Customer Reviews

Arab and Israeli Terrorism: The Causes and Effects of Political Violence, 1936-1993

5 star:		(0)
4 star:		(0)
3 star:		(1)
2 star:		(0)
1 star:		(0)

 

 

Kameel B. Nasr's book "Arab and Israeli Terrorism: The Causes and Effects of Political Violence, 1936-1993" attempts to examine precisely the causes and effects of Arab and Israeli terrorism by carefully describing many of the political factions and their guerilla actions in the Middle East. The blowing up of embassies, the airplane hijackings of the 1960s, and especially the rise of Abu Nidal are thoroughly covered, as are many other incidents in the region. Attention is given to the futility of counter-terrorism, showing how the direct response to these attacks was the inspiring of more terrorist recruits, which lead to the growth of guerilla movements.
This book begins describing Zionist terror against the British during its occupation in the 1940's and further describes Zionist terror against Palestinians. Terror groups like the Stern, Irgun, and Hagana were intended to erode the morale of the British army and make Palestine unsafe for British personnel, "staging a new precedent in the world of international terrorism" said the Sunday Times. They also blew up the King David Hotel in Jerusalem, masqueraded as Arabs. Nasr implies that Israelis masquerading as Arabs in fact played out many terrorist activities of which suspicion fell on Palestinians. There were dozens of incidents against the British but Israeli terror groups also systematically targeted Palestinians. The massacres at Deir Yassin and Kufr Kassem village are only two tragic examples of Israeli terrorism. In the words of the Irgun leader, Menachem Begin, "The legend of terror goes before a fighting force and wins."
Nasr goes on to describe the various Palestinian factions such as the PLO and Fatah, and the terrorist activities of the PFLP, and the NAY. He concentrates on the PLO's inability to control the terrorist activities of its group, and suggests that some of these activities were in fact played out by the Mossad, the Israeli secret service. He mainly associated the PFLP and the NAY with numerous airplane hijackings. However Nasr focuses on the leader of the NAY, Abu-Nidal, and his anti-PLO group, the FRC. He unravels the connection Abu-Nidal must have had with the Mossad. Abu Nidal has never attacked Israel and Israel has never raised a hand to the FRC. In fact, Abu Nidal actually confessed that he had Israeli agents in his organization. Is any more evidence needed to prove that the Mossad infiltrated the FRC? Abu Nidal put all his effort in the assassinations of the most effective and intellectual leaders of the PLO, the same type the Mossad killed.
Nasr has done well in analyzing the causes and effects of Arab and Israeli terrorism by examining the various political entities. The possibility of this book suggests that if it were not for Abu Nidal and the Mossad, the PLO may have prevailed. "Abu Nidal and the Mossad assassinated those who were most fluent, most able to interact with Europeans and present the case of Palestine, and who could have positively influenced PLO decisions." Additionally, Nasr promotes various examples of Israel's ability to find many Arab "traitors" to assassinate fellow Arabs. But were Arabs able to find Israeli traitors to assassinate fellow Israelis? This book does not suggest that. Rather it suggests disunity amongst the Arabs. Are they helpless? Will they ever over come this inner-rivalry? Furthermore, Nasr discredits some alleged Palestinian terror attacks by calling on Israeli use of Arab disguise. Nevertheless, he does raise a particularly good question. "If we look at the pattern of verified Arab masquerade incidents, then we have to call into question how Zionism, which was not a popular movement in the Arab Jewish communities, quickly attracted hundreds of thousands." The truth behind these immigration movements remains hidden. What's more, one could suggest that Nasr's book lacks objectivity by its continuous implication that many PLO leaders who were assassinated, such as Kamal Adwan and Kamal Nasser, were not who the Israelis claimed them to be just because they preached for "negotiation and compromise". Nasr low bashes Israel for using deception yet does he not think that Palestinians are capable of the same sort of deception? Moreover, it is appealing to learn the fact that in their activities, Palestinian terrorists typically demanded the release of prisoners, like Abu Daoud from Jordan, which shows how important individuals are in the Palestinian struggle. This book contains many personal stories about these political groups and consists of primary information from leaders involved in these groups. Nasr's study has been worthwhile by providing significant information and events in his book without overly rehashing the evident history of terrorism in the Middle East. The information that Nasr presents regarding Abu Nidal has enhanced my knowledge in the particular interest of Arab terrorism and the significant contribution Abu Nidal has made to the validation that rests in the phrase Palestinian terrorists.
Nasr explains that it would be rash to conclude that terrorists get their way. "Israeli terrorism may have achieved its short-term goal of territory but did not fulfill the Zionist dream of a successful socialist state. "They won it all, but they never enjoyed it. " And of coarse, Palestinian terrorism didn't win a square inch of land or unite the Arab countries to fight on their behalf." Another certain conclusion is that counter terrorism and reprisals only raised the level of conflict and escalated radicalization of the opposition. "The bombing of Lebanese villages for the Munich Olympics or bombing Tripoli for Abu Nidal terrorism does not represent justice but increases the conflict." It can even be concluded that American belligerent policy accelerated terrorism. The US collaboration with Saudi Arabia arranging the bombing outside a Shia mosque against Sheikh Fadlallah could have been the reason behind the staged suicide bombing on the Battalion Headquarters Building, killing 240 US marines. Providing a historical overview of terrorism in the Middle East, this book shows how terrorism has generally failed as a means to reach a political objective in the region.