This book explores how the everyday person reasons about nuclear strategy. James DeNardo's data reveal surprising patterns of thinking on basic issues from SDI, arms control, and proliferation to the end of the Cold War. His discovery that the amateur's strategic reasoning defies all conventional theories lays the groundwork for a new understanding of national security politics. His demonstration that professional strategists reason like novices--that we are all Amateur Strategists--challenges the intellectual foundations of modern deterrence theory, public opinion studies, and game theory.
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Book Description
Editorial Reviews
Review
"The Amateur Strategist is an important and intriguing book. DeNardo breaks new ground in his reconceptualization of opinion formulation and expression; this is a major achievement." Robert Jervis, Columbia University
"This is one of the most interesting contributions to nuclear deterrence theory that I have read in a long time. It is a fascinating study of how real people--experts and nonexperts--think about nuclear deterrence and arms control. The similarities and differences between expert and nonexpert opinion are very provocative." Robert Powell. University of California, Berkeley
"Novice opinions on strategic weapon systems range so widely as to seemingly defy logical explanation. More surprisingly, as DeNardo shows, experts' opinions are subject to similar dispersion....The book has important implications for the analysis of public opinion, and more broadly deepens our understanding of ways in which 'bounded rationality' generates policy preferences." Jack Hirshleifer, University of California. Los Angeles
"This is one of the most interesting contributions to nuclear deterrence theory that I have read in a long time. It is a fascinating study of how real people--experts and nonexperts--think about nuclear deterrence and arms control. The similarities and differences between expert and nonexpert opinion are very provocative." Robert Powell. University of California, Berkeley
"Novice opinions on strategic weapon systems range so widely as to seemingly defy logical explanation. More surprisingly, as DeNardo shows, experts' opinions are subject to similar dispersion....The book has important implications for the analysis of public opinion, and more broadly deepens our understanding of ways in which 'bounded rationality' generates policy preferences." Jack Hirshleifer, University of California. Los Angeles
Book Description
Demonstrating that novices can reason like professional strategists, this study of amateur nuclear strategic reasoning reveals surprising patterns of thinking that challenge the intellectual foundations of modern deterrence theory, public opinion studies and game theory.
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2 of 11 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
A brilliant, pathbreaking book.,
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This review is from: The Amateur Strategist: Intuitive Deterrence Theories and the Politics of the Nuclear Arms Race (Cambridge Studies in Public Opinion and Political Psychology) (Paperback)
A must read for anyone interested in how real people think aboutnuclear strategy and the arms race. Fascinating and provocative.
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Inside This Book
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First Sentence:
The literature on nuclear strategy is the obvious point of departure for anyone interested in nuclear thinking. Read the first page Key Phrases - Statistically Improbable Phrases (SIPs): (learn more)
weapon heuristic, security heuristic, invulnerable platforms, nuclear preferences, game theoretic categories, game theoretic spectrum, nuclear reasoning, arms racing game, game theoretic category, game theoretic consistency, political background variables, game theoretic types, novice strategists, strategic world view, intuitive calculus, heuristic calculus, weapon flavor, heuristic flavors, professional defense analysts, deterrence reasoning, countersilo capability, novice samples, countervalue weapons, nuclear thinking, deterrent stability Key Phrases - Capitalized Phrases (CAPs): (learn more)
Soviet Union, New York, United States, Princeton University Press, Cornell University Press, Prob Value, Prisoner's Dilemma, Robert Jervis, Cambridge University Press, Experts Novices, Oxford University Press, Thomas Schelling, Unclear Total, Eastern Europe, Foreign Affairs, International Security, Communist Party, Harvard University Press, New Era, Ronald Reagan, Albert Wohlstetter, Reagan Administration, Security Dilemma, The Nature of Belief Systems, Variable Coefficient New!
Books on Related Topics | Concordance | Text Stats Browse Sample Pages:
Front Cover | Table of Contents | First Pages | Index | Back Cover | Surprise Me!
The literature on nuclear strategy is the obvious point of departure for anyone interested in nuclear thinking. Read the first page Key Phrases - Statistically Improbable Phrases (SIPs): (learn more)
weapon heuristic, security heuristic, invulnerable platforms, nuclear preferences, game theoretic categories, game theoretic spectrum, nuclear reasoning, arms racing game, game theoretic category, game theoretic consistency, political background variables, game theoretic types, novice strategists, strategic world view, intuitive calculus, heuristic calculus, weapon flavor, heuristic flavors, professional defense analysts, deterrence reasoning, countersilo capability, novice samples, countervalue weapons, nuclear thinking, deterrent stability Key Phrases - Capitalized Phrases (CAPs): (learn more)
Soviet Union, New York, United States, Princeton University Press, Cornell University Press, Prob Value, Prisoner's Dilemma, Robert Jervis, Cambridge University Press, Experts Novices, Oxford University Press, Thomas Schelling, Unclear Total, Eastern Europe, Foreign Affairs, International Security, Communist Party, Harvard University Press, New Era, Ronald Reagan, Albert Wohlstetter, Reagan Administration, Security Dilemma, The Nature of Belief Systems, Variable Coefficient New!
Books on Related Topics | Concordance | Text Stats Browse Sample Pages:
Front Cover | Table of Contents | First Pages | Index | Back Cover | Surprise Me!
Citations (learn more)
This book cites 93
books:
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13
books
cite this book:
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- The Strategy of Conflict by Thomas C. Schelling on 15 pages
- Ideology and Discontent by Clifford Geertz on 6 pages
- International Polictics 2nd by Robert Art & Robert Jervis on 6 pages
- Strategy and Nuclear Deterrence (Princeton Paperbacks) by Steven E. Miller on 5 pages
- The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion (Cambridge Studies in Public Opinion and Political Psychology) by John R. Zaller on 5 pages
See all 93 books this book cites
- The Authoritarian Dynamic (Cambridge Studies in Public Opinion and Political Psychology) by Karen Stenner in Back Matter
- Race and Place: Race Relations in an American City (Cambridge Studies in Public Opinion and Political Psychology) by Susan Welch in Back Matter
- How Voters Decide: Information Processing in Election Campaigns (Cambridge Studies in Public Opinion and Political Psychology) by Richard R. Lau in Back Matter
- The Rational Choice Controversy: Economic Models of Politics Reconsidered by Jeffrey Friedman in Back Matter
- Imperfect Institutions: Possibilities and Limits of Reform (Economics, Cognition, and Society) by Thrainn Eggertsson in Back Matter
See all 13 books citing this book
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