. Ericson in Back Matter
See all 13 books citing this book
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