American Power and the New Mandarins, first published in 1967, is a collection of essays by Noam Chomsky about the Vietnam War and related subjects. Originally famous for his contributions to linguistics, Chomsky began writing extensively about U.S. foreign policy during the Vietnam War, and this collection is the first of his many political books. While the subject matter is a bit dated, those who are interested in either the intellectual climate during the Vietnam era or the origins of Chomsky's career as a critic of U.S. policy will find plenty to interest them in this book.
Chomsky's primary goal in American Power and the New Mandarins is not to convince the reader that the Vietnam War was wrong. On this issue, he says that "Anyone who puts a fraction of his mind to the task can construct a case [against the war] that is overwhelming" (9). Rather, his goal is to illustrate the degree to which American intellectuals supported the war, or at least the assumptions behind it. Many people remember the Vietnam War as a time of widespread protest against U.S. policy, with intellectuals and the youth leading the way. Chomsky argues that the war's "opponents" were often not concerned with the moral issues related to the war, but rather with the fact that the war seemed to be unwinnable and was costing too many American lives. The implication is that these intellectuals would not be protesting if the U.S. had crushed the Vietnamese resistance without significant loss of American life (Vietnamese life being irrelevant).
The book is made up of eight essays of varying length, and an introduction and an epilogue.
- In "Objectivity and Liberal Scholarship," Chomsky introduces the concept of the "new mandarins"--those who claim the authority to determine policy based on their allegedly "scientific" understanding of human nature and technology. These "new mandarins" believe that their knowledge gives them the right to restructure society in Vietnam and elsewhere, regardless of the wishes of the local population. In addition, Chomsky argues that many intellectuals tend to accept the status quo and support the basic assumptions of U.S. policy--that Western nations always know best, and force is justified to keep Third World countries from going down the "wrong" path. This essay is not very concise or organized; Chomsky has plenty of evidence to present but it flows out in no particular order. Chomsky devotes nearly 50 pages to criticizing a single historian's book about the Spanish Civil War--an excellent example, in Chomsky's opinion, of "the deep-seated bias of liberal historians," (93) but a cumbersome way to make his point. Still, whatever its organizational shortcomings, this essay presents plenty of evidence to illustrate the biases of liberal intellectuals in favor of American power.
- In "The Revolutionary Pacifism of A. J. Muste: On the Backgrounds of the Pacific War," Chomsky explains the parallels between the Vietnam War and Japanese expansion in China in the 1930's. In both cases, defenders of government policy appealed to "the high moral character of the intervention, the benefits it would bring to the suffering masses" (183). Both America and Japan tried to set up puppet governments to serve their interests, and responded to doubts about their actions by emphasizing the "Communist" threat (196).
- "The Logic of Withdrawal" discusses the political strength of the NLF (Vietcong) and the continuing resistance of the United States to any political settlement that might allow the Vietnamese a fair choice between the NLF and other alternatives. Chomsky ridicules the idea that an NLF political victory could pose any threat to America's survival, comparing this to the Nazis' claim that "a Jewish-Bolshevik conspiracy was threatening the survival of Germany" (249).
- "The Bitter Heritage" is Chomsky's review of Arthur Schlesinger's book of the same name. Schlesinger expresses the "liberal" view that the United States had made a tactical error by fighting a costly war, but that American motives were pure. Chomsky argues that this view represents the extreme limit of mainstream opposition to the war in the United States. The view that "the United States has no unilateral right to determine by force the course of development of the nations of the Third World" (297) is not considered to be "responsible criticism" (296).
- In "Some Thoughts on Intellectuals and the Schools" and "The Responsibility of Intellectuals," Chomsky continues his criticism of intellectuals who endorse the irresponsible use of American power.
- "On Resistance" and "Supplement to 'On Resistance'" are Chomsky's statements about how to protest the war. Chomsky argues that resistance should remain nonviolent, not only because of moral considerations, but also because violence "will surely fail, will simply frighten and alienate some who can be reached, and will further encourage the ideologists and administrators of repression" (374-5). Chomsky endorses the refusal to be drafted as an ideal means of resistance, since it directly impedes the government's ability to carry out its policies and can be used to make a visible statement as well.
If you are a Chomsky fan, you will probably enjoy this book; his writing style and basic outlook have remained consistent over the decades. He has written plenty of books and essays about more recent events, however, so if you are interested in American power in general rather than Vietnam in particular, you might want to check the newer ones out first.
