Customer Reviews

American Empire: The Realities and Consequences of U.S. Diplomacy

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The author provides a persuasive argument that America is indeed an empire, albeit not of the traditional colonial type. Bacevich demontrates rather convincingly that the U.S., since roughly the Spanish-American War, has pursued a grand strategy of reshaping the world in its image, through free trade, military dominance, and globalization. Particularly remarkable is the extent to which succeeding U.S. administrations have maintained continuity of purpose in achieving these goals. If you think Bill Clinton and GW Bush are radically different in their approaches to U.S. foreign policy, this book will open your eyes. In fact, Bacevich amply demonstrates that even presidents subscribing to the realist school of international relations have been greatly influenced by the idealism espoused by Woodrow Wilson before the First World War. In sum, if you are a student of U.S. foreign policy, political science, modern history, or just a concerned citizen of the "global community," this book can only serve to increase your understanding of how the United States achieved its current status of world dominance and what the implications of that are.

To many cynics, a book like the "American Empire" might seem like an exercise in futility. Who could have trouble believing, after all, that America's primary strategic objective is to create a global marketplace without barriers to the movement of goods, capital, ideas and people? But what starts as an exposition of this argument soon branches into various themes of diverse interest yet equal importance.

Andrew Bacevich, a professor at Boston University, takes on conventional wisdom. For those who are baffled by the complexity of the post Cold War world and are dismayed by America's lack of a coherent strategy, Mr. Bacevich is reassuring: America's objective, now and in the past, has been to promote global openness; "this books finds continuity where others see discontinuity," he writes, parting ways with those who believe that globalization fundamentally reshaped American foreign policy priorities.

While this theme is ever-present, Mr. Bacevich covers a lot more ground. Perhaps his most telling contribution is the resurrection of Charles Beard and William Appleman Williams as trenchant observers of American foreign policy. Both Beard and Williams offer their own hypotheses about why America is driven to this ever increasing need for markets abroad. And, after this voyage into intellectual history comes Mr. Bacevich's own argument about why America is compelled to this strategy of openness.

All three reach the same conclusion: America's imperial quest is meant to overcome problems at home. Although Beard and Williams are polemic in their view that America's foreign adventures prologue the inevitable reckoning with domestic troubles, Mr. Bacevich adopts a more dispassionate view and offers merely a possible explanation: With America's national cohesiveness eroding, Mr. Bacevich writes, "an ever-expanding pie satisfying ever more expansive appetites was the only `crusade' likely to command widespread and durable popular enthusiasm."

With this in place, Mr. Bacevich moves on to a different point: American military assets, he contends, are increasingly used to promote global openness. This heightened willingness to use coercion has elevated the role of the military in American politics, perhaps even more so than ever before. And, this increased militarization of American politics is playing a central, if underappreciated, role in formulating as well as executing foreign policy.

For sure, all this is food for thought. Surprisingly enough, Mr. Bacevich has refrained as much as possible from judgments; in fact, writing a book on such a topic whilst remaining neutral is a feat in itself. All the same, Mr. Bacevich's military mind is evident throughout. A book whose aim is to show that America's chief purpose is promoting globalization would have done well to pay heed to dollar diplomacy as much as it has to gunboat diplomacy. Yet this minor objection could not abate the appeal of an otherwise outstanding book.

In American Empire, Andrew Bacevich provides a fine and historically cogent analysis of American foreign policy. Bacevich writes with clarity, skill, and historical understanding as he argues that a new Pax American - an American Empire - is at hand. While the definition of empire and whether United States is in fact an imperial power is debatable, the real value of Bacevich's analysis is its identification of continuity in American foreign policy and grand strategy throughout the Twentieth-Century. American Empire does this by identifying U.S. attempts to promote and preserve "openness" around the world. While this sometimes leads Bacevich to overemphasize continuity (such as ignoring George W. Bush's willingness to ignore and alienate allies not just through policy but through diplomatic tone), it nevertheless reveals a coherent grand strategy organizing U.S. foreign policy. Bacevich is also sometimes too inclined to describe "globalization" as tantamount to "Americanization," but these minor flaws do not mar his overall analysis, which is excellent. Some have argued that this book is anti-American, but any serious reader will find that it is hardly that. It is, however, a subtle yet hard nosed analysis of the underlying assumptions and strategy of American foreign policy.

The author is an American academic, an ex-officer of the US Army. Chapter One, `The myth of the reluctant superpower', exposes the nonsense that the US state just responds to events, improvising as it goes, containing others' aggressions, going to war only in necessary self-defence. Bacevich notes that the US state's "purpose is to preserve and, where both feasible and conducive to U.S. interests, to expand an American imperium." He shows the basic continuity of US foreign policy, "the unflagging self-interest and large ambitions underlying all U.S. policy."

Globalisation expresses US economic, political, military and cultural supremacy, maintained by unilateral aggressive wars, through military proconsuls, gunboats and Gurkhas. The US state claims that its `internationalism' is progressive and `isolationism' is backward, that the USA is the vanguard of history, the pioneer, leading the world to the future of peace and prosperity.

But a single dominant power brings not peace but perpetual war: the Pax Britannica involved Britain in war every single year while the Empire lasted. The same holds for the USA, ever since 1898.

Since the Soviet Union's suicide, US warmongering has speeded up: since 1989, the USA has made 47 overseas military interventions, following a consistent strategy for US empire. Clinton's war in Somalia killed between 6,000 and 10,000 civilians, two-thirds of them women and children, according to a senior US officer. The illegal war against Kosovo, ostensibly humanitarian, became a full-blooded war against Serbian civilians, killing at least 1,500. In Afghanistan, US forces have so far killed between 1,000 and 4,000 civilians.

US forces are now stuck in Iraq, where they have killed more than 13,000 civilians. The US naval victory at Manila Bay in 1898 led to forty years of occupying and `pacifying' the Philippines. How long will we tolerate this increasingly genocidal war against the Iraqi people?

Bacevich calls for honestly recognising that the USA is an empire, so it can be run morally and realistically. But empire, founded on exploitation and repression, denies democracy, abroad and at home. It is reactionary, not progressive, and can no more be run morally than slavery can.

This work started out strong, beginning with an excellent chapter on 20th century American intellectual history covering Beard, Williams, and the myth of the Accidental Empire. Beard and Williams questioned the meaning and motive behind the open door policy, proclaiming it sheep's clothing over an imperialist agenda. Both historians were stigmatized and largely ignored by later historians for their trouble.

Bacevich then connects the open door to the post cold war world, showing how globalization as conceived in American foreign policy was 'new bottles for old wine'.

The majority of the book is an extended review of the Clinton years, looking at how Bosnia, Iraq, and Kosovo reflect continuities with the Open Door.

Some bits I didn't know: The use of private military contractors started back in Bosnia because Americans wouldn't support a boots on the ground strategy and we weren't supposed to take sides.

Also, the weak State Departments under Bush reflect a structural problem. The theater CINC's have much greater budgetary power and discretion of action, to a foreign power their words matter more then any ambassador (or Secretary of State?)

I would avoid the last chapter on George W. Bush, it appears to have been written prior to the invasion of Iraq and is therefore useless as analysis.

I think Bacevich is too quick to look for continuity between administrations and spends too little time on constraints. Reagan, Bush I and Clinton all had adversarial relationships with Congress, and their policies were tailored around what congress would allow. As Bush II demonstrates, removing that constraint allowed wildly discontinuous policies. If it was so easy for Bush to push an overtly imperial agenda why can't the next President push an overtly anti-imperial agenda with equally revolutionary changes?

This is one the better books of analysis done on America's place in the world. Its an honest attempt to put down on paper the realities of America's interactions with the world rather than the idealisms that many authors (especially neoconservative ones) present.

What make the book so good is that it actually tries to be neutral and to look at things from an objective point of view. His coverage of the American Military is unmatched. He is one of the few writers that actually talks about the reality of the Military and politics in America.

The only point the author misses is an understanding of how the very size of prosperity of the United States forces it into certain roles. Economic sucess at home inevitably leads to economic expansion overseas. And economic expsnsion leads to concerns about security outside of the country's borders. The other thing it inevitably leads to is confusion over what the interests of the country really are. Empires are not usually created by force of will. They are created by political and economic circumstances that require them. If America were to disappear tomorrow, the next most powerful country or group of countries would be forced to deal with the same problems and take on the same responsiblities.

The weakness of the book is that the author's expertise is more on the military side than the economic. To really understand the American empire, its as necessary to understand the international monitary order, the "dollar" standard and the international flows of trade/money.

Two examples of authors in opposition to Bacevich are Thomas Barnett and Robert Kaplin. Barnett's message is that there are no American interests, only Imperial interests. As a result (for example) the US should surrender all its interests and retreat from East Asia to show our good will to Imperial partner China. Kaplan on the other hand views the whole world outside the US as the wild west and sees the mission of the US to bring American civilization to the "savages". Those books are different than "Empire" in that they are blatently pushing political policies than providing analysis.

In spite of its lack of economics, its still a better book than those produced by others. The neutral tone and analysis itself is worth the book even if you don't agree with the conclusions.

Writing in the Summer 2002 issue of Parameters Andrew J. Bacevich observed in a book review "This is a book on considerable wisdom, larded with considerable nonsense. " The same criticism could be lodged against American Empire.
This book is part of a group of volumes in recent years, like Chalmers Johnson's Blowback and Samuel Huntington's Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order which suggest that we should reevaluate the history of American foreign policy, pushing aside idealistic self-delusion and recognizing that a continuing driving need to open new markets abroad and forcing the international community to conform to policies of economic liberalism which make the world safe for American business interests. What differentiates this crop of criticism from that which came before is that is comes not from the traditional academic left, but from former cold-warriors and thinkers more closely associated with the political right.
Bacevich starts by reviewing the careers and theories of two diplomatic historians, Charles Beard and William Appleman Williams. Both theorists viewed U.S. foreign policy through an economic lens, tracing the source of American actions abroad to conditions at home. The both are in line with Bacevich in attacking the view of the United States as a "reluctant superpower." On Page 24 he quotes Beard "Empires are not built in fits of absent mindedness." The author acknowledge that both these individuals were largely discredited late in their carreers for failing to see the hostile ideology of the day as any kind of threat. Beard dismissed the rise of European Fascism, while Williams similarly ignored international communism. This is ironic for while Bacevich, with the advantage of hindsight, acknowledges Nazi and Stalinist/Maoist regimes as legitimate threat worthy of U.S. military intervention, he seems dismissive of the rising threat of violent religious fundamentalism.
After this section comes the highpoint of the book, an intriguing if slanted history of U.S. foreign policy of the post Cold War era. Working primarily from news reports, speeches and public documents, the author compiles an intriguing analysis of the events of the two Bush and Clinton administrations. While focusing on the last 14 years, he also tries to connect the actions to long-term trends in U.S. diplomacy dating back to at least the Spanish American War. Unfortunately this ambitious work of historical analysis is underplayed in favor of a survey of more recent events.
The usefulness of this portion as a reference is compromised by the fact that the events described are not ranged chronologically, but rather the author seems to be trying to group the material by theme in chapters titled "Globization and its Conceits" and "Policy by Default" among others. These themes are so repetitive however that that it is hard to pick out just what point a particular incident is supposed to evidence.
After this comes a series of out of place digressions on a variety of topics. Other readers have noted that the book at time reads more like a selection of separate essays tenuously connect rather than a unitary, flowing argument.
The chapter "Gunboats and Gurkas" discussing the reluctance of the U.S. to commit forces and its tendency to fight conflict either by proxy or through high-technology. This is followed directly by "Rise of the Proconsuls" which suggest that we as citizens should be wary of the foreign policy power invested in American military elites. "Proconsuls" is interesting in that a large portion of the chapter is devoted to GEN Wesley Clark's behavior in the NATO-Serbian war, with the material derived predominantly from Clark's own book. Despite the source, the text does not display the General in a positive light.
With the bulk of it appearing to have been written prior to the tragedy of September 11, 2001, the observations in this book about the Bush administration's foreign policy in regards to the Mid-east have not aged well. The Author makes reference to the war in Afghanistan; however he seems to feel that the events of that conflict did not signal a fundamental change in US foreign policy practice, or the alleged reluctance of America to commitment ground forces. The current occupation of Iraq makes some of his statement almost comical. For example: He suggests you can rate the administration commitment to the current conflict by the number of reserve component soldiers called up, stating "The president ordered modest numbers of national guardsmen to active duty-far less than in 1990-but most citizen-soldiers called to the colors were assigned duties no more hazardous than providing backup security inside airport terminals." With tens of thousands of Nation Guardsmen currently deployed around the world and 88 dead in Operation Iraqi Freedom alone, this line seems both flippant and naive. "(The Bush Team) made no preparations to take the fight to the Taliban...U.S. forces in (as opposed to above) Afghanistan was confined to a single raid by about a hundred Army Rangers, as inconsequential as it was brief." In light of subsequent events, one can only conclude that Dr. Bacevich severely misread the intentions of the Bush administration.
Interestingly, the sentence above is included verbatim in a National Review article Mr. Bacevich wrote nearly a year earlier. That piece made most of the same points as the "War for Imperium" chapter, in about the same number of pages. This would seem to lend credence to the theory that this piece was assembled out of previously existing essays or at least that he was mining the his existing works for material to flesh out the book.
Despite the merits of offering a diplomatic history of the post cold war era, American Empire as a whole is a largely unsatisfying work. The author's core thesis, while not irrefutable, is one worthy of further research and discussion, Overall, Bacevich offers a good attempt at contemporary diplomatic history and analysis and then sabotages it with a dearth of unnecessary and off topic material.

A fantastic description of how U.S. policymakers have broadened their perception of U.S. national interests to be essentially unbounded. In reality, the book focuses primarily on the history of U.S. diplomacy, as opposed to the consequences of its pursuit of increasingly unlimited aims. Bacevich perceptively describes the U.S. as at heart a revolutionary power whose domestic myths, desires, and insecurities cause it to look outwards in search of a transformative mission.

I found this book very interesting from a historical perspective but frankly did not find the author's arguments very persuasive. While there is truth that during the cold war America was a leader and held sway over many parts of the free world - - to call it an empire confuses power with ownership.
I believe the theory of the empire is particularly weak after the end of the cold war. Things are still in a great deal of flux and the period post 1989 is still too short a time to determine a trend. The longer term evidence and examples from President Wilson forward are not very convincing.
I found the examples of inconsistancy and failure to execute with precision and success quite insightful and interesting.
On balance I found the book disappointing with regard to its main premise and theme but very interesting in other ways.

The U.S. may be geographically isolated in North America but it conducts its foreign policy on a global scale. Washington pushes aggressively for an open world economy where trade is free and U.S. capital can flow without impediments. Its gigantic military establishment operates from bases in Europe, the Middle East, Central Asia, and the Far East. It acts to isolate, disarm, or rub out "rogue regimes" like those in Serbia, Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Syria, Burma, Libya, Venezuela, Zimbabwe, and Cuba, however unimportant or faraway they may be. Incredibly, America sees threats everywhere, even though no country or conceivable coalition of countries could threaten it. Maintaining a global footprint is a constant of U.S. policy, no matter which party is in power.

"American Empire" weaves these odd facts into a comprehensive analysis of post-Cold War U.S. foreign policy. The basic idea is that Washington has sought to nurture and organize a world of well-governed capitalist states that will live in peace, trade freely, eschew terror, and accept U.S. leadership. Dissenting states sooner or later feel U.S. pressure to "transform," as the demise of Soviet power has given America a blank check to coerce small countries. And while America aims to be the dominant global power and the enforcer of systemic norms, ordinary Americans tell themselves that the system isn't "imperialist" because it is benevolent and in the interest of the common good.

"American Empire" is provocative, historically informed, and well written. The author, Andrew Bacevich, is a retired Army colonel who understands the politics of foreign policy very well. He does a great job of cutting through political cant and identifying the underlying bipartisan continuities in American strategy that tend to be obscured by Democratic and Republican campaign rhetoric. He explains why the end of the Cold War didn't result in the liquidation of the U.S. military machine or its network of overseas bases, supposedly erected to defend the West against communism. And while he may overstate the economic motivation behind U.S. foreign policy -- did it really shape our actions in Somalia, Kosovo, or Afghanistan? -- the exaggeration is almost forgivable, because our media and political leadership act as if corporate interests and sheer greed play no role in U.S. foreign policy at all.

I knocked off one star mainly because of a big omission at the core of the book: for someone who believes that economics drives strategy, Bacevich has almost NO discussion of investment flows, the WTO, free trade agreements, or the use of the IMF and the World Bank to pry open foreign economies. It's a weird, glaring omission. I can only conclude that Bracevich, a diplomatic historian, didn't feel competent to handle the material.

Final Comment: "American Empire" was published in 2002 and mostly written before 9/11. It didn't anticipate the seachange that occurred under Bush and Cheney. In particular, it wrongly predicted that the U.S. would continue the Clinton-era policy of containing Iraq via sanctions and occasional air strikes. While it's true that the invasion of Iraq was consistent with the policy of imposing democratic capitalism on "rogue" states, Bacevich seemed to assume that a "real" war wasn't in the cards, since the sacrifice-averse American public would only support easy wars (a la Kosovo) that relied on airpower and proxy armies, not on U.S. grunts. As other Amazon reviewers note, Iraq and Afghanistan didn't fit this model perfectly -- but then Libya fits it to a tee! No book on U.S. foreign policy is perfect, but take it from me, a career foreign affairs bureaucrat: "American Empire" is better than most.