Almost a Miracle: The American Victory in the War of Independence (Hardcover)

~ John Ferling (Author)
Key Phrases: siege army, posts strategy, forage parties, New York, South Carolina, New England (more...)

Editorial Reviews

From Publishers Weekly

Starred Review. Ferling, professor emeritus at the University of West Georgia, caps his distinguished career as a scholar and popular writer on the colonial/revolutionary period with arguably the best, and certainly one of the most stimulating, single-volume histories of the American Revolution. Exhaustively researched and clearly written, it stresses the contingent aspects of a war where victory depended on making the fewest mistakes. Despite chances to end the war in battle, by negotiation or by international conference, Britain failed for lack of manpower, the decision to wage limited war and an ineffective central government—and above all, comprehensive underestimation of American military effectiveness and political resolve. America's cause, ironically, nearly foundered on reluctance to support a standing army, and a government that wasn't strong enough to plan and execute a concerted war effort. That popular enthusiasm never broke owed much to a stable French alliance and to George Washington, who was a good diplomat, a better politician and an excellent judge of character. Steadily growing into the responsibilities of commander in chief, he achieved legitimate iconic status by the war's end. Ultimately, Ferling demonstrates that independence was won through the endurance of the American people and their soldiers, who held on for that last vital quarter of an hour. (June)
Copyright © Reed Business Information, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

From The Washington Post

Reviewed by Jon Meacham In late 1779, John Adams, then America's "minister plenipotentiary for peace," set out across the Atlantic for France. It was a difficult moment. The Revolution was turning into a long war. It had been more than four years since Lexington and Concord and three since the Declaration of Independence; the American forces and their French allies had just lost an important engagement in Savannah. Adams had much to do, and his journey marked the beginning of yet another lengthy separation from Abigail. Sacrifices, however, were necessary, Adams said, adding: "We shall be happy, whenever our Country is so."

But as John Ferling makes clear in Almost a Miracle, his comprehensive and engaging new history of the Revolution, that day of national happiness was nowhere near. Ferling's book is a sprawling account of the military side of the war, an oft-told story that still rarely fails to engage. The American victory, as Wellington said of Waterloo, was a close-run thing, and the details of the clash of the world's mightiest empire with a guerrilla force of rebels remain compelling. Ferling's own attitude, recounted in his preface, is a common one: "I find the lure of the War of Independence to be ever more irresistible. It was war on a grand scale. Near its end, John Adams remarked that the American Revolution had set the world ablaze, and indeed the War of Independence grew to be a world war, with men fighting from Florida to Canada, from the Caribbean to Africa to India, and across broad reaches of high seas." Grand stuff and sweeping themes. But reading the book now, in the fifth summer of another American war in a very different century, one is also struck by the echo, however faint, of how asymmetrical warfare waged by native peoples can bedevil even the finest professional soldiers.

The rebels had honed their unconventional tactics long before the Revolution, mostly in combat against Native Americans. "The colonists learned how to minimize the chances of an enemy ambush, sometimes employed a hit-and-run style of fighting, often utilized a mobile strategy, and not infrequently adopted terror tactics that included torture; killing women, children, and the elderly; the destruction of Indian villages and food supplies. . . . In time, warfare in the colonies came to be associated with a manner of fighting that England's career soldiers variously called 'irregular war,' 'bush war,' or simply the 'American way of war.' " There was also a clash of cultures between the independent-minded Americans and the haughtier British officers in the years leading up to the Revolution; there were scourges and beatings and hangings.

The combustible intersection of brute tactics, the Brits' resentment of their rebellious colonialists, and the fury many Americans felt at their London masters turned the Revolution into a grim and bloody conflict even by the standards of warfare. In South Carolina, for example, there was what Ferling calls "a saturnalia of bloodshed" at the Waxhaws crossroads (home of the young Andrew Jackson), a massacre of "severed hands and limbs, crushed skulls, and breached arteries. Some men were decapitated by the slashing cavalrymen. Others were trampled by maddened horses. The bellies of many were laid open by bayonets." The victims were Americans, and for years the rebels could only scrape by; George Washington spent a lot of time, Ferling notes, putting "a rosy face on . . . defeat, a skill that he had perfected."

The decisive moment came not where the Revolution was born (in the North) but in the hot, distant fields of the South. Ferling is particularly strong in recreating the relentless misery of the war in Georgia and the Carolinas, an essential theater that is overlooked in many popular recountings. The gradual colonial successes in the Carolinas were crucial to the ultimate victory; it was Nathaniel Greene's satisfaction with a battle at Eutaw Springs, S.C., that led him, in September 1781, to think that perhaps, just perhaps, "this cruel war" might "end gloriously" for the rebels.

He was right. The British failure to subdue the region (they were driven to Savannah and Charleston, coastal outposts) was almost immediately followed by what turned out to be the final showdown at Yorktown, Va., in October 1781. George Washington was surprised to receive a note from Cornwallis requesting a ceasefire so that the British might sue for peace; as Ferling points out, no one in the whole choppy history of the war had ever surrendered to Washington before.

The guns silent, word of Cornwallis's capitulation spread rapidly. As a dispatch rider galloped north with the news, a 15-year-old Virginia militiaman guarding prisoners near the Appomattox River recalled that "every American present" threw "his cocked hat up in the air," shouting, "America is ours." In London, Lord North, the prime minister, paced and muttered, "Oh God, it is all over!" And in Philadelphia, Congress processed to a Lutheran Church to give thanks to God and pray for a sound peace. The people, as John Adams had hoped, were as happy as their country.

Copyright 2007, The Washington Post. All Rights Reserved.

See all Editorial Reviews

Product Details

• Hardcover: 704 pages
• Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA (June 4, 2007)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0195181212
• ISBN-13: 978-0195181210
• Product Dimensions: 9.3 x 6.6 x 2 inches
• Shipping Weight: 2.5 pounds (View shipping rates and policies)
• Average Customer Review: 4.7 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (41 customer reviews)
• Amazon.com Sales Rank: #81,000 in Books (See Bestsellers in Books)

Customer Reviews

Most Helpful Customer Reviews

103 of 111 people found the following review helpful:

4.0 out of 5 stars A Good Book, with pro-Southern Biases , August 8, 2007

By	R. A Forczyk (Laurel, MD USA) - See all my reviews (TOP 500 REVIEWER)    (REAL NAME)

Historian John Ferling sets out to define the causes for American victory in the War of Independence on the broad canvas of his magnum opus, Almost a Miracle. The author uses a remark General George Washington made after Yorktown - that American victory seemed almost a miracle - as a starting point for his dissection of just how the American rebels were able to defeat the greatest empire on earth. Almost a Miracle is a very well-written, well-argued historical work that sets out not only to narrate facts but to ascertain what they mean and whether or not the actual outcome was indeed a miracle, or only seemed that way at the time. The author handles this material deftly, but there are two issues of bias in his approach that may cause readers familiar with this subject to bristle. First, the author has a tendency to emphasize defects with familiar heroes of the Revolutionary era (Washington, Hamilton, Lafayette, Franklin), while praising men (Lee, Gates) who ended up with less than stellar records. Second, the author - who lives in the south - tends to exaggerate the importance of the south while neglecting to mention colonial demographics, that the percent of the population in the Carolinas and Georgia was small. Overall, Almost a Miracle succeeds in laying out a well-argued explanation for the American victory and if readers can overlook some of the author's bias, they will find a very satisfying intellectual look at why the American Revolution turned out the way it did.

Almost a Miracle consists of four main parts (Going to War, 1775-1776; the War in the North, 1776-1779; the War in the South, 1780-1781; and American Victory, 1781-1783), which are sub-divided into 25 chapters. The book also includes 25 maps, an 8-page bibliography and 75 pages of footnotes. Each chapter lays out part of the chronological narrative and the author uses the clever device of intercalary chapters labeled "choices" to discuss each sides strategic options and plans for the next year. While the author's writing style tends toward the academic, it is unencumbered enough to keep the narrative flow moving at a brisk pace.

Although this is primarily a strategic history, covering the war from both the British and American viewpoints, the author does provide a fairly comprehensive history of military operations, as well. The tactical detail varies and the early chapters on fighting in the north are far less detailed than chapters on fighting in the south, which is clearly the author's presence. Some battles, like Freeman's Farm in 1777, are covered primarily through first-person quotes which are interesting, but tell little about the overall action. The author provides enough detail to explain why a given battle turned out the way it did, but he spends comparatively little effort detailing the inner organization of each army or tactical lessons learned.

The author's characterization of key individuals is often difficult to accept, since most seem unduly harsh. While the author avoids outright hero-bashing, he clearly wants to take Washington and his key officers off their pedestals. I particularly found the author's constant snide remarks about Washington's "cronies" and "sycophants" (i.e. Alexander Hamilton, Lafayette) to be over-the-top. We all know about Washington's military deficiencies in terms of command experience and mistakes made, but these seem balanced by the battlefield victories he did achieve and in keeping an unpaid army intact for years. By any definition, Washington was a great commander, which explains why he was admired. The author also wants to elevate Gates and Lee, saying they "were among the few truly talented generals in the army" but were undone by Washington's resentment of military competitors. Where was that military talent ever demonstrated? Other than acting in the role of senior advisor to Washington in 1775-76, it's hard to see what Lee accomplished before he was captured. The author holds up Gates as the "victor of Saratoga" - denigrating the real heroes, Arnold and Morgan - and suggests that he too, was skewered by a whispering campaign by Washington's inner circle. When Gates runs away from the battlefield at Camden, the author makes excuses for him. When Lee's efforts lead to a near-rout at Monmouth, the author excuses him. While the author skewers one Revolutionary hero after another (even poor Ben Franklin), Gates and Lee enjoy immunity from criticism. This aspect of the book is irksome and does not add to the author's thesis.

So why did the Americans win? The author sees the key reasons as a string of British strategic mistakes: not committing enough troops to North America, failing to appreciate the extent of the rebellion early on, and failure to protect the Loyalists. The author agrees with several traditional conclusions about the over-caution of British commanders and the role of the French. He states that, "Britain possessed the capability to score a knockout punch during the war's early years...that the rebels were not crushed in1776 was due largely to General Howe." And, "French help was the single most important factor in determining the outcome of the War of Independence." Actually, these explanations tell us why the British lost the war, not how we won it.

The author favors the idea that the Southern Strategy adopted by the British in 1780-1781 might have salvaged a British victory by allowing them to hold onto 2-3 of the 13 original colonies. However, a British presence in the lower south after the war would have only pushed the newly-independent colonies to push more quickly for a federal constitution and regular army. The author's interpretation that the war "was won in the south" appears designed more to please regional tastes than to pass a test of analytic rigor (was an alternate hypothesis tested?). Overall, a good book on the Revolution, but not without its quirks.

62 of 66 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars An Epic Chronicle of the Revolutionary War, June 24, 2007

By	Roy E. Perry "amateur philosopher" (Nolensville, Tennessee) - See all my reviews (TOP 1000 REVIEWER)    (REAL NAME)

Bringing to this book nearly forty years of teaching and writing experience, John Ferling is one of the premier authorities on the history of early America.

Ferling is the author of numerous books and articles on the American Revolution, including Setting the World Ablaze: Washington, Adams, Jefferson, and the American Revolution; The World Turned Upside Down: The American Victory in the War of Independence; and A Leap in the Dark: The Struggle to Create the American Republic (2003), which won the Fraunces Tavern Book Award as the year's best book on the American Revolution.

In Almost a Miracle, Ferling, professor emeritus at the University of West Georgia, has written an engrossing, fast-paced military history of the Revolutionary War, from the first shots fired at Lexington and Concord to the surrender of Cornwallis at Yorktown.

At the end of this eight-year war, George Washington remarked that the American victory was "little short of a standing miracle."

How did America emerge victorious?

Ferling's assessment of George Washington is a double-edged sword. Often out-generaled, Washington made several egregious blunders that, had the British commander (Howe) acted aggressively, would have ended the war almost before it began. Washington also was slow to recognize the importance of Britain's "Southern Strategy," believing that military action in the "backwater" South was of small importance.

And yet, Washington's Fabian strategy and tactics (employing frequent "hit-and-run" retreats and a defensive war of posts), held the tattered American forces together, through brutal winters at Valley Forge and Morristown, to live and fight another day.

"Washington alone," writes Ferling, "had the preparation for the office of commander in chief at the outset of the war and the intelligence, temper, and character necessary to grow in the office. His defects notwithstanding, fortune smiled on the infant nation when Washington was selected to lead it into the war."

Ferling points out that, although there was no turning point in the Revolutionary War, there were, however, significant victories that enhanced the American cause, such as the battles of Bunker Hill, Trenton and Princeton, Saratoga, and King's Mountain.

Inclement weather was also an important factor, causing both the British and the Americans to revise their battle plans, resulting in missed opportunities for success or narrow escapes from disaster. (Providence seems to have been confused as to which side to favor.)

"Battles often hinged on intangibles," writes Ferling, "such as leadership under fire, heroism, good fortune [luck?], blunders, resiliency, planning, tenacity, and surprise."

Above all, Ferling asserts, "French help [financial and military, especially the French fleet] was the single most important factor in determining the outcome of the War of Independence." While this is true, one should not sell short the sacrifices made by numerous soldiers and sailors who fought in the patriot cause.

In addition to military matters covered by other writers, Ferling provides a bonus: a more detailed coverage of the war at sea (including the heroic exploits of John Paul Jones) and, especially, of Britain's Southern Strategy and the partisan war (guerilla fighting) in the South, led by audacious and aggressive Nathanael Greene.

This book is a gripping chronicle of the epic struggle that gave birth to our nation. If anyone reading this book did not already know the outcome, he or she would fear for the patriot cause. The fact that America triumphed is, indeed, "almost a miracle."

Previous Books by John Ferling:
--A Leap in the Dark: The Struggle to Create the American Republic
--Setting the World Ablaze: Washington, Adams, Jefferson, and the American Revolution
--The World Turned Upside Down: The American Victory in the War of Independence
--Struggle for a Continent: The Wars of Early America
--A Wilderness of Miseries: War and Warriors in Early America
--The First of Men: A Life of George Washington
--John Adams: A Life
--John Adams: A Biography
--Adams vs. Jefferson: The Tumultuous Election of 1800
--The Loyalist Mind: Joseph Galloway and the American Revolution
--Compromise or Conflict: The Rejection of the Galloway Alternative to Rebellion

27 of 29 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars Perspective on the War of Independence, June 18, 2007

By	James T. Kennedy MD "jtknyu" (Philipse Manor, NY USA) - See all my reviews (REAL NAME)

Almost A Miracle is terrific telling of the Revolution, including its details, strategies, participants, daily human realities, the roles of luck and chance, and the might-have-beens of history. As a New Yorker I could actually picture Ferling's recreation of Washington's eight-abreast march down the Post Road as it proceeded from place to place and finally to Broadway as the last Continentals, black and white, re-took York Island in November 1783. That's good writing. I finally learned why a small city in South Carolina would be named for a Rhode Islander. Buffs and newcomers alike will enjoy the flow and perspective in Ferling's version of this oft-told tale. No Founding Era collection could be complete without it.

Reviews require criticisms too, and I have two: a book like this would benefit greatly by an Appendix or two that included a timeline and a cast of characters (sort of like White's Bitter Ocean). Secondly, all books have typos and grammatical faux pas - this one has too many.