Customer Reviews

Alamein

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Bungay's book on Alamein is quite different from that of Latimer's. In a sense, they compliment each other very well. While Latimer focuses on the actual combat, giving you a "worm's eye view" in many cases, Bungay choses to focus more on the institutions and leaders that participated.

In this sense, Bungay reviews the armies that fought: Italians, UK/Commonwealth, and German. Logistics, politics, morale, leadership, docrtine, and tactics are all assessed. By doing so, Bungay provides a wealth of information on why the battle developed as it did. The actual battle is dispensed with in a chapter or so, more as a way of demonstrating that the institutional factors predicted the nature of the battle.

This is a good book, particularly if you are interested in how command, doctrine, tactics, and politics influence what occurs on the battlefield. If you are interested only in a straightforward "blow by blow" of the battle, then Latimer's book is recommended.

As with "The Most Dangerous Enemy" Mr. Bungay looks for the reasons why a battle is won or lost in other parts such a logistics, supply, training, chain of command, etcetera. It is a very good change from the typical books where all the success or failure is charged upon the fighting soldiers. This book shows how a battle outcome is very much decided before starting

This is a battle that I have read a lot about. It was in WW2 terms, a small battle but in terms of consequences, it had major significance. It was a battle that probably Britain did not even need to fight but for their morale, they had to fight and win.

Having said that for this reason much has been written on this battle but Stephen Bungay has managed to put a new twist on the battle. Whereas most people discuss the actual battle, he tends to discuss the factors that go around the battle as well eg the supply line, generalship and the respective airforce. In a very interesting way.

I find myself disputing one minor point eg German air force kills where he states that on 9/01/42 Marseille shot down 17 British aircraft in one day. In fact on that day, the British lost 11 planes to all causes including AA fire. As pilots often tend to exaggerate their kills, Stephen Bungay should have been more careful in accepts such facts on face value. On the other hand I do agree with his conclusions that as the *star* German pilots tended to consider their purpose to build up scores not the mission and to some extent the German system encouraged this aim, this resulted in the German airforce not doing their mission properly.

If you are looking for a book to start you off on Alamein or looking for a book to give you some new insight into this battle, this book is for you.

Successful modern business strategist Stephen Bungay previously brought his formidable analytical skills to examine the Battle of Britain in his impressive book `The Most Dangerous Enemy', a defining work in understanding that important historical conflict.

In this shorter work about the desert campaign culminating in the Battle of El Alamein, Bungay once again brings his intelligent analytical mind to examine the conflict from perspectives focussed not only on the battlefield, the armies and their equipment, but on the political and strategic hinterland governing the motives and actions of the various participants.

Of inestimable importance, the author illustrates, is the big picture. Hitler saw the Mediterranean theatre as a sideshow to his invasion of the USSR, sent the Deutsches Afrika Korps (DAK) under Rommel to Libya to prevent Mussolini suffering the humiliation of total defeat at the hands of the British Commonwealth forces, and simply wanted `not to lose.' The DAK never received sufficient resources or supplies to finish off the British forces because British warships, submarines and aircraft based in Malta were sinking their supply ships all the time, and when the DAK reached Alamein their supply tail was too long and continuously harassed by the allied air forces. The Panzerarmee Afrika which comprised roughly even numbers of German and Italian forces - fundamentally unsuited as allies - were unable to invade Egypt and occupy Cairo and Alexandria partly because of these factors (and partly Auchinleck's skilled defensive battle). Occupying Cairo was not something Hitler was enthusiastic about, though Mussolini greeted the prospect with great relish and looked forward to riding into Cairo on a white horse as `The Conqueror of Egypt.'

Churchill by contrast wanted to win in North Africa and dominate the Mediterranean, rather than just `not lose' and was never content with a stalemate. There were important strategic and political reasons for fighting and winning the battle at Alamein, which the 8th Army did not need to fight for military reasons because the `Torch' landings would have ultimately led to Rommel being attacked from the west by overwhelming allied forces and having his supply lines severed. The battle had to be fought and won to prove that the British Army could defeat an equivalent German Army fighting under a German general; to rebuild the 8th Army's confidence as `winners'. Stalin on the one side, and the Americans on the other, also needed to be convinced that Britain was an effective ally with a hard-fighting army which could comprehensively defeat the Wehrmacht in the field on its own. Secondly, the victory was needed to secure Churchill's position at home, as by 1942 his conduct of the war was being criticised and he had already faced a censure motion in Parliament. Churchill certainly made the most of the victory: after November 1942 his position as PM was never challenged until the 1945 election.

The early chapters cover the strategic war; the tactical war - with an enlightening examination of the different command styles of the Italian, British and German forces, the latter with their `Mission Command' philosophy proving superior on the battlefield; the supply war with a long and detailed section about the importance of Malta which the Axis forces planned to invade (and needed to) but never did; and an excellent chapter `The Soldiers' War' redolent of the author's incisive no-holds-barred analysis of aircrew experiences in `The Most Dangerous Enemy.'

The personality issues between the Germans and Italians, between Kesselring and Rommel, between the British commanders in charge of Malta's air defences and between Montgomery and almost everyone, are dealt with by the author with skill and insight. Bungay is a thorough researcher who wherever possible goes back to original sources - like Rommel's letters to his wife Lucie for example, which are continuously quoted in the book. An examination of the governing philosophies of the two opposing air forces is also very illuminating. The Desert Air Force focussed resources in support of the ground troops by attacking the enemy's formations and supply columns; the MO of the Luftwaffe's fighter arm in contrast was that everything operationally should feed the objective of upping the kill scores of a handful of `Ace' pilots in order to feed Goebbels' propaganda machine for civilian morale-boosting, so the RAF's bombers attacking Rommel's troops were left largely unmolested ("the bombers had tail gunners"). The RAF therefore proved incomparably more effective both strategically and tactically, and although the Me109F was superior in every way to Hurricanes and American lend-lease P40s, it was the RAF who eventually gained air superiority and ensured the ground victory was decisive.

Montgomery might have never emerged from relative obscurity had the transport plane carrying Gott (the initial appointee as 8th Army commander) not been shot down, killing him with others on board. The choice of Monty to replace Gott was greeted by Churchill with scepticism. Bungay does not lionise Monty and is fully aware of his notoriously `difficult' side, but explains where these attitudes originated and demonstrates convincingly that he was exactly what the 8th Army needed at the time. Most importantly Monty recognised that British troops often referred to the DAK simply as "Rommel" and were in awe of the German general. Monty was the first British general to appreciate the importance of what we would now term media management to a wider audience, and by consciously and deliberately marketing himself as a recognisable personality with whom the troops could identify, responded directly to the personality cult around Rommel by creating a counterpoint in himself. He also galvanised the Army in ways his predecessors Auchinleck and O'Connor, for all their achievements and tactical abilities, failed to do. By emphasising training, supplies, inter-arm battlefield co-operation and above all, morale, he told them directly, face to face that they were going to win and "there is no doubt about it." He played to the strengths of the 8th Army and within the limitations of what could be achieved, made it an effective fighting machine; he gave it unassailable confidence in itself and in its leadership. "Montgomery's was a double achievement", writes Bungay, "He fought the battle the army could win, and created the army to win the battle...he had to do a lot more than Rommel, who did not have to build professional skills because the German General Staff had done that in the 1930s. Neither in fighting the battle nor in building the army was Montgomery 100% successful...but successful enough to get a decision on that battlefield and turn the army into an instrument capable of winning battles to come."

Bungay is a superb writer with an engaging, direct style, intelligent and highly literate. Often humorous and always interesting, his books are page-turners and thoroughly enjoyable. His modern management analysis skills bring new perspectives to these historic events, and let's hope he has more works in the pipeline.