An American Ordeal: The Antiwar Movement of the Vietnam Era (Syracuse Studies on Peace and Conflict Resolution) [Paperback]

Charles DeBenedetti (Author)

Book Description

ISBN-10: 0815602456 | ISBN-13: 978-0815602453 | Publication Date: April 1990

The first interpretive history that covers the antiwar movement in this country throughout the entire Vietnam era. Richly illustrated with compelling photographs of the times, the book chronicles the war struggle that provoked a struggle about America.

Editorial Reviews

From School Library Journal

YA-- A fascinating study of the antiwar movement. Beginning with the first stirrings in the mid-50s, many older, respected Americans--such as Norman Thomas, A. J. Muste, and Linus Pauling--joined with the young of the time (including the Berrigan brothers and Dave Dellinger) to stop nuclear testing. Other issues in society, such as black equality and the Vietnam war, modified the movement. The scope of this book is enormous, going far beyond its title. It is really a look at the political mood of the people and leaders of the 60s. The outstanding text is rivaled in its importance by the depth of the bibliographic references.

Barbara Weathers, Duchesne Academy, Houston

Copyright 1991 Cahners Business Information, Inc.

--This text refers to an out of print or unavailable edition of this title.

From Library Journal

A solid assessment of the American peace movement from 1955-75 and the importance of that "amorphous and pervasive social current" in American culture. Like that culture, the antiwar movement was a "diverse and dynamic enterprise that changed dramatically in its composition, assumptions and purposes." The authors assert that the movement was both cultural and political, and in that duality lay its central paradox: its cultural power compromised its political effectiveness. While the movement did not force the United States to give up the war, it "persistently identified" that choice as the central issue of American foreign policy, as well as part of the struggle over how people would define their values, institutions, and destiny. An important book, essential for all public and academic libraries. After DeBenedetti's untimely death in 1987 the book was completed by Chatfield. DeBenedetti, a long-time LJ reviewer, was also the author of The Peace Reform in American History (LJ 3/15/80) and other well-received books.--Ed.
- John R. Sillito, Weber State Coll. Lib., Ogden, Ut.
Copyright 1990 Reed Business Information, Inc. --This text refers to an out of print or unavailable edition of this title.

Product Details

• Paperback: 495 pages
• Publisher: Syracuse Univ Pr (Sd) (April 1990)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0815602456
• ISBN-13: 978-0815602453
• Product Dimensions: 8.8 x 6 x 1.3 inches
• Shipping Weight: 1.6 pounds (View shipping rates and policies)
• Average Customer Review: 5.0 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (4 customer reviews)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #635,169 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

More About the Author

Discover books, learn about writers, read author blogs, and more.

Customer Reviews

Most Helpful Customer Reviews

12 of 12 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars The ultimate antiwar movement study, April 4, 2001

By 

Lauren (UK) - See all my reviews

This review is from: An American Ordeal: The Antiwar Movement of the Vietnam Era (Syracuse Studies on Peace and Conflict Resolution) (Paperback)

This book has been an absolute bible to me in my study of the Antiwar Movement of the Vietnam Era. For anybody studying this period of history, it is of intrinsic value. It details every aspect of the antiwar movement, the cause and consequence of it and lots of other relevant material. Nearly every other modern study of this nature draws a lot from this book. Although DeBenedetti's untimely death leaves the book with a rather ragged finish, its objective analysis is perfect for any historian or student wishing to study the antiwar movement in depth.

7 of 7 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars Great insight into the 60's Antiwar Movement, July 27, 2007

By 

Michael A Neulander "Political Philosophy" (VA) - See all my reviews
(VINE VOICE)    (TOP 1000 REVIEWER)    (REAL NAME)   

This review is from: An American Ordeal: The Antiwar Movement of the Vietnam Era (Syracuse Studies on Peace and Conflict Resolution) (Paperback)

This was required reading for a graduate course in American history.

In An American Ordeal The Antiwar Movement and the Vietnam Era, the authors chronicle the antiwar movement from 1955 to1975. The book gave a sophisticated analysis of the antiwar movement that went beyond some of the tired dichotomies of Communism versus Democracy that are ubiquitous in the historical scholarship of the period. The authors considered the complexity of the antiwar movement with its multitude of factions and how it affected the political atmosphere. The image of the antiwar factions and how the American public felt about the different foreign policies the protestors and the Administration were advocating was described in the book.

The period of 1955-1963 was discussed regarding initiatives on nuclear disarmament to slow down or eliminate the nuclear arms race. This period's primary achievement was to focus attention on the issue of atmosphere nuclear testing. After the signing of the Test Ban Treaty in1963, the nuclear disarmament element of the movement began to fade. The civil rights efforts coalesced around the rise of a youthful intellectual left that was more willing to give of themselves to advance the cause of social justice. After 1965, as the Vietnam War intensified, a large portion of these same anti-nuclear and civil rights organizations became part of the opposition to U.S. involvement in Vietnam. Ironically, President Johnson was the peace candidate of the 1964 election and became an intractable hawk on the war. This brought about disillusionment within the movement regarding the strategy of influencing policy makers and, a shift to the strategy of massive demonstrations.

The authors maintain that the Vietnam War portion of the 1955-1975 period of peace activism was the most obtuse. The period of 1965-1975 with its concurrent social issues including racial equality and violent domestic unrest was a time of wrenching discord and malaise. The authors believed a dominant theme of the period was the war policy of the Johnson and Nixon administrations versus those that were against intervention in Vietnam. The dynamics of opinion on both sides throughout the period were discussed. The authors pointed out that the desire to cling to executive power by both administrations trumped a clear delineation of policy alternatives for the war. This was the central theme of the book: The withdrawal from the war was the policy option the antiwar movement displayed and ultimate public acceptance of this policy was seen as a sign of the movement's success in that regard.

A second theme the authors extensively explained was the division within the antiwar movement. Although a dominant theme in the historical interpretation of the period, the authors saw the dichotomy of us versus them on both sides of the intervention question as simplistic and ultimately unsatisfying in the pursuit of a deep understanding. The authors viewed such a dichotomy as a reflection of the same Cold War rhetoric that led to initial U.S. involvement in Vietnam.

The authors duly note that the antiwar movement did not have a single directing organization or ideology. Consequently, the movement offered varying criticisms of American society and foreign policy along with its criticism of the war. The various groups that came under the umbrella of the movement had differing levels of organization. They could be national, regional or local level organizations. Exponential growth in the movement from 1962 to 1972 contributed to the sense of haphazard direction and poor organization.

The debacle at the 1968 Democratic National Convention lead to further disillusionment with any hope of a change in policy employing the political process. The rioting tarnished an already poor public image of the movement, making it easy to paint it as functioning not as an advocate of an alternative policy, but rather as just a group of contrarian adversaries. The authors pointed to the irony of advocates of peace now doing their own bombing and aggressive attacks on the home front. These events were highly publicized and the Nixon White House exploited, and in some instances encouraged, such conflicts. The authors argue that the vast majority of antiwar protestors were peaceful in their actions but it was the most sensational and violent manifestations of protest that were burned into the nation's consciousness.

By 1972, as violent street protest waned, the antiwar faction within Congress gained momentum as did the Democratic Party. The emergence of George McGovern as the Party's presidential candidate reflected a higher level of acceptance of the argument for withdrawal from Vietnam. The antiwar activists were quite a vociferous contrast from those in the lower socioeconomic class who opposed the war. Lower class opposition thought the war was a waste of lives and money and they had little belief in any Democratic desires of the South Vietnamese. Still, they did not approve of the war protestor's actions which led to their collective reticence on disengagement.

One fascinating point the authors made was that, opinion analysts had found that most Americans respond to foreign policy situations "not out of knowledge of the situation, but rather in response to cues issued by respected reference groups". These groups were political parties or religious and social groups. With the advent of the war, these
traditional groups divided and thus, public opinion on the war became ambivalent. The antiwar movement was unable to fill this vacuum because of its public image as a group of deviants who wanted to thwart authority at every opportunity.

Both Johnson and Nixon believed that the outcome of the war jeopardized their presidency. Johnson's Great Society was jeopardized by division over the war and the possibility of defeat. President Nixon thought losing the war would jeopardize U.S. leadership in the world. Consequently, the authors concluded that each of these men perceived their policy options to be very limited. Substantial popular dissent would threaten the power of their executive office and ultimately their political grasp of it. This explained both presidents deep disdain for the antiwar movement.

However, Johnson and Nixon's dislike of the movement did not prevent them from being somewhat constrained by it. Johnson did not call up the reserves out of fear of exacerbating domestic division. Nixon's plan to Vietnamize the war was a result of domestic dissent regarding the war. The authors further argued that, even President Ford's attempt to prop up Saigon as the North drove on the South, was halted by a Congress responding to public sentiment and blocking funding for such a move. The
antiwar movement was seen by the authors as contributing to this change in Congress through its efforts in electoral politics and protest.

An interesting point by the authors was that while protest encouraged eventual Congressional action, it also encouraged both leaders to overextend themselves. The Johnson Administration and military leaders made extravagant claims about the war to thwart protest. As the public became aware of these prevarications and the Tet offensive seemed to support the notion the war was not going well, further disillusionment set in. This happened in spite of the fact that the Viet Cong was eviscerated in the offensive leading to North Vietnamese Regular Army (NVA) being sent South as the war continued. The folly of misleading the American public and having them find out about it becomes abundantly clear here. The illusion may help the effort initially, but in the long run, it damages the effort more than it aids it. This is a principle of political leadership with abundant historical examples and one that is a necessary condition for effective government.

Another striking observation that was not elaborated upon satisfactorily was, opinion polls indicated the public felt the protestors were inane and responsible for prolonging the war. However, these same polls indicated that communist triumph in Vietnam was preferable to an open ended war and the war was too costly. Therefore, not only was there a schism between those for continuing the war and the movement, there seemed to be a division in the minds of the majority which added to the difficulty in leading the nation out of the morass.

Further commentary and scholarship on the reasons for the capricious nature of public support for armed conflict could be beneficial for developing leadership principles. Once the public commits to a conflict but then sees its real human cost exceeds expectations, it naturally withdraws support. Therefore, the accuracy of that initial calculation of cost is imperative because of the natural proclivity of humans to dislike even the appearance of being lied to.

The opinion ofthe political leadership and the public was a creature that evolved. An opinion that evolved as the arduous reality ofthe war literally came home in the form of war veteran reporting of it, the disclosure of the Pentagon Papers and division within President Johnson's cabinet over the war. The book further postulates that as the public
became aware of discomfort within the executive and legislative leadership over the war, public confidence in the endeavor waned. These arguments were supported by opinion polls and historical research which garnered information regarding leadership decision making on the war.

The book then states that, perhaps organized protest led to a ground swell in public opinion that infiltrated the political process. Rather than converting the public to its antiwar views, the movement pushed the political leadership to change course. An effect that was only possible because of protest. The... Read more ›

1 of 1 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars Great insight into the 60's Antiwar Movement, July 27, 2007

By 

Michael A Neulander "Political Philosophy" (VA) - See all my reviews
(VINE VOICE)    (TOP 1000 REVIEWER)    (REAL NAME)   

This was required reading for a graduate course in American history.

In An American Ordeal The Antiwar Movement and the Vietnam Era, the authors chronicle the antiwar movement from 1955 to1975. The book gave a sophisticated analysis of the antiwar movement that went beyond some of the tired dichotomies of Communism versus Democracy that are ubiquitous in the historical scholarship of the period. The authors considered the complexity of the antiwar movement with its multitude of factions and how it affected the political atmosphere. The image of the antiwar factions and how the American public felt about the different foreign policies the protestors and the Administration were advocating was described in the book.

The period of 1955-1963 was discussed regarding initiatives on nuclear disarmament to slow down or eliminate the nuclear arms race. This period's primary achievement was to focus attention on the issue of atmosphere nuclear testing. After the signing of the Test Ban Treaty in1963, the nuclear disarmament element of the movement began to fade. The civil rights efforts coalesced around the rise of a youthful intellectual left that was more willing to give of themselves to advance the cause of social justice. After 1965, as the Vietnam War intensified, a large portion of these same anti-nuclear and civil rights organizations became part of the opposition to U.S. involvement in Vietnam. Ironically, President Johnson was the peace candidate of the 1964 election and became an intractable hawk on the war. This brought about disillusionment within the movement regarding the strategy of influencing policy makers and, a shift to the strategy of massive demonstrations.

The authors maintain that the Vietnam War portion of the 1955-1975 period of peace activism was the most obtuse. The period of 1965-1975 with its concurrent social issues including racial equality and violent domestic unrest was a time of wrenching discord and malaise. The authors believed a dominant theme of the period was the war policy of the Johnson and Nixon administrations versus those that were against intervention in Vietnam. The dynamics of opinion on both sides throughout the period were discussed. The authors pointed out that the desire to cling to executive power by both administrations trumped a clear delineation of policy alternatives for the war. This was the central theme of the book: The withdrawal from the war was the policy option the antiwar movement displayed and ultimate public acceptance of this policy was seen as a sign of the movement's success in that regard.

A second theme the authors extensively explained was the division within the antiwar movement. Although a dominant theme in the historical interpretation of the period, the authors saw the dichotomy of us versus them on both sides of the intervention question as simplistic and ultimately unsatisfying in the pursuit of a deep understanding. The authors viewed such a dichotomy as a reflection of the same Cold War rhetoric that led to initial U.S. involvement in Vietnam.

The authors duly note that the antiwar movement did not have a single directing organization or ideology. Consequently, the movement offered varying criticisms of American society and foreign policy along with its criticism of the war. The various groups that came under the umbrella of the movement had differing levels of organization. They could be national, regional or local level organizations. Exponential growth in the movement from 1962 to 1972 contributed to the sense of haphazard direction and poor organization.

The debacle at the 1968 Democratic National Convention lead to further disillusionment with any hope of a change in policy employing the political process. The rioting tarnished an already poor public image of the movement, making it easy to paint it as functioning not as an advocate of an alternative policy, but rather as just a group of contrarian adversaries. The authors pointed to the irony of advocates of peace now doing their own bombing and aggressive attacks on the home front. These events were highly publicized and the Nixon White House exploited, and in some instances encouraged, such conflicts. The authors argue that the vast majority of antiwar protestors were peaceful in their actions but it was the most sensational and violent manifestations of protest that were burned into the nation's consciousness.

By 1972, as violent street protest waned, the antiwar faction within Congress gained momentum as did the Democratic Party. The emergence of George McGovern as the Party's presidential candidate reflected a higher level of acceptance of the argument for withdrawal from Vietnam. The antiwar activists were quite a vociferous contrast from those in the lower socioeconomic class who opposed the war. Lower class opposition thought the war was a waste of lives and money and they had little belief in any Democratic desires of the South Vietnamese. Still, they did not approve of the war protestor's actions which led to their collective reticence on disengagement.

One fascinating point the authors made was that, opinion analysts had found that most Americans respond to foreign policy situations "not out of knowledge of the situation, but rather in response to cues issued by respected reference groups". These groups were political parties or religious and social groups. With the advent of the war, these
traditional groups divided and thus, public opinion on the war became ambivalent. The antiwar movement was unable to fill this vacuum because of its public image as a group of deviants who wanted to thwart authority at every opportunity.

Both Johnson and Nixon believed that the outcome of the war jeopardized their presidency. Johnson's Great Society was jeopardized by division over the war and the possibility of defeat. President Nixon thought losing the war would jeopardize U.S. leadership in the world. Consequently, the authors concluded that each of these men perceived their policy options to be very limited. Substantial popular dissent would threaten the power of their executive office and ultimately their political grasp of it. This explained both presidents deep disdain for the antiwar movement.

However, Johnson and Nixon's dislike of the movement did not prevent them from being somewhat constrained by it. Johnson did not call up the reserves out of fear of exacerbating domestic division. Nixon's plan to Vietnamize the war was a result of domestic dissent regarding the war. The authors further argued that, even President Ford's attempt to prop up Saigon as the North drove on the South, was halted by a Congress responding to public sentiment and blocking funding for such a move. The
antiwar movement was seen by the authors as contributing to this change in Congress through its efforts in electoral politics and protest.

An interesting point by the authors was that while protest encouraged eventual Congressional action, it also encouraged both leaders to overextend themselves. The Johnson Administration and military leaders made extravagant claims about the war to thwart protest. As the public became aware of these prevarications and the Tet offensive seemed to support the notion the war was not going well, further disillusionment set in. This happened in spite of the fact that the Viet Cong was eviscerated in the offensive leading to North Vietnamese Regular Army (NVA) being sent South as the war continued. The folly of misleading the American public and having them find out about it becomes abundantly clear here. The illusion may help the effort initially, but in the long run, it damages the effort more than it aids it. This is a principle of political leadership with abundant historical examples and one that is a necessary condition for effective government.

Another striking observation that was not elaborated upon satisfactorily was, opinion polls indicated the public felt the protestors were inane and responsible for prolonging the war. However, these same polls indicated that communist triumph in Vietnam was preferable to an open ended war and the war was too costly. Therefore, not only was there a schism between those for continuing the war and the movement, there seemed to be a division in the minds of the majority which added to the difficulty in leading the nation out of the morass.

Further commentary and scholarship on the reasons for the capricious nature of public support for armed conflict could be beneficial for developing leadership principles. Once the public commits to a conflict but then sees its real human cost exceeds expectations, it naturally withdraws support. Therefore, the accuracy of that initial calculation of cost is imperative because of the natural proclivity of humans to dislike even the appearance of being lied to.

The opinion ofthe political leadership and the public was a creature that evolved. An opinion that evolved as the arduous reality ofthe war literally came home in the form of war veteran reporting of it, the disclosure of the Pentagon Papers and division within President Johnson's cabinet over the war. The book further postulates that as the public
became aware of discomfort within the executive and legislative leadership over the war, public confidence in the endeavor waned. These arguments were supported by opinion polls and historical research which garnered information regarding leadership decision making on the war.

The book then states that, perhaps organized protest led to a ground swell in public opinion that infiltrated the political process. Rather than converting the public to its antiwar views, the movement pushed the political leadership to change course. An effect that was only possible because of protest. The... Read more ›