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American Foreign Policy in a New Era

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Robert Jervis contends that the world political system today is fundamentally different from anything that has come before it. His book describes the impact of three significant changes on world politics and the theory of deterrence. He also analyzes the Iraq war and the Bush Doctrine in light of this new paradigm. His purpose for writing this book is (1) to develop his theory of a new paradigm (2) evaluate its impact on world politics and the theory of deterrence and (3) argue against the sustainability of the Bush Doctrine.
Argument:
Jervis acknowledges that his book "explicates and explains more than evaluates and prescribes," (Jervis; 2005: 2). Nevertheless, after outlining his argument for a new paradigm in Chapters One and Two, he devotes the rest of the book to evaluating the Iraq war and deconstructing the Bush Doctrine. The following section will reconstruct the argument that Jervis develops in the first two chapters.
A new paradigm: (Chapters One and Two)
Jervis posits three fundamental changes to the current world political system. The most significant change is the existence of a Security Community comprised of the leading powers that are natural rivals to each other : "This is a change of spectacular proportions, perhaps the single most striking discontinuity that the history of international politics has anywhere provided," (Jervis; 2005: 13). For the first time in the history of the current nation-state system, the leading great powers no longer fear armed conflict with one another. In addition, Jervis notes two other major developments: (1) unchallenged American hegemony or unipolarity and (2) the rise of terrorism and the American response to it.
Jervis maintains that the structural conditions for American hegemony were "produced by the size and vitality of the American economy, the lack of political unity within Europe, and the collapse of the Soviet Union," (Jervis; 2005: 58). Therefore, in many ways America has been acting like a normal state that has gained a position of dominance (Jervis; 2005: 92). However, Jervis argues extensively in Chapter Two that 9/11 has triggered assertive American hegemony. He qualifies this statement by emphasizing that due to structural factors, aggressive US hegemony was "an accident waiting to happen," (Jervis; 2005: 92). In addition, Jervis stresses the significance of critical decisions made by the current administration in response to the terrorist attacks. He notes that "it took both September 11 and the particular outlook of the Bush administration to put the United States on its current path," (Jervis; 2005: 58).
Together, these three phenomena (the SC, American hegemony, and 9/11) have had a major impact on world politics and deterrence. Indeed, Jervis believes that "we are headed for a difficult world, one that is not likely to fit any of our ideologies or simple theories," (Jervis; 2005: 138). Nowhere is the impact more evident than the war in Iraq, which Jervis discusses in Chapter Three.
Impact on World Politics and Deterrence: (Chapter Three)
In Chapter Three Jervis discusses his second point: the impact of the new paradigm on world politics and the theory of deterrence. He focuses his discussion on the Iraq war within the context of deterrence, which he notes, "was the centerpiece of American policy and theorizing during the Cold War but now seems contradicted and denied," (Jervis: 2005: 59).
Jervis contends that the Bush administration falsely assumed that deterrence would not be effective against a nuclear-armed Saddam. He attributes this disbelief to (1) a general skepticism among conservatives for deterrence and (2) the heightened sense of vulnerability created by 9/11. Jervis devotes most of Chapter Three to arguing against President Bush's claim that "after 9/11 the doctrine of containment just doesn't hold any water" (Jervis; 2005: 68). He also sets the stage for his final two chapters.
After a thorough discussion of why deterrence would work, Jervis turns to possible alternatives to the policy. These include the spiral model, a quasi-constitutional order, and the option the Bush administration chose: preventative war. Jervis briefly notes that the concept of preventative war is a central component to the Bush Doctrine, which he examines more fully in Chapter Four.
Deconstructing the Bush Doctrine: (Chapters Four and Five)
Chapter Four is devoted to illuminating the links between 9/11, American hegemony and the Iraq war through an analysis of the Bush Doctrine. As noted, Jervis maintains that 9/11 created a heightened sense of vulnerability in America. The Bush administration reflected this sense of vulnerability in its disillusionment with the theory of deterrence. However, its response to 9/11 was a combination of structural factors (the SC and American hegemony) and the unique perspective of the Administration as manifested in the Bush Doctrine.
Jervis argues the main thrust of the Bush Doctrine is a belief that a state's domestic regime drives its foreign affairs. Evil regimes make evil foreign policy; and since these threats cannot be deterred, the regimes must be changed. Assertive American hegemony is therefore required for both national security and international stability. In sum, Jervis argues that Bush has blended elements of Wilsonian liberalism and the democratic peace theory with realism's primacy of the use of force (Jervis; 2005: 80-83). However, Jervis argues in Chapter Five that the Bush Doctrine is not sustainable.
Jervis begins Chapter Five by first reiterating the importance of the SC in allowing the US preemptive strike. He affirms: "I very much doubt whether the United States would have dared invade Iraq in an era of great-power rivalry," (Jervis; 2005: 104). Nevertheless, it does not follow that the Bush Doctrine can endure, even though no power could prevent the war in Iraq. Jervis maintains that ultimately the Doctrine will collapse of its own weight. His reasons include: (1) the Doctrine's internal contradictions (2) the nature of the American domestic system and (3) the inability of America to understand the actors it views as threats (Jervis; 2005: 104). Jervis concludes by stating that "Bush's policy has left the United States looking neither strong nor benign, and we may find that the only thing worse than a successful hegemon is a failed one," (Jervis; 2005: 138).
Evidence:
A new paradigm: (Chapters One and Two)
Jervis does not provide much empirical evidence to support his claims of a Security Community other than to point out that these states have not gone to war in over fifty years, do not openly advocate war with each other, and do not actively engage in "war gaming" or planning for war with each other. However, he does analyze various theories for why the SC exists, including constructivism, liberalism and realism. He then puts forth his own "synthetic interactive explanation."
The author's argument is comprised of four elements. First, a necessary condition for the SC is the belief that conquest is difficult and war is terribly costly (Jervis; 2005: 26). When the cost-benefit ratio favors conquest, aggression is encouraged. The security dilemma operates "with particular viciousness" in such an environment since even defensive states need to prepare for attack. However, Jervis contends that the expected benefits of war have declined among SC members--largely because they are satisfied with the status quo.
Secondly, peace within the SC brings many gains, especially economic. Despite intense and sometimes nasty trade negotiations, "no one thinks that conquering others would bring more riches than trading with them," (Jervis; 2005: 26). In sum, SC members believe economic interdependence is more positive than negative.
Thirdly, a change in values is central to the rise of the SC. For example, "war is no longer seen as good in itself," thus honor and glory are no longer paramount (Jervis; 2005: 27). Jervis also notes that the SC is "relatively homogeneous in that its members are all democracies and have values that are compatibly similar," (Jervis; 2005: 27). An historical impulse to war has been the desire to change the other country. This desire evaporates when two nations have a shared identity.
Path-dependency is the final element Jervis attributes to the creation of the SC. Without the Cold War, the previously discussed elements would not have overcome the traditional rivalries of the member states. Jervis contends, "the conflict with the Soviet Union produced American security guarantees and an unprecedented sense of common purpose among the states that now form the Community," (Jervis; 2005: 29).
Jervis does not provide any type of quantitative or empirical data to support his claim of a unipolar world either. Instead, he speaks of America's hegemony or unipolarity as if it were an accepted fact. He notes that "with the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the failure of Europe to unite, no state is in a position to challenge the United States in terms of material power, widespread influence, ability to set the framework for debate, and the capability---although in many areas not a willingness-to provide public goods," (Jervis; 2005: 1).
His discussion of the rise of terrorism is more thorough. Jervis acknowledges that terrorism is not new in itself, but 9/11 did differ in the form and scale of the attacks. He pays particular attention to the role fear has played in the Bush administration, which he illustrates through an analysis of senior official's language. He cites several quotes from Bush, Cheney, Rumsfeld, and Rice using such terms as: America felt its vulnerability; the world has changed; every threat had to be reanalyzed; the prism of 9/11; the smoking gun might be a mushroom cloud; and imagine September 11 with weapons of mass destruction, (Jervis; 2005: 55-58). Subsequently, Jervis leads his discussion of the effects of fear into his chapter on the Iraq war.
Impact on World Politics and Deterrence: (Chapter Three)
Jervis argues in Chapter Three that the new paradigm (the SC, American hegemony, and 9/11) has had a major impact on World Politics and Deterrence. He focuses his discussion on the war in Iraq and its implications for the theory of deterrence. Having already communicated the role 9/11 (fear) played in the Bush administration, Jervis uses the rhetoric of the administration to demonstrate its disillusionment with the theory of deterrence. Specifically, Jervis maintains that the Bush Administration was concerned with "extended deterrence," or the ability to prevent Saddam from disrupting the region. Drawing on Glenn Snyder's "stability-instability paradox ," Jervis asserts that Bush falsely assumed that America could not contain Saddam.
He then reasons extensively throughout Chapter Three why deterrence would have been effective against Saddam. Jervis does this by first positing arguments against deterrence, and then pointing out their flaws. Arguments that Jervis refutes include: (1) American threats lacked credibility (2) Saddam is an "irrational actor" and (3) Saddam lacks good information, making him "accident-prone" (Jervis; 2005: 65-67). Jervis concludes that even if Saddam had gained nuclear weapons "it is hard to believe that the stability-instability paradox would have strongly inhibited the United States, but not Iraq," (Jervis; 2005: 67). Nevertheless, he acknowledges that what matters is that the Bush administration has rejected the theory of deterrence, opting instead for a policy (the Bush Doctrine) that blends American hegemony with preventative war. Jervis asserts that the Iraq war is the ultimate expression of this doctrine. He confronts this new political posture in the final two chapters.
Deconstructing the Bush Doctrine: (Chapters Four and Five)
Jervis divides Chapter Four into two sections. First, he deconstructs the Bush Doctrine by analyzing the Administration's rhetoric and official policy statements. He describes the Doctrine as having four essential components: (1) a strong belief in Waltz's second image (2) the belief that great threats can only be defeated by vigorous policies (preventative war) (3) a willingness to act unilaterally and (4) an overriding sense that American hegemony is required for international stability (Jervis; 2005: 79).
Secondly, recalling his theory of a new paradigm, Jervis examines the structural factors that allowed for the Bush Doctrine. He does this by providing an historical account of the growth of American hegemony. Jervis does not include any empirical evidence to support his analysis of the structural factors, but instead bases his argument on the relevant principles of realism. These include: (1) power is most effectively checked by counterbalancing (2) a state's interests expand with its power (3) increased relative power brings with it new fears and (4) even states that find the status quo acceptable must worry about the future (Jervis; 2005: 93-95).
In sum, Jervis stresses the mixture of structural factors, 9/11, and the Bush Doctrine to explain current US foreign policy. He relates that "the combination of power, fear, and perceived opportunity lead [the US] to seek to reshape world politics and the societies of many nations," (Jervis; 2005: 96). However, Jervis argues that ultimately the Bush Doctrine is not sustainable.
In his last chapter, Jervis contends that the Bush Doctrine will ultimately collapse of its own weight. His reasons include: (1) the internal contradictions of the doctrine (2) nature of the domestic system (3) limits of the intelligence community and (4) America's inability to understand the actors it views as threats. The author's arguments flow from logical deductions and inference.
For example, Jervis notes that Bush's Wilsonian liberalism requires the assistance and cooperation of other nations. However, the doctrine's assertion of aggressive American hegemony and preference for unilateralism thwarts such collaborative efforts. In addition, the goals of the doctrine are not only extremely ambitious , but the markers for progress are especially difficult to establish. The pluralistic character of the American polity will not permit an extended conflict without some evidence of material improvement (Jervis; 2005: 114). Furthermore, the primacy placed on preventative warfare rests squarely on the capabilities of the intelligence community. The conflict in Iraq demonstrates the infallibility of such a policy. Finally, Jervis relates that unless America can do a better job at comprehending those actors it perceives as threatening, it will have to wage preventative war continuously. Jervis notes that since the end of the Cold War, America's coercive policies have failed five times in moderating another actor's behavior: Panama, Gulf War, Haiti, Kosovo, and Iraq (Jervis; 2005: 127-129).

Clear convincing arguments for a change in US foreign policy regarding the future risks and threats.

This would have been a three-star review, but as the #1 Amazon reviewer for non-fiction about global issues, I have decided to begin penalizing publishers for low-rent publications that are poorly presented on Amazon--for this book there is no description, no table of contents, no cover (low rent, no jacket hence no cover art, and small print to boot), and so on. This is essentially a 138 page essay with a lot of notes thrown over the transom.

The greatest deficiency, for one who was waiting breathlessly for this great man's appreciation of "American Foreign Policy in a New Era," is that the book turned out to be poorly titled and narrowly focused. This book is essentially a very thoughtful discussion of why the Bush Administration has acted very unwisely in attacking Iraq and failing to pick up on the terrorism warnings from the Clinton Administration.

Unfortunately, the book fails completely to address the *other* nine threats to global stability, within which terrorism falls ninth, just above organized crime. The other global threats that we must address, as identified by LtGen Dr. Brent Scowcroft and other members of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change (A more secure world: Our shared responsibility, United Nations, 2004). They focused, in this order of priority, on: Poverty; Infectious Disease; Environmental Degradation; Inter-State Conflict; Civil War; Genocide; Other Large-Scale Atrocities; Nuclear; radiological; chemical; biological weapons; and (after Terrorism); Transnational organized crime.

Sadly, I was expecting a learned discussion of each of these threats, potential inter-agency and coalition approaches to each of these threats, and a proposed plan of attack such as J. F. Rischard provides in High Noon 20 Global Problems, 20 Years to Solve Them

I do not regret buying the book--anything by grand master Robert Jervis is important and worth reading--but he missed a larger opportunity here. Joe Nye's books Understanding International Conflicts (6th Edition) (Longman Classics in Political Science) and The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go It Alone (you can skip the more plebian Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics) are better. I also recommend the monograph, available at the Army War College Strategic Studies Institute web site, "Preventive War and Its Alternatives: The Lessons of History," by Dan Reiter, and the recent monograph by Collin Gray, "Irregular Enemies and the Essence of Strategy: Can the American Way of War Adapt?" Both are free, concise, and brilliant.