War and the American Presidency [Paperback]

Arthur Meier Schlesinger (Author)

Book Description

Publication Date: October 10, 2005

"Historical reflections that deftly challenge the political and ideological foundations of President Bush's foreign policy."--Charles A. Kupchan, New York Times

In a book that brings a magisterial command of history to the most urgent of contemporary questions, two-time Pulitzer Prize-winning historian Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., explores the war in Iraq, the presidency, and the future of democracy. Describing unilateralism as "the oldest doctrine in American history," Schlesinger nevertheless warns of the dangers posed by the fatal turn in U.S. policy from deterrence and containment to preventive war. He writes powerfully about George W. Bush's expansion of presidential power, reminding us nevertheless of our country's distinguished legacy of patriotism through dissent in wartime. And in a new chapter written especially for the paperback edition, he examines the historical role of religion in American politics as a background for an assessment of Bush's faith-based presidency.

Editorial Reviews

From Booklist

Pulitzer Prize-winning presidential historian Schlesinger is perhaps best known for his study of the Kennedy presidency, A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House (1965), and it is his reputation that will likely attract readers otherwise turned off by the vociferous glut of books, pro and con, about the Bush administration. Their interest will be well rewarded, for this selection is a notch better than most. Rather than comparing the current president's character with that of his predecessors--something both political camps enjoy doing--Schlesinger focuses on the office, not the man, and argues that the current administration's use of presidential power in war tells both an old story and a new one. Old, in that unilateral warfare is as old as America, but new--and, says Schlesinger, dangerous--in the manner in which Bush has taken advantage of wartime's mandate. This intelligent collection of essays, sketching historical congruities (most conspicuously between the Bush administration and Nixon's original "imperial presidency") as well as incongruities, includes a compelling discussion of the challenges inherent to history's lens. Brendan Driscoll
Copyright © American Library Association. All rights reserved --This text refers to the Hardcover edition.

Review

[An] elegant, cogent and civilly argued contribution to the battle that is raging for the soul of the nation. -- Michael D. Langan, Boston Sunday Globe

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Product Details

• Paperback: 224 pages
• Publisher: W. W. Norton (October 10, 2005)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0393327698
• ISBN-13: 978-0393327694
• Product Dimensions: 8.2 x 5.4 x 0.6 inches
• Shipping Weight: 6.4 ounces (View shipping rates and policies)
• Average Customer Review: 3.6 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (16 customer reviews)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #868,872 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

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Customer Reviews

Most Helpful Customer Reviews

32 of 32 people found the following review helpful:

4.0 out of 5 stars What We Needed to Know in 2002., November 17, 2006

By 

Edwin C. Pauzer (New York City) - See all my reviews
(VINE VOICE)   

This review is from: War and the American Presidency (Hardcover)

"In 1998, Donald Rumsfeld, [Paul] Wolfowitz, [Richard] Perle were among the eighteen signers of an open letter to President Clinton arguing that regime change in Iraq 'needs to become the aim of American foreign policy'." This quote from world-respected author and one-man political think tank, Arthur Schesinger shows that these individuals were looking for an excuse that 9/11 gave them, to invade Iraq. They began beating the tocsins of war shortly after to create their vision of a middle eastern democracy under a pax americana.

Arthur Schlesinger points out in detail how the Bush administration pressured the CIA for raw intelligence from which they would make an interpretation, how the reasons for invading Iraq kept changing, and how the White House kept contradicting previous statements. The reader can only come to the conclusion that the Bush Doctrine is an utter failure, the invasion of Iraq was not to fight terrorism but to satisfy a right-wing vision, that we were lied to about an association between Saddam Hussein and Osama bin-Laden, that we lied to about WMD. Even after this collaboration and weapons failed to materialize, Schlesinger states "the Bush administration is left with liberation, which it had once deemed an insufficient justification for putting American lives at risk."

I found the first three chapters captivating, but I gave this four stars because of a need to keep a dictionary by my side. The author's vocabulary far exceeds mine, and those of fewer words may find this annoying or challenging. I was also annoyed by the author's use of French without translation: "Nous Sommes Tous Americains." (We are all Americans.) In some places, I had to stop and absorb his insight--a more worthwhile pursuit.

But, if you are looking for a powerful and persuasive argument against our government and its actions, Arthur Schlesinger gives it to you. Read it, and soak it up. Finally, remember the words of George Bush:

"There was no viable exit strategy....Going in and occupying Iraq, thus unilaterally exceeding the United Nations mandate, would have destroyed the precedent of international response to aggression that we hoped to establish."

That was from George Herbert Walker Bush (41)!

13 of 15 people found the following review helpful:

4.0 out of 5 stars A critical and timely assessment, September 24, 2004

By 

Luan Gaines "luansos" (Dana Point, CA USA) - See all my reviews
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This review is from: War and the American Presidency (Hardcover)

If the American public is suffering from a lack of information about the history of the presidency and the balance of power, especially prior to a national election, I don't see how a discussion of specific historical incidents can do anything but add to the lively debate in assessing the Bush presidency and the preemptive doctrine that occasioned the invasion of Iraq.

In the current political climate, dissent is under fire, accused of increasing the danger for our troops in Iraq. Recent statements from Washington indicate that such dissent may border on the treasonous. Schlesinger's book is a timely response to such assertions, because the author sites specific incidents in American history, making a strong case for the necessity of open dialog in the service of the democratic process.

The current preemptive doctrine is worthy of careful consideration. Schlesinger posits that military might is no substitute for wisdom and can only accomplish limited goals. Peace through the prevention of war is replaced with peace via preventive war, an entirely different prospect, with its own inherent problems. Even Truman opined the foolhardiness of a concept that war can only be prevented by war, "You can't 'prevent' anything by war except peace."

Preventive war depends upon accurate intelligence; certainly, it is human nature to guess the future from the experiences of the past. But do we use the historic perspective to create insight or justification for our agenda? The future will not yield itself to the vision of one man or one nation; hence, extreme caution is imperative. We must constantly monitor the inherent dangers of power and the arrogance it breeds.

Nixon was the last president to exercise the concept of "imperial presidency", when the balance of power is upset by the executive branch, via foreign policy decisions, with a lack of congressional oversight and the aid of the attorney general. But Osama bin Laden reopened the doors of imperial presidency for our generation, John Ashcroft at the helm, promoting the Patriot Act I and II, which must allow open debate by the Congress before any restrictions are made on the freedoms we enjoy.

Certain question arise, in reading this book and considering the problems at hand; for example, if war does nurture the concept of the imperial presidency, and certainly the events of 9/11 have made the public more vulnerable and willing to take direction from our leaders, do a democratic people have a moral obligation to stop dissent during wartime? Is this the example shown by our forefathers? And, in a nation born of dissent, what is the nature of patriotism? Schlesinger answers all these questions in detail. The answers are surprisingly informative, certainly worth consideration.

Both popular and electoral votes were at issue in the last election and may be again, so the author includes the pros and cons of the arguments as the framers of the constitution grappled with the safest way to preserve the will of the people. There are also issues regarding the uninhibited pursuit of runaway capitalism and its inherent dangers, including the imminence of a complicated global economy.

Religious fanaticism breeds terrorism, yet people are drawn together in the comfort of spiritual identity, searching for meaning in their lives, so how do we achieve a balance that allows belief systems to coexist, without taking advantage of the obvious fear or one "God" trumping another? It is critical that we refuse to allow fanatics to usurp emotion-driven decisions that cause violence in the name of God.

These are difficult times with serious issues confronting the voters and debate is critical if we are to live within the intended framework of our democracy. "The great strength of democracy is its capacity for self-correction", whether in the global market, the pressures of race and assimilation or spiritual frustration caused by global anonymity. As citizens, we are intimately invested in a process that has so far been successful in safeguarding our values and democratic ideals, but we cannot avoid personal responsibility when electing those to best represent us.

In the final analysis, history documents the nature of dissent in this country and the fact that no president has been sacrosanct, whether the country is at war or not, is well established. Dissent is viable in a democracy, dialog the lifeblood of citizenship and critical to voters. Schlesinger's book suggests an appreciation of our rich history of dissent and the valuable lessons of experience, positive and negative. Stimulating curiosity in pursuit of lively discussion is never a waste of time. Luan Gaines/2004.

17 of 21 people found the following review helpful:

3.0 out of 5 stars Cogent, but rambles at the end., September 8, 2004

By 

Richard Thomas (washington, dc) - See all my reviews
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This review is from: War and the American Presidency (Hardcover)

Arthur Schlesinger's foray into Bush-bashing comes rather late, but is perhaps the most interesting example yet published. Schlesinger is probably best known for "A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House," and it is his reputation as a two-time Pulitzer Prize winner and august presidential historian that will attract readers otherwise repelled by the glut of partisan books, pro and con, about the George W. Bush administration. Rather than re-hash ground already well-trodden by other authors, in this collection of essays Schlesinger sticks with his forte and looks at the Bush Administration through the lens of the revived "Imperial Presidency" (a phrase Schlesinger himself coined). The result is a collection of Schlesinger's thoughts, part of which tell a very different story about the Bush Administration emerges from this shift of focus from character and policy to historical place and precedent. This different story is both a new and an old one.

It is an old story, in that "unilateralism" is as old as the Republic. The tradition of unilateralism in American foreign policy is often muddled through the use of the term "isolationism." Schlesinger reminds us that the point of America's original school of foreign policy was never to turn inward and isolate America from the world (as China did in the 15th Century), but to avoid foreign alliances and entanglements. The history of pre-Wilsonian America is not one of a country eschewing foreign affairs altogether, but one of a country avoiding foreign commitments. Even Bush's aggressive twist to unilateralism is not especially new, as the 1846 Mexican War should remind astute students of history. The shift towards internationalism is relatively new, beginning only with and sustained by the Cold War. Schlesinger sees this and places the modern Bush doctrine of unilateralism, and especially preventative war, into this perspective.

Schlesinger reminds us that Bush's enhanced political power is also nothing new. Schlesinger's phrase "the Imperial Presidency" was the title of his book about the Nixon Administration, and has since become a basic concept in American political science: when confronted by a foreign crisis, the Congress dumps enormous power into the hands of the Presidency. The modern twist on this came about through the sustained crisis of the Cold War; prior crises had been of a much shorter duration. This imperial accumulation of Presidential power during the Cold War continued until the abuses of the Nixon Administration caused a backlash and restored some sense of balance in the political system. The threat of global terrorism after 9/11 has brought about the resurgence of the Imperial Presidency.

Although it is a generally sober and often insightful work, the book does suffer from some editorial flaws. In the early chapters of the book, Schlesinger addresses just how important the character of the Attorney General can be during times of crisis in determining how civil liberties are handled. However, he later devotes a whole chapter later to "Patriotism and Dissent in Wartime." His discussion on Attorney Generals and their relative merits would have been much better if it had been consolidated there, in particular his frank disapproval of John Ashcroft.

It is in the last two chapters that the subject matter seriously diverges from the chosen topic. While they sometimes make for interesting reading, "How to Democratize American Democracy," "Has Democracy a Future?" and "The Inscrutability of History" do not really belong in a book entitled "War and the American Presidency." "How to Democratize American Democracy," a brief history of the flawed workings of the Electoral College and consideration of how to reform it, is the best. The other chapters are speculative in nature and are, in a sense, contradictory. One looks at the problems facing the future of democracy, the other points out the limits of using history to speculate on the future. One wonders why the author would place those two side-by-side, let alone in a historical examination of War the Presidency during wartime. These final chapters - especially the latter of the two - have the feel of being hastily tacked on.

While the book comes to a rambling conclusion, there is much merit to the particular approach taken by Schlesinger his criticism the Bush Administration. Unlike the books of Michael Moore, Al Franken or Paul Begala, Schlesinger's work is not a comedy. Nor is it mere angry partisan bile. It is a cogent historical analysis. While the book reads much like a man's musings on a small variety of topics, the musings and the man make them well worth reading.