25 of 30 people found the following review helpful:
3.0 out of 5 stars
Less Military Than The Title Suggests / But Still A Good Book, March 19, 2006
This review is from: America's Coming War with China: A Collision Course over Taiwan (Hardcover)
The content of this book runs a bit contrary to its title in that it is not a military book, but more of a political and strategic one. A more appropriate title could have been `The China-Taiwan Stand Off.'
Given the title of the book, a military analysis of a possible war with China is expected. But as it stands, the book is a bit short and a bit general when it comes to military matters. The work could have been better served by a group of experts, or two authors. The writer is a member of the Cato Institute, and should have had colleagues at the institute available and willing to work with him. As it stands, the finished work it is a small book (216 pages).
As for the Cato Institute, it is known for supporting `hands-off' politics, both at the economic and international level. Therefore it is not surprising that the author advises on a hands off approach to Taiwan by emphasizing that the US should end all defense obligations while simultaneously free up all weapons sales.
The author warns of a possible conflict with China, but does not excuse US policy as a co-contributor. Contrary to most other books on the subject, the author does not exclude US provocations against China (the sudden sale of high-tech weaponry to Taiwan, the reneging on supposed agreements with China, the tentative air defense shield for Taiwan etc) instead of exclusively focusing on Chinese provocations.
This book makes it obvious the US is talking through both sides of its mouth on the Taiwan issue. Unlike China, who has made its stance crystal clear, the US position on Taiwan borders on the nebulous. Herein lies the danger. The world does not know what the US will do should China attack Taiwan and the US position is open to interpretation, an interpretation that could be wrong.
As he points out, the US simultaneously congratulates and threatens both countries. The US proclaims to want military collaboration with both yet cautions both against military build-up. The US has economic ties with both - yet threatens to alter those ties if either misbehaves. The United States supports Taiwanese national defense, yet forbids Taiwan to declare itself a nation. There is a constant danger that one or both sides could misinterpret the vague US position and do something that would produce unexpected results. The author displays many examples that the PLA might just be on its way to doing that with an apparent belief in the Chinese high command that the United States will do little or nothing should the Chinese attack Taiwan. This seems like a dangerous piece of miscalculation given that America might see the storming of Taiwan as a direct challenge to its naval power.
A major chunk of the book is dedicated to the history of the evolving political interpretations of the Taiwan Relations Act, first signed in 1979 as a new definition of relationship between Taiwan and the US following America's denial of official recognition for Taiwan (Taiwan was also kicked out of the UN). The reason: blooming economic and political relations with China (which could not have happened otherwise). This is a very revealing and important part of the book.
The book does delve unnecessarily into the detailed history of Taiwan and China during WW-II. Some coverage is critical, but not to the extent the book carries it out and too much is dedicated to this section, which suggests filler.
But there is some nice detail also (unseen in most other works), about the political dilemma of Taiwan. As it turns out, the Taiwanese Kuomintang Party were mostly mainland Chinese who descended on Taiwan after the fall of China to the communists, and are themselves considered outsiders by the Taiwanese. It was also the Kuomintang who kept alive the self-destructive `one-China' concept in the hope that a counter-revolution would occur on the mainland and the Kuomintang would cross the straits to reclaim the reins of power. This ridiculous dream and its political stance have come back to haunt Taiwan, since Communist China latched on to the very same concept but in reverse (with the Communist party as rulers of Taiwan). The long-term policy by both sides has led to the present-day crisis.
As the author points out (and many other books do not), the Taiwanese have a strong dislike for both the newly arrived Kuomintang and mainland Chinese. They consider themselves a nation who (much like Armenians, Kurds, Palestinians or Tibetans), have been striving for sovereignty for decades with little success. Ironically, the Kuomintang has recently earned much hatred in Taiwan for becoming a leading proponent for unification with China mostly on Chinese terms. Most ominously, in Taiwan it is now the parties aggressively pushing for an official declaration of sovereignty and independence which now enjoy popularity in Taiwan.
The war scenario featured in the book, though interesting, is a bit general and short for a book whose title suggests a detailed look at military confrontation. There is no explanation of events leading up to war. Things just happen.
No motivation or explanation is given for China's all-out military reaction other than the `line-in-the sand' scenario, where Taiwan renounces being any part of China and declares itself a sovereign nation (an act China has officially declared an act of war). Once the declaration is made, the Chinese simply react like robots. No Chinese point of view, no deliberations, no planning. To top it all off, Taiwan is made out to be the upstart villain who foolishly endangers itself, and the rest of the world with its upstart arrogant antics! (how dare Taiwan provoke the Chinese by saying it is an independent nation)
The description of the actual fighting is general. Perhaps too general. The author states that an American carrier group is devastated by Chinese destroyers firing Sunburn missiles. But he fails to mention Sunburn is an exclusively nuclear weapon (as are most Russian naval missiles supplied to the Chinese). Was the attack nuclear? If so the author does not say. All coverage of any use or ramifications of nuclear weapons at sea is simply not covered. We simply don't know. All we know is that a lot of ships are sunk.
An important point made in the book, however, is that the US could be abandoned by its strategic allies in the Pacific. This could happen because these allies (South Korea, Japan, Australia, Singapore, Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia and Australia) having huge investments in or with China, investments which they do not want to endanger by angering the Chinese. China has most of the Asian countries in its pocket not by way of military threat, but through the sizeable investments these countries have made in China (even US and Taiwan are affected). To underline the point , the author is simply saying all these countries and interests would rather see Taiwan fall and have their sea sovereignty somewhat challenged rather than lose their China investments. The effect on the US alone of a total Chinese embargo could be devastating. To give the bottom line a general and comical slant: if we help Taiwan, China closes Walmart. In this respect, the book underlines that China has already won half the battle. Therefore the denial of military bases in areas we thought friendly could become a reality once the shooting starts. China has dedicated decades towards building economic leverage in the Pacific and the book makes clear China is now in possession of it.
While the author rightly suspects such countries as the Philippines, South Korea and Australia as shirking their support for the US in case of a Taiwan crisis, his representation of Japan as a country who will immediately deny the US all its military bases upon the outbreak of a war with China seems miscalculated and naive. Japan is completely obsessed with its sea lanes, and the taking of Taiwan would be a threat to those sea lanes.
Finally, without giving away the concluding part on the US-China war or its consequences, it resembles Japan and the US sitting down to discuss spheres of influence following the battle of Midway. Yes, it all makes perfect sense and sounds so civilized and logical, but is it a realistic expectation?
Although strategically, the book makes good points, it also carries oversights.
The author never mentions sea power and trade lanes as one of the reasons for China's attack on Taiwan or America's and Japan's opposition to such an attack. The author also does not mention China's strategic claims beyond Taiwan, such as the South China Sea, the Spratleys and the Senkaku Islands, which suggest strategic aims beyond Taiwan. In the author's opinion, Taiwan is important to China simply to make up for humiliation at the hands of foreign powers in the 19th century and as socio-political proof of China's unification and sovereignty. Taiwan is never analyzed from the point of view of a strictly a political, economic and strategic prize, which it most certainly is.
In conclusion, the three most interesting parts are the war scenario (though somewhat short and general), the descriptions of Taiwan's internal politics, its detailed analysis of the history of the Taiwan Relations Act and the book's 7th chapter which lists all the possibilities and directions a Sino-Taiwanese conflict could take as well as the capabilities on each side.
It is also obvious the author did some last minute revisions to make sure the book as recent and up-dated as possible.
I must honestly say this book compliments some of the other `anti-China' or `China-warning' books quite nicely since it offers a more neutral (rather than exclusively pro-American) view of the crisis (though I would say it is a bit anti-Taiwanese in its viewpoint).
To the serious student of the China-Taiwan crisis I also recommend the impressive "China: the Gathering Threat" by Menges, which this book actually compliments and completes quite nicely by bringing up factors not brought up in the Menges book.
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4 of 4 people found the following review helpful:
4.0 out of 5 stars
Good as an Introductory Book, October 29, 2007
This review is from: America's Coming War with China: A Collision Course over Taiwan (Hardcover)
This a decent book, certainly, but I disagree with the premise that America's supposed schizophrenic approach to dealing with the two Chinas could be the determining factor in sparking a war. What's more likely (if we're going to play the speculation game, which, you will have noticed, most China analysts like to do) is that war would occur in spite of the US's efforts to keep the status quo, which has been the cornerstone of its policy for decades. Indeed (and here, I disagree again), although it may appear as though the US's position is inconsistent, this only helps serves its own purpose: to keep Beijing focused on its "precious island," and away from, say, Japan while at the same time forcing Taiwan to purchase whatever multi-billion dollar (used) arms package it has lying around. I would posit the US's approach(es) consititute one of that country's greatest foreign policy successes. And by not always being consistent (a statement by George Bush comes to mind), the United States is (purposefully or otherwise) beating both Chinas at their own game. But how long the US can keep this up is the big question. And to that end, the author is probably right in believing that Washington and Beijing are on a collision course over the Republican backed "renegade province," but I'm just not sure if he understands the hows and whys. And the answers to those question have a lot more to do with the Chinese heart than politics, something a think tank analyst might not be so familiar with.
Again, it's not a bad book, and it could very well enjoy a huge surge in sales after the Olympics. (You see? There's that projection, again.) Also, what a great cover. Whether intentional or not the red in the Nationalist flag symbolizes the blood soaked soil of China. I give this book four stars. It makes for a good overview even if I don't agree with everything the author is saying.
Troy Parfitt, author
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