Customer Reviews

America's Coming War with China: A Collision Course over Taiwan

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1 star:		(4)

 

 

The content of this book runs a bit contrary to its title in that it is not a military book, but more of a political and strategic one. A more appropriate title could have been `The China-Taiwan Stand Off.'

Given the title of the book, a military analysis of a possible war with China is expected. But as it stands, the book is a bit short and a bit general when it comes to military matters. The work could have been better served by a group of experts, or two authors. The writer is a member of the Cato Institute, and should have had colleagues at the institute available and willing to work with him. As it stands, the finished work it is a small book (216 pages).

As for the Cato Institute, it is known for supporting `hands-off' politics, both at the economic and international level. Therefore it is not surprising that the author advises on a hands off approach to Taiwan by emphasizing that the US should end all defense obligations while simultaneously free up all weapons sales.

The author warns of a possible conflict with China, but does not excuse US policy as a co-contributor. Contrary to most other books on the subject, the author does not exclude US provocations against China (the sudden sale of high-tech weaponry to Taiwan, the reneging on supposed agreements with China, the tentative air defense shield for Taiwan etc) instead of exclusively focusing on Chinese provocations.

This book makes it obvious the US is talking through both sides of its mouth on the Taiwan issue. Unlike China, who has made its stance crystal clear, the US position on Taiwan borders on the nebulous. Herein lies the danger. The world does not know what the US will do should China attack Taiwan and the US position is open to interpretation, an interpretation that could be wrong.

As he points out, the US simultaneously congratulates and threatens both countries. The US proclaims to want military collaboration with both yet cautions both against military build-up. The US has economic ties with both - yet threatens to alter those ties if either misbehaves. The United States supports Taiwanese national defense, yet forbids Taiwan to declare itself a nation. There is a constant danger that one or both sides could misinterpret the vague US position and do something that would produce unexpected results. The author displays many examples that the PLA might just be on its way to doing that with an apparent belief in the Chinese high command that the United States will do little or nothing should the Chinese attack Taiwan. This seems like a dangerous piece of miscalculation given that America might see the storming of Taiwan as a direct challenge to its naval power.

A major chunk of the book is dedicated to the history of the evolving political interpretations of the Taiwan Relations Act, first signed in 1979 as a new definition of relationship between Taiwan and the US following America's denial of official recognition for Taiwan (Taiwan was also kicked out of the UN). The reason: blooming economic and political relations with China (which could not have happened otherwise). This is a very revealing and important part of the book.

The book does delve unnecessarily into the detailed history of Taiwan and China during WW-II. Some coverage is critical, but not to the extent the book carries it out and too much is dedicated to this section, which suggests filler.

But there is some nice detail also (unseen in most other works), about the political dilemma of Taiwan. As it turns out, the Taiwanese Kuomintang Party were mostly mainland Chinese who descended on Taiwan after the fall of China to the communists, and are themselves considered outsiders by the Taiwanese. It was also the Kuomintang who kept alive the self-destructive `one-China' concept in the hope that a counter-revolution would occur on the mainland and the Kuomintang would cross the straits to reclaim the reins of power. This ridiculous dream and its political stance have come back to haunt Taiwan, since Communist China latched on to the very same concept but in reverse (with the Communist party as rulers of Taiwan). The long-term policy by both sides has led to the present-day crisis.

As the author points out (and many other books do not), the Taiwanese have a strong dislike for both the newly arrived Kuomintang and mainland Chinese. They consider themselves a nation who (much like Armenians, Kurds, Palestinians or Tibetans), have been striving for sovereignty for decades with little success. Ironically, the Kuomintang has recently earned much hatred in Taiwan for becoming a leading proponent for unification with China mostly on Chinese terms. Most ominously, in Taiwan it is now the parties aggressively pushing for an official declaration of sovereignty and independence which now enjoy popularity in Taiwan.

The war scenario featured in the book, though interesting, is a bit general and short for a book whose title suggests a detailed look at military confrontation. There is no explanation of events leading up to war. Things just happen.

No motivation or explanation is given for China's all-out military reaction other than the `line-in-the sand' scenario, where Taiwan renounces being any part of China and declares itself a sovereign nation (an act China has officially declared an act of war). Once the declaration is made, the Chinese simply react like robots. No Chinese point of view, no deliberations, no planning. To top it all off, Taiwan is made out to be the upstart villain who foolishly endangers itself, and the rest of the world with its upstart arrogant antics! (how dare Taiwan provoke the Chinese by saying it is an independent nation)

The description of the actual fighting is general. Perhaps too general. The author states that an American carrier group is devastated by Chinese destroyers firing Sunburn missiles. But he fails to mention Sunburn is an exclusively nuclear weapon (as are most Russian naval missiles supplied to the Chinese). Was the attack nuclear? If so the author does not say. All coverage of any use or ramifications of nuclear weapons at sea is simply not covered. We simply don't know. All we know is that a lot of ships are sunk.

An important point made in the book, however, is that the US could be abandoned by its strategic allies in the Pacific. This could happen because these allies (South Korea, Japan, Australia, Singapore, Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia and Australia) having huge investments in or with China, investments which they do not want to endanger by angering the Chinese. China has most of the Asian countries in its pocket not by way of military threat, but through the sizeable investments these countries have made in China (even US and Taiwan are affected). To underline the point , the author is simply saying all these countries and interests would rather see Taiwan fall and have their sea sovereignty somewhat challenged rather than lose their China investments. The effect on the US alone of a total Chinese embargo could be devastating. To give the bottom line a general and comical slant: if we help Taiwan, China closes Walmart. In this respect, the book underlines that China has already won half the battle. Therefore the denial of military bases in areas we thought friendly could become a reality once the shooting starts. China has dedicated decades towards building economic leverage in the Pacific and the book makes clear China is now in possession of it.

While the author rightly suspects such countries as the Philippines, South Korea and Australia as shirking their support for the US in case of a Taiwan crisis, his representation of Japan as a country who will immediately deny the US all its military bases upon the outbreak of a war with China seems miscalculated and naive. Japan is completely obsessed with its sea lanes, and the taking of Taiwan would be a threat to those sea lanes.

Finally, without giving away the concluding part on the US-China war or its consequences, it resembles Japan and the US sitting down to discuss spheres of influence following the battle of Midway. Yes, it all makes perfect sense and sounds so civilized and logical, but is it a realistic expectation?

Although strategically, the book makes good points, it also carries oversights.

The author never mentions sea power and trade lanes as one of the reasons for China's attack on Taiwan or America's and Japan's opposition to such an attack. The author also does not mention China's strategic claims beyond Taiwan, such as the South China Sea, the Spratleys and the Senkaku Islands, which suggest strategic aims beyond Taiwan. In the author's opinion, Taiwan is important to China simply to make up for humiliation at the hands of foreign powers in the 19th century and as socio-political proof of China's unification and sovereignty. Taiwan is never analyzed from the point of view of a strictly a political, economic and strategic prize, which it most certainly is.

In conclusion, the three most interesting parts are the war scenario (though somewhat short and general), the descriptions of Taiwan's internal politics, its detailed analysis of the history of the Taiwan Relations Act and the book's 7th chapter which lists all the possibilities and directions a Sino-Taiwanese conflict could take as well as the capabilities on each side.

It is also obvious the author did some last minute revisions to make sure the book as recent and up-dated as possible.

I must honestly say this book compliments some of the other `anti-China' or `China-warning' books quite nicely since it offers a more neutral (rather than exclusively pro-American) view of the crisis (though I would say it is a bit anti-Taiwanese in its viewpoint).

To the serious student of the China-Taiwan crisis I also recommend the impressive "China: the Gathering Threat" by Menges, which this book actually compliments and completes quite nicely by bringing up factors not brought up in the Menges book.

This book claims that the American alliance with Taiwan will lead to a war with China in 2013 because of America's committment to defending the island. However the author then proposes cutting the U.S off from Taiwan. This is a strange proscroption. Just because an alliance with a democracy might mean there is a chance of war with the dictatorship doesnt mean every alliance should be ditched. That would be like claiming that since America's alliance to England in the 1930s might lead to war with nazi Germany that therefore the U.S should have cut herself off. Alliances are part of foreign policy, China must also fear that an invasion of Taiwan will lead to war and this is thus a balance of power, a key to diplomacy. Kissinger has shown this in Diplomacy (A Touchstone Book).

This book is both far fetched and draws the wrong conclusions.

Seth J. Frantzman

This a decent book, certainly, but I disagree with the premise that America's supposed schizophrenic approach to dealing with the two Chinas could be the determining factor in sparking a war. What's more likely (if we're going to play the speculation game, which, you will have noticed, most China analysts like to do) is that war would occur in spite of the US's efforts to keep the status quo, which has been the cornerstone of its policy for decades. Indeed (and here, I disagree again), although it may appear as though the US's position is inconsistent, this only helps serves its own purpose: to keep Beijing focused on its "precious island," and away from, say, Japan while at the same time forcing Taiwan to purchase whatever multi-billion dollar (used) arms package it has lying around. I would posit the US's approach(es) consititute one of that country's greatest foreign policy successes. And by not always being consistent (a statement by George Bush comes to mind), the United States is (purposefully or otherwise) beating both Chinas at their own game. But how long the US can keep this up is the big question. And to that end, the author is probably right in believing that Washington and Beijing are on a collision course over the Republican backed "renegade province," but I'm just not sure if he understands the hows and whys. And the answers to those question have a lot more to do with the Chinese heart than politics, something a think tank analyst might not be so familiar with.

Again, it's not a bad book, and it could very well enjoy a huge surge in sales after the Olympics. (You see? There's that projection, again.) Also, what a great cover. Whether intentional or not the red in the Nationalist flag symbolizes the blood soaked soil of China. I give this book four stars. It makes for a good overview even if I don't agree with everything the author is saying.

Troy Parfitt, author

An excellent primer on the 'Taiwan problem', although those who follow the issue won't find much new here. The first chapter sets out a scenario for a war in the Strait, the rest trace the problem from its origins and explain why it's heading for crisis in the near future. The book is short on military details, as another reviewer noted - the chapter on PRC military capabilities is its shortest. The concluding chapter setting out policy recommendations for the US govt is also a little brief. The author also suffers from the chronic inability of western polsci writers on China to get historical details right (Taiwan was not occupied by the 'Ming dynasty' in 1661, Mr Carpenter), though it's a minor beef given the subject matter. The book is strongest in its analysis of the contemporary politics and strategic thinking on this most dangerous of global hotspots. A refreshing change from the fear-mongering polemic that usually passes for American popular writing on the PRC.

American is full of intelligent experts on China, but it doesn't seem to have a lot of experts on Taiwan. Taiwan might not be as big or as important as China to the US, but it is an important elements in the situation. Without the understanding, there will be no accurate conclusion and no good proposition of solutions.

I think Taiwan should be allowed to defend itself, if it is under attack. I agree with the author on that the US should really reconsider its policy, and sell Taiwan weapons other than defensive ones when necessary because there is no way Taiwan can defend itself properly just by taking a pounding. Defensive weapon are usually more expensive, and it can't help detering China's attack, China will just keep attacking. If Taiwan has the ability to defend itself then the US wouldn't need to worry too much if it will get drag into the war.

I disagree with the previous poster on encouraging Taiwan to reunify with China. That will be a big strategic mistake in the long run I believe. The US should clearly state that "we do not support indepedence, and we do not support reunification." This way it makes the US neutral on this matter. (which it should be, because ideally the fate of Taiwan should rest on the hand of Taiwanese, not the US or China, since they are the one that live and die on it.)

Despite the US discouragement of indepedence and China's threat and coercion, Taiwan's recent poll seems to show that the percentage of people who support independence is actually growing over past few years. Perhaps the US should wait a bit more instead of just rushing in and push Taiwan to China's embrace.

In the years ahead there is no more important relationship
than that between the U.S. and China. Unfortunately, as Ted Galen
Carpenter details in America's Coming War with China, these two
nations are headed towards a train wreck over the issue of Taiwan.
Truly frightening is the possibility of a nuclear confrontation at
a time when the Cold War seems like ancient history.
Carpenter's carefully reasoned analysis should scare us out of
any complacent assumption that everything will work out.
Unfortunately, U.S. officials don't seem to know what they are
doing, irrespective of whether they are Republicans or Democrats.
Carpenter maneuvers between those who would accommodate Beijing and
those who would prepare for war. One can only hope that America's
Coming War with China is widely read, especially inside Washington.

Regardless of what the author thinks, we will not go to war with China over Taiwan. The simple reason is that we cannot fight a conventional war with China and win. Consider that number of migrant workers alone in China exceeds the entire population of the US. China can field an army the likes of which the world has never seen. Our military and government knows that (as do our allies). While we may at some point get drawn into proxy wars like we did with the Soviets during the Cold War, there is no military strategy short of using atomic weapons that would allow us even a chance at victory in an all out war against China. And thanks to all of our American dollars buying cheap Chinese goods, we have effectively financed the moderisation of their military. China is no longer the backward opponent we faced in Korea. In addition to the sheer size of the combat force they could field, they have a modern army, air force, nuclear submarines, and cutting edge wepons systems like their new "carrier killer" missle. The truth is that we are not going to war over Taiwan because we would lose a conventional war and we will not risk nuclear conflict over something that is not really essential to our national security. When China decides they want Taiwan, they will simply take it. If they are feeling generous they may allow us some means of saving face when they do so. The one thing working to our advantage right now is our mutual economic dependence makes it in the interest of both countries to avoid hostility. China needs our markets, we need their loans and cheap products. But this situation will not exist indefinitely. Eventually we will go broke and a stronger China will incur only minimal risk by asserting itself more agressively in the game of nations. Just as no one wanted to poke the Red Bear with a stick, neither will anyone want to risk arousing the Red Tiger.

Ted Galen Carpenter's America's Coming War with China: A Collision Course over Taiwan (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005) is must reading for anyone interested in Sino-American relations, or in U.S. grand strategy generally. Although most Americans - foreign policy analysts, scholars, and interested citizens - understandably are preoccupied with events in the Middle East (Iraq, Iran, Lebanon) and the War on Terror, when it comes to impacting the U.S. role in world politics, in the longer term these events almost certainly will be overshadowed by the rise of China to great power status.
In America's Coming War with China, Carpenter - the Vice President for Defense and Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute, a Washington, D.C.-based think tank - provides a succinct, elegant analysis of why Taiwan could be the trigger for a major war between China and the United States. His main thesis is simply stated: the current U.S. strategy of "strategic ambiguity" on the question of whether it will come to Taiwan's defense in the event that island is attacked by the People's Republic of China is neither likely to deter the PRC from using force against China, nor to restrain Taiwan from declaring its independence from the mainland (which inevitably would trigger a Chinese military response). Instead, Washington's stance of strategic ambiguity runs a high risk of causing leaders in either Beijing or Taipei - or, quite possibly in both capitals - to blunder into war because they have miscalculated how the United States would respond to a confrontation between Taiwan and the PRC.
Carpenter does an excellent job of distilling a great deal of history to manageable, understandable dimensions. In an early chapter, he traces the history of Taiwan since the time of the Sino-Japanese War (1894-95). In that war, a Westernized, modernizing Japan soundly defeated a backward China, and, as its main spoil of victory, acquired Taiwan (or Formosa as it then was known) from China. Formosa/Taiwan remained a part of the Japanese Empire until Japan's defeat in 1945. Japanese rule - though harsh in some respects - contributed crucially to the island's economic, political, and social modernization and helped to foster created among its residents a sense of apartness from the mainland. Formosa/Taiwan reverted to rule by the mainland between 1945 and 1949. In 1949, the ongoing civil war in China - which pitted Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist (Kuomintang, or KMT) regime against the Chinese Communist Party lead by Mao Zedong - resulted in the decisive military victory of the Communists. The defeated Chiang, and the remnants of his regime and army, fled across the Formosa/Taiwan strait to establish a last redoubt on that island.
As Carpenter shows, the roots of the current Taiwan problem are traceable directly to the outcome of the Chinese Civil War in 1949. When Chiang and the Nationalists set up shop in Taiwan, the did not renounce their claim to sovereignty over the Chinese mainland. In other words, the Nationalist regime adopted a "One China" policy. So, of course, did Communists: like the Nationalists they claimed sovereignty over both the Mainland and Taiwan. Although military tensions were high in the Taiwan Straits during the 1950s (with war between the Communist government on the mainland, and the Nationalist government on the Taiwan threatening during the Korean War, and in the crises over Quemoy and Matsu - Nationalist-controlled islands just off China's coast - in 1955 and 1958) war did not break-out. A major reason for this is that although the United States granted diplomatic recognition to Chiang's regime and entered into a treaty to defend it, Washington acted decisively to restrain Chiang's many harebrained schemes to "liberate" the mainland. (Or, in the parlance of those halcyon Cold War days, the U.S. refused to "unleash" Chiang.)
The late 1960s, of course, saw the beginnings of a sea-change in U.S. policy. Under the direction of President Richard Nixon, and Henry A. Kissinger, the U.S. embarked on a course of action that culminated in Washington's decision to normalize its diplomatic relations with the PRC. The motive was the desire to enlist China - which had its own problems with Moscow (and came perilously close to a full-scale war with the Soviets in 1969) - in the containment of the Soviet Union. Under the Carter administration, the Sino-American rapprochement culminated in Washington's decision to extend formal diplomatic recognition to the PRC, and simultaneously to "de-recognize" Taiwan (officially known as the Republic of China). During these early years of Sino-American rapprochement, both the Nixon and Carter administrations accepted the One China principle, although the U.S. expressed the hope for peaceful resolution of the differences between Taiwan and the PRC.
As Carpenter demonstrates, the seeds of ambiguity were present in American policy toward Taiwan almost from the beginning of Washington's reconciliation with Beijing. Neither the Nixon nor Carter administrations were willing to give the PRC a blank check to pursue reunification (the Nixon administration refused to abrogate the U.S. defense treaty with Taiwan). Although the Carter administration did revoke the U.S.-Taiwan defense treaty when it recognized the PRC, Congress - led by the "Taiwan Lobby" of right-wing hawks - passed the Taiwan Relations Act. The Act established a de facto diplomatic relationship with between the U.S. and Taiwan, undertook to provide Taiwan with defensive weapons, and stated the U.S. could not be indifferent to the use of force by the PRC to change the status quo on Taiwan. Under the Reagan administration, Washington's policy toward China and Taiwan was even more ambiguous: while affirming the U.S. commitment to a One China policy and non-interference with internal Chinese matters, Reagan also substantially increased American arms sales to Taiwan (and, of course, his personal inclinations were decidedly pro-Taiwan and anti-PRC).
Although in some respects cross-Straits relations occasionally have been tense since the 1960s, the status quo seemed to hold relatively well until the mid-1990s. Then it began to deteriorate, and all the signs point to even more trouble down the road. The question, of course, is what happened to imperil the uneasy status quo that the U.S., the PRC and Taiwan each accepted during the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s? Carpenter does an excellent job of answering this question. First, there have been profound changes in Taiwan. Demographically, the mainlanders who fled to Taiwan with Chiang have begun to die, and indigenous Taiwanese have gained ascendancy. The younger generations of indigenous Taiwanese feel no attachment to mainland China. In the argot of political science, demographic change has brought about a change in Taiwan's "national identity": islanders regard themselves as Taiwanese, not Chinese, and increasingly view Taiwan is an independent nation. Second, reflecting these demographic and cultural changes, pro-independence politicians (Taiwan's current president, Chen Shui-bian, and his predecessor, Lee Teng-hui) and parties (most importantly, the Democratic Progressive Party) have come to dominate Taiwanese politics. Under Chen's leadership, Taiwan has made clear its aspirations for formal Taiwanese independence. In other words, under Chen, Taiwan has essentially adopted a "Two China" - or more accurately, a One China, One Taiwan - policy. In this regard, Chen has been playing a dangerous game: walking right up to Beijing's red line - a formal declaration of independence, or its functional equivalent - but not quite crossing the line and precipitating a military response by the PRC.
The PRC, as Carpenter amply documents, is firmly committed to reunification with Taiwan, and perforce unalterably opposed to any moves toward independence by Taipei. Moreover, Carpenter shows that the PRC is increasingly unwilling to continue accepting the current status quo. Leaders in Beijing are well aware of the political consequences of the ongoing demographic shifts in Taiwan. They realize that there may only be a finite window for reunification to take place, and hence are increasingly impatient with Taiwan's diplomatic stalling when it comes to engaging Beijing in serious discussions on this issue. At the same time, the U.S. - the third player in this drama - has followed a zig zag policy (especially under the current administration). The wisest of U.S. leaders - former Secretary of State Colin Powell - for example realize that it would be folly for the support Taiwanese independence. Yet, hard-liners in the administration (including, probably President George W. Bush himself), Congress, and foreign policy community - especially so-called neoconservatives - believe that American interests are firmly tied to the defense of Taiwan. In this respect, as Carpenter perceptively observes, Taiwan's domestic political transformation bolstered the hard-liners' case. Under Chiang, Taiwan was just another unsavory authoritarian regime. But now it is a prosperous democracy, and defense of its independence can be justified as consistent with America's Wilsonian foreign policy tradition - a tradition reaffirmed by the so-called Bush Doctrine.
Carpenter makes a powerful, compelling argument that the U.S. needs to change its Taiwan policy, because its current policy could easily lead to an unintended disaster. First, the ambiguity in current U.S. policy may lead Taiwan to conclude that even it crosses the "red line" by declaring independence, the U.S. will defend it from Chinese military retaliation. Or, alternatively, Washington's policy may encourage Taiwan to continue refusing to discuss reunification seriously with Beijing. After all, as long as the Taiwanese believe the U.S. would bail them out in the event the PRC uses military power to force reunification, Taipei has no reason to deviate from the current drift of events, which is leading inexorably to at least de facto independence. At the same time, the U.S. policy of keeping the PRC guessing about Washington's response if force is used against Taiwan may result in Beijing guessing wrong - which would mean a Sino-American war.
America's Coming War with China is a timely and important book. And its importance is heightened by the fact that the author is one of America's most prolific and insightful foreign policy analysts. One sign of an important book is that it provokes reaction. While this reviewer agrees with most of what Carpenter has to say, his argument does raise several questions. As he sees it, the risk of a Sino-American conflict lies in "a festering dispute over the status of one small island." But Taiwan is not the cause of Sino-American tensions. The underlying cause is China's rise to great power status, and the challenge that poses to the dominance in East Asia that the United States has enjoyed since 1945. Instead of being a cause, Taiwan's real importance as a symbol that U.S. hard-liners can use as a pretext to fight a preventive war against China. The U.S. has no security interests at stake in Taiwan, and it seems absurd that it would risk war with China over an unresolved issue lingering from a civil war that ended more than five decades ago. (On this point, Carpenter might have made more of the fact that until the Korean War derailed his plans, Dean Acheson - whose hard-line/anti-Communist credentials are impeccable - wanted to extricate the U.S. from the residue of the Chinese Civil War by casting Taiwan to its fate). If Taiwan has become the potential flashpoint in Sino-American relations today, it is because U.S. hard-liners want to maintain U.S. global hegemony, and because they define U.S. interests in Wilsonian - ideological - terms, rather than in terms of realpolitik.
As one reads America's Coming War with China, one inescapably concludes that Carpenter is right in arguing that Taiwan's fate is not worth the risk of war with China. Whether the policy he proposes to avoid war is adequate to avoid that outcome is another matter, however. He proposes that the U.S. should: (1) explicitly declare that it will not come to Taipei's assistance militarily in the event of an armed confrontation between the PRC and Taiwan, and (2) simultaneously undertake to sell Taiwan whatever arms it deems necessary for its self-defense. The first part of this proposed policy is wise, but the second is not because it will only embolden Taiwan to rebuff the PRC on reunification - a stance that as Carpenter himself argues is bound to result in a war between the PRC and Taiwan. Even the U.S. adopts a declaratory policy of non-intervention in such a conflict, the domestic political dynamics in the United States would (as Carpenter concedes) result in strong pressures on any administration to come to Taiwan's rescue. The U.S., in other words, may say in advance that it will not intervene in a war between the PRC and Taiwan, but if such a war actually started it would probably be very difficult for the U.S. to remain on the sidelines.
The best policy for the U.S. is to reduce the risk of war by making it clear to Taipei that it must come to terms with Beijing on reunification, and by forcing Taiwan to accept the stark fact that - in the final analysis - the balance of power between it and the mainland its decisively titled in the PRC's favor. U.S. policy should aim at forcing Taiwan to accept the realities of its geopolitical position and the necessity of coming to terms with Beijing on reunification. That is the only certain way to avoid a war in the Taiwan Straits, and the consequent risk of U.S. involvement. As far as the longer range issue of "containing China" is concerned, the U.S. can accomplish this objective without the risk of war by adopting an offshore balancing strategy in East Asia and leaving it to major powers (Japan, Russia, India, Vietnam, S. Korea) in the region - whose security, unlike that of the U.S., really is potentially threatened by a rising China - to rein-in a rising China.
The fact that this reviewer disagrees with Carpenter's policy recommendations does change the essential fact: America's Coming War with China a powerfully argued indictment of Washington's current policy on the Taiwan issue, and a much needed warning that the U.S. needs a new policy if it is to avoid disaster in the Taiwan Straits.

Christopher Layne
Associate Professor
Bush School of Government and Public Service
Texas A & M University
College Station, Texas

While most of our attention is focused on Iraq, the Middle East, and the Muslim world, Carpenter reminds us that United States could be walking eyes wide shut into a potential crisis with China. Carpenter shows how plausibly easy it would be for the U.S. to find itself drawn into a conflict with China and raises the fundamental question that the defense and foreign policy establishment (Republican and Democratic, liberal and conservative) continue to sidestep: Is Taiwan a vital U.S. national security interest worth risking war with China? Carpenter argues "no" and lays out a more prudent U.S. policy course of action that is radically different than policies pursued by current and previous administrations -- neither hawkish or accommodationist. The last thing United States needs is to make an unnecessary enemy out of China. Unfortunately, many of neo-conservative ilk who are either in or influencing the administration have long had China in their sights and seem all too willing to take on China even though we are embroiled against a far more dangerous threat: al Qaeda and other radical Isalmist terrorists. The question is whether Carpenter's cautionary tale will be a guide for avoiding catastrophe or a tragic prescient "I told you so."

"If there was one overall theme in Ted Galen Carpenter's book, "America's Coming War with China: A Collision Course over Taiwan," it would have to be: why America will NOT go to war with China.
While Taiwan has long been a thorn in the side of the People's Republic of China, the reluctance of China to take the island by force since the late 1950s reveals the danger of such action to China's own enviable economic stability.
Carpenter reveals how the PRC simply cannot force reunification militarily, at least not anytime soon. For the same reason the U.S. won't annex or "liberate" Cuba, China simply cannot risk the international economic damage that would follow an invasion attempt of Taiwan, not to mention the additional unforeseen political and military fallout.
Carpenter's analysis is insightful, and at times brilliant, and there's little doubt that the need to clarify the U.S. position on Taiwan begs immediate consideration regardless of what an anathema it could be to the PRC. Taiwan as well should not be put in a position to leverage brinksmanship between the U.S. and the PRC.
If any threat exists from the PRC, I would suggest that it would arise from the same circumstances that prompted Japan to assert aggression before and during WWII: limited or depleting natural resources. Any Chinese aggression provoked by the pressure of limited resources would prompt reunification of Taiwan as an extension of such aggression.
As one of our biggest customers of military hardware, often rivaling Israel, Taiwan is a valuable democratic comrade (to borrow the Communist term) in the volatile western Pacific region.
Fortunately outright conflict in the region would be a lose-lose situation for all parties involved both militarily and economically likely threatening social stability worldwide.
Well written and both topical and informative if you have even a fleeting interest in Sino-Taiwanese cross-strait relations.
REVIEW EVERY BOOK YOU READ. READERS, AUTHORS AND PUBLISHERS DESERVE YOUR OPINIONS TOO!"