Customer Reviews

Allies and Adversaries: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Grand Alliance, and U.S. Strategy in World War II

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"Allies and Adversaries: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, The Grand Alliance, and U.S. Strategy in World War II" by Mark A. Stoler is a tour-de-force piece of military history, certainly of the highest academic standard. One can usually tell how 'serious' a work of military history is by what types of sources are used by the author for information and how many. Of the 380 pages of Stoler's book nearly 100 are set aside for 'notes' and bibliography - a more obvious sign of 'how much' research Stoler did would be pointless. So is this merely secondary sources and posturing? No not by a long shot. Stoler utilizes a variety of source materials, from unpublished works, to archival material, personal interviews, and published works (book and journal forms). As an academic scientist this reviewer can appreciate solid literature work and Stoler has certainly done that. Is "allies and Adversaries" merely a thoroughly researched book, or does it have literary flare and depth of new insight?

Let's address the literary competence of Stoler's work. The quick of it: solid but not lilting. Unfortunately many works of this 'academic' depth can be extremely dry and quite unreadable. Stoler's book is very readable. Yet, Stoler does a good job weaving an interesting story that brings together disparate sources into a prose that maintains the readers interest. This is not however to say this is a 'pick it up but can't put it down' book. The text is a bit dry but given the subject matter - strategy and statesmanship in the context of war - this may not be surprising. To his credit Stoler proves adept at keeping a good pace and telling a story that is enjoyable if not riveting.

So what about insights? Does Stoler's 'deep' research yield new information worthy of this depth? In short: probably. Clearly Stoler presents a thorough picture of how, when and why major (above theatre level) strategic decisions were made in the Second World War. Moreover, Stoler provides considerable information about who was making decisions and influencing those decision makers. Where the work suffers is from lack of much tangible information relative to the Soviet and British decision making processes. Stoler can probably be forgiven for the formers omission but certainly there is material to be had relative to the British side. A quick read of another work - "American Strategy in World War II: A Reconsideration" - centered on high strategy of WWII written shortly after the war by Kent Roberts Greenfield will clearly illustrate that the basic story presented by Stoler has been documented for decades. Where Stoler has added is in the depth of presentation. Plenty of new material is presented here, clearly justifying the legwork put into this study.

In the final analysis Mark Stoler has generated a very readable and extremely solid piece of historical literature. Serious students of WWII should consider picking up a copy of this book to see the bigger picture - that far beyond the foxhole that put men in the foxholes wherever and whenever they were. As a serious piece of historical work "Allies and Adversaries" is a 5 star effort.

Mark Stoler writes that the JCS became powerful in foriegn affairs as a result of World War II. According to Stoler in the early years of World War II the State Department took over the direction of national security due to internal divisions within the JCS. However the JCS managed to defeat the State Department in the laucnhing of Pacific Offensives in late 1942. Thereafter the JCS had greater influence in foreign policy as seen through the aquisition of the mandated islands for military use, against the wishes of the State Department, and plans for the deployment of American troops and bases in Europe to counter the perceived Soviet threat. I would highly reccomend this book to anyone whose interested in civil-military relations.

Allies and Adversaries is one of the most valuable works I have ever read about the Second World War. Its account of US-UK tensions during the war would make it noteworthy regardless, but even more impressive is Stoler's clear and objective account of the Americans' halting slide into military involvement between 1938 and 1941. I have never seen a more authoritative account of how the U.S.-U.K. alliance came to pass and how the war with Japan transpired. As regards the latter, Stoler lucidly explains the logic, twisted though it was, of the attack on Pearl Harbor. History viewed through the eyes of our enemies can teach us valuable lessons. A&A also fills in the historical portrait of Gen. George Marshall, providing a more incisive account of Marshall as (master) politician than I have found in the general's official biography and published papers. My forthcoming biography of Lt. Gen. Frank M. Andrews (for whom Andrews Air Force Base is named) will owe much to Stoler's account of the years leading up to Pearl Harbor, when a small number of American leaders quietly shouldered the burden of the world's future.

Notwithstanding Professor Stoler's significant other works and formidable background, this is the kind of book that does more damage than good-- particularly if it is chosen as a text by some college or university to introduce the "big picture" of World War II alliances. The story of the Anglo-American alliance, for serious military and political affairs students, has many, many lessons to offer, and nearly all of those lessons are lost in the superficiality of this volume. One feels sure that Professor Stoler should have been advised not to publish this one. It oversimplifies and diminishes value of studying the topic. The faults are several; two alone suffice to sink this volume. The first is near total lack of the relevant technical detail that is now known to us. It was a naive time, and to be sure, some of the arguments between the two staffs were parochial. But most were not. There were many, many technical reasons for the deliberations, and if FDR and Churchill overruled their staffs on this issue or that, it was because few good choices, in fact, were available. There are now twenty or more good professional books that point to the technical challenges the Chiefs on both sides had to face. Edward S. Miller's War "Plan Orange;" Rick Atkinson's "An Army at Dawn"; or even Ike's own generous "Crusade in Europe" are three. By November 1942, when Torch was finally undertaken, the US Army's (and the British Army's) grasp of and ability to conduct combined arms warfare was rudimentary at best. On the other side of the world, Navy had already beat the IJN at Midway and was wrapping up the ugly Guadalcanal campaign. Is it any wonder that that King would argue (or MacArthur, for that matter) could legitimately argue the military merits for Pacific thrusts at a time when the Army would land in North Africa without long-range aircraft, enough ground forces or tanks to ensure a win? Stoler's book makes the Chiefs sound like silly argumentative children for failing to appreciate Roosevelt's greater political priority. That is not only not true, it masks the lessons that detail would provide. Nor can we let Stoler off the hook here for this as academic casual-read: he is a visiting prof at the Naval War College. As a grad of that institution, i shudder to think of the students that walk away here thinking they understand either military or political strategy. The second great fault of the book is genuinely shocking: Stoler, who teaches and writes about what military professionals might call "Grand Strategy" of World War II, doesn't seem to grasp that such strategy requires a view toward both ends and means. Stoler could have written a great book in which we all learned of the limited means and the loft ends of that war and the struggle on the part of the staffs, political and military, to make it all work somehow. Instead, we have not just a limited book, but given the importance of the topic, a really bad book. -- Commander MS Loescher, US (ret.)