Customer Reviews

Allies at War: The Bitter Rivalry Among Churchill, Roosevelt, and De Gaulle

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Simon Berthon's fine overview of General De Gaulle and his complex relationships with Churchill and Roosevelt raises more questions than it answers. I couldn't help but wonder whether a more concilliatory attitude towards De Gaulle by Churchill, and especially, Roosevelt, might have led to a more harmonious postwar relationship between the United States and France during the Cold War. Certainly France's independent foreign policy seems at times designed to be spiteful of U. S. interests; no doubt this is part of a bitter legacy stemming from De Gaulle's difficult relationships with the wartime leaders of Britain and America. Berthon does a fine job portraying De Gaulle as a stern man of principle motivated solely by what he thought was in France's best interest, not his own. Despite flaws in pacing and occasional typos, "Allies at War" is a revealing look at a largely overlooked saga of World War Two, and hence deserves my strong recommendation to those interested in Allied politics during the course of the war.

Allies at War presents the story behind the scenes of de Gaulle, FDR, and Churchill. Reading the letters between these men and their internal conversations is very revealing. FDR comes across as being judgemental and surrounding himself with many incompetent cronnies. FDR's political manuevering is interesting as he switches sides, or seems to, from appeasement of the Vichy government to flirting with the Free French as election polls dictate many of his actions. Churchill comes across as temperamental and authoritarian. Although Churchill deeply admired de Gaulle, he is willing to appease FDR's hatred for de Gaulle because of the enormous military aid which the United States can bring to bare to win the war. Charles de Gaulle comes across as man of principle who is very temperamental and outspoken. Many of the outbursts seem unforgiveable in the eyes of Churchill and FDR but often are simply honest remarks and answers to questions asked by the press.

The editors did a poor job of correcting typo and grammatical mistakes in this book. Also, Berthon's pacing appears off kilter. One feels the author rushes to finish the book. FDR's flirtation with Stalin and its effect on the leaders is explored in only the slightest degree. Berthon summarizes the effect of these after war tensions in a very short chapter of fifteen pages. De Gaulle's criticizing of America's Vietnam War as a "detestable war, since it leads a great nation to ravage a small one," is portrayed as resentment against America for FDR's bad treatment of him during WWII; the author never justifies this last judgement with any collaborating facts.

In conclusion, this book reveals some insight into the often contentious relationship between the three leaders. De Gaulle comes across as a man of courage, intelligence, morality, with a deep passion for France. De Gaulle sets his own course, unwilling to be a pawn of either England or the U.S. and in so doing becomes instrumental in Frances regaining its position as an important European power. Churchill comes across as the man stuck in the middle acting as a bulwark to hold the allies together. FDR is seen as a man of little conscious bent on winning the war his way, whatever the cost.

Digging into private papers and declassified information, this book attempts to use the Roosevelt/Churchill/De Gaulle triangle to explain postwar divisions between the allies. In the author's view, De Gaulle is the proud French patriot, Churchill the mediator, and Roosevelt the unscrupulous guy wearing the black hat. If only Roosevelt had treated De Gaulle with more respect, we are told, French-American relations would have been smoother.

While the author sheds light on Roosevelt's repeated attempts to influence the Vichy French and provides detailed explanations of the machinations behind operation torch and d-day, there is little background information. It's almost as if the French and Americans had no history before WWII, leaving a once pristine relationship vulnerable to Roosevelt's capricious designs for American power in the post WWII world.

Obviously, this is not the case. French attempts to absorb American troops under French command in WW1 are well documented, with General John Pershing fighting a continuous battle to maintain his postion against French pressure. Interwar relations between America and France were little better. Seen in this light, French-American relations during WWII were simply a necessary reaction to the Nazis, similar to the tenuous US-USSR relationship, which immediately dissolved upon Germany's defeat.

Furthermore, even if Roosevelt was the bad guy, as the author contends, his obstacles to US-French cooperation should have been removed by his death. Instead, US-French relations deteriorated throughout both the Truman and Eisenhower administrations. Eisenhower might have been De Gaulle's strongest American ally during the war, which seemed to make no difference at all to the French later on.

Realistically, De Gaulle's French patriotism was directly at odds with the growth of American power, regardless of the identity/charactor of the American president. So in hindsight the Roosevelt/Churchill/De Gaulle relationship is interesting, but not nearly as historically significant as the author contends.

Berthon's book studies the conduct of World War II as a reflection of the personalities of De Gaulle, Churchill and FDR. His thesis is that De Gaulle, a noble man of steadfast character and selfless behavior, was badly treated by Churchill and particularly by FDR, who is portrayed as odious and rather stupid by Berthon. Berthon ascribes De Gaulle's post-war prickly behavior to residual hurt over his earlier ill-treatment. The focus is clearly on the war, and not on the later Gaullist governments.
What to make of the book? C'est magnifique, mais ce n'est pas la guerre. Berthon uses much of the apparatus of TV docudramas, recounting the thoughts and feelings of the participants without any evidence to back up his assertions.He ignores De Gaulle's manifest lack of success at leading resistance, the chief cause of tension between De Gaulle and the allies. His bibliography lists certain Gaullist sources assembled after the war, and some standard histories, but leaves out many vital sources essential for understanding De Gaulle and France, concentrating on those loyal to the General. Complex questions are ignored, incidents contrary to Berthon's thesis overlooked. Much of it reads like a press release from Jacques Soustelle, circa 1950. There are numerous errors of fact, most of them unimportant, but unsettling in the context of the book. Berthon does not discuss practical factors, but focuses exclusively on personalities- one emerges with the impression that FDR and Churchill enjoyed the kind of untrammelled personal power that Stalin might have aspired to. It makes his book all the weaker that the portraits of the three leaders do not really agree with many of the sources.

I give the Berthon's work two stars because I believe he made a serious effort, and I think too little is known about De Gaulle, who is barely a name for those of us born after 1960. Therein lies another problem: had this book been published in 1972, there would have been many articulate eye witnesses and many other books in print to which it could be compared and evaluated. As it is, this book, and the accompanying television series, bid fair to determine the attitude of anglophone countries towards De Gaulle and his accomplishments for the 21st century. And that would be a pity.
The book has good moments, but is too biased and too incomplete to make it sufficient as a stand alone source. There is an old book, 30 years out of print, called "No Laurels for De Gaulle"- a translation of "De Gaulle a Londres". Written by a French naval officer who knew De Gaulle during the London years, it offers an interesting counterpoint. Sadly, there is no suggestion that Berthon has ever heard of it. And that sums up the strengths and limitations of this book. I recommend the book to those with an interest in French history, but would be afraid to give it to some one without a good background in the subject.