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America's Secret War: Inside the Hidden Worldwide Struggle Between America and Its Enemies

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In "America's Secret War", George Friedman, the chairman of Stratfor, a private intelligence and information service, guides us through the intricacies of the origins and consequences of what he calls the `Fourth Global War'.
He starts by comparing the war to a game of chess where, to the unknowledgeable, there are many possible opening moves, but to the initiated there are only a few. This is a book of current events and recent history. It is, by design, more informative than inspirational. Friedman has an opinion, not always expressed in his Stratfor reports, but it is not obvious. He claims, in the foreword that he is trying to be cold and objective, rather than passionate, and while he is successful in maintaining objectivity, his passion or intensity comes through.
He challenges conventional wisdom with his allegations that Desert Storm was not about Iraq, but about Iran and her challenge to Saudi Arabia over who will be the leader of the Moslem world. In the West, he says the war was seen as a perfect example of modern statecraft with proper objectives and an exit strategy'. It had something for everyone. It appealed to three different groups, and to each within their own geopolitical constructs. For the `cold-warrior' perception of global politics the war was the proper defense of a Cold-War ally. For those who have a more Kissingerian realpolitik interpretation of the world saw the war as the proper containment of Iraq and of Saddam in balance of power terms. Finally the `End of History' post-modernists viewed the war as an expression of the multi-lateral `new world' working together against a rogue state. All of these views combined to make this a popular war in the West. Friedman says that what was not appreciated in this view was that the perception in the Moslem world was wholly different. In his opinion, the Islamic world saw this intervention as anti-Islamic rather than anti-Saddam and by supporting this use of `infidel' troops to pursue war against other Moslems the Saudis pushed the anti-Saudi fundamentalist factions over-the-top. These factions recruited disaffected, newly trained, mujahedin empowered by their successful pursuit of the anti-Soviet Afghan war to create the anti-western Al Qaeda organization. Al Qaeda is a working intelligence organization that pursues the goals of toppling the current Islamic regimes that they see as illegitimate, creating an uprising in the Moslem world and reestablishing the Caliphate. Friedman says that in spite of the errors we have made in the war, Al Qaeda has still failed to meet any of these objectives.

According to Friedman, in the Clinton administration foreign policy was more about doing good things to help deserving people, than about pursuing America's national interests. As the worlds only superpower, war was now optional, to be pursued or declined at our option, since no enemy had the power, it was assumed, to force us into war. The attack on 9/11 showed otherwise. Although the earlier attacks; in 1993 on the World Trade Center, and on the US Embassy and Marine Barracks in Beirut, the Kobar Towers in Saudi Arabia, the Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, and the USS Cole in Yemen were mostly declined by the Clinton Administration, the audience for the attacks was not the US, but the Moslem world. By failing to respond the US showed weakness and impotence while highlighting Al Qaeda's effectiveness. These attacks vanquished the hopelessness and powerless feeling in the `Arab street' and helped to create the current resurgence of aggressive militant Islam. Friedman compares this war to WWII. Although the traditional idea of war with a competing nation-state is diluted by the non-local or pan-Islamic nature of the Al Qaeda Islamo-fascism, it is still a war. The current conflict has many similarities to the ideological wars of national liberation against Marxism-Leninism, but the historical comparison and precedents in the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 are, to him, obvious. The legalistic interpretation that war is simply crime, and the perpetrators of war, criminals is, to Friedman at least with historical perspective, nonsense. He posits that this view would have led FDR on December 7, 1941, to declare that we would hunt down the Japanese pilots who participated in the attack and subject them to judicial proceedings to determine their proportionate guilt and subsequent punishment. This is, as he maintains, absurd. It was, however, the position supported by the Clinton administration in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and the current view of Harold Koh, dean of the Yale Law School among others. This view helped to justify the separation between the US Justice Department and the US intelligence gathering organizations In the US, the FBI is a police organization entrusted with the prosecution of crime. Intelligence organizations are involved in the collection of information in anticipation of and to prevent future action. According to Friedman, these functions are not compatible and many of our intelligence failures are the result of this misalignment of resources.

In Friedman's opinion, the only response for a nation who has received a surprise attack is to quickly go on the offensive. Political considerations are, at that time, more important than military ones and more modest goals are to be eschewed in favor of more robust ones even if less than ideal conditions are present for this action. This view resulted in the attack on Afghanistan that caught Al Qaeda and the Taliban by surprise since they didn't think we could respond quickly with more than limited air attacks. This show of force was also necessary to gain the allegiance or at least the attention of the various Afghan warlords whom we had largely abandoned after the Soviet withdrawal in 1989 and who had now made accommodation with or had direct ties to the Taliban. Although the Afghan campaign worked well and has resulted in the installation of Hamid Karzai as Afghan President, who is now a US ally rather than a Pakistani surrogate, it has not been so great a defeat for Al Qaeda that they lost standing or credibility in the Islamic world. To do this, and to further erase our image of weakness, we needed a greater show of force and determination. This had to be the invasion of Iraq.
The need for invasion was not unrelated to nuclear proliferation. We were worried about the control of the Pakistani nuclear weapons program as well as those in Iran and Iraq. While the State Department favored supporting centralized state control in Pakistan and Iran, they were opposed by the Defense Department which said that nuclear weapons or facilities in control of governments in whom we had no confidence was an intolerable situation. Defense said that 9/11 had created a situation where compromise was unacceptable and a military response was necessary. State was focused on the limits of our capability, Defense was focused on the threat, Defense won.
Friedman says our putative allies were torn. They understood that the US had to wage war on Al Qaeda and they were willing to help us track down Al Qaeda operatives. They were not willing, however, to help us invade Iraq and thereby (at least in their minds) shift the global balance of power. They opposed the Iraq invasion for the same reason we wanted it: it would make the US the preeminent power in the Middle East. That, combined with our control of the seas, would give us a global empire that was not in the interests of the so-called `Great Powers'. These nations feared that with Saudi Arabia and Iran surrounded, America would have more influence on oil production denying Russia the oil pricing advantage she currently enjoyed. France had been pursuing an essentially anti-American foreign policy since WWII seeing America as a threat to her national interests and her attempts to dominate Europe through her collaboration with a psychologically subordinate and submissive Germany. Friedman says that France thought 2003 was the perfect time to create a unified European foreign policy under guidance from Paris and Berlin with the help of Moscow. What they underestimated was the historical collective memory of Eastern Europe who remembered past treatment by Moscow, Paris, and Berlin and welcomed Rumsfeld's categorization of `New Europe'. The result was an increased influence in Europe for the US and embarrassment for France that some may call a victory for the Bush Administration.
Friedman ends the book with a scorecard of gains and failures. He regards the lack of understanding of how completely Iran had built political and administrative control in the Shiite community and through the efforts of Ahmed Chalibi as major failures, as well as the underestimation of the depth and quality of planning in Saddam's guerrilla war. On the success side, he says there has been no `toppling of regimes', no rising of the `Arab street', and virtually all Islamic regimes have increased their support for anti-Al Qaeda activity and are using their own intelligence services to achieve US anti-terrorist goals. The war has also succeeded in the Machiavellian objective of making the US hated and feared in the Arab world instead of hated and held in contempt, which Friedman calls a positive. In summation he says that the American people understand and can endure war, it is the American elite that project their own timidity and self-doubts onto the national character. He says that this is indeed a war, and probably a war `to the finish'. Friedman's book adds some specific new information along with focus and clarity to the continuing debate. It also reads easily and with Steven Coll's "Ghost Wars" provides a continuous detailed history of the latest chapter in the conduct of the `Great Game'. .

I just finished reading this book when I saw the author on CNN this morning. Synchronicity. He was what I had expected: sharp, smart, to the point, and not self-evidently in the thrall of a particular political bias.

In fact, this is what drew me to the book. In the introduction he makes a point of saying, "This is not a passionate book. Passion is overrated." Instead, his book is a coldly (and very provocatively) analytical look at the strategic chess match between the U.S. and Al Qaeda since 9-11. There were quite a few things I hadn't seen reported before about the Afghan War (B-52's as sky writers -- who knew?). He sees the Iraq war as a strategic flanking move aimed at influencing Saudi Arabia. Deep strategic thinking underlies the U.S. strategy there, but of course it's too complex and ruthless to explain or sell to the American people, so we got WMD. But it makes good cold sense, and Friedman describes and analyzes this new angle quite convincingly.

He's a clean writer and an insightful thinker with access to a great deal of evidently fresh information. I like his lack of passion. The executives at MSNBC should take one of their screaming blowhards -- Joe Scarborough or Chris Matthews, take your pick -- and replace them with a real-deal analyst like Friedman. A voice of reason in an unreasoning time.

I had never heard of George Friedman before grabbing his book off the shelf and striking gold. This book is full of smart analysis delivered straight. And it may just make you optimistic about the long-term prospects for the war against Islamo-fascism.

Once you begin to read this book, you will find it difficult to put down. Friedman writes clearly and forcefully about the real reasons why America invaded Iraq and the role that the invasion plays in the War on Terror.

Friedman begins his narrative with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, a nightmare development that threatened to give the Soviets control of the Persian Gulf and to lead to America's expulsion from the Middle East. The Carter Administration recognized the strategic threat and began moving quickly to assemble an Islamist guerrilla force to bog down the Soviets in their own Vietnam. The US strategy was intensified by the Reagan Administration and ultimately proved successful, but it had the side effect of convincing the Islamists that they could, if they fought hard enough, topple a superpower. The presence of American troops in Saudi Arabia during the First Gulf War did much to enrage the Islamists, convincing them that their best chance of re-establishing an Islamic caliphate lay in provoking a war with the United States.

Friedman's book explores the Byzantine details of American and Islamist Realpolitik in a fairly balanced way. He argues that the invasion of Iraq was not about WMDs or connections to Al Qaeda or even about oil, but was intended to show the Islamic world (and particularly Saudi Arabia and Pakistan) that the United States meant business and that those who didn't get with the program were going to be dealt with very harshly. The fact that the United States has substantial ground and air forces within easy striking distance of Syria, Iran and Saudi Arabia, among others, has no doubt been noticed by the leaders of those countries, dampening their enthusiasm for tolerating Al Qaeda.

The details of this Realpolitik are not pretty. To facilitate the invasion of Afghanistan, the United States obtained Russia's permission to base troops in the Islamic states of the former Soviet Union--in exchange for which, America agreed to mute its criticism of Russia's excesses in Chechnya. After Islamist terrorists attacked the Indian parliament in New Delhi, America secured Pakistan's reluctant cooperation in the War on Terror by making it clear that the United States wouldn't mind very much if India launched a nuclear attack on Pakistan (if America didn't launch one first). The book contains numerous other examples of why America, Iran and other countries behave in ways that are portrayed in the newspapers as peculiar, but are actually quite understandable when taken in context.

Although I think it is fair to say that Friedman is sympathetic with the Bush Administration's approach, he is not an apologist. He documents numerous strategic, tactical and intelligence failures in Iraq, not the least of which was the Administration's failure to appreciate the control that Iran exercised over Iraq's Shi'ite population. He is properly critical of the separation between the American political leadership and the soldiers: "A ruling class that sends the children of others to fight, but not their own, cannot sustain its power for very long" (339). And he concludes that, although the United States has the upper hand in the War on Terror, "the war now hangs in the balance. It is not clear who will win the war. Neither side is defeated. Neither side can give up." This is a balanced and sobering book, a must-read for anyone interested in what is really going on in the War on Terror.

This book is the best overview of the current situation regarding the US war on terror and the war in Iraq (the two are part of the same.) At some 350 pages or so it can't be hugely in depth, but it packs in a lot of punch, epxlaining all the major and important trends. The writing is concise, straight to the point and lucid. For me it wasn't boring at all, although at times the seriousness of our situation was more than sobering.

The book attempts to explain, in as unbiased a manner as possible, the strategic reasoning behind both America's and the terrorist's actions, how the war had its origins in the end of the Cold War, and how the two sides' strategies are playing out. It's an excellent primer for anyone who wants to know such things as:

- What is Al-Qaeda, how did it start, and what does it want? (Basically a reinstating of the Abbasid Caliphate. The Afghanistan victory against the Soviets convinced radical Islam that it had the power to do this.)

- What is Al-Qaeda's strategy for obtaining what it wants? (Don't expect any quarter or any scruples, their capabilities are limited so they make up for it with extremism, trying to provoke America into a much larger war with Islam in general. It's hard to deny someone a war when they want to kill you and try extremely hard to do so.)

- What is America's strategy for dealing with Al-Qaeda? (Al-Qaeda is designed to be extremely survivable. Defeating it won't be easy or quick and will require a large amount of sacrifice and patience. Its survivability limits its effectiveness though, ensuring a long campaign.)

- What role does the Iraq campaig play in the struggle? (It's become the equivalent of the Solomons campaign in the Pacific in WWII, or the battle of Stalingrad. It's losing its original strategic significance with both US and Al-Qaeda objectives being left unfulfilled, but it is becoming the campaign where the victor -although not the victory- is determined.)

- What role do the Saudis play? (They have to fight Al-Qaeda since that's where Al-Qaeda's funding comes from. This would mean a civil war in the country. The Government, which is very detached from the highly Wahabi population, is trying to avoid this at all costs dragging the problem along even more. Stagnation and failure in Iraq means the Saudis won't stand up to Al-Qaeda because they will feel Al-Qaeda is more powerful / has stronger will to fight than America.)

- What role does Iran play? (They hate us and want us destroyed. They hate Al-Qaeda too and want them destroyed. They are developing nuclear weapons. Worst case scenario? Play Al-Qaeda and America off each other, supporting both, one with weapons and the other with intelligence, and then step into the power vacuum.)

The book is history and analysis rolled into one, starting with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and going to the present day. As such the parts explaining the more distant past are better than the parts explaining the present, since hindsight is 20/20 and there is some significant uncertainty as to the current situation. This is certainly understandable and excusable, if not outright unavoidable. It's also a very realpolitik explanation, which at times can be a bit depressing since there's not much to be said about the human spirit in the realpolitik view. However, one should hope for the best but plan for the worst, and realpolitik certainly forces you to do the latter.

Americans should read this book so that they can understand just how difficult an enemy Al-Qaeda is, how limited America's choices really are, how effective our actions have been or have not been, and what the geo-politics of the mideast are. Once you have this necessary knowledge you'll be far more able to critically analyze the news and America's actions for fighting Al-Qaeda.

Definitely recommended.

"America's Secret War" is not for the politically inclined. It is for people who simply want to know what happened, and what is going on now. It covers events up to mid-2004 Iraq.

The book is a product of Dr. Friedman's private intelligence company, Stratfor. You should first understand Dr. Friedman's methodology, because the book contains no bibliograpy or references. From his website:

"Anomalies/pattern recognition - The team is focused on a constant pursuit of anomalies that contribute to the evolution of net assessment reports, a virtual model of the world and the interaction of all its parts. Our analysts begin each day by sweeping open sources - including printed and electronic news media, commercial databases, trade publications and human sources - seeking information that either reinforces or contradicts the net assessment or that brings forth new areas of inquiry.

Information architecture - Stratfor's detailed understanding of where information resides enables the company to gather sensitive information. Stratfor believes that most of the world's information is readily available through open sources and that which is secret can be inferred. The company, however, is not completely dependent upon digitized and printed information. Analysts also make use of unclassified reports that are not widely available and "proprietary and secret" information - classified and sensitive information that can be obtained legally."

As a Stratfor reader, I am satisfied that the information is valuable. I leave your own conclusions to you. That said...

...the reader of "America's Secret War" will come away with a few basic understandings:

-That al Qaeda is truly unique and very sophisticated, and not just another terrorist group like Hamas or Hezbollah or Abu Sayyaf. It's crucial to understand that al Qaeda has a specific history and specific goals. No matter our image of terrorism, underneath it is a visible, political agenda available to all willing to look. The diplomacy leading to the war in Afghanistan is quite a read, and was something of a miracle. Dr. Friedman also discusses the immense legal challenge of pursuing al Qaeda, as the 9/11 attack didn't fit any clear definition of acts of war or criminal acts on the books at the time. How we would pursue it would determine who would do the pursuing. This is why president Bush's frequent juxtaposition of "war on terror" and "bring them to justice" is more than a rhetorical problem.

-That the errors within our intelligence community were structural. Dr. Friedman spends a great deal of time exposing the shallowness of the claim that "our government knew about 9/11". There's a big difference between possessing data and having knowledge. We had not corrected the intelligence problem we discovered after Pearl Harbor, which the creation of the CIA was meant to solve. The fallacies of 100% source-based intelligence are discussed.

-That geopolitics regarding the Middle East are anything but simple. We still hold the idea that the Arab world can be explained with blanket statements, and that is dangerous. Al Qaeda was not liked by many of our enemies, who in turn don't like each other. The tangled, internal politics of Saudi Arabia is untangled for the reader.

-That the Iraq War was strategic, not about WMDs as was claimed, and not about oil, as is charged. Here is where the Stratfor reader will be at home, but the new reader will be greatly informed. You'll be given the immense, diplomatic and strategic reasons for our decision to go to Iraq. Whether or not you agree with it is left to you. Again, this is just an account of what happened, not what should or should not have happened.

There is no need to surround the events of the last few years with politics and conspiracy theories, as has become the popular standard. His book is not meant to draw you to any side other than the side of record, and thus dismisses the rhetoric we've all grown used to hearing. The political reality is introduced only where it has an actual effect on events; but its substance is the stuff of popular consumption and is properly dismissed as immaterial and misleading. Behind everything, even terrorism, are rational, political motives, and Dr. Friedman does a good job of presenting them.

The cover describes Stratfor (the intelligence company Friedman founded) as a "Shadow CIA". By this book's description of the CIA, this implies it has a lot of details right but misses many important broad trends. The book tends to have weaknesses of this nature, being better as a history of Al Qaeda's conflict with the U.S. than as a guide to the future, but it's probably a good deal more reliable than CIA analysis.
It describes a few important trends that I wasn't aware of. The best theory the book proposes that I hadn't heard before is the claim that the U.S. government is much more worried about Al Qaeda getting a nuclear bomb than the public realizes (for instance, the Axis of Evil is the set of nations that are unable or unwilling to prove they won't help Al Qaeda get the bomb).
The explanation of the U.S. motives for invading Iraq as primarily to pressure the Saudi government is unconvincing.
The book's biases are sufficiently subtle that I have some difficulty detecting them. It often paints Bush in as favorable a light as possible, but is also filled with some harsh criticisms of his mistakes, for example:
"It is an extraordinary fact that in the U.S.-jihadist war, the only senior commander or responsible civilian to have been effectively relieved was Eric Shinseki, Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, who was retired unceremoniously (although not ahead of schedule) after he accurately stated that more than 200,000 troops would be needed in Iraq"
But it's hard to place a lot of confidence in theories that are backed mainly by eloquent stories. It's unfortunate that the book is unable or unwilling to document the evidence needed to confirm them.

_America's Secret War_ is an illuminating and likely to be controversial book on the history to date of the war that began September 11, 2001. Variously termed the Fourth Global War (the Third being the Cold War), the U.S.-Jihadist War, the U.S.-Al Qaeda War, or the U.S.-Islamist War, the very fact that three years into it that there is no agreed upon name is indicative of the ambiguous and divisive nature of the conflict.

Friedman traces the origins of Al Qaeda to the mujahideen of the Soviet war in Afghanistan, a force trained and supplied by the U.S., recruited and financed by Saudi Arabia (with Pakistan playing a vital role as well), a program initiated by the Carter administration and expanded by Reagan. While not condemning the operation, as Friedman believes that the Soviet defeat in Afghanistan was a key element in beating them in the Cold War, the operation did sow the seeds of Al Qaeda. These mujahideen were educated, battle-hardened, and very ideological - and not at all wanted back by their home governments (chiefly Saudi Arabia). Abandoned also by the Americans, incensed by the presence of Christian nations on holy Saudi soil during the first Gulf War, and increasingly intolerant of corrupt, American-supported regimes in the Islamic world, they sought to attack the U.S. chiefly because they wished to wound the country in such a way as to force it into intervening massively in the Islamic world. Such an intervention - preferably an invasion - would Al Qaeda hoped provoke a Muslim uprising, overthrowing regimes and ideally restoring the medieval Caliphate.

Friedman detailed the operational strengths and weaknesses of Al Qaeda. The original mujahideen were quite experienced with covert operations, largely from having worked side-by-side with the CIA, seeing first hand American covert operation tactics and technology. Al Qaeda expanded this knowledge by among other things continually testing U.S. intelligence in the 1990s, provoking the system to see what responses were generated, checking for leaks in their organization, etc. Not only was this reflected in part by the African embassy bombings and the attack on the _U.S.S. Cole_ but also by the constant "chatter" that is heard worldwide (as an added bonus for Al Qaeda this chatter can also saturate the intelligence system, rendering it less sensitive to real threats).

The book details the entire strategic views of the United States, from pre-war to today. Friedman states that the U.S. was caught flat-footed by 9-11; not only was it tactically surprised, but it was strategically surprised (far greater than say Pearl Harbor, as the U.S. knew it was going to war with Japan). The U.S. early on in the war was forced to adapt Cold War plans the best it could to deal with the situation (such as protecting the President on 9-11 and waging war in Afghanistan) but continually had trouble grappling with fighting a global war against a non-state, elusive enemy, one that while heavily involved in Afghanistan was nonetheless not dependent upon on any one nation.

The war against Al Qaeda produced many problems for the administration. There is still a debate on whether to treat at least in some quarters the conflict against Al Qaeda as a law enforcement or a military issue. The FBI, one of the many agencies tasked to find Al Qaeda in the U.S. is primarily a law enforcement agency, not an intelligence agency, and by its very nature is often poorly suited to uncovering cells in the U.S. American intelligence has in the past few decades since the Bay of Pigs been obsessed with verifiable intelligence, everything needing a verified, documented source, rated arbitrarily he says on a scale of 1 to 5. If it does not, it might not make it into a final report or if it does it is severely downplayed. Assumptions, unverified reports, and leaps of logic might not make it into final reports, perhaps written and filed away - which along with isolated bits of information "prove" to critics that the government "knew" something - but may in the end have no influence on decision makers.

Friedman states that the U.S. has two overall strategic goals in the war. First, it is to deny any possibility that weapons of mass destruction would fall into Al Qaeda's hands. The early days of the war saw Washington in a panic about this, particularly concerned with the status of Pakistan's nuclear weapons. Second, the U.S. seeks to change the behavior of countries that for domestic reasons might support Al-Qaeda or otherwise be disinclined to work against them.

A large portion of the book is spent on the war in Iraq. Friedman maintains that the primary though unstated reasons were twofold; to end the perception that it was militarily weak and that Al Qaeda was going to prevail in the long run (in particular the U.S. was concerned with Saudi perception), and to provide a strategic base to fight Al Qaeda everywhere in the region; other concerns, though real, were secondary. Though the U.S. has achieved some strategic success in the war, the Iraq war showed many key intelligence failures; that Ahmed Chalabi (chief U.S. candidate for the Iraqi presidency) was an Iranian agent who fed the U.S. disinformation, the U.S. was unaware that the Shiites in Iraq had long ago been organized by Iranian intelligence after Desert Storm, and that Saddam Hussein from the very beginning had intended to fight a guerrilla war.

An interesting book, I liked how Friedman discussed not just military strategy but international politics, detailing France's stance for instance on the Iraq conflict and American attempts to counter it as well as deals made with Iran and Russia in the fight against Al Qaeda, even Spanish politics following the Madrid bombings. The U.S got heavily involved in South Asian politics as part of the war on terror during the events after the December 13, 2001 attack on India's parliament, an event that might have resulted in another India-Pakistan war.

I just finished reading this book and came away fascinated and humbled by what's been going on in the world. It truly is a global chess game with many secret agendas and clever players trying to survive.

I've read many of the reviews posted here and rather than repeat what I've seen here I'll just suffice to say that this is essential reading for anyone who wants to make any strong statements for or against the United States foreign policy....whether you're a Blue State or Red State mentality.

I disagree with the reviews that talk about all of this being in the news already. I follow the news and I sure must of missed this kind of analysis. In fact I'm convinced that the American public cannot be fully told what's really going on strategically because it simply "can't handle the truth!"

If we're going to play hardball in world politics with the likes of Iraq, Iran, Russia, China, France, Al-Quada, Saudi Arabia, Israel, and Pakistan, then we have to be sure that everyone can't read our hand so easily. We have to deal with all the other players on an even playing field....the masses can't really know our complete strategy.

Enough said....great book and I highly recommend it. It will bring meaning to your watching of the news.

I just finished a book I'd like to recommend to anyone interested in understanding the history and strategy behind the "War on Terror." George Friedman's "America's Secret War" is one of the most comprehensive and insightful analyses of warfare I have read. [Friedman is the founder and chairman of Stratfor, a leading private intelligence company - and I've found it well-worth subscribing to their e-mail reporting.] The beauty of the book is that it recounts the history of the bin Laden terror movement and the West's responses in synopsis form (354 pp), while laying out the strategic logic driving each side every step of the way. Although it's impossible to say that every interpretation of the strategic logic on each side is absolutely correct, the explanations all make sense in light of history as I understand it. Friedman pulls no punches when it comes to his critique of President Bush and his national defense team's handling of the war, for example:

"In the case of the Iraq campaign, the problem is compounded by the fact that the administration never made a clear public case explaining the connection between the campaign and the broader war. As Stratfor has argued, there was a clear concept driving the war, focusing primarily on Saudi Arabia. The administration's unwilling­ness to articulate that connection publicly-its insistence that the war was about weapons of mass destruction or democracy-made it appear as if Iraq were a war in its own right, unconnected to the broader war. Thus, success or failure in Iraq became the definition of U.S. success in the broader war. The inability to articulate strategy led to the administration's inability to place Iraq in a broader context. In turn, it was impossible to explain the significance of the battles or justify the losses. The war became incoherent."

However, when you look at the complex problem of defeating Islamo-fascists as Friedman details it, you can't help but appreciate Bush's successes so far, given the uncertain and less-than-desirable menu of options on Bush's plate. For example, I believe that calling off the assault on Fallujah in April 2004 was a military counterinsurgency mistake of the first order; however, Friedman makes a persuasive case that curtailing the attack was just part of an effective military-diplomatic strategy to counter the Shiite leader Ayatollah al-Sistani's power play to subordinate U.S. policy to his design. Friedman is quite good at explaining the relationships and interaction of the multiple, diverse factions involved in this war.

The only factual error I found in the whole book was minor. Friedman misidentifies the USAF OSI as the Air Force's intelligence arm rather than it's Counterintelligence and Criminal Investigation service (p65).

Friedman writes in an understandable style that is very readable for the layman, although a general familiarity with world events since the 1979 Iranian Shiite Revolution is useful because the author does not spend much space rehashing the details of past history. This book was published in November 2004, so there is a year plus gap between the place where Friedman ends his analysis and the present. But I still find it very timely to put today's events in perspective and would strongly recommend it to all concerned Americans. It would greatly raise the level of discussion concerning U.S. policy for protecting ourselves and our civilization from the Islamo-fascists, if Americans were aware of the realities of our fight to the death with the Islamo-fascists, instead of just "sound-bite/bumper sticker-'Bush Lied'-wisdom."

This is a fascinating book about American foreign policy both leading up to and following September 11, 2001.

Though Mr. Friedman's topic seems impossible to address without some political angle, Friedman takes a "Dragnet" approach--"just the facts." He explains the goals and aims of Al Qaeda, the history of American presence in the Middle East during the Cold War, and explains Al Qaeda's motives in attacking the United States on September 11. He then discusses the response of the United States in great detail around the world, but focusing on the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq.

The most fantastic aspect of this book was that it opened my eyes to the chess game of diplomacy which is going on way over our heads. Friedman explains what the U.S. government had to do in order to get other countries to cooperate (every country stated PUBLICLY that they would cooperate, but many were not as helpful in substance). The flare-up between India and Pakistan several years ago was a result of the U.S. using creative diplomatic pressure.

There are also other points Friedman makes in this book which raise larger questions I have about government and politics. For instance, in the initial days of the Afghanistan invasion, the media made big headlines about the troops in Afghanistan being "bogged down" and moving very slowly. The U.S. government actually wanted to create this impression in order to keep the Taliban from retreating too soon. By staying around longer to fight, the United States hoped to destroy more of the Taliban before they got the chance to melt away. This makes me wonder: was the government trying to deceive the media to report the "bogged down" story? Was the media a willing participant in the interests of national security? Did the government actually do anything to create such an impression in the media's eyes?

The most significant question which Friedman's analysis leads to is this: if international diplomacy is this complex and secretive, then what exactly does my democratic vote stand for? Friedman's thesis for the reasons leading to the Iraq War were completely ignored during the 2004 Presidential election (and it seems clear that both political parties prefer it this way). What message does it send if I vote for the candidate who is a "flip-flopper" or vote for the candidate who "rushed into war without a plan for peace?" These slogans have nothing to do with the real issues--what should be the role of America in the world post-9/11, how do we get real international cooperation against Al Qaeda, should Al Qaeda be treated as a group of criminals or an army of soldiers, etc. These are tough, important questions.

No book is without its shortcomings, and Friedman's text has some limitations. First, some of his analysis is wrong. I have no idea which information is incorrect, but it is safe to assume that Friedman himself is not 100% right. Because each of his points is so clearly stated and convincing, it is virtually impossible to know what is true, and what is erroneous. This is difficult to keep in mind while reading.

Also, I wish the title did not have to contain the word "Secret." Though the war is certainly hidden, those who don't bother to read the book may think the "secret" is that the war is about oil, the desire for revenge against Saddam, or any other of the groundless conspiracy theories (from any political angle). Those who read the book, however, will know better.

Friedman has written an epilogue to the book which can be viewed on the web (just Google the author's name, title, and "epilogue," and you'll find it). There is not much new information, but it gives his most recent update on the government's activities to thwart a terrorist attack before the 2004 election, which is the most interesting piece of information you've never heard. Anyone interested in politics, foreign policy, and military strategy will be impressed by this book. You'll love it!