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America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy

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This book is a thoughtful and comprehensive look at the origins and consequences of the "Bush doctrine" in foreign policy. It's also a serious critique, made more so by the fact that it is not couched (unlike, say, Michael Mann's "Incoherent Empire") in the language of partisan name-calling and electoral bitterness.

In fact, Daalder and Lindsay's argument kind of sneaks up on you, in that the first section of the book almost ... almost ... seems pro-Bush. Unlike many of his critics, these authors are willing to give the guy a little credit for having a brain in his head and a firm, relatively well-defined, set of beliefs. They argue that the discreet facts Bush knows (citing the famous pre-election "pop quiz" of world leaders) are less important than the principles he believes, since the latter are the raison d'étre of his policy. As they note in an important chapter titled "Bush's Worldview," while GWB may not be able to articulate the underlying logic of his hegemonist worldview in "a form that would please political science Ph.D.s" [p. 41], those principles are deeply held and guide his thinking on strategic matters.

This might seem to be damning with faint praise. But it's still more of an admission than we'll get from most subscribers to the kneejerk-but-tired caricature of Bush as a puppet whose strings are pulled by the neocons (or the oil companies, or Dick Cheney, or his dad, or whoever). What it also does, however, is set up the authors' principal argument, that "the Bush revolution" can in fact be traced back to the president himself: his ideas, his declarations, and his decisions.

The conclusion seems to be not so much that this revolution is evil (the arguments here are utilitarian rather than moral, which isn't necessarily a bad thing) as it is poorly thought-out. The administration is surprised to discover that America's historic friends and allies don't automatically line up behind the president's priorities. That falling into disfavor with world opinion can actually have consequences for our foreign policy (and that even a "hyperpower" can't do everything by itself). That pre-emption and unilateralism don't work so well in cases like North Korea or Iran. That how to stabilize post-war Iraq should have given more thought in pre-war times. And that "with us or against us" bipolarism gets murky with countries like Pakistan or Saudi Arabia.

I've read a handful of books in recent weeks about America's descent into empire and this president's new direction in foreign policy. While "America Unbound" lacks the wide historic lens of Chalmers Johnson's "The Sorrows of Empire," it is still a fine look at this president, his administration, his underlying principles, and their geopolitical consequences. Its restrained and logical tone -- unburdened by the polemical language of the Bush-hating Left -- ought to attract thoughtful and open-minded readers, and be a useful contribution to sober debate about the direction this nation is headed.

The Brookings Institute earns its reputation as a unique think tank that blends excellent scholarship, a dispassionate tone, and accessibility for the general reader. "America Unbound" is emblematc of the Brookings creed. Although many books have critiqued America's radical new approach to foreign policy, "America Unbound" is the only title that retains a neutral, even clinical tone.

There are no ambitious arguments forwarded in this book. Instead, the reader is presented with a very thorough account of the Bush administration's foreign policy record, and the policy circles that have shaped it. The authors do, however, tackle two popular tropes; that Bush is a rube to his advisers, and that "neo-cons" have played Rasputin to that rube. The authors offer a account that portrays a Bush who is master of his own destiny, who has formulated a consistent vision, and who has synthasized a foreign policy based on the advice of a number of polcy cliques - democratic imperialists, assertive nationalists, and defensive realists.

My only criticism of the book is the inadequate treatment of the underlying premise of Bush's vision, which the authors describe as "hegemonist." In defining the "hegemonist" philosophy, they entirely neglect the essential examination of "minimal" versus "maximal" realism models, which are really the heart of the debate over the wisdom of Bush's foreign policy approach. Minimal realism is the wellspring for many critics and alternative thinkers (Joseph Nye, for example), and yet maximal realism has been an ascendent paradigm among many. The subject is simple, essential, and relevant. The authors would have been wise to address it.

The other quibble I have with the book its hasty conclusions about the fallout from Iraq. Though the rubicon has been crossed, the jury is still out on whether Bush will be vindicated or villified for the intervention. As well, with an election year coming, it is erroneous to conclude that Bush's soft pedalling toward Korea is a retreat from his "revolution." If Bush is reelected and a stabilizing Iraq emerges, it might just as easily be argued that a Phase III in the War on Terror is launched, with a commensurate second wind of flourish.

The present book is a compelling read and covers many but not all of the major issues on terrorism and Iraq.

I feel like I have been on an overdose of these books just having read House of Bush, House of Saud by Craig Unger - the biggest tell all blockbuster (my opinion), The Choice by Zbigniew Brzezinski (an excellent analysis), Disarming Iraq by Hans Blix, Noam Chomsky's Hegemony of Survival (truly a book that makes one think), Thirty Days (about Tony Blair) by Peter Stothard, and Price of Loyalty by Paul O'Neill (excellent book), Why America Slept by Gerald Posner, the very popular best seller Against All Enemies by Richard Clarke, and the Rise of the Vulcans by Mann and Mann. I put together a "listmania" list of the 25 best books - the best books - mainly non political taken together, no strong bias conservative or liberal - a spectrum of opinion when you take them all together.

Many of the books are "gotcha" books that link Bush with some wrong doings or alternately books like Brzezinski that lay out solutions. This book is a bit different. It is more of a chronological history, and the book has been highly acclaimed by the Economist, NY Times etc. After reading I can see why.

I started to read the present book and was unable to put it down until I had read it virtually cover to cover. It is a surprisingly good book and neutral in tone and a compelling read - for myself it was a page turner. It brings together the story of Iraq and WMD's in chronological order (all briefly). It starts with the Bush campaign and what he says in his run for the presidency regarding foreign policy, his philosophy, the team that he put together, plus the authors put in some historical perspective starting with Washington, then Wilson, Truman, etc. It then works its way through pre and post 9-11, Afghanistan and Iraq until late 2003.

Surprisingly I found that this book is in almost complete agreement with some of the more recent "tell all" books (Blix, O'Neill, Clarke), and I would strongly recommend reading this book. The overlying theme or conclusion is that the intelligence was flawed and incomplete. Like the Hans Blix book there were no WMD's in Iraq. The Iraq war was pushed by Wolfowitz and others prior to 9-11, and can best be described as a distraction or even an incitement of Muslims towards anti-Amercian feelings. The invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan lacked realistic follow up plans for the post military invasion. So those conflicts still remain unresolved. Also, the more serious threats of Iran and North Korea remain almost unsolvable due to the potential negative consequences of a military solution for those cases including the threat of North Korea dropping nuclear weapons on South Korea.

An excellent book and I highly recommend.

This one is of the best book criticizing Bush unilateralism. The two authors were staffers of the Clinton's National Security Council. Yet, their analysis remains as objective as possible.

The book central argument is well accepted: the President unilateralism has produced quick victories in Afghanistan and Iraq but has fractured the world system and has exacerbated anti-Americanism. As a result, the U.S. is less secure. The authors make the case that "the fundamental premise of the Bush revolution that America's security rested on an America unbound was profoundly mistaken."

The attacks of September 11, 2001, allowed Bush to refashion American foreign policy in a bolder fashion. But, his vision and goals really had not changed. His key assumption is the belief that states, rather than individuals or groups remain the essential force in international affairs. Bush came up with his phrase "Axis of Evil" when referring to Iran, Iraq, and North Korea. He also set his foreign policy in black or white "you are either with us or against us." This refers to countries supposedly supporting terrorism or not. Despite the evidence that al Qaeda is supranational terrorist network with few allegiance to specific State, the Bush doctrine is to fight such terrorist network one State at a time.

While the connection between al Qaeda and the Afghanistan Taliban made sense following Bush vision that States do sponsor terrorism; The Taliban was the exception that confirms the rule. Typically, it is not the case, as terrorist networks operate beyond State boundaries. Yet, the conviction derived from victory over the Taliban sent Bush and the U.S. astray on an unbound foreign policy leading to the Iraqi invasion.

Regarding Iraq, all the administration assumptions turned out to be incorrect. The U.S. administration three main assumptions where:
1) Saddam Hussein's possession of weapons of mass destruction posed an imminent threat;
2) Turning Iraq into a viable self-governing state would be easy. The Iraqis would welcome U.S. troops as liberators; and
3) Once weapons were found and postwar normality returned even those countries opposed to the war would want to contribute to Iraq reconstruction.

All assumptions were wrong. No weapons of mass destruction have been found. The Iraqi society has collapsed. U.S. soldiers are killed almost daily by Islamic terrorists infiltrating Iraq. And, the U.S. alone is bearing the fiscal and military burden of Iraq reconstruction.

Another false assumption driven by Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld was that the peacekeeping occupation of Iraq would take far fewer soldiers (only 30,000) than the actual war did. This turned out to be a huge mistake. It quickly became clear that the peacekeeping occupation required more soldiers than the war (180,000 for peacekeeping, only 125,000 for the war). The soldiers ranks were quickly shored up; But, at a cost of more than $1 billion per week. We will need that many troops there for at least another year or two. This means $50 to $100 billion alone just for the U.S. troops. This huge cost does not include any Iraq reconstruction cost.

Here is the true cost of Bush's unilateralism. Militarily, close to half the U.S. Army is deployed in Iraq, with no exit date in sight. American soldiers are on one-year rotations, and many face the prospect of returning to Iraq within a year of going home. Morale, recruitment and retention are bound to suffer. Our Army is being stretched too thinly on the wrong issue. And, our ability to address more pressing national-security challenges is impaired.

The authors make sharp observation regarding the Administration vision. Contrary to popular beliefs, they do not view Bush as a puppet manipulated by a neoconservatives. Instead, they see Bush as an assertive leader effectively imposing his vision. That he does not express it like a Ph.D. in political science is irrelevant. The authors note that the top spots from an executive standpoint are not populated by neoconservatives (Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfovitz, Pentagon adviser Richard Perle), but instead by "assertive nationalists" such as Vice President Dick Cheney, and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. But, the neoconservatives have successfully promoted their opinions. Some of the assertive nationalists have become strong advocates of neoconservative policies. This is particularly true for Dick Cheney.

Dick Cheney experienced a transformation after September 11, 2001. He immersed himself in studying Islam and the Middle East, meeting with the top scholars on the subject: Bernard Lewis and Fouad Ajami. These scholars argued that toppling Saddam would send a message of strength and enhance America's credibility throughout the Muslim world. Having spent time with such tutors, the vice president became the chief advocate of the neoconservative position. Thus, if one can argue with Dick Cheney's position on Iraq; surprisingly, one can't argue he had not consulted the top minds on the subject. With 20/20 hindsight, it is easy to rebut the Administration Iraqi policies. However, it is more challenging to navigate the quicksand of foreign policy. Nevertheless, the book does an excellent job of clarifying one's hindsight on such matters.

Few people know as much about foreign policy from the inside as does Ivo Daalder of the Brookings Institution, a think tank in DC that actually managers to be genuinely non-partisan and therefore all the more authoritative. This book is thus all the more well-informed, judiciously written and scrupulously balanced than much of the rabidly right or rabidly left material pouring out at the moment. If you really want the inside scoop on what to think of George Bush's foreign policy, especially with a war on terrorism going on (and possibly not that well....) and a Presidential election looming, you could do no better to look at this superb and well though out authoritative book on Bush and his foreign policy. Christopher Catherwood (who once spent time in a similar institution in the UK, and author of CHRISTIANS, MUSLIMS AND ISLAMIC RAGE, Zondervan 2003)

Just read this helpful little book. Daalder and Lindsay describe President Bush's post-9/11 foreign policy revolution. It's easy to read and is a fine introduction into the world of neoconservatism (though he doesn't really use the term "neocon" to describe Bush's worldview). The authors point out that the Administration is a bit more heterogenus than most recognize: some of the folks around the President really believed in the power of democracy, some believed that America must remain strong and assertive to protect its national interests. As has been told many times, Bush had his attention elsewhere prior to 9/11: a little foreign policy, but mostly domestic issues - and certainly almost no focus on terrorism. That changed, of course. We can all dispute the long-term impact of the supposed Bush revolution in foreign policy, but if things don't turn around soon in Iraq - and now Afghanistan - we may see another quick revolution back to a more realism-based look at the world. As Daalder and Lindsay pointed out, thankfully there are relatively few people who want to do away with an internationalist perspective. Retreating to within our borders and the believe that oceans can protect us has been thoroughly rebuked by reality. But that does not mean that the power of military preemption (or prevention) should be our stated right as a powerful nation.

Daalder and Lindsay are most powerful in their analyses of the major speeches and documents to come from President Bush and his administration.

Helpful book, but others are better: Rise of the Vulcans by James Mann is far more useful for understanding the different viewpoints of the Administration. That and he offers compelling of the major players in the Bush administration (although there is little discussion about Bush himself).

Collaboratively written by Ivo H. Daalder (a Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy Studies at the Brooks Institution) and James M. Lindsay (the Vice President and Director of Studies of the Council on Foreign Relations), America Unbound: The Bush Revolution In Foreign Policy asks the politically loaded question: "How did a man once mocked for knowing little about the world come to be a foreign policy revolutionary?" Presenting an unabashedly positive portrayal of President George W. Bush's foreign policy, America Unbound draws upon recent modern history to chart a course for the future -- while warning of pitfalls and problems that could stir the resentment of other powers. A stirring and thought-provoking exhortation of President George W. Bush as a bringer of global change, America Unbound is strongly recommended reading for political conservatives, political commentators, and students of contemporary American politics as reflected by the Bush Administration as it engages in a global war against international terrorism.

This is a thoughtful and generally objective assessment of the impact of Bush Jr on the foreign policy of the United States. The central thesis that runs through the book is that Bush Jr has had a fairly consistent set of foreign policy objectives that were modified by the events of 11 September 2001 - but modified within the existing guidelines. More broadly, the authors see Bush Jr's objectives as in the foreign arena as drawing from some of the purposefulness evident in domestic policy in his first eight months in office (when, of course, foreign policy was subordinate to domestic aims, but still followed an "America first" rather than a multilateral approach).

The analysis concludes with warnings about the dangers of Bush Jr's approach, and implies that the administration has not learned the lessons it should have taken away from fighting an enemy that is not a state in the traditional sense. The criticism of the lack of planning for the post Afghan and post Iraq conflict environments is an area of particular emphasis - with the undertone that, in a conflict where "nation-building" is essential if military objectives are to be met long term, multilateralism is critical to the success of operations. Hints of "imperial overstretch" creep into the debate here.

The book sets out the background and provides supporting evidence extremely well. For a dual authored piece, Daalder and Lindsay have managed to come up with an extremely readable book, written in a comfortably informal style with (one suspects) the odd appearance of a rather dry humour coming in. The authors are former Clinton staffers, but objectivity is not particularly damaged. The bias, it appears to me, is a strong support for the position of the now rather isolated Secretary of State, Colin Powell. There is no "knee-jerk" analysis depicting Bush Jr as a buffoon, or as a slave to sinister neo-con forces in the administration, and the authors skilfully point out that to characterise Bush Jr in such a way is to misunderstand his Presidency. It would have been nice if there was slightly more examination of the US's perception by other countries under the new Bush Doctrine - for instance, if the US sees itself as a "liberator" of Iraq (which it must as part of the Bush Doctrine), it must see all attacks on itself in Iraq as the work of Baathists, Al-Qaeda and so on (as they can be the only opponents of "liberation"). However, if Iraqis do not share the same world view as Bush Jr, these attacks are potentially legitimised (Iraq's experience with Western incursions into its territory have rarely categorised the incoming authority as a provider of "liberty" or freedom, as the British experiences in the inter-war period demonstrate only too clearly). Bush Jr's failure to pursue multilateral support because of the absolute belief in the righteousness of the Bush Doctrine could be a major problem, if other areas of the world hold different but still legitimate interpretations of liberty. This is an area which leads out from Daalder and Lindsay's work, and would probably benefit from further study.

This book, while illuminating in parts (especially its discussion of the rise of the so-called "Vulcans" in and around the administration, from Wolfowitz to Perle to Rice), seems fairly banal and obvious in its conclusions about Bush's foreign policy (i.e., he is applying a newfound assertiveness and bluntness to foreign policy ideals that already existed but were inconsistently applied by prior administrations), and worse, seems cribbed mostly from quotes in newspaper articles and from journal articles written by Bush policymakers. (It was, however, intriguing to read that Condoleezza Rice wrote in 2000 that the US military was not "a police force" and not "designed to build a civilian society.") It seems that in their zeal to get a book out before the 2004 election cycle the authors did a lot of piecemeal paste work but very little in the way of analysis. That said, the fact is that most books of this type are by definition of limited usefulness, since it is not until several years' time has elapsed (if not decades) that any administration can be fairly or conclusively judged by history.

While obviously opposed to the Bush approach to foreign policy in general and to Iraq in particular, Ivo Daalder and James Lindsay have nonetheless succeeded in producing a remarkably fair book attempting to explain the reasons behind the President's about face from recent U.S. foreign policy. The attacks on 9/11 and other terrorist activities over the past decade had gradually convinced the President that the internationalist view espoused by Bill Clinton and his own father was simply no longer the answer. Bush has chosen instead to embark on a new unilateralist course favored by most of his senior advisors that the authors argue may be somewhat productive in the short run but likely to be a disaster over the long haul. Extremely well written, thoughtful and meticulously documented, this book should be an essential read for any citizen seeking to get up to speed on foreign policy issues before the 2004 Presidential election.