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In fact, Daalder and Lindsay's argument kind of sneaks up on you, in that the first section of the book almost ... almost ... seems pro-Bush. Unlike many of his critics, these authors are willing to give the guy a little credit for having a brain in his head and a firm, relatively well-defined, set of beliefs. They argue that the discreet facts Bush knows (citing the famous pre-election "pop quiz" of world leaders) are less important than the principles he believes, since the latter are the raison d'étre of his policy. As they note in an important chapter titled "Bush's Worldview," while GWB may not be able to articulate the underlying logic of his hegemonist worldview in "a form that would please political science Ph.D.s" [p. 41], those principles are deeply held and guide his thinking on strategic matters.
This might seem to be damning with faint praise. But it's still more of an admission than we'll get from most subscribers to the kneejerk-but-tired caricature of Bush as a puppet whose strings are pulled by the neocons (or the oil companies, or Dick Cheney, or his dad, or whoever). What it also does, however, is set up the authors' principal argument, that "the Bush revolution" can in fact be traced back to the president himself: his ideas, his declarations, and his decisions.
The conclusion seems to be not so much that this revolution is evil (the arguments here are utilitarian rather than moral, which isn't necessarily a bad thing) as it is poorly thought-out. The administration is surprised to discover that America's historic friends and allies don't automatically line up behind the president's priorities. That falling into disfavor with world opinion can actually have consequences for our foreign policy (and that even a "hyperpower" can't do everything by itself). That pre-emption and unilateralism don't work so well in cases like North Korea or Iran. That how to stabilize post-war Iraq should have given more thought in pre-war times. And that "with us or against us" bipolarism gets murky with countries like Pakistan or Saudi Arabia.
I've read a handful of books in recent weeks about America's descent into empire and this president's new direction in foreign policy. While "America Unbound" lacks the wide historic lens of Chalmers Johnson's "The Sorrows of Empire," it is still a fine look at this president, his administration, his underlying principles, and their geopolitical consequences. Its restrained and logical tone -- unburdened by the polemical language of the Bush-hating Left -- ought to attract thoughtful and open-minded readers, and be a useful contribution to sober debate about the direction this nation is headed.
There are no ambitious arguments forwarded in this book. Instead, the reader is presented with a very thorough account of the Bush administration's foreign policy record, and the policy circles that have shaped it. The authors do, however, tackle two popular tropes; that Bush is a rube to his advisers, and that "neo-cons" have played Rasputin to that rube. The authors offer a account that portrays a Bush who is master of his own destiny, who has formulated a consistent vision, and who has synthasized a foreign policy based on the advice of a number of polcy cliques - democratic imperialists, assertive nationalists, and defensive realists.
My only criticism of the book is the inadequate treatment of the underlying premise of Bush's vision, which the authors describe as "hegemonist." In defining the "hegemonist" philosophy, they entirely neglect the essential examination of "minimal" versus "maximal" realism models, which are really the heart of the debate over the wisdom of Bush's foreign policy approach. Minimal realism is the wellspring for many critics and alternative thinkers (Joseph Nye, for example), and yet maximal realism has been an ascendent paradigm among many. The subject is simple, essential, and relevant. The authors would have been wise to address it.
The other quibble I have with the book its hasty conclusions about the fallout from Iraq. Though the rubicon has been crossed, the jury is still out on whether Bush will be vindicated or villified for the intervention. As well, with an election year coming, it is erroneous to conclude that Bush's soft pedalling toward Korea is a retreat from his "revolution." If Bush is reelected and a stabilizing Iraq emerges, it might just as easily be argued that a Phase III in the War on Terror is launched, with a commensurate second wind of flourish.
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