Anzio: The Gamble that Failed [Paperback]

Martin Blumenson (Author)

Book Description

ISBN-10: 0815411294 | ISBN-13: 978-0815411291 | Publication Date: June 5, 2001 | Edition: 1

Anzio, a small town a mere hour's drive from Rome, became a battleground on which both Allies and Germans paid a bloody price. Planned by Churchill as a swift amphibious flanking maneuver, the 1943 battle of Anzio has been viewed by some as one of the most ill-conceived tactical operations of the Allied war effort, and by others as one of the war's singular lost opportunities. Blumenson examines the actions of the men involved, including Churchill, Eisenhower, Clark, and Montgomery, and takes into account records from Allied and German sources.

Editorial Reviews

Review

Anzio contains remarkable insights into the actions, mental tortures and philosophy of the ranking commanders. (John Toland The New York Times Book Review )

...a superb, omniscient narrative... . Blumenson's well-written, insightful, and fast-paced Anzio: The Gamble That Failed is an anatomy of a military disaster. Readers will be rewarded with a deeper understanding of this saga of an ill-conceived operation and notorious lost opportunities, tempered with the perseverance and intrepidity of Allied soldiers. (Military Heritage )

...a superb, omniscient narrative... . Blumenson's well-written, insightful, and fast-paced Anzio: The Gamble That Failed is an anatomy of a military disaster. Readers will be rewarded with a deeper understanding of this saga of an ill-conceived operation and notorious lost opportunities, tempered with the perseverance and intrepidity of Allied soldiers. (Military Heritage )

About the Author

Martin Blumenson is a distinguished military historian and the author of Kasserine Pass, along with the two-volume The Patton Papers.

Martin Blumenson is a distinguished military historian and the author of Kasserine Pass, along with the two-volume The Patton Papers.

Product Details

• Paperback: 224 pages
• Publisher: Cooper Square Press; 1 edition (June 5, 2001)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0815411294
• ISBN-13: 978-0815411291
• Product Dimensions: 8.5 x 5.6 x 0.6 inches
• Shipping Weight: 11.2 ounces (View shipping rates and policies)
• Average Customer Review: 4.0 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (1 customer review)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #2,157,150 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

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1 of 1 people found the following review helpful:

4.0 out of 5 stars The Gamble That Failed, July 17, 2009

By 

Dave Schranck "Dave" (Anaheim Ca) - See all my reviews
(TOP 500 REVIEWER)   

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This review is from: Anzio: The Gamble that Failed (Paperback)

Mr Blumenson writes an excellent story but its not quite the equal of the definitive book "Fatal Decision" by Carlo D'este.
The author writes a deliberate introduction that sets the stage for the landing that Mr Churchill so desperately, obsessively wanted in order to quicken the liberation of Rome. The author begins by explaining how the Americans and British became good friends and partners since WWI but how the relationship soured a little during the current war due to different agendas and different outlooks on how to win the war. The friction will escalate when the Italian campaign was downgraded in favor of Operation Overlord.

Operation Shingle was initiated because both US 5th Army and the British 8th Army was stalled at the Cassino line and it was hoped an amphibious landing at Anzio behind the German 10th Army would break the deadlock.
To make a long story short, General Lucas, the commander of 6th Corps, who achieved a successful landing but was blamed and retired for not succeeding in taking Alban Hills and meeting up with 5th Army. General Lucas was too concern that his forces were inadequate and that F.M. Kesselring's forces would destroy his Corps if caught in the open, decided to stay at Anzio and build his defenses and wait for the anticipated German counterattack. Both Churchill and Alexander were too optimistic and when the breakout didn't occur fast enough, Lucas was removed. I would suggest that Alexander and Clark were wrong for relieving Lucas. Its true Lucas made couple mistakes like not taking Cisterna but he defended his beachhead properly against the mightly counteroffensive by Mackensen and saved his Corps and harbor from annihilation. I submit Alexander, Churchill and others were overly unrealistic in anticipating a quick advance to the Alban Hills. Clark didn't break through the Cassino line for some time and it would have given Kesselring plenty of time to destroy 6th Corps.

The author does a great job of balancing the accounts of both sides, interjecting not only the military aspects as seen from both sides of this saga but also the inner thinking of Lucas, Clark, Kesselring and Mackensen. The author spends the most time, using archival data, building a profile of General Lucas. It was interesting to read about the personalities of these people. The author does a good job of connecting the interrelationship of the Anzio beachhead and the Allied line at Cassino. The Anzio landing was never meant to be an independent action.

With Clark unable to break through and support Lucas and if Lucas had broken out within the first few days to capture Alban Hills and Highway 6 and 7, the author believes with the forces Kesselring was able to bear on 6th Corps that the entire 6th Corps would have been eliminated. The book ends with the eventual breakout of both 6th Corps from the beachhead and Clark at Cassino and the liberation of Rome.

The last chapter is the author's conclusions and is very pertinent and helpful to the fuller understanding of the ramification of this operation. He mentions that there were many alternatives the Allies could have taken; that many of the generals were not in favor of the landings or that liberating Rome was too costly and would distract attention and resources from Operation Overlord. I consider the Italian campaign in general and Anzio in particular as one of the biggest controversies of the European front and Mr Blumensen covers this point as well. There were so many alternatives for the Allies to choose from.
On a side note, the author describes the step by step process of coordinating and planning a large scale amphibious landing that was interesting as well.
The author has done a very good job of explaining the many facets of this campaign; I highly recommend it.