Anticipating Surprise: Analysis for Strategic Warning [Paperback]

Cynthia M. Grabo (Author)

Book Description

Publication Date: November 2004

Anticipating Surprise, originally written as a manual for training intelligence analysts during the Cold War, has been declassified and condensed to provide wider audiences with an inside look at intelligence gathering and analysis for strategic warning. Cynthia Grabo defines the essential steps in the warning process, examines distinctive ingredients of the analytic method of intelligence gathering, and discusses the guidelines for assessing the meaning of gathered information. Since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on America, intelligence collection and analysis has been hotly debated. In this book, Grabo suggests ways of improving warning assessments that better convey warnings to policymakers and military commanders who are responsible for taking appropriate action to avert disaster.

Editorial Reviews

About the Author

Cynthia Grabo holds an MA from the University of Chicago. She worked as an intelligence analyst for the U.S. government from 1942 to 1980. Ms. Grabo's awards include: the Defense Intelligence Agency's Exceptional Civilian Service Medal, the Central Intelligence Agency's Sherman Kent Award for outstanding contribution to the literature of intelligence, and the National Intelligence Medal of Achievement.

Product Details

• Paperback: 184 pages
• Publisher: University Press Of America (November 2004)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0761829520
• ISBN-13: 978-0761829522
• Product Dimensions: 9.1 x 6.4 x 0.6 inches
• Shipping Weight: 10.4 ounces (View shipping rates and policies)
• Average Customer Review: 4.7 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (6 customer reviews)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #41,398 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

Customer Reviews

Most Helpful Customer Reviews

26 of 26 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars THE textbook on how to do strategic intelligence analysis, November 18, 2004

By 

Michael Derick "Dewey" (Norwich, VT) - See all my reviews

This review is from: Anticipating Surprise: Analysis for Strategic Warning (Paperback)

This book is great on several counts: first, it was extremely readable without the jargon that usually comes with these types of books; secondly, this is a textbook that teaches you how to do intelligence analysis for forecasting; thirdly, it is realistic and the author's 30 years of experience comes through in the telling of examples and instruction; and finally, although the book was previously classified and sat on the shelf in the intelligence community for many, many years, it seems like it could have been the predecessor for the 9-11 Report. Overall, a real gem of a book for anyone interested in doing intelligence analysis or knowing how it is suppose to be done.

26 of 27 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars Warning Wisdom, February 23, 2006

By 

Retired Reader (New Mexico) - See all my reviews

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This review is from: Anticipating Surprise: Analysis for Strategic Warning (Paperback)

If there was an intelligence failure associated with the 9/11 disaster it was a failure of intelligence warning. Yet in all the calls for intelligence reform that have been made since that disaster none have seriously addressed the issue of the analytic techniques for identifying and warning of potential threats to U.S. security. Cynthia Grabo took the concept of intelligence warning as deadly serious and, in the early 1970's, wrote down her observations on the best analytic practices for developing warning intelligence. She was, until her retirement in 1980, considered the final authority on warning intelligence. This book is an abridged and declassified summary of her work and her thinking on warning intelligence and is as valuable today as it was thirty years ago.

Although the Cold War is long over the analytic techniques required to identify threats and build warning information are just as relevant today as they were in the 1970's. Unlike so many of the books and other documents on intelligence `reform', this book addresses the basics of analysis and actually deals with realistic processes of intelligence production. More importantly, it recognizes that analysis of warning intelligence is a unique set of skills and crafts that represent a specialized and relevant career field. If the Directorate of National Intelligence (DNI) were actually a functioning organization this book should be read by DNI executives and its lesson applied to create a dedicated `intelligence warning' center as the principal center reporting to the DNI. Warning intelligence is no less relevant today than it was when Cynthia Grabo attempted to codify the methodologies of producing it.

On a personnel note, this reviewer never had an opportunity to meet Ms. Grabo, but can testify to the fact that she and her writings were considered the definitive word on warning intelligence by many of us both during and after the Cold War.

7 of 7 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars Is Warning Possible?, August 18, 2008

By 

D. S. Thurlow (Alaska) - See all my reviews
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This review is from: Anticipating Surprise: Analysis for Strategic Warning (Paperback)

2004's "Anticipating Surprise" is a distillation of a much larger, and classified, study on the challenge for the U.S. Intelligence Community of providing strategic warning. Author Cynthia Grabo's working experience covered the Cold War from Korea to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. This condensed version, put together by the Joint Military Intelligence College, alludes to some later examples of warning problems.

Those looking for quick and easy solutions to the conduct of analysis for strategic warning may be disappointed. As Grabo notes in a summary chapter, "Nothing is going to remove the uncertainties of the warning problem." Anticipating surprise is hard work; Grabo explores the topic in clear simple language, pointing out some reliable methods and some obvious pitfalls. After explaining the basics of the warning problem, Grabo devotes several chapters to the use of indicators of pending enemy action, whether military or political. She notes both the difficulty and the criticality of providing the decision-maker with a coherent, positive judgement on a warning problem.

Grabo includes a remarkably lucid discussion on the problem of deception, the discouraging conclusion of which is how often deception is successful. A follow-on discussion on assigning probabilities to various outcomes is unusually accessible for what is often an arcane topic. A final chapter sums up the discussion and offers some take-away points for the professional practioner.

"Anticipating Surprise" is very highly recommended professional reading for the intelligence officer. Persons in the academic community or the decision-making business may find this short book to be invaluable preparation for understanding more focused studies such as the report of the 9/11 Commission. This reviewer recommends reading it in conjunction with Roberta Wohlstetter's outstanding "Warning and Decision" dissection of the Pearl Harbor disaster.