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Al-Qaeda: Casting a Shadow of Terror

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_Al-Qaeda_ by Jason Burke is an excellent and well-researched book on the structure, history, philosophy, goals, and future of not only of al-Qaeda itself but of other militant movements within the Islamic world.

Most fascinating to me was that the book was as much as about what al-Qaeda wasn't as about what it was (and is). Al-Qaeda is one of the most misused, overused, and misunderstood words in the media today, one that has artificially been imposed upon a rather large and diverse group of Islamist groups beginning in the early 1990s.

In Arabic, al-Qaeda is basically an abstract noun, one meaning "base," as in a camp or a home, or "foundation," as is what is under a house. It can also mean "pedestal," such that what supports a column, and also can mean "rule," "formula," "method," and "pattern." It has been in use since at least the mid-1980s among the Islamic radicals fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan, though Burke wrote that this should not be surprising, as it is a common Arabic word. Generally the term since then has not been used to describe an extant organization, but actually a purpose and a function. One of the first times the term was encountered was from the name of a terrorist manual, entitled _Al-Qaeda_, obtained from Ahmed Ajaj, detained months before the 1993 World Trade Center attack and later convicted for his role in that assault. The title was translated at the time as meaning "the basic rules" and Burke felt that was the correct translation; that it is not the name of a group being used but rather it is being used in its sense of a "maxim" or the "fundamentals."

Many in the media, in positions of leadership, and even professional analysts often make the mistake of thinking of al-Qaeda as some sort of united organization, run by one man, maybe envisioning a James Bond type villain presiding over a vast international organization from some secret lair in the desert. The closest thing according to Burke that ever really could have been called "al-Qaeda" was a rather small and short-lived organization, one active between 1996 and 2001 and largely based in Afghanistan, destroyed and dispersed as such by the fighting at Tora Bora.

If anything, he wrote, there were three al-Qaedas. One is what he called "the al-Qaeda hardcore," based in Afghanistan, comprised of men such as bin Laden, Mohammed Atef, Abu Zubaydah, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and others, a small group of militants, generally Afghan war veterans. Then there "the associate members of al-Qaeda," long-term associates of bin Laden and the hardcore, not usually based in Afghanistan, who accepted missions from them, acted as intermediaries and recruiters for not only the hardcore but for others, and also undertook projects of their own. The third group is vast, amorphous, and hard to define, basically the movement of modern radical Islam itself, with its myriad cells, domestic groups, and individuals. This Burke called the "network of networks;" other groups, originally often with only very local concerns (Burke detailed at length militant movements in Kurdish Iraq, Pakistan, Algeria, Uzbekistan, and elsewhere), that would from time to time come to be to varying degrees under bin Laden's umbrella, sometimes for specific missions (approaching bin Laden or his associate members for money, weapons, fatwas, or training), other times for more long term associations. An important aspect of the network of networks is that many groups were often very independent in action and only worked with bin Laden as they saw fit; there was no compelling these groups and individuals to act.

In reality, there is a rather broad movement of Islamic militancy active in the world today, of which al-Qaeda is only a part of. Burke viewed Osama bin Laden as actually a rather peripheral figure, mainly existing in a charismatic, inspirational function or as a facilitator for the activities of other militant organizations and individuals. Burke provided several models to view al-Qaeda. One is to see al-Qaeda as some sort of wealthy university distributing research grants and providing classes to allow the ambitions of its pupils to be fulfilled, a sort of Holy War Foundation. Another analogy is viewing it as a model of venture capitalism; individuals or small group approached the chief executive and the board (bin Laden, etc.) with ideas that they believed were worthy of support. This board would evaluate hundreds of proposals and decided which to back, which missions would turn a profit so to speak.

The last section of the book detailed the results to date of the war on terror. Though there have been successes - many members of the al-Qaeda hardcore have been killed or captured, Afghanistan has a real chance at democracy, and there has been extensive physical damage to the hardcore with the loss of its training camps and its refuge in Afghanistan - Burke felt that the group is winning. Those hardcore members that were not killed or captured have dispersed and continued to aid and fund operations worldwide. Many of these militants, after dispersal from Afghanistan following the American attack, caused radicalization wherever they ended up, notably in Pakistan, Kashmir, Algeria, Yemen, Chechnya, Indonesia, and Uzbekistan. Though bin Laden's ability to personally influence events has greatly decreased since he went into hiding after Tora Bora, the network of networks is hardly touched, as most groups are firmly rooted in "local contingencies and causes," having little if anything to do directly with al-Qaeda, and didn't necessarily need al-Qaeda to begin with. From Burke's perspective bin Laden is doing very well, as he achieved his goals of radicalizing movements in many countries, leading them to plan their own terrorist activities, using people often with no previous experience with terrorism and unknown to security services (the October 12, 2002 Bali bombing had nothing to do with al-Qaeda) and to unite and work with other groups outside their own narrow local goals, with militants from diverse places cooperating like never before.

Ever since 1998 (the year of the embassy bombings), I've actively searched for good books about al-Qaeda. This book is probably the best that I've read. Only Peter Bergen's "Holy War Inc" approaches it in quality. In a comparison of Burke and Bergen's books, I would say the former is more up-to-date and with more analysis; the latter is slightly more readable. In total, I would give Burke's book the edge simply by reason of it being newer:

The Very Good:

1. The chapters explaining the al-Qaeda viewpoint are excellent.

2. The details about the Cole plot and the Millenium conspiracy are very good.

3. The analogy of the hard-core al-Qaeda being a "venture capital firm" of terrorism (or a library or newspaper) is quite apt and very interesting.

The Not So Good:

1. The book rambles in a couple of spots.

2. The author does not provide any concrete road map for combating the al-Qaeda "ideology."

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Another thing I would like to comment on is the fact that both Clarke and Bergen's books pass a number of tests for me about whether they are worth reading (I suggest readers apply them when considering buying future books on this topic):

1. They don't blame the US or the West for the problem. This is a very annoying characteristic of a lot of writing about Bin Laden. Some people out there just refuse to accept that sometimes people do very bad things for no good reasons at all.

2. They don't say that our problems with Bin Laden will disappear if we are more even-handed in dealing with the Israeli-Palestinian dispute.

3. They don't propose or even waste time by considering idiotic conspiracy theories such as the idea that Bin Laden was behind Oklahoma City, TWA 800, and other unconnected tragedies and terrorist events.

So read this book and learn something!

This book is a compilation of really good research (all footnoted), personal interviews, and eyewitness accounts of events that have occurred from 1990 forward. Mr. Burke's analysis is top notch, and accurate for the most part.

That's all jim-dandy, but what sets this book apart from the rest, is Mr.Burke's understanding of the religion of Islam, Muslims, and the extremist mindset. Generally, most authors lack knowledge of Islam, and thus draw incorrect conclusions.

The book is objectively written, with minimal personal opinions or diatribes. (That's a positive). I recommend this book as the definitive guide on Terrorism in the 21st century.

Having said that, the Conclusion chapter is bad, and seems to be written by a PR person. Conclusions that do not line up with what Mr.Burke said in the book...But aside from this, a good read.

At last! What is destined to become the seminal publication on this important issue. Does not buy into the media myths about Al-Qaeda. Highly accessable, readable and tells you everything you need to know about modern Islamic terrorism and the philosphy that is Al-Qaeda.

Thematically and factually Burke has done it better than any of his peers. This is a must read.
He glosses over a few things (why the Pentagon changed his name from non-threatening Osama to icky and frightening sounding Usama, as well as the fact there's no Iraqi terrorism against the US) perhaps in a bid to be non-partisan, which he is.
But his intensive research and unique and thoughtful assertions that militant Islam is so much bigger than Al Qaida, and his exploration of Al Qaida itself as a vague sideline player challenges the dumbed down childish media image of the organization. And he does it all without recourse to "send a message" "wake up call" mindless cliche drivel. This book is the "anti Fox news" without being partisan.
There's no better book on this subject, and I've read almost all of them.
David Anderson, JD, BA ( Middle East politics), NYC

Everyone in the West should read this book, and especially here in the states where all the information we get is filtered, spun, and oversimplified. This book causes the reader to question several basic precepts of the so-called war on terror. The first is that by killing all the bad guys we will solve the problem. Bush, as Burke points out, is bin Laden's most effective recruiter. Every time the US military does something in the Middle East, bin Laden's notion of a cosmic struggle between the West and Islam is reinforced. Another is that democracy is the answer--actually, as Burke demonstrates, pro-Western regimes in countries like Egypt and Pakistan have had to use authoritarian tactics to suppress popular Islamism. Finally, Burke shows how the war in Afghanistan was basically successful in destroying terrorists' bases of operations, but that the US invasion of Iraq, by giving those terrorists an new place to operate, was a major setback. Bush's advisors should give this a read if they aren't all illiterate.

London Observer Chief Reporter Jason Burke was featured in the recent BBC2 documentary "The Power of Nightmares" which compared the rise of Islamic militancy with the corresponding (and equally unnerving) rise of the religious right in US politics. The rather silly cover of his book on the subject belies what is in fact a thorough, erudite, dispassionate and compelling account of the rise of Radical Islam, of which "Al Qaeda" - in its strict sense - is really only a small part.

Burke has spent a number of years in various Islamic hot spots (Saudi, Afghanistan, Kurdish Iraq) and has apparently the spent the most of the last four years doing his homework. The account he sets out (which really ought not to be a surprise to anyone but the Neo-Conservatives) is that Islamic militancy is not centrally controlled; there is no "head of the snake" except the one Western foreign policy has created in Osama bin Laden. For nothing has assisted fundamentalism as a rallying point for (the in reality mostly social and political) discontent in the Islamic word than his vilification by Messrs Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz and their friends. Indeed, Burke's case is that before the Western Hawks began targeting it, Islamic militancy was, amongst its own constituents, all but dead in the water.

Burke is convincing in his arguments that Al-Qaeda *the actual organisation* was never more than a hard-core of twenty or thirty militants, was not more than indirectly associated with many of the terrorist acts attributed to them, and was dispersed, incapacitated and in large part eliminated after the war in Afghanistan. But Al Qaeda *the idea* - which is the creation of western conservative political classes - has spread virus-like amongst the Islamic world, and is a much more threatening spectacle. Ideas are a whole lot harder to kill off than individuals.

In laying the groundwork for his thesis Burke is obliged to engage with a lot of minutiae of the history of Islamic dissent (every bit-player in the last twenty years gets a mention), and this part of the book is somewhat heavy going, though it certainly leads gravitas: without it, Burke would be open to criticism for a lack of thoroughness. But otherwise, this is a stimulating and important book.

Olly Buxton

Jason Burke's book is extremely well researched. His knowledge of various elements within Radical Islam is quite frankly scary. He's met the men responsible for germanating Qtub's ugly apyocalyptic interpretation of Jihad into a full fledged attack against the West. Until the early nineteen nineties Jihad was merely a continental struggle pitting dissaffected military messianic groups against alleged puppet governments. Al Queda changed the course of radical Islam and Burke was within a whiff of Osama for years prior to 9/11. While his time in Afghanistan certainly seems to have created a sense of diluted empathy for militant Sunni groups, Burke's ultimate thesis is a towering reminder that winning the military war against radicals will not be enough to redeem the enlightened path of histroy. The West and particularly America must strive to win the hearts and minds of moderate Muslims. The road to success in any conflict is understanding. In this conflict, like any other, we must know our enemy and Burke's book is a good addition to the said realm of understanding.

Burke undertakes a much better analysis of the links between al-Qa'ida and other Islamic militant groups. Quite a few analysts take the view that if an individual has met UBL or trained in one of his camps he is automatically a member of al-Qa'ida. Burke highlights that this is not always the case and there are a multitide of reasons for individuals and groups seeking assistance from the al-Qa'ida network.

Fantastic book! What an extraordinary piece of investigative journalism. It's scary to think that there is little anyone can do today about "al-Qaeda." Even if they find and kill the top leaders, that won't do much since, as Burke argues, "al-Qaeda" and the modern Islamic militancy is not a formal group but an idea. More violence only helps the militants in their efforts to radicalize and mobilize more people. It's going to be a long and difficult battle, both physical and mental...