Customer Reviews

The Anatomy of Fascism

5 star:		(16)
4 star:		(6)
3 star:		(4)
2 star:		(1)
1 star:		(3)

 

 

The Marquis de Morés, returning to 1890s Paris after his cattle ranching venture in North Dakota failed, recruited a gang of men from the Parisian cattle yards as muscle for his "national socialism" project -- a term Paxton credits Morés' contemporary Maurice Barres, a French nationalist author, with coining. Morés' project was potent and prophetic: his national socialism was a mixture of anti-capitalism and anti-Semitism. He clothed his men in what must have been the first fascist uniform in Europe -- ten-gallon hats and cowboy garb, frontier clothes he'd taken a shine to in the American West. (Author Paxton suggests the first ever fascist get-up was the KKKs white sheet and pointy hat). Morés killed a French Jewish officer in a duel during the Dreyfus affair and later was killed in the Sahara by his guides during his quest to unite France to Islam to Spain. Morés had earlier proclaimed: "Life is valuable only through action. So much the worse if the action is mortal."

Here assembled together are all of the elements of what Paxton would classify as first stage fascism: "the creation of a movement." Most fascist movements stall in this first stage he notes -- think, for instance, of the skinheads, the American Nazi Party and Posse Comitatus. Paxton's other stages are 2) the rooting of the movement in the political system; 3) the seizure of power; 4) the exercise of power; and 5) the duration of power, during which the regime chooses either radicalization or entropy. He notes that although each stage "is a prerequisite for the next, nothing requires a fascist movement to complete all of them, or even to move in only one direction. The five stages permit plausible comparison between movements and regimes at equivalent degrees of development. It helps us see that fascism, far from static, was a succession of processes and choices: seeking a following, forming alliances, bidding for power, then exercising it. That is why the conceptual tools that illuminate one stage may not necessarily work equally well for others." pg. 23.

Paxton also tentatively offers a definition of fascism, but only after tracing the rise of various movements from their beginnings in the 19th century through the present day. Other historians and philosophers, he suggests, have written brilliantly on fascism, but have failed to recognize that their analyses apply to only one stage or another. He also notes that often definitions of fascism are based on fascist writings; he maintains that fascist writings while valuable were often written as justification for the seizure of power, or the attempted seizure, and that what fascists actually did and do is more critical to understanding these movements. Indeed, the language of fascism has changed little since the days of the Marquis De Mores.

He hesitates in offering both his definition and his analytical stages, saying that he knows by doing so he risks falling into the nominalism of the "bestiary." He demonstrates that this is a common failing of definitions of fascism which are often incomplete or muddled as they typically describe only one or two typically late stages. Other historians, for instance, split fascism into Nazism or Italian fascism, avoiding the problem of understanding their common elements by concentrating on their differences, insisting that they are incommensurable. Finally in the last pages, Paxton offers up this fairly comprehensive and useful definition: "Fascism may be defined as a form of political behavior marked by obsessive preoccupation with community decline, humiliation, or victimhood and by compensatory cults of unity, energy and purity, in which a mass-based party of committed nationalist militants, working in uneasy but effective collaboration with traditional elites, abandons democratic liberties and pursues with redemptive violence and without ethical or legal restraints goals of internal cleansing and external expansion."

Paxton is particularly strong in showing how the circumstances in post WWI Germany and Italy -- the demobilized mobs of young soldiers, sent to war by elites who had no conception of the destruction and suffering they had unleashed upon the younger generation -- were ripe for fascism's appeals. For many, liberalism, conservatism and socialism all seemed equally complicit in the crack-up of Europe in the Great War. Fascism, rising from the ashes, employed the socialistic tools of mass marches, the military techniques of terror learned in the war, and as they gained power, the new tools of mass communication and propaganda developed in the US during WWI. Fascists also reacted astutely to public discomfort toward the mass migrations from southern and eastern Europe coming in the wake of political and economic distress in those regions, using that fear to increase their power through scapegoating and its attendant rhetoric of purity.

Fascism is both charged and blurry word these days, used by both the left and the right to assail their critics and enemies. The Nazi remains the evildoer par excellence in popular and political culture, invoked for a thrill of fear or the disciplinary scare or emotional incitement. In this masterful synthesis of writings in politics, history, philosophy and sociology, Paxton untangles the vast literature fascism has generated, establishes some essential ground rules for coming to grips with its many expressions, stages, and manifestations, and clears a space for further, better focused research. Although academic in its orientation, it is well and clearly written. Finally, for the reader who is not familiar with modern European history, it is a very useful and informative text as it takes into its scope by necessity much of European and American history over the past one hundred years. Absolutely required reading.

Think of this admirable book as a victory lap by a distinguished scholar. Or, from the standpoint of the reader, as an aged brandy, subtle and nuanced with a smooth aftertaste. Robert O. Paxton has spent his career trying to make sense the dark hours in the middle of the 20rth Century. He's enjoyed-and earned-the privilege of working with challenging colleagues, and with bright, informed students. Now nearing the end of his career, he gets to deliver his informed judgment.

Paxton does a commendable job of treading a fine line here. One the one hand, he is alert to recognize that fascism doesn't lend itself to facile copybook definition: not every kind of evil is fascism, and not every evil state exhibits the same complex of pathologies. But fascism does not escape definition altogether. There is (argues Paxton) a set of characteristics that are noteworthy and distinctive. Caution, plot spoiler ahead:

"Fascism may be defined as a form of political behavior marked by obsessive preoccupation with community decline, humiliation, or victimhood and by compensatory cults of unity, energy, and purity, in which a mass-based party of committed nationalist militants, working in uneasy but effective collaboration with trditional elites, abandons democratic liberties and pursues with redemptive violence and without ethical or legal restraint goals of internal cleansing and external expansion." (Paxton, 218)

Paxton says that his own definition (if that is what it is) "encompasses its subject no better than a snapshot encompasses a person." Fair enough, But Paxton's own insistence on this point is just one more reason to take pleasure in this remarkable summa from an important scholar.

This very thoughtful book is aimed at understanding the basic features of fascism. Paxton is very concerned with rescuing the term from its present status as a convenient insult. As Paxton points out, though not until relatively late in the book, all modern democracies contain nascent fascist elements. Given the incredibly destructive consequences of successful or even partially successful fascist movements, we should have a good understanding of fascism so as to be able to recognize fascist threats. Paxton departs somewhat from prior literature in that he does not concentrate on fascist ideology. Paxton is careful also to look at a broad spectrum of facsist movements, both successful and unsuccessful, rather than falling into the trap of using Nazism as an archetype. Looking at other features of fascism than ideology makes considerable sense. Fascist movements had important differences in ideology and fascism in general, with its appeal to intense nationalism and exclusionary sense of identity, shouldn't be expected to have a uniform ideology. Italian fascism, at least in its original form, lacked the virulent anti-semitism of Nazism, while the fascist movement in Romania was aggessively Christian in ideological content. Paxton provides instead a structural analysis and definition of fascism by pursuing a careful examination of how fascist movements functioned. Some of Paxton's important points are Fascism appears in failed or highly stressed democracies, that fascism involves mass politics, that fascism emerges as a reaction to perceived threats from socialism, that fascism depends on charismatic leadership, and that fascism always contains a cult of violent action. A particularly important point is that the successful fascist movements, Italian Fascism and Nazism, were invited into power by traditional conservative elites seeking to coopt fascist mass mobilization in support of their own ends. In authoritarian societies where the conservative elites were more powerful or confident, such as Spain, Romania, or Hungary, fascist movements were consigned to the sidelines or actually suppressed. Paxton's analysis is thorough, largely convincing, and based on a remarkable knowledge of the huge literature on this topic. This is actually an extended essay, 220 pages of text, but the book contains also a superb annotated bibiography and outstanding footnotes which add considerably to the length of the book.

I disagree with Paxton on some points. He describes fascism as the major political innovation of the 20th century, assigning liberalism, socialism, and conservatism to the 19th century. Perhaps, but I suggest that the Leninist version of Marxism is sufficiently different from 19th century socialism to constitute a new phenomenon in political life. Paxton states that an essential feature of fascism in power is the existence of parallel governmental structures. When fascism came to power in Germany and Italy, it did do in presence of intact state structures and civil institutions. Fascist party organization became a parallel structure of government and way to impose control, often competing with "normative" government. This is true but not unique to fascism. Erection of parallel bureaucracies is a common response of leadership concerned about the reliability of their formal governmental structures. The considerable expansion of American Presidential power over the last century has been accompanied by expansion of the size and power of the White House staff and its allied structures. Similarly, when the Qing conquered Ming China, they governed in parallel through both the traditional scholar-bureaucrats and through a parallel system of officials owing direct loyalty to the Qing emperors. Paxton correctly states that violent action was a necessary component of fascism and that pursuit of war was integral to Nazism and Italian Fascism maintaining their essential momentum and solving internal problems. It is worth noting however, that this is not unique to fascist states. Authoritarian states have commonly used external aggression as a way of addressing internal problems. Think of the invasion of the Falklands by the military dictatorship in Argentina or the similarly reckless and self-defeating attempt by the Greek dictators to annex Cyprus. There is a particularly strong tradition of these types of actions in German history and this was probably one of the causes of the First World War. Paxton errs also, I think, in downplaying (though not disregarding) the convergent features of fascism in power with Marxist-Leninism in power. I think the concept of totalitarianism has more power than he is willing to concede.

This book admirably summarizes a vast literature on Fascism and highlights a few key points which can be kept in mind when the threat of Fascism is imagined or raised.

1. Fascism cannot be understood only from its ideologues, it needs to be looked at in practice.
2. The practice of Fascism, as indeed the rise to power of Fascism, requires collaboration and support from the much older, stronger, and more respectable conservative and establishmentarian foundations of any society.
3. Because Fascism is designed to prevent leftist revolution it is profoundly conservative, but because its means are radical it cannot really remain conservative in practice.
4. Because Fascism is conservative it does not require much in the way of terror, intimidation, or violence to capture the acquiescence and cooperation of large segments of society, particularly of "respectable" society. It does its evil under the cover of the good and the conventional.
5. Therefore Fascism's evil can be hard to discover until it is too late.

Paxton also provides a list of the "mobilizing passions" of Fascism which can be looked for in any society. It is here that one can in contemporary America, for example, analyze the ranting and raving of talk-show hosts, the unconventional and radical goals of foreign policy experts, the manipulation of patriotic appeals, and the apocalyptic appeals of popular religiosity to discover whether Fascism has entered the national life or not. The Fascist label can be used indiscriminately and falsely, but it is possible that at the present time it ought to be used more insightfully. But it ought indeed to be used!

The term "fascist" is used with such abandon that it has really lost all meaning: it is commonly used to describe anyone in a position of any power who the speaker doesn't like. Most people who use the term doesn't even realize that it was once seen by many very intelligent people as being a supremely viable form of government.

This book offers a great deal of food for thought. Mr. Paxton seeks to define "fascism" by looking at the history of the movement, and by examining whether it has any future. He explains why some regimes which are usually termed fascist really were not, and mentions other goverments that probably should be considered such.

This book is rather short and a fairly simple read, making it very accessible to the ordinary reader. It is perfect for anyone who would like a deeper understanding of fascism and fascist movements. I wholeheartedly recomend it to anyone who is interested in the history of the 20th century (political, social, labor, military, or otherwise) or who would like to better unedrstand exactly what fascism is and why it was so powerful.

Robert O. Paxton has written a comprehensive introduction to, and discussion of fascism in all its forms. Some of the main topics the book deals with are:

1. Fascism compared with the other main political movements - liberalism, conservatism and socialism. Paxton points out that unlike these, Fascism is more about aesthetics and emotion rather than intellectual ideology and reason.

2. The factors which predisposed certain nations to fascism and not others. Particularly, the disillusionment and crises in politics following WW1, which created a gap in the political landscape for fascist movements to form.

3. How the fascist movements gained political legitimacy by making deals with incumbant conservatives and liberals who feared a communist takeover.

"Anatomy of Fascism" is certainly not an easy read - it is written in a highly intellectual style. Nevertheless, the arguments it proposes are always clear and understandable. I bought this book as a present for my husband, and I finished it before he did. I have never read political history or non-fiction before, as I always thought the topic too dry and boring. The fact that this book managed to captivate me (I normally read literature, romances etc), is a testament to it's comprehensible style and fascinating content.

The Anatomy of Fascism will appeal to the uninitiated novice as well as the student in the field. It assumes little prior knowledge of fascism and explains things in context, giving background information where necessary. The arguments unfold in a sequential, orderly manner. I would recommend this book to anyone who wants to "explore" political history, and see fascism in a new, more objective light.

As one of the few American scholars of the Vichy regime, it is perhaps fitting that at the end of his career, eminent historian Robert Paxton tackles the political-philosophical question of "what" fascism "is." What he produces is a slim, eminently readable work about fascist movements in Europe and beyond, seeking those tropes and similitudes that herald a fascist movement in action. This builds to a chapter in the work that details what he thinks fascism "is" (even though the word, he freely admits, can be slippery and still hotly contested in academic circles).

Paxton's conclusions are too detailed to present here, but the book is neatly organized around a set of key questions. They are, in brief, how fascist movements create themselves, how they take root, how they acquire some form of "power," how they deploy that power, and what the long term prospects of a fascist regime are (Paxton suggesting that fascism is, fundamentally, a "zero-sum game"). He then devotes a brief chapter to fascist and quasi-fascist movements outside of Europe by way of solid historical comparison, and concludes with his "definition" of what fascism is, ably summed up in other reviews in this thread. At the end is a superior bibliographic essay on the major works concerning fascism and the differences between them. Any college student writing a paper on fascism would do well to pick up the book for the bibliographic essay alone.

Paxton eschews theoretical language and uses a writing style that is not "easy" given the weight of the topic, but accessible to academic and non-academic readers. While many have bemoaned what they see as omissions (and rightfully so), I do not see this as a fair criticism given Paxton's obvious desire to reach as broad an audience as possible with his cautionary analysis. He supports his arguments well with the most eminent and credible authorities, and the book's precise endnotes amply reflect the deadly seriousness of the work and his command of the subject.

Some have criticized Paxton, I notice, for giving Stalin's Russia the short-shrift, or neglecting other fascist thought systems woven in to certain nations. I think the latter point is a function of editorial choice for the sake of clarity. I suppose my only response to the former point is that the book is "The Anatomy of Fascism," not "The Anatomy of Stalinism." Indeed, on pages 209-211 of his book, Paxton addresses this very point succinctly. Stalin qua Hitler (who are only two players on a much grander stage) is a distinction with a difference, and in rejecting the sometimes too-monolithic word "totalitarianism" as an analytical mode, Paxton is able to stay with his subject without veering off into comparing once-competing "totalitarian" systems, which would only confuse the reader and reduce his central hypotheses to hash. Or, as he puts it, avoiding the default debate of "Which monster was more monstrous?" a fundamentally meaningless question in the context of this book and what it seeks to achieve, namely "fascism parsed to its essence." I also notice that many seem to think that this book is somehow "far left," or something along those lines. For myself, I found it very apolitical, which was not only refreshing but allowed for a crisp clarity in presentation untroubled by a pre-determined set of assumptions.

I suppose the most chilling conclusion Paxton reaches is that "fascism" is, at one of its hearts, a "creeping" phenomenon, more organic than, to use one example, "Marxist-mechanical," a movement "from below" in many of its manifestations as opposed to "from above." While a proposition that culturally driven is difficult to prove, I think Paxton makes a compelling case. I do not wish to say more for fear of ruining the book for a prospective reader.

A sober, accessible, readable work from a master historian performing at his absolute best. Highly recommend.

Fascism is the genus to which Nazism, Falangism, Francisme, the Arrow Cross, the Order of the Archangel Michael, the Ustasha, and possibly also certain strains of militant Islam belong. The book provides a very useful primer to the subject (which, by the way, goes well beyond a standard insult for supposed right wingers). It is, however, addressed to college students and won't be much fun for those with an occasional interest, nor very informative for those who have already read on the subject. But even people familiar with the subject can always use a single refresher source. The bibliographic essay is excellent, and the copious footnotes are very rewarding (who ever knew that Iceland had fascists?). The book is not as fulfilling as Payne's, but it is much shorter and up to date.

Although these things should be obvious to any college-educated person, it is still useful to assert that third world dictatorships (such as Pinochet or Mobutu) are not fascist, that Fascism's symbols must be rooted in a country's culture (so that Swastikas and Roman salutes are quite useless in most countries), that Fascism could achieve power only with the support of existing elites but was not a mere tool of those elites, and that Fascism was authentically democratic (this is a good lesson who believe democracy is always good no matter what its consequences), although it never came to power via an election.

Paxton is intriguing when he refers to his opinion that the USA, at the end of the '60s, was ripe for a fascist takeover. He refers to the revulsion many Americans felt for the counterculture of the time, the fear of many lower middle class white males at being left behind by women and blacks after the Civil Rights movement, and the likelihood that Vietnam War veterans might fail to be integrated into the new scheme of things and thus could perform a role similar to the fascist squadristi or the Nazi SA, and allow themselves to be used to frighten the electorate into a strong-arm fix to the crisis. He doesn't elaborate on this scenario, but it might have been viable if the American political system had failed to recover from the Nixon resignation. This would have been particularly likely after the oil crises of the 1970s if the two main parties had fallen apart. Remember that Wallace, then a racist, captured in 1968 13% of the popular vote, and 5 Southern states.

This is an interesting "What If" that the author could have explored further, although he probably chose not to in order not to bulk out the book excessively. Thus, it retains its sense of urgency and provides abundant interesting information on most pages.

In spite of these merits The book does make a serious blunder, when, in the final chapter, it compares Fascism to Communism and concludes that Nazism was far worse because it persecuted people for who they were, whereas Communism persecuted them because of what they did or had, and these things could be changed. This is blatantly untrue.

When Stalin ordered the kulaks to be liquidated as a class, he did not mean that those who gave up their excess property would be left alone. He meant that anyone classed as a kulak should be liquidated irrespective of what he did or didn't do. Indeed, many kulaks were not richer than their neigbours, and were classified as such only to fulfil the quotas imposed by the Vozhd.

When the Soviet Union or China created the groups "Enemies of the People", it included the children or spouses of such enemies of the people, who clearly couldn't have done anything to prevent it. "Enemies of the People" were persecuted, incarcerated and often killed.

And when Stalin ordered that the families of soldiers who did not stand their ground in battle should be punished (read: executed) he wasn't giving them any choice: how could the families prevent a relative from behaving cowardly? So, it is wrong, and not just factually, to state that Communism punished people only because of what they did. The implication that people under Communism could save themselves by changing their behaviour is also false, and deeply offensive. In reality Communism killed people for who they were, and for who their parents, or spouse, or children, or siblings were, or for the actions of their neighbours, and even for their own nationalities: witness the cruel deportation of the Chechens and other peoples during WWII. When top Bolsheviks ordered the murder of tens of thousands of Poles at the Katyn Massacre because these people were leaders in their communities (priests, teachers, nobles, etc.), just what could these victims have done to survive? When Mao, during the cultural revolution, sent urban students to "learn from the peasants" and live for years in unimaginable squalor, just what was he punishing?

I don't have a clear and articulated opinion on whether communism or fascism was worse (although I do know that in fascist states one would usually be left alone unless one belonged to a persecuted group- see Eric Johnson's "Nazi Terror"-, whereas in commuist states one could be swept along by the periodic purges irrespective of what one was and what one did- see Robert Conquest's "The Great Terror", inter alia), but I am certain that Paxton belittles the awfulness of Communist rule, and somehow assumes that its victims were to blame for what they suffered (since they wouldn't have been punished if they had changed their behaviour). To anyone who might be misled by Paxton's opinion, I can only recommend enduring texts such as Anne Appleabum's "Gulag: A History", or Solzhenitsyn's "Gulag Archpielago".

I still give Paxton 3 stars because this dubious opinion is marginal to his analysis (he clearly didn't think it through and might choose to elaborate the point in a further edition) and other than that the book is pretty good if slightly wooden.

Robert Paxton has written a comprehensive, intelligent overview of fascism in all its forms. Among the topics covered are:

1. A comparison of fascism with the three main political movements that preceeded it: liberalism, conservatism and socialism. It is highlighted that fascism was more about aesthetics and emotion than intellectual philosophy or reason (particularly compared with communism).

2. How and why fascist movements sprang up in certain countries and not others. There is a great explanation of the disillusionment after WWI and the longing for a new sense of national pride in people, which highlighted a political "gap" for fascism to emerge in.

3. How incumbant liberal and conservative governments made political deals with fascist parties out of fear of a communist onslaught. This gave fascisin Germany and Italy political legitimacy.

4. Whether or not fascism still exists today, and if it could make a resurgence. An alternative view of the Israel/Palestine conflict is presented.

This book is written in a highly intellectual style, and yet all the arguments are easy to understand. Each paragraph and chapter flows in logical procession. Little prior knowledge of fascism (or politics in general) is assumed, and the explanations and background information are well presented.

I bought this book as a present for my husband, since I normally read literary fiction, romances etc. The fact that I picked it up and was hooked (finished it before he did), is a testament to it's comprehensible style and content. It will appeal just as much to the lay person who likes to think, as to the scholar in the field. Get it, read it. You won't regret it.

What is fascism? asks Robert Paxton, the renowned historian of Vichy France in this new book. And at the end of the book we get an answer. Aside from obsessions with unity and strong leadership, fascism (a) seeks to mobilize popular support for right-wing causes (b) "in uneasy but effective collaboration" with traditional conservative forces (c) to sweep away democratic restraints and (d) to indulge in redemptive violence free of ethical or legal restraints to engage in foreign expansion. It is a response to the failure of traditional elites to maintain power in a democratic society, who then work with the ferocious populism of fascist parties. Paxton works to this conclusion by comparing Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy as well as by looking at unsuccessful fascisms, various neo-fascisms of the present day, and whether other movements can be properly described as fascism.

The result is eminently sensible. One can see this as Paxton succinctly judges other theories of fascism and finds them wanting. It would be wrong to describe its origins as primarliy intellectual, when it was the traumas of the first world war and the Great Depression that led to fascism's triumph. Moreover intellectuals were only important in its early stages before it achieved popular support, while fascism radiated a contempt for coherent thought (Paxton quotes one Italian fascist who declared "The fist is the synthesis of our theory.") Often lurid psychological explanations of fascism cannot explain why sexual repression and misogyny did not lead to fascism in France or Britain. Fascism was not simply a puppet of capitalism, since Henry A. Turner has demonstrated that most German businessmen preferred an authoritarian solution. Yet it cannot be said that fascism was anti-capitalist: its rhetoric was precisely that, and fascism could not have come to power without the support of the conservative establishment. The idea that fascism is the result of atomized "masses," one supported by Hannah Arendt, does not do justice to the fact that pre-1933 Germans joined hundreds of private clubs and associations. Nor is "totalitarian" a useful label, since it does not explain the chaotic, competing and disorganized nature of the Nazi state. Describing it as a "political religion" is not very helpful either. Such a theory implies that fascism is a response to the spiritual crisis caused by secularism (so why in Germany and not in England?) and implies that fascism and Christianity are fundamentally opposed (which does not do justice to their complex, equivocal relationship). Describing fascism as a "Developmental dictatorship" is also not convincing. Italy grew faster before 1914 and after 1945 than it ever did under Mussolini. What we see in fascist states are a conflict between "normative" and "prerogative" sectors, one governed by rules the other increasingly by the dictator's desires. Paxton goes on to discuss the tug of war (a useful metaphor) between fascists and conservatives, the leader and the party, and the party and the state.

If this is fascism, then what isn't? Paxton makes the provocative, and to my mind convincing, argument that the Ku Klux Klan could be seen as the first intimation of fascism. By contrast Paxton's definition as fascism as popular mobilization against democracy allows him to dismiss a variety of movements as non-fascist. Islamic fundamentalists are not fascist, because the Moslem states they are fighting are not democratic. By contrast, because Israel is a democracy, its chauvinist and sectarian elements could, ironically, mutate into fascism. But Peron, or the Brazilian dictator Vargas were not fascists, since they were neither fighting democracies (in fact Peron was freely elected at least twice) and both provided some genuine encouragement to labour movements. Paxton seems a bit uncertain about Spain: on the one hand Franco appears as a traditionalist and an authoritarian. On the other hand he certainly squelched Spanish democracy, slaughtered 200,000 people during World War II and before 1945 freely indulged in very fascistic rhetoric indeed. On the other hand Imperial Japan did have a fascist movement, but after assassinating several prominent politicians it was suppressed by the state in 1936.

Whereupon it purged itself of any remaining liberal and democratic impulses and engaged in a record of aggression and atrocity that well merits comparison with its Nazi ally. This leads us to a problem. Paxton emphasizes power and economic interest over ideology and national spirit. But what about violence? So when Paxton seeks to distinguish between fascism and authoritarianism, he should have made clearer that the difference is not necessarily a moral one. Suharto's regime was little more than a spectacular kleptocracy, but he murdered hundreds of thousands of Indonesian communists and nationalist Timorese. Perhaps we need another definition that would deal with Apartheid, the Rape of Nanking and the destroyers of the world trade center. And since it is the failure of conservatives to hold power themselves that made them turn to fascism, some discussion of how modern conservatives win elections might be helpful. The footnotes have the odd habit of referring to future and past pages in the book, and at one point Paxton confuses Walther Funk with Wilhelm Frick. But nevertheless this is a remarkably clear and sensible book.