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The Amerasia Spy Case: Prelude to McCarthyism

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In 1950, Joe McCarthy started telling USAmericans that there was a Great Communist Conspiracy that had infiltrated the U.S. govt., the Press, the churches, you name it. One of his prime exhibits was the AMERASIA case, where what started as an espionage conspiracy suddenly, mysteriously collapsed. "It's true," said the Right and the Republicans. "Nonsense you're all paranoids," said Democrats, liberals, and the Left. Now, thanks to Klehr and Radosh, we have the truth, and it is stranger than anything either side ever suspected. There were multiple, independent, overlapping conspiracies, at AMERASIA magazine (to spy for Stalin),in the State Dept. (to undermine FDR's China Policy), in the Communist movement (to shape U.S. policy) in the Justice Dept. (to cover up political embarrassments) and in Congress (to cover up the other conspiracies). Had the truth been told then, we might have been spared some of the worst political messes of modern times. Highly Recommended.

In 1995, with the release of the Venona Papers, the charade that the Russians were "Socialists In A Hurry" or "Socialists In Overhalls" went out the window. The subsequent access to KGB files and the discovery of the papers of the Communist Party-USA that had been hidden in a Russian warehouse for 40 years (Yelstsin asked Reagan if he wanted them as they were taking up too much space!!) only added to the primary research material that ended once and for all the arguments between the Left and the Right on who was right on the cold war. The Left lost!

Further, the charade that there were no Russian spies, either domestic or foreign, in the US is finally put to rest with the exposure of not only the Rosenburgs (whose sons are now trying a new tack by saying that at least their mother wasn't a spy--sorry boys), Alger Hiss was an industrial strength liar until they buried him at 93 (Truman didn't move him out of the State Department to the Carnegie Endowment For Peace for nothing), Witaker Chambers was not only telling the truth but was right on every count, and Harry Dexter White (someone whose daughters were still trying to clear his name as recently as 1994) was "red" to the marrow while undermining the Nationalist Chinese cause during their civil war with the Communists. One member of the Truman administration, I forgot which (Laurence Duggan?), had the good sense to jump out a window to his demise as the FBI was closing in.

"Amerasia" is superb in exposing it as a Communist spy cover being run out of Johns Hopkins University, not a bona fide research think tank, and that McCarthy was right in his charges.

To make the reading even more enjoyable for those of you who were on the Right during those years the authors expose Tommy "The Cork" Corchoran, a major "fixer" for the FDR administration (he got Father Coughlin tossed off the radio by going to the Bishop of Detroit), as the go-between who fixed the trial with payoffs of judgeships and other government positions for the key people. The whole trial was a fraud and a set-up and the authors find the primary documents to prove their case.

A seminal work of American History, the Cold War, and Communism in the United States.

A book you'll probably read twice because of the dismay, keep in your library, recommend to everyone you know, and then proudly proclaim: "McCarthy was right!".

The Amerasia spy case - a case where six Americans associated with the Far-Eastern affairs journal "Amerasia" were charged with espionage in June, 1945, but then cleared or had charges reduced - would be confined to the dust-bin of history if Sen. Joe McCarthy had not made the case relevant again with his Lincoln Day speech in 1950 in Wheeling, WV, where he asserted that up to 205 card-carrying Communists currently worked in the State Dept. The authors do not ignore the consequences of McCarthy's inflammatory charges, devoting a lengthy chapter to the special subcommittee hearings chaired by Sen. Tydings of MD to investigate State Dept security, but their main thrust is to detail the movements, meetings, and conversations of those six individuals and others from the time they were suspected of espionage through the disposition of their case, as well as, the actions taken by various governmental bodies in pursuit of them. Despite the authors' close look, in the end, the entire situation remains murky and ambiguous. It is not in doubt that all of the six had Communist sympathies and associated with known Communists, but they seemed to not have crossed the line into outright espionage, though one, Philip Jaffe, was actively seeking such an opportunity.

The entire affair began only on the chance reading by an OSS analyst of an article published in the Jan, 1950, issue of "Amerasia" that was a virtual reprint of a secret report that he had previously written. The OSS, when given an opportunity to break into the journal's offices, found hundreds of classified documents from several departments, most of them related to the Far-East. The FBI was called in to conduct a thorough investigation. It is not surprising that virtually the entire book, other than the use of some public records, is based on FBI documents produced from all manner of sources: from break-ins, surveillance, phone taps, and hidden microphones, in addition, to more conventional reports.

The individuals arrested were: Philip Jaffe, founder and editor, an independently wealthy person and the most pro-active of them all; Kate Mitchell, assistant editor, very smart and the daughter of well-respected, conservative family; John Stewart Service, State Dept diplomat, convinced that the Communists would and should take over China; Andrew Roth, a US Navy lieutenant, a Communist sympathizer who nonetheless was with the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI); Emmanuel "Jimmy" Larsen, an obscure State Dept employee with Far-Eastern interests; and Mark Gayn, a well-known, free-lance reporter who traveled in radical circles. Larsen and Roth seemed to have been the sources for most of the documents, whereas, Service basically passed on his own reports written as part of his duties.

In light of subsequent developments, it is startling that the Justice Dept pursued this case so vigorously. Initially, some in the FBI considered the case to be "airtight." But such sentiments evaporated quickly. Instead, prosecutors quickly realized that they had no direct evidence of espionage. Furthermore, they had no confidence that the methods used to obtain evidence could hold up in court. And there were definitely political and exposure considerations. Political fixer Thomas Corcoran, working with the Justice Dept and special prosecutor Robert Hitchcock, orchestrated a damage-control strategy in not forcefully pushing the case, especially with the grand jury. Service, Mitchell, and Gayn were cleared by the grand jury. In the Fall of 1945, Jaffe and Larsen paid fines of $2500 and $500, respectively, on charges of theft and illegal possession of documents, not espionage. In Feb, 1946, all charges against Roth were dropped. The handling of the case was very controversial. The press excoriated the Justice Dept for hounding leftists, and conservatives found the conduct of the case to be a whitewash. Hitchcock joining the prestigious law firm of Mitchell's uncle shortly after the case was resolved seemed to confirm that view.

Political conservatives and anti-communists, of whom McCarthy was a foremost member, had been convinced for years that a certain faction in the US government, primarily in the State Dept, was intent on undermining the Chinese nationalists under Chiang Kai-shek in favor of the Communists led by Mao Tse-tung. The fall of China to the Communists in late 1949 merely exacerbated those sentiments. The convergence of many factors buoyed McCarthy's charges. Cold War anti-communism was raging, but conservatives had been thwarted in gaining control of the Presidency for twenty years. They were certain that proving a large-scale penetration of the US government by Communist agents would propel them into the Presidency.

McCarthy was not a member of the Tydings committee, but in playing the roles of witness and outside agitator, he set the tone for the proceedings. His aggressiveness is typified by his pursuit of "China Hand" and college professor Owen Lattimore, referring to him as the "top Russian espionage agent," a charge found to have almost no substance. Of course, the Amerasia "whitewash" was on the agenda. However, the Amerasia defendants called before the committee provided no more clarity than five years prior. The Tydings' hearing did not go well for the conservatives or McCarthy. Clearly there was no wholesale penetration of the US government by Communist agents. On the other hand, McCarthy was not deterred. His vigorous pursuit of Communists would continue into 1954, until his own excesses in that search brought about a quick fall.

The book is very narrowly focused; it is concerned almost entirely with the Amerasia affair and the persons closely tied to the case. It is almost too narrow. There would seem to have been room for the authors to widen the scope of their examination without loosing focus. It is not really clear that knowing all the minute maneuverings of the six persons is all that important, though perhaps is somewhat interesting. The book does provide some context for understanding McCarthy's charges. The authors do not hide from the clandestine activities, ambiguous loyalties, and efforts to cover-up concerning security matters. They are fairly even-handed in their judgments.

No doubt, security and loyalty are dicey subjects, especially in a time of war in a nation that supposedly values the free flow of ideas. This book does shine a light on the difficulty of balancing those concerns, despite the lack of indisputable conclusions about many of the particulars of this case.