Animal Gospel [Paperback]

Andrew Linzey (Author)

Book Description

Release date: October 1, 1999

Our treatment of animals is a gospel issue, Andrew Linzey contends, because those individuals and institutions that could have become the voice of God's most vulnerable creatures have instead justified cruelty and oppression. He offers an inspiring personal account of the gospel truths that have sustained his commitment to the cause of animals for more than twenty-five years.

Editorial Reviews

From Library Journal

The latest work of Christian scholar Linzey is his most impassioned and trenchant to date. Here, he contends and urgently argues that the necessity of Christ-like ministry does not and should not exclude animals ("the brute creation")-instead, it ought to speak especially to them. Who is more deserving of God's mercy, and ours, than the mute and the suffering? Linzey moves easily between Scriptural precept and contemporary example in this moving and heartfelt volume, one of the most interesting works of theology to appear in years. Highly recommended.
Copyright 2000 Reed Business Information, Inc.

About the Author

Andrew Linzey is an Anglican priest, a theologian, a writer, and is internationally known as an authority on Christianity and animals. He is a member of the Faculty of Theology at the University of Oxford, and holds the world's first academic post in Ethics, Theology and Animal Welfare--the Bede Jarret Senior Research Fellowship at Blackfriars Hall, University of Oxford. He is currently Honorary Professor at the University of Birmingham in England and Special Professor at Saint Xavier University in Chicago. He has written numerous articles and authored many books on animal theology and ethics.

Product Details

• Paperback: 180 pages
• Publisher: Westminster John Knox Press (October 1, 1999)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0664221939
• ISBN-13: 978-0664221935
• Product Dimensions: 6 x 0.4 x 9 inches
• Shipping Weight: 8.8 ounces (View shipping rates and policies)
• Average Customer Review: 5.0 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (7 customer reviews)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #949,785 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

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Most Helpful Customer Reviews

82 of 84 people found the following review helpful

5.0 out of 5 stars A Gospel for All Creatures March 30, 2000

By Stephen H. Webb

Format:Paperback

Andrew Linzey is often called the chaplain of the animal rights movement, but that is hardly fair. The title, "chaplain," suggests someone who gives a bit of moral advice or adds some solemnity to a public occasion. Linzey does much more than that. For many years, he has been developing one of the most creative and constructive Christian theological projects. He is a systematic thinker in the sense that he examines and transforms every aspect of Christian doctrine from the perspective of compassion for animals. Yet he also is faithful and consistent in his appropriation of the Christian tradition. Indeed, he manages to recover aspects of Christianity of which even the most faithful are frequently unaware. I have often taught Linzey's earlier book, Animal Theology, in a college course, and that book is pitched at a slightly higher level than this one. But this book, Animal Gospel, is his most passionate and engaging work yet. If you are interested in what Christian theologians say about the animal rights movement, this is the one book to get. Linzey blends the theoretical and the practical in a comprehensive vision of what it means to be a Christian, not just what it means to be an animal rights activist. If you read this book, your views of Christianity will be changed as much as your views of animals. My only problem with Linzey is that sometimes he is too quick to use the language and assumptions of the animal rights movement, but the more I read of him, the more I realize that he uses the rhetoric of rights as a strategy to best implement the compassionate ideal of Christian faith.... There is a growing movement among theologians to talk not just about the environment or nature but also about our specific obligations to animals, and we owe this movement to Linzey's pioneering work. Read more ›

31 of 32 people found the following review helpful

5.0 out of 5 stars A Call for Christian Compassion August 18, 2000

By A Customer

Format:Paperback

Once again, Dr. Andrew Linzey has delivered a wonderful and inspiring appeal for Christians and peoples of every faith to embrace the highest virtue - EMPATHY. He proclaims that a heightened sense of empathy brings us closer to God and permits us to live in harmony with one another and all of creation. A commitment to jump off our "human" pedestal and experience the wonders and beauty of God's creation in a humble and respectful manner is the true essence of Spirituality. "Animal Gospel" is a truly enlightening exposition.

17 of 18 people found the following review helpful

5.0 out of 5 stars An Intelligent, Reasoned Work of Compassion March 20, 2006

By Susan Pigott

Format:Paperback

Andrew Linzey provides a thought-provoking, erudite argument for why Christians ought to be concerned about animals. He does not resort to ill-founded arguments or emotionally manipulative pleas. Rather, he outlines in logical fashion the issues at hand: Animals are one of God's concerns; because God cares for animals so should those who claim to be God's people.

The first part of the book makes the case for animal rights--but Linzey carefully defines what he means by animal rights. Animals have rights because they were created by God and have intrinsic value as a result. Linzey does not put animals above humans or even discuss them in terms of "equal rights." Instead he asserts that while humans are given dominion over all creation, dominion is defined as service, protection and compassion. In other words, dominion is not unrestrained power and the right of superiority, it is the responsibility to love the world as God loves--via service. He does not minimize humanity, but demands that our humanocentric belief that God is only concerned about humans is simply wrong.

Linzey challenges the church to rise up to her responsibility. In several chapters, he outlines how irresponsibly the church has acted in regard to the environment and animals--both in theology and praxis. Yet, in other chapters he describes signs of hope-moments when Christians have stood up for ethical treatment of animals.

Linzey has spent years of his career developing his arguments. This book represents a collection of his best work (several chapters were previously published in other formats). The work is copiously footnoted and rigorously researched. For anyone who wishes to explore the issue animal rights from a Christian perspective, this is an excellent place to start.

4 of 4 people found the following review helpful

5.0 out of 5 stars BRILLIANT AND NOBLE WORK June 1, 2007

By Nadia

Format:Paperback|Amazon Verified Purchase

10 STAR BOOK!
This book represents a REAL MASTERPIECE of work--VERY DEEP PROBING, DEEP REASONING AND THOUGHT, and VERY DEEP HEART work into Christian theology and the rights of non-humans. It is worth much more than 5 stars.

This book should not be overlooked by ANY person concerned with the rights of non-humans. It is first-rate superb work, splendid work from a well-known British priest and theologian.

I really CANNOT GIVE ENOUGH PRAISE to the author and this book. Finally activists have an ally linked to the Christian Church who REALLY SPELLS IT ALL OUT FOR YOU IN GRAND STYLE AND IN PERFECT STYLE WITH ALL THE DETAILS. You could not find a better example of animal theology--and really--of "REASON and JUSTICE" for non-humans in the name of the Christian Church in any other book or writing. I was astonished at the exhaustive and exquisite effort involved in this book.

REALLY trust me on this one!!

I highly recommend Animal Theology and Why Animal Suffering Matters by the same author. These three books go together--"Animal Gospel" and "Why Animal Suffering Matters" are the final arguments.

The following has been added September 2009 in order to support comments I made in another review I did:

Reverend Andrew Linzey is a spiritual leader, religious leader. I adore him. Here are some excerpts from his "The Ethics of Hunting": You can read the entire "The Ethics of Hunting" on the internet. Everything in quotations are his words and I do not claim them to be my own.

The following excerpts are from Reverend Andrew Linzey, British priest and theologian. They are part of his report entitled The Ethics of Hunting....

"There is ample evidence that mammals experience not just pain, but also suffering, that is, stress, terror, shock, anxiety, fear, trauma, foreboding as well as pain, and that only to a greater or lesser degree than we do ourselves. Animals and humans show a common ancestor, show similar behaviour and have physiological similarities. Because of these triple conditions, these shared characteristics, it is perfectly logical to believe that animals experience many of the same emotions as humans. Logic tells us this and we do not need scientific data to believe in the suffering of animals. In fact, the onus should be on those people who try to deny that animals have such emotions. They must explain how in one species nerves act in one way and completely differently in another. They must explain why we believe that a child who cries and runs away from us after we have stamped on his or her foot is unhappy while a dog who behaves in precisely the same manner is said to present us with insufficient information for us to believe that the dog is unhappy. In the words of Konrad Lorenz, `The similarity [between humans and animals] is not only functional but historical, and it would be an actual fallacy not to humanize.'"

"It is not enough to say that animals should not suffer or that suffering is wrong, what is needed is an account of why that is so. Only when this case has been made can we fully appreciate the strength of the moral obligation to avoid harm. It is important to understand that this sensitivity has strong rational foundations. As I have written elsewhere:

"It is important to spell out precisely why animals should be regarded as constituting a special moral case, or as having a special claim on our attention. When analyzed impartially we can see that there are a range of considerations that are peculiarly relevant to animals and also to some vulnerable human subjects. For example:"

ANIMALS CANNOT GIVE OR WITHHOLD THEIR CONSENT

"The point is obvious but it has considerable moral significance. It is commonly accepted that `informed consent' is required in advance by any person who wishes to override the legitimate interests of other. The absence of this factor requires, at the very least, that we should exercise special care and thoughtfulness. The very (obvious) fact that animals cannot agree to the purposes to which they are put increases our responsibility and singles them out (along with others) as a special case."

ANIMALS CANNOT REPRESENT OR VERBALISE THEIR OWN INTERESTS.

"Again the point is obvious but it has serious moral implications. Individuals who cannot adequately represent themselves have to depend upon others to do so. Burns writes that, `Because it is not possible to ask an animal about its welfare, or to know what is going on inside its head, it is necessary to draw up some indicators which enable one to make a judgement' (para 6.10; p. 108). In fact, many animals show quite plainly that they are afraid, threatened, and so forth. But because they cannot communicate in words, we often ignore their cries, their avoidance behaviour, and their clear signs of stress. Scientific knowledge certainly helps, but it should not mask the point that it is precisely the animals' inability to communicate with us -- at least in a straightforward way -- which should invoke in us an increased sense of obligation and mark them out as a special case."

ANIMALS ARE MORALLY INNOCENT.

"Because animals are not moral agents with free will, they cannot -- strictly speaking -- be regarded as morally responsible. That granted, it follows that they can never (unlike, arguably, adult humans) deserve suffering, or be improved morally by it. Animals can never merit suffering; proper recognition of this consideration makes any infliction of suffering upon them particularly problematic."

ANIMALS ARE VULNERABLE AND DEFENSELESS.

"They are wholly, or almost wholly, within our power and entirely subject to our will. Except in rare circumstances, animals pose us no direct threat, constitute no risk to our life, and possess no means of offence or defense. Moral solicitude should properly relate to, and be commensurate with, the relative vulnerability of the subjects concerned."

"The key point to note is that these considerations make the infliction of suffering and death on animals not easier-- but harder to justify. Perhaps the best analogy is the special solicitude now rightly extended to weaker members of the human community, for example, newly born infants or young children. It is, inter alia, their sheer vulnerability, their inability to articulate their needs, and their moral innocence, that compels us to insist that they be treated with special care and protected from exploitation. But, if this argument is sound, it applies to sentient mammals as well."

"Hunting offends two basic moral principles. The first is that it is intrinsically wrong to deliberately inflict suffering on a sentient mammal for purposes other than its own individual benefit (for example, in a veterinary operation). This, I submit, is the most satisfactory definition of `cruelty.' Historically and legally, the term `unnecessary suffering' has been used and in its time may have had its pragmatic uses. But with hindsight, we can see that this term involved the problematic implication that there are `necessary' cruelties, or that cruel acts could be morally licit. What follows ineluctably from the above considerations for moral solicitude is that there are certain prima facie acts against the vulnerable, the innocent and the defenseless (both human and animal) which cannot be other than morally unconscionable, and the deliberate infliction of suffering is surely one of them. We do not speak, for example, of `necessary rape' or `necessary torture' or `necessary child abuse,' and neither should we do so in the case of the deliberate infliction of suffering on animals."

"But there is also a second, even more fundamental principle, namely, that it is intrinsically wrong to deliberately cause suffering for the purposes of amusement, recreation, or in the name of sport. It is sometimes argued that not all hunters enjoy the pursuit of their quarry and that may be true. But that hunters are involved in a collective activity that has the definite and deliberate aim of harrying a living creature to its death (which in the process causes suffering) is indisputable."

"It is important to understand why taking pleasure from the cruel death of an animal is nothing less than morally evil. In order to do so, we need briefly to give some account of some of the major theories of normative ethics. Roughly, they can be divided into three: (1) Deontological theories which hold that there is an objective standard of right and wrong and that there are duties incumbent on each individual, some of which are absolutely binding. (2) Virtue theories which hold that the standard of right or wrong consists in acts or behaviour likely to promote individual virtue or the `virtuous life' -- specifically the classical virtues, such as prudence, justice, courage and temperance. And (3) utilitarian theories which broadly hold that the best consequences will be those that include the greatest possible balance of pleasure over pain. These theories differ in the account given of our obligations to animals, but the important thing to note is that all these theories, and their classical and modern exponents, would draw an absolute line at taking pleasure from cruelty." In accordance with the Greatest Happiness Principle, of classical utilitarian theory, "the pain of animals must always be taken into consideration when coming to a moral decision. Certainly the death of any animal and its pain would outweigh the pleasure achieved in hunting and one would thus have to conclude that hunting cannot be morally justified. And, moreover, the taking of pleasure in pain or the making a sport of it would deserve the highest kind of moral censure."

"Unsurprisingly, Peter Singer, perhaps the leading contemporary utilitarian ethicist, is resolutely opposed to hunting and asserts that, "The trouble is that the authorities responsible for wildlife have a `harvest' mentality, and are not interested in finding techniques of population control that would reduce the number of animals to be `harvested' by hunters."19 Suffice to say, it would take a tortuous calculation to justify recreational hunting by reference to orthodox utilitarian theory."

"Of particular importance is the united view expressed by classical theorists that cruelty has anti-social implications. It was this awareness that drove the humanitarian movement of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries to oppose bull-baiting, bear-baiting, cock-throwing (throwing sticks at a cock) and cockfighting, and why practices, such as bull-fighting, and rodeos were made illegal in this country. If one looks at the early debates concerning animal protection, two rationales are frequently prevalent: Cruelty is unjust to other creatures, and also harms the perpetrator by diminishing his or her humanity. Consider, for example, the celebrated preamble to Lord Erskine's famous Cruelty to Animals Bill in 1809: `...the abuse of that [human] dominion by cruel and oppressive treatment of such animals, is not only highly unjust and immoral, but most pernicious in its example, having an evident tendency to harden the heart against the natural feelings of humanity.'"

"This latter claim was, at the time, largely rhetorical. It was simply assumed, in accordance with classical moral thinking, that this must be so. But there is now an accumulating amount of evidence linking violence and abuse of animals to other forms of violence, abuse, or anti-social behaviour. One recent authoritative work maintains that: `Violence directed against animals is often a coercion device and an early indicator of violence that may escalate in range and severity against other victims.'"

"Not least of all, we should not overlook the capacity of human beings to become desensitized through habitual exposure to practices which involve suffering and violence to animals. This has been, as we have seen, a frequent concern of philosophers and moralists. The question has to be faced: What example of respect, or rather disrespect, for animals is learnt through hunting? John Locke, writing as early as 1693, maintained that the education of children must abhor any tolerance of cruelty since `the custom of tormenting and killing beasts will, by degrees, harden their minds even toward men; and they who delight in the suffering and destruction of inferior creatures, will not be apt to be very compassionate or benign to those of their own kind.' Specifically when unchecked, `unnatural cruelty is planted in us; and what humanity abhors, custom reconciles and recommends to us, by laying in it the way of honour. Thus by fashion and opinion, that comes to be a pleasure, which in itself neither is, nor can be any.'"

"The first and most obvious is that nature is an essentially self-regulating system; animals breed in relation to the food and environment available. Secondly, as Burns notes, there is no obvious `equilibrium level' (para 2; p. 82) for each species; it is now held by many that populations rise and fall as a matter of course. It is believed that animal populations cycle just as trees, grasses and, in general, plants cycle. Thirdly, killing (`culling') does not necessarily `control' any species since the species itself compensates for any dent in its population. Scientists talk of compensatory reproduction. This is a well-known phenomena; many animals compensate for losses by breeding at an earlier stage, having bigger litters, and so forth."

FINALLY:

"Given the weakness of the case for control by hunting, it is astonishing that society should have tolerated it as long as it has, especially since comparable acts against domestic animals are illegal. That society has tolerated it, and that people who hunt so vehemently support it, says something about the mechanism of moral rationalization that bedevils all attempts to think clearly and impartially about the morality of our treatment of animals. Since we now know that the case for control by hunting is negligible, we can only logically suppose other motives are in play, be they social, cultural, or sheer pleasure seeking. It is the recognition of this latter factor, namely pleasure seeking, that above all makes hunting so especially morally abhorrent. We may recall Macaulay's famous rebuke that the Puritans objected to bull-baiting, not because it hurt the bull, but because it gave pleasure to the spectators. But the Puritans were only half-wrong. Both the pain of the hunted and the pleasure of the hunter should equally concern us morally. Both constitute an offence which is so grave and so deep that abolition is the only moral course open to us." Read more ›