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The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy

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This is an excellent work on the development of American military strategy over the years. It will serve both as a standard work of reference, and an excellent read in its own right.

The book is at its best on the early Republic and the era from the Civil War to WWI. Later chapters are slightly weaker, possibly becase there is a plethora of books on the run-up to WWII, the conflict itself and its aftermath.

What is fascinating is watching the evolution of a nation deeply suspicious of a standing army (something inherited both from the British tradition, and from the experience of the Revolution), and looking for quick and easy solutions ro defend its seaborne commerce. In fact, Thomas Jefferson bleieved in strong coastal defences, and small ships equipped to defend ports. This was a disastrous strategy which misfired in the War of 1812. The British showed that command of the sea was command of the coast -such an invader could pick his spot for a landing, and proceed.
The North itself used this strategy in the Civil War.

For many years, Indian fighting was the main occupation of the army, usually supplemented by local volunteers. However, the foundation of West Point led to a significant improvement in that a cadre of trained officers were now available. In the Civil War, most of the high command (and one of the Presidents) were West-Point trained, and performed well (with exceptions) as tacticians and strategists compared with European contemporaries.

In Weigley's view (and I disagree with him slightly) Grant and Sherman emerge as the two best military strategists of the Civil War period. My only cavil is that he possibly is too hard on Grant, crediting him with a mistaken emphasis on mass and concentration that led to the bloody battles in Virginia (1864 - Wilderness, Spotsylvania and Cold Harbor) which bled the Confederates white but also severely mauled Grant's own army.

True, Sherman had an instinctive grasp of the turning movement and the destruction of enemy resources as a strategy of attrition. But he learned this from Grant, and Grant's own aberrant attacking mode lasted only three months, thereafter he also went back to turning movements. In fact, his crossing of the James after Cold Harbor was probably the boldest and most effective stroke of the war (better even than Vicksburg) but went unrewarded due to poor execution by his subordinates. Some of this was Grant's as his senior generals were exhausted after three month's hard fighting, but one wonders what would have happened if Phil Sheridan had been in command of the lead corps and taken Petersburg in July 1864. Richmond would surely have fallen, leaving the Confederacy facing into a bleak winter without Atlanta or Richmond.

Weigley rightly traces the influcence of Grant in the approach of the Americans to WWII strategy and defends Eisenhower against the charge that he had backed away from this strategy rather than give the British the lead role in the advance on Germany.

The naval counterpart to Grant was Alfred Thayer Mahan, and one of the best chapters in the book is the description of Mahan's influence on naval Pacific strategy before and during WWII.

I am now reaching the end of the book, and it badly needs a revision to take account of post-Cold War events. Hopefully, Weigley might do this - after the Gulf War and Sept 11, there would be a ready market for such a work.

Weigley is a great writer on military history - his 'Age of Battles' is about Pre-napoleonic warfare, and is possibly a better book this one. I recommedn both books.

There is nothing more boring than a badly written book of military history, especially when it is required reading. I have plowed through several in command & staff college, and this one is a delight. It is easy to read without being simple. I actually enjoyed the reading. After chapters of Clausewitz and Jomini and more battle diagrams than is humane, I got to this book. What a relief! Heck, I would read this book just for fun!

I have never enjoyed reading an academic war history, before. I will probably give copies of this book to selected friends. It is on my "top ten of the genre" list. Americana at its best.

This book is essentially an exploration of the way America has conducted war, from the Revolutionary War to Vietnam. Weigley attempts to show the development of American military thought, from hit-and-run tactics of the Revolution to global policing and the containment of communism in the mid twentieth-century. Throughout it all Weigley focuses on key figures--Washington, Grant, a couple of Marshalls and a couple of Mahans, among others--who played important roles in the way the military thought and acted.
Overall, this is a very fascinating study. Weigley's knowledge of the subject is commendable. It is a bit unfortunate that about 2/3 of the book is devoted to the twentieth-century, and that there is only a very sparse chapter on the Indian Wars, but it is understandable considering the tremendous expansion of the military in the 1900s. Sometimes Weigley's writing style is a bit difficult to follow--I found myself rereading sentences quite often--but overall the book is well enough written. This is a great book not just for military history buffs but for anyone who enjoys history in general.

I am only a third of the way through this book (just finished the Civil War) and I can already say, unequivocably, that this is an absolutely amazing book. Unlike many military history books which tend to get hung up on tedious descriptions of individual battles (and, thus, lose the forest through the trees and never make a point), this book is an absolute treasure of insights about military strategy as it has evolved from the 1700s through present day. Weigley's writing is incredible, and it seems that every paragraph makes a startling insightful comment.

This book is a pleasure to read and I really recommend it.

If you were assigned this text as part of a college course, you are in luck - it might be the best thing you read all semester. Weigley has a sharp prose style, and he delves into areas of American military history that others either ignore or neglect. I found his take on the war of annihilation against the American Indians especially important, mostly because it is free of political sentimentality and simultaneously captures the human tragedy of the event. His account of the airwar against Germany and Japan is riveting and revealing. Weigley has a gift for making statistics come alive. A great and grand narrative.

From Russell Weigley, one of America's most distinguished military historians, The American Way of War illustrates how the nation's political, economic, and social development shaped the military and its methods. Originally published in 1973, the work does not, of course, contain analysis of military policy from Vietnam to the present. Despite this, Weigley's work stands up well and is essential reading for those interested in military history or public policy. His conclusions are solid and writing clear and engaging. Of particular value are chapters covering strategy and policy of the War for Independence, Civil War, and World War II.

The material on Washington's strategy during the Revolution was excellent and showed that he actually pursued a brilliant strategy. Likewise, the analysis of the Civil War convincingly contradicted what I had learned about Grant and Lee's strategic abilities during college. Weigley also wrote the first really good analysis of the strategy of World War II that I have read. He discusses Jomini, Mahan, and others who influenced American military strategy.

The only gripe I have about the book is that the discussion of American strategy in a nuclear world got into too much detail of budgets and bureaucracy. Also, the discussion of Vietnam is weak, but that can be excused since he did not have the advantage of highsight (the book being published in 1973).

Overall an excellent and thought-provoking study of the evolution of American military strategy.

Excellent descrition of the US military strategy from its roots. It gets a little weak after the WWII specially in the Vietnam chapter and afterwards. It would be desirable an update covering post cold war events and the actual worl situation.
I strongly recommend it to be introduced to strategy thinking and for the understanding of US military operations and some of its foreing policy. We can also find some clues about the links between politicians and Army as well as the way that led US to become the largest military power.
It adds some interesting details about potential war plans that US considered for years against Canada, Great Britain and others.

Dr.Russell F. Weigley's history and assessment of the American application of political and military power is one of the most detailed and comprehensive studies of its kind. Weigley explores the ever evolving role of the military in an ever changing world, using history as the guideline to establish his facts. This book covers the American Way of War through the second half of this century, and illustrates how U.S. strategy and policy became the benchmark for military institutions the world over to the present day.

Russell Weigley concludes this grand overview of American military strategy with the observation that the time of usable combat may be ending. The unlimited nature of nuclear warfare, and the trend since the 19th century for conventional war to produce less than decisive results, were the ground for his conclusion.

He wrote this in the midst of the Vietnam War. What has happened since argues for his conclusion. Limited counterinsurgency conflicts in Central America aimed at keeping leftist elements from power only delayed the process. They're part of and leading governments now. The first Iraq War left an indecisive conclusion that nagged at the neocons until they had a chance for a decisive victory, or so they thought. Now there is a grueling conflict that is the essence of the indecisive result. Afghanistan is much the same. Slow bleeding of American military, political and economic power is the consequence of not heeding the lesson Weigley drew. Finally, the best use of military power is to prevent its use, and once the sword is drawn, policy has failed.

Weigley's reach is stunning, from Washington to Westmoreland, deeply imbued with the changing strategic context of war generated by changing technologies, from rifled weapons to nuclear missiles. It is this very growth of technology that has made war increasingly unable to yield satisfactory conclusions. This can only become more true, indicating that usable combat is indeed coming to an end, and only the difficult but necessary processes of negotiation and diplomacy will bring solutions to global challenges that are only becoming more pressing, from climate change and energy security to poverty, disease and indeed, the spread of increasingly deadly weapons.

One interesting biographical note - Weigley came from Reading, Pa., where I grew up. From this I know that one character in this book, Gen. Carl Spaatz of the Army Air Force who directed the bombing of Japan, also came from Reading. The airport there is named after Spaatz. I can no longer get a commercial flight into that airport though. They halted a few years ago. Apparently post 9-11 security needs made it uneconomical to operate commercial flights in there anymore. Ironic, indeed, and perhaps another indirect confirmation of Weigley's final conclusion, when the most powerful military in the world cannot assure domestic security.